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Preface
The research behind this book was undertaken within a programme on ‘The Cul-
tural Conditions Underlying Social Change’ at the Research Council of Norway.¹
This ‘SAMKUL’ programme understands culture as being ‘the sphere within
which various groups and individuals think, communicate and act’. Culture,
then, is to be analysed ‘as a way of thinking and patterns of communication’
in ‘the interaction between people and their surroundings’, as expressed in the
programme description. This book digs into the interaction over contested public
religion in settings where the cultural conflicts are partly shaped by media dy-
namics. The book is an outcome of the SAMKUL project ‘Engaging with Conflicts
in Mediatized Religious Environments. A Comparative Scandinavian Study’,
which has been abbreviated as CoMRel – Co for Conflict, M for Media and Rel
for Religion.²
Most of the chapters in this book are written by CoMRel researchers, coming
from the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, Uppsala University in Sweden
and, in Norway, from the University of Agder³, the MF Norwegian School of The-
ology, Religion and Society, as well as the University of Oslo, which coordinated
the project. In the section on local civic settings, we include contributions from
another Research Council of Norway-funded project, namely, ‘Cultural Conflict
2.0: The Dynamics of Religion, Media and Locality in North European Cities’
(CC2).
The book took shape as a collaborative enterprise during a productive week
in a former monastery at Metochi on the island of Lesbos, Greece, now a study
centre for the University of Agder. We formulated the outline together, and later
reworked it in a collective collaboration, and this is reflected in the Introduction
and realized in the chapters that follow.
Knut Lundby
Editor and project leader
Oslo, 9th March, 2018
 www.forskningsradet.no/samkul
 http://www.hf.uio.no/imk/english/research/projects/comrel/
 David Herbert is also working at Kingston University, London.
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Knut Lundby
Introduction: Religion and Media in
Cultural Conflicts
Abstract: The overall question that is raised in this book is: how do the media
influence public engagement with contested issues about religion? Here is an in-
troduction to the media dynamics and the key concepts on religion and cultural
conflicts, as well as to the Scandinavian context of the study, and this is to be
expanded upon in the following chapters. The approaches to be applied in the
case studies of this research are briefly presented before summarizing the
three sections of the book comprising its 18 chapters.
Keywords: religion, media dynamics, cultural conflicts, Scandinavia
Religion has become a matter of intensified public concern, as well as a vehicle
for diverging opinions in public discussions. These controversies pre-eminently
play out across mass media and social media. How do the various media influ-
ence public engagement with contested issues about religion? This is the over-
arching question to which we aim to find answers in this book. The idea is to ex-
amine how religion in public spaces becomes thematized and is enacted through
media, and is then further articulated in social interaction – either face-to-face
or in continued exchange in the various forms of media, including social media.
In this way, the media are primarily objects of conflict, but are also possible re-
sources with which to manage tensions.
Public Cultural Conflicts
The chapters in this book focus on cultural conflicts in which religion is regarded
as playing a key role. The cultural aspects of such conflicts include the interac-
tions, interpretations, and identifications with religion. Culture and cultural con-
flicts play out in the social patterns, activities, and attitudes that include individ-
ual media use, as well as political and religious engagement. The book addresses
how their conflictual interactions with, interpretations of, and identifications
with religion play into public arenas. We are not studying the nature of private
beliefs, scepticism, and religious practices as such, but we observe how individ-
ual beliefs and practices may imply controversy when they are enacted in public
OpenAccess. © 2018, Knut Lundby. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
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spaces, or even as performed conflict. Our approach to the study of contested re-
ligion is laid out in Chapter 4.
That conflicts are ‘public’ means that they are brought into ‘a visible and
open forum of some kind in which the population participates’ in order that
common ‘understandings, identities, values and interests’ are contested (Living-
stone 2005, 9). Such a ‘visible and open forum’ is a public arena.We explore the
public aspects of contested religion in selected public arenas. We do not enter
the debates on the ‘public sphere’ (Gripsrud et al. 2010) from a theoretical per-
spective. Rather, we examine concrete public settings in which people engage
with media material on religion. We have selected public service media, local
contexts for civic participation, and classrooms in public schools as the environ-
ments for case studies.
Several terms characterize the contestation of religion in such arenas. Con-
flict denotes open antagonism between stakeholders that may change the bal-
ance of power between them. Tensions refers to implicit or latent antagonisms,
in contrast to open conflict. A controversy is primarily a dispute over the role
of religion in culture. However, the use of these terms may not be fully uniform
throughout the book. We aim to capture the various ways that religion is being
contested under the pressure of contemporary media dynamics.
We are concerned with the conflicts and tensions that are amplified, framed,
and co-structured by various media and are played out in public arenas (Hjar-
vard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015). The media shape and share cultural conflicts
about religion, demanding responses which involve negotiations of values, be-
liefs, and policies. We study media representations of religion, but primarily
from the perspective of the interactions and interpretations that these generate
in various settings.
The media feed into, and influence, activities in most public arenas (see
Chapter 3) – and the media themselves become public spaces. Various media,
be they news media or entertainment media, mass media or social media, be-
come sites for explicit or implicit contestation over religion (see Chapter 4).
The media offer resources for people’s engagement with contentious public as-
pects of religion in different public arenas.
The Scandinavian Setting
The processes above are challenges in most modern, diverse societies. We study
these contestations as they play out in the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden, seeking to understand how the media shape public engagement
with controversies about religion. Although the empirical material in the book is
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drawn from Scandinavia, the findings and reflections should be relevant to other
parts of the world. Scandinavia offers an analytical prism through which to under-
stand how intersecting social, political, and cultural circumstances can exacerbate,
or alleviate, conflicts over religion in various media settings.
The particular Scandinavian setting is introduced in Chapter 1. The strong
traditions of welfare and solidarity in these three Scandinavian societies are
being challenged by globalization and neoliberal policies. There are increased
tensions over ethno-religious diversity and there is heightened controversy
over religion and secularity. Religion, and especially Islam, has become a con-
tentious subject in political and public discussions, discussions in which right-
wing populist parties play an active role, including the politicizing of the Chris-
tian heritage. Since Islam has a fairly recent presence in the Scandinavian reli-
gious landscape, which has been shaped by 500 years of Lutheran Christianity,
the risk is to overemphasize its role. Muslims are, however, only small minorities
in each country, and even within these small populations there is great religious
diversity. Citizens with Muslim backgrounds vary in their adherence to religion
as much as other nationals do. Practicing Muslims may attend mosques and reg-
ister with Islamic communities, while the secular, ‘cultural Muslims’ and atheists
among those who emigrate from Muslim countries avoid organized religion.
While controversy around Islam is the most visible aspect, there are also
other highly contested issues on religion. Atheist and secularist organizations
challenge the previous church hegemony and morality. Scandinavia demon-
strates challenges that occur as a result of the growing diversity in societies
that are built on a model of religious, cultural, and social homogeneity. The con-
troversies indicate that these formerly rather homogenous societies are trying to
adapt their symbols, institutions, and public services to a more diverse cultural
and religious situation. These tensions easily become intensified in a globalized
and mediatized world.
Mediatization
Mediatization is the process in modern societies through which the extensive
role of the various media transforms the patterns of social interaction and the
workings of social institutions (Hepp 2013; Hjarvard 2013; Lundby 2014). This
also applies to communication on religion. Understanding these dynamics is
necessary in order to grasp the cultural conflicts over religion. These dynamics
are explored in greater detail in Chapter 3, but will be discussed briefly here.
The study of ‘mediatization’ differs from the study of ‘mediation’. The study of
mediation concerns the ways in which the use of particular media in communica-
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tion practices may influence the form and content of the message and its reception,
for instance, the way in which a news story may frame Islam and influence the au-
dience’s interpretation. The study of ‘mediatization’ usually focuses on two aspects:
The historical changes brought about in different fields or institutional contexts of a
society following the growing presence of various media in society, and the medi-
atized conditions for social interaction following these historical changes. An exam-
ple of mediatization is the diminishing authority of religious institutions, given the
conditions for communication that are set by the manifold nature of media (Hjar-
vard, 2018). Conceptually speaking, ‘mediation’ and ‘mediatization’ denote differ-
ent processes, but these processes are interconnected.
Media are not just disseminators of messages. They have become integral
parts of the communication and interaction in all of the fields of contemporary
culture (Couldry and Hepp 2017). Mediatization theory ‘tries to capture long-term
interrelation processes between media change on the one hand and social and
cultural change on the other’ (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2010, 223). With
our focus on cultural conflicts, it is particularly important to pay attention to
the dynamics of mediatized conflicts (Eskjær, Hjarvard, and Mortensen 2015; Cot-
tle 2006) (see Chapter 3).
In contemporary societies, religion, as a social and cultural process, has be-
come increasingly interconnected with mediatization processes (Lövheim 2014).
The chapters in this book therefore approach religion as a contested and medi-
atized social phenomenon. Following Hjarvard (2012) we distinguish between
various forms of mediatized religion, namely, ‘religious’ media that are control-
led by religious organizations; journalism on religion, as represented by the sec-
ular press, and ‘banal religion’, or the bricolage of religious symbols and ele-
ments in popular cultural media (Hjarvard 2012; Lövheim and Axner 2015). A
discussion about the usefulness and possible development of these forms of
mediatized religion is introduced in Chapter 4.
‘The media’ are constantly changing, with the continuous launches of technol-
ogies with new affordances and new constellations in the media industries, and
this encourages new user patterns. The studies presented in this book focus on
media producers, but primarily on the roles that media users play through their in-
terpretations and interactions with the representations that they approach – and in
the ways in which these user patterns work back into the formation of religion. Me-
diatization of religion implies that public practices and expressions of religion are
transformed through their interplay with various media. We study mediatization
processes during conflicts over religion in discussions over public service broad-
casts (see Chapters 5–8), in dialogue and discussions in multicultural local civic
settings (Chapters 9–12), and in classroom teaching on religion and ethics (Chap-
ters 13–15). The case studies are complemented by a cross-national, comparative
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survey which is presented in Chapter 2. Concluding notes on mediatization in gen-
eral, and on the mediatization of religion, in particular, following the case studies,
are to be found in the third part of the book.
Approaches
The book is written by a team of researchers with backgrounds in religious stud-
ies, sociology of religion, media and communication studies and media sociolo-
gy, anthropology, and political science. There is thus an interdisciplinary per-
spective behind the work. We have applied a variety of methods, primarily
case study approaches with qualitative methods, for instance, interviews and ob-
servation. Online ethnography is applied in the studies of social media practices.
The attitude patterns reported in Chapter 2 are based on statistical analyses of
representative national surveys, with the regression analysis being documented
in the Appendix.
The cases studied in each part of the book (see below) are selected for com-
parative analyses across the three Scandinavian countries. The comparisons are
conceptually driven, with cases taken from comparable contexts. They illustrate
how religion is contested within the media dynamics in the particular settings
under study. Not all of the three countries are included in each setting. Still,
we claim that the studies offer insight into how the various media influence pub-
lic engagement with contested issues about religion.
Content of the Book
The first part of the book, on Contexts, opens with a chapter on the characteris-
tics of Scandinavia, touching upon its history, cultural foundations, and political
and media systems. Chapter 2 outlines the tendencies and variations in attitudes
among Scandinavians as well as the role of religion in public settings, and this is
based on national surveys that we commissioned. After the survey findings two
more theoretical chapters follow. Chapter 3 considers the media dynamics that
are at work in contesting religion, while Chapter 4 presents the approach that
we apply in analysing religion as a contested phenomenon.
Part two introduces the actual Controversies in the series of case studies. This is
the most extensive part of the book. Here, we try to answer three questions, each to
be studied in one specific setting. First, how do public service media provide space
for, or control, the visibility of the actors, perspectives, and issues that are related to
conflicts around religion in the public realm? (Chapter 5). This question is re-
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searched with one selected case study from each of the Scandinavian countries and
with emphasis on different outlets within the public service cross-media platforms.
Chapter 6 examines the Facebook group that was set up in protest when a Norwe-
gian national broadcaster stopped a news anchor from wearing a cross pendant.
Chapter 7 considers the careful framing by producers of Rebellion from the Ghetto,
a Danish TV documentary, and the reactions to it in both online and offline de-
bates. Chapter 8 looks at the conflicting ideals in the coverage of Islam in a weekly
radio programme on Swedish public service radio.
Second, we move to questions on how contested, mediatized religion is han-
dled in local civic settings in Denmark and Norway. Chapter 9 provides initial per-
spectives, theorizes mediatization, and considers cultural conflicts in such con-
texts. This is followed by a study of the ways in which local Christian
publications react to national policies on asylum seekers (Chapter 10). Next is
a study of how newly arrived Muslims enter interreligious dialogue initiatives
as part of their tactics to counter mass media portrayals of their minority
group and to perform ‘belonging to the Norwegian nation’ (Chapter 11). This sec-
tion ends with a piece on the ways in which metropolitan Muslim converts han-
dle negative media frames, trying to construct dual identities (Chapter 12).
The third question is: how do teachers and pupils in classroom situations in
public schools engage with the conflicts around religion that are thematized and
made visible in mediatized representations? Following perspectives on media-
tized religious education in upper secondary schools in Norway and Sweden
(Chapter 13), this section of the book presents a case study of teachers’ efforts
to curb boredom in classes on religion and ethics through entertainment (Chap-
ter 14), and a report and reflection on media influence on religious education
classes on Islam (Chapter 15).
The final part of the book, Crosscurrents, first comments on gender, diversity,
and the mediatized conflicts of religion across the case studies in the book
(Chapter 16), and this is followed by a discussion of the interaction dynamics
in the cases as they contribute to the theory on the mediatization of religion
(Chapter 17). This concluding part of the book closes with two entries that are
written by distinguished international scholars who have been following this re-
search at a distance. Lynn Schofield Clark, a media and communication scholar
from the USA, and Marie Gillespie, a sociologist from the UK, put the findings in
the previous chapters into a global context, in Chapter 18, ‘From Scandinavia to
the World’, before Birgit Meyer, a German anthropologist and scholar of religion
who is based in the Netherlands, provides an afterword.
Through these chapters various intersecting aspects of the processes of ne-
gotiating controversies about religion in Scandinavian mediatized public settings
are illuminated. By analysing media use and social interaction through public
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service media, in schools, local civic settings, and on online platforms, this book
contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which media shape
and amplify cultural conflicts about religion, and how public interactions in re-
sponse to these processes incite negotiations relating to values, beliefs, and poli-
cies in societies that are undergoing crucial social and cultural transformations.
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Knut Lundby, Pål Repstad
Chapter 1
Scandinavia: Traits, Trends and Tensions
Abstract: The Scandinavian welfare societies depend on strong states to provide
public services and to redistribute income. Scandinavians enjoy comprehensive
welfare systems that offer citizens social security within open economies. Scan-
dinavia combines international market capitalism with government regulation.
The political–economic crisis in Europe influences Scandinavia as well, with
pressure from globalization and immigration, and new political divisions that
are articulated by right-wing populism.
The Scandinavian countries are built on egalitarian values and practices and the
level of trust between people is high. However, the countries are finding that
these egalitarian values also have unintended, problematic consequences, espe-
cially as these once relatively homogenous societies experience growing diversi-
ty. Today, there are peculiar contrasts in the Scandinavian cultural–religious
landscape, between old churches with large majorities of the population as
members, and levels of secularity in Scandinavian societies that position the re-
gion as the most secular corner of the world.
Keywords: Scandinavia, welfare state, welfare society, homogeneity, equality
The Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, are known as wel-
fare societies that are based on cultural homogeneity and the ideals of social
equality. Scandinavia, with its surveyable population of 21 million (2017), is
small in scale, but it scores high on several indices of social and economic per-
formance.¹ There is a widespread self-understanding of liberal open-minded-
ness, and secularity is often taken for granted. Equality between the sexes is a
core value. Conflicts are usually handled in negotiations within a neo-corporatist
system between strong states and collective institutions, or in open public debate
(Engelstad et al. 2017b; Hilson 2008). These conflict-solving mechanisms extend
to the media system. The Scandinavian countries are on top in world press free-
dom rankings² and have strong public service media (Syvertsen et al. 2014).
 Most prominent in the UNDP Human Development Reports, see http://hdr.undp.org/en/2016-
report
 For example, the 2017 index from Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table
(Accessed 12 June 2017).
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Within this seemingly harmonious framework cultural tensions are evolving.
The political–economic crisis in Europe also influences the Scandinavian coun-
tries. The above Scandinavian characteristics are under pressure from globaliza-
tion and immigration, with new political divisions being articulated by right-
wing populism. Public tensions over radical Islamism and immigration from
Muslim countries ignite discussions about Islam as a threat, although the Mus-
lim population makes up small minorities in the Scandinavian countries. Global
influences contribute to contested religion in Scandinavia. Growing diversity in
the religious field, as well as in the media landscape, forms part of the conflicts
that are arising. This is the core issue in the present book, to be researched
throughout the following chapters. The tensions and conflicts are often framed
as being cultural, but they may instead be social, economic, and political.
This chapter tries to map how these tensions are spelled out in the domains
of religion and media in Scandinavia, as well as in the relations between media
and religion.We do not go deep into analysing the issues, as we also need space
for giving some basic, but relevant information about social and cultural frame-
works in Scandinavia. The main aim of the chapter is to work as a background
for the specific case studies to come, and we provide many references to the
analyses in the following chapters.
1.1 Scandinavia and the Nordic Region
There is a distinction between Scandinavia and the Nordic region. Scandinavia is
part of the Nordic region, which also encompasses Finland and Iceland, as well
as Greenland and some smaller islands. There is geographical, cultural, and po-
litical proximity between Scandinavia and the wider Nordic sphere. All five Nor-
dic countries are built on egalitarian values and practices. But all five countries
experience unintended challenging consequences as these once relatively homo-
genous societies become more cultural-religious diverse.
Immigration implies a demographic challenge that is causing cultural ten-
sions. Sweden has been the most open to immigration. Of the three countries,
Sweden has the biggest population but this amounts to no more than 10 million
people. The two other countries are smaller – and more restrictive on immigra-
tion. Denmark has the highest population density, with more people (5.8 million)
than the more spacious Norway (5.3 million).³
 Source: National statistical bureaus as per mid-2017.
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Despite different histories, and even previous internal armed conflicts, the
Scandinavian countries are closely knit together (Kouri and Olesen 2016). They
are all parliamentarian democracies and formally monarchies. The Scandinavian
languages are close and usually people understand each other’s writing and
speech, although immigrant languages and the use of English are on the rise.
The three countries have many cultural traditions in common and thus have easi-
ly shared stories. This is slowly changing, with the growing ethnic and religious
diversity and the fragmentation of the media landscape.
Figure 1.1 Scandinavia is geographically positioned ‘on the top’ of Europe.
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The Scandinavian countries have chosen different paths in international
economic and political cooperation. Denmark and Sweden are members of the
EU, while Norway is not, although it is integrated into the European economic
market. Denmark and Norway are members of NATO, while Sweden is neutral.
The three countries, however, work together in Nordic institutions, with Finland
and Iceland included, and have long shared passport-free movements across
their borders.
Taken together, the three Scandinavian countries have no more than approx-
imately one-fourth of Germany’s population, or about the same number of in-
habitants as the US state of Florida. The small scale has been a favourable con-
dition for the development of the Scandinavian welfare system. Changes, like
recent immigration, are creating tensions.
1.2 Welfare States in Transition
The Nordic welfare societies, built after World War II, depend on strong states to
provide public services and to redistribute income. In return for relatively high
taxes the Scandinavians get free public education through the university level,
a national health care system mostly for free, guaranteed paid leave from
work for both mothers and fathers of infants, and subsidized child care,
among other benefits. The Scandinavian neo-corporatist states are characterized
by ‘a seemingly unlikely combination of a basic liberal orientation with a high
degree of state intervention … upheld due to the long term development of dem-
ocratic institutions, in tandem with a growing inclusion of groups excluded from
the public sphere and fields of power’ (Engelstad 2017, 265). Peasants’, workers’
and women’s organizations are among the social movements that have made
their way into institutionalized negotiations and helped shape the modern
state (Aakvaag 2017). Even if some movements in a neo-liberal direction have
taken place in recent decades in the Scandinavian countries, they still fit better
than most countries into the Social Democratic type in Esping-Andersen’s typo-
logy of welfare capitalist regimes, and more so than into the two other types, Lib-
eral and Conservative. The main reasons for this are that many welfare benefits
are still universal and are not subject to means testing, and, secondly, that many
welfare benefits are distributed to people in their capacity as citizens, and are
not only reserved for occupationally active people (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Scandinavians, then, enjoy comprehensive welfare state systems that offer
the citizens social security within open economies. They combine international
market capitalism with government regulations and coordinated negotiations be-
tween strong employer’s associations and strong unions. Gender equality and
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women’s participation in work are underlined as key values. This way of organ-
izing society has been termed the Nordic or Scandinavian model (Barth, Moene,
and Willumsen 2015; Hilson 2008).
The economic base has primarily been industry in Sweden, agriculture in
Denmark, and fish and oil in Norway. All three countries experience pressures
for change in open, globalized economies.Wage differences have been relatively
small, but gaps in income have expanded somewhat over the last 30 years, in
Sweden more than in Denmark and Norway, and the gap is even wider in wealth
than in income.⁴ This implies a growing potential for social tensions, which
counter the Scandinavian ideology of equality and small social differences.
1.3 Lutheran Background in Strong States –
Deconstructed
The Scandinavian states have since the 1500s been legitimized through state
churches: These majority Evangelical Lutheran churches have their roots in
the Protestant Reformation five hundred years ago. As the religious landscape
slowly became more diverse, particularly since the 1970s (Furseth et al. 2018),
tensions have grown over the privileged position of the majority church. Sweden
dissolved its state church in 2000. Norway cut the confessional link to the Lu-
theran religion in the Constitution in 2012, and took further steps to split church
and state five years later. Denmark still has a state church, a liberal ‘folk church’.
In all three countries, state recognition is extended to other registered faith com-
munities and worldview organizations. All three countries give financial support
to the majority church as well as to other registered communities, through differ-
ent national arrangements (Kühle et al. 2018). Such economic funding still seems
to have broad political support. However, some politicians argue that violation of
human rights should make it possible to withdraw such funding schemes, and
voices arguing for secular arrangements across institutional sectors are becom-
ing more vocal. A few politicians, both left-wing and right-wing, even ask why
the state should automatically sponsor religious organizations, as long as
other voluntary cultural work is not automatically supported. Still, the imprint
of the long Christian tradition on the fabric of society is there, e.g. almost
every holy day in the Christian calendar is a national holiday in Scandinavia.
 Perspektivmeldingen 2017, [Economic perspectives 2017], The Norwegian Government, Meld.
St. 29 (2016–2017), 135– 137; and OECD Statistics, “Income Distribution and Poverty,” accessed
31 March 2017, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=66670
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1.4 Homogeneity, Equality, Similarity, and Trust
The Scandinavian countries, with their relatively sparse populations, have often
been considered to be relatively homogeneous. The populations have limited the
potential for diverse institutions, and the minorities have been small in number
and politically weak. It is true that the three countries, until recently, have had –
some would say still have – a dominating national majority church that is rela-
tively closely intertwined with the state. There are also publicly owned public
service broadcasting corporations (see Chapter 5), that dominate but which are
in competition with commercial radio and TV channels. The Scandinavian school
system is also relevant here. Almost all young Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes
are pupils in schools that are part of the public sector at both primary and sec-
ondary levels. There are openings for commercial schools and schools that are
owned by religious and other voluntary organizations, but the number of pupils
in such schools is low, and the state has some supervision and control also in
these schools, as they are partly financed by public means. Hence, despite
some local variations, almost the whole population has received a common so-
cialization within a framework that is set by the state.
Some other characteristics are often presented together with homogeneity:
The Scandinavian countries are dominated by egalitarian values and practices,
and the level of trust between people is high.⁵ Surveys from around 2010 put
Denmark on top, Norway second, and Sweden as number six among countries
in the world, in terms of responses to the question of trust in other people.
The population in Scandinavia is also more state-friendly and has a higher
trust in the government than most countries (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008;
Bjørnskov and Bergh 2011).
These characteristics are often praised by Nordic researchers (Barth et
al. 2014), and by others as well (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Small economic
differences tend to prevent social conflicts and the development of mutual
stereotypes, it is argued. Relatively small differences also make it easier for peo-
ple to trust each other, and the presence of trust facilitates efficiency, as the
number of control mechanisms can be reduced.
However, sometimes egalitarian values have unintended problematic conse-
quences. The Norwegian anthropologist Marianne Gullestad (2002, 46) cites
Alexis de Tocqueville, who pointed out in his study of Democracy in America
 For Denmark and Norway, data from European Values Study,Wave 4, conducted 2008–2010.
For Sweden and most other countries from the World Values Survey, data from Wave 6, conduct-
ed 2010–2014.
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from 1840 that the idea of equality seems to require similarity, that people have
to feel they are more or less the same to be of equal value (Tocqueville 2008
[1840]). Gullestad finds this tendency to be particularly strong in Scandinavia,
where equality is conceived of as sameness. This has consequences for the rela-
tionship to migration and integration by ‘others’, she holds.
Many Scandinavians require sameness from newcomers in order to be re-
garded as equal (Gullestad 2002). This may partly be an explanation when peo-
ple feel threatened by immigrants, however, this tendency could be countered by
deliberate policies and personal experiences with newcomers from other cul-
tures. At the time of writing, Gullestad (2002) observed a growing ‘ethnification’
of the national identity, with the renewed importance of Lutheran Christianity in
contrast to Islam. By 2017, the perceived challenge from Islam is related to na-
tional culture as such, and not particularly to a Christian tradition. Gullestad’s
analysis of equality and similarity is interesting, but so general that it is difficult
to confront with specific empirical data. A point that weakens Gullestad’s hy-
pothesis about the connection between egalitarianism and a demand for same-
ness is an impression that the citizens and elite groups who are mostly in favour
of equality are also those that are most positive to immigration.⁶
The image of Scandinavian countries as unusually homogeneous countries
can be contested. Up North in Norway and Sweden, the Sami have been sup-
pressed by the national governments. The Sami were recognized by the United
Nations as an indigenous people, giving them rights to keep their languages,
reindeer husbandry, and traditions. Today, they are recognized in their respective
countries and have separate parliaments, but with limited scope for making their
own decisions. There are still tensions, particularly over the use of land resources
(Berg-Nordlie, Saglie, and Sullivan 2015).
Furthermore, we can also find tensions within the majority cultures in Scan-
dinavian countries. The Norwegian sociologist Stein Rokkan is famous for having
developed a typology of important cleavages in European politics. His typology
is inspired by Norwegian political history, but is relevant also in other countries,
not least in Denmark and Sweden. In addition to the socio-economic dimension,
from left to right, and focusing on socio-economic inequality and the balance be-
tween market and state regulation, he identified two other important dimensions
that influence voting behaviour, and politics in general. Firstly, he described a
moral–religious dimension, often focusing on support for religion, sexual ethics,
family politics, and issues concerning life and death (abortion and the possibil-
ity of legalizing euthanasia). Secondly, he identified a territorial dimension, also
 See Gulbrandsen et al. (2002) for a study of Norwegian elite groups.
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called a centre–periphery dimension, comprising issues like centralization ver-
sus decentralization, but also cultural issues, like the prestige of rural dialects
in the public sphere (Rokkan and Lipset 1967). All these dimensions and cleavag-
es can be found in the three Scandinavian countries, creating social and political
tensions. Even in small Denmark, there are cultural, including religious, differ-
ences between Copenhagen and the Thy region in Northern Jutland.
1.5 Growing Diversity, Religious Complexity, and
New Secularity
In all the Scandinavian countries, from the 19th century until today, there has
been a gradually growing diversity in the field of worldviews, first within a
Christian framework, then including secular worldviews, and, finally, also in-
cluding religious traditions other than Christianity.
Today, there are peculiar contrasts in the Scandinavian cultural–religious
landscape. On the one hand, the Scandinavian countries have strong collective
cultural–religious traditions, with majority churches encompassing between
two-thirds and three-quarters of the population. On the other hand, it may hard-
ly be considered religious at all. According to the World Values Study and Ingle-
hart–Welzel’s cultural map, the three Scandinavian countries are positioned at
the most secular corner of the world. Scandinavians score highest on the combi-
nation of Self-Expression Values and Secular–Rational Values (see Figure 1.2).
The Swedes have been in this secular cultural values corner for two decades,
while Danes and Norwegians had moved there by 2015.⁷
In Norway, in particular, there is a strong, organized non-religious humanist
strand. This encompasses 2 percent of the population (2016). However, the
growth in the number of those outside any organized and registered religious
or life stance community is more remarkable, in Scandinavia as in many other
Western countries. In Denmark, the rise was from 9 percent in 1988 to 19 percent
in 2014, and in Norway from 3 to 13 percent (Furseth et al. 2018). Figures for Swe-
den are not available, but they are probably higher than in the other two coun-
tries. However, staying out of organized communities do not necessarily imply
that people are not concerned with religious or spiritual issues.
 World Values Survey, Institute for Futures Studies, accessed 23 Aug 2017, http://www.iffs.se/
en/world-values-survey/. Strictly speaking, the Inglehart–Welzel cultural map is based mainly
on questions about values, but indirectly the map also tells quite a lot about religion.
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There has been a decline in the membership of the majority churches, with
the steepest declines in Sweden.While 9 out of 10 Scandinavians were members
in 1988, this was down to 7 of 10 Swedes and 3 of 4 Danes and Norwegians in
2014. These are still high shares of the population. However, there has been a de-
cline in participation in the rites of passage among members, as well as an ero-
sion of beliefs and religious self-identification (see Chapter 2).
The relative membership decline of the majority churches is partly due to
changing religious practices and beliefs among the native-born population,
and partly due to immigration. Many of those coming from other countries
bring other religions with them. For example, Polish migrant workers have ex-
panded the number of Catholics, and immigrants from Muslim countries have
resulted in a visible Islamic presence. In 2014, Christian communities outside
the majority Lutheran churches had a share of 6–7 percent of the populations
in Norway and Sweden, but no more than 2 percent in Denmark. Members in reg-
istered faith communities from other religions, taken together, made up no more
than 3 percent of the Norwegian population in 2014, and in Denmark and Swe-
den it is even fewer (Furseth et al. 2018).
Islam is the fastest growing among these religions, although the numbers
are not easy to trace; there are Muslims who are outside the registered mosques.
In any case, non-Muslim Scandinavians perceive the share of Muslims to be
much higher than it actually is, according to surveys in 2016. Danes guessed
Figure 1.2 Inglehart–Welzel’s cultural map (2015) based on the World Values Survey.
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that 15 percent of the population in the country were Muslims, while the actual
estimate at that time was 4.1 percent. In Norway, the guess among people was 12
percent, while the actual estimate was 3.7 percent. The Swedes thought the coun-
try was 17 percent Muslim, while the figure was 4.6 percent.⁸
With this greater diversity comes a religious complexity, Inger Furseth (2018)
suggests. She argues that religious complexity in the Nordic countries ‘consists
of seemingly contradictory trends, such as a growing secularization in the Nordic
populations, trends of both differentiation and de-differentiation of religion at
the state level, a growing presence of religion as a topic at the political level,
a greater visibility of religion in the media, and a de-privatization of religion
at the level of civil society’ (ibid, 16). This religious complexity is bringing the
Scandinavian countries, with their historically fairly homogenous cultural and
religious traditions, more on a par with other Western European societies.
There is a growing secularity, higher visibility of religion in public debate, and
new expressions of public religion by immigrants. This growing diversity and
complexity easily invites tensions and conflicts over religion and religiously in-
fused political issues.
1.6 Globalization, Immigration Policies, and
Populist Pressure
As the Scandinavian countries have gradually become more multicultural and
multi-religious, social inequality has acquired a new dimension. Social inequal-
ity now not only refers to economic inequality, but also to inequality based on
ethnicity and immigrant background. The ongoing immigration create tensions
in the Scandinavian welfare states (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). ‘The wel-
fare state puts forward important premises for the kind of integration policy
that is possible to develop … while at the same time welfare policy has important
consequences for immigrants’ everyday lives’ in Scandinavia (Brochmann and
Hagelund 2012, 1). Tensions over immigration have been increasing recently all
over Europe, including Scandinavia. This must be understood against the back-
ground of the economic crises in Europe from 2009 onwards, and the increasing
number of refugees from conflict areas outside Europe for a period in 2015. Rog-
 Line Fransson, “Ny undersøkelse: Vi tror det er langt flere muslimer enn det egentlig er. I
Norge – og resten av verden,” [New report: We think there are more Muslims than is the
case], Dagbladet, 20 Dec 2016, http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/vi-tror-det-er-langt-flere-mus
limer-enn-det-egentlig-er-i-norge-og-resten-av-verden/66547941.
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ers Brubaker (2017) has given a description of the rise of right-wing populist
movements in several European countries. These movements, he claims, have
partly shifted from nationalism to ‘civilizationalism’, driven by a perceived civi-
lizational threat from Islam. The movements combine an identitarian ‘Christian-
ism’ (with a relatively low level of religiosity) and a more secular, and ostensibly
liberal, defence of gender equality, freedom of speech, and increasingly also gay
rights – all with polemical edges against Islam. This description has some rele-
vance also to Scandinavia. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have chosen different
policies on immigration and the integration of immigrants, with Sweden being
the most generous and inviting to newcomers. Denmark approved a generous im-
migration law in 1983, but following the 9/11 attack in 2001, and the Danish Mu-
hammad cartoon crisis in 2005–2006, the Danish political take on immigration
hardened (Lindroth 2016, 82– 100).
In Sweden, an anti-immigration party entered parliament in 2010. In Nor-
way, the terror caused by the right-wing Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, in
2011, was aimed at liberal immigration policies, particularly against Islam. In
Denmark, the new centre–left government that was elected in 2011 softened
the harsh policies on immigration of the previous governments (Brochmann
and Hagelund 2012, ix–x). However, the more liberal policies did not last. In par-
ticular, following the many refugees and asylum seekers, in autumn 2015, restric-
tions on immigration were imposed in all three countries.⁹ At the outset, many
Scandinavians countered the strict immigration policies of their governments
in accordance with their high levels of social trust, which is defined as a shared
belief that strangers will not harm or deceive you. Tensions have been sharper
since, due to public conflicts over Muslim immigration.
It is difficult to trace comparative figures among the Scandinavian countries.
By the beginning of 2016, 16.3 percent of all those living in Norway were immi-
grants or were Norwegian-born with immigrant parents.¹⁰ In Sweden, the figures
are higher. In 2012, the foreign-born counted for 15 percent of the population; in
addition, 5 percent were the descendants of immigrants. About half of all immi-
grants in Scandinavia at that point were from Asia, Africa, and Latin America
(Pettersen and Østby 2013). During the refugee and asylum crisis of autumn
2015, Sweden took in a much larger share of asylum seekers (162,000) than Den-
 A presentation of recent Norwegian refugee policy is given in Chapter 10.
 Statistics Norway, “Key figures for the population,” accessed 30 August 2017. https://www.
ssb.no/en/befolkning/nokkeltall/population.
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mark (21,000) and Norway (31,000).¹¹ However, the number of people that were
arriving created tensions in all three countries.
Established political parties in Scandinavia are experiencing emerging ten-
sions with right-wing populist parties, primarily over issues of immigration
from Muslim countries. The meaning of ‘populism’ differs and it can only be
fully understood in the political and cultural context of the various countries
(Herkman 2016). In Denmark, Dansk Folkeparti (The Danish People’s Party) is
a strong force in national politics, receiving one-fifth of the votes in the 2015 elec-
tion. In Sweden, the established parties have avoided cooperation with the im-
migration critical Sverigedemokraterna (The Swedish Democrats). By 2017, this
front was loosening up, as other parties have had to listen to the growing unrest
over immigration. In Norway, Fremskrittspartiet (The Progress Party), in 2018, is
part of the government, with the minister for justice and immigration in their
portfolio.
1.7 The Public Sphere in the Nordic Model
Religion and media are two of the institutional fields where freedom of expres-
sion is particularly important for deliberation and democracy in modern societ-
ies (Engelstad et al. 2017b, 2). Public religion (see Chapter 4) and public media
(see Chapters 3 and 5) are both part of the public sphere. Besides media and re-
ligion, Engelstad et al. (2017b) point out that arts and culture, research and high-
er education, and voluntary organizations are areas of the public sphere in Scan-
dinavia. The socio-economic base influences cultural expressions, but the public
sphere is, at the same time, ‘an essential precondition for the shape of the socio-
political configuration’ (Engelstad et al. 2017b, 2). As we have noted, the Scandi-
navian countries distinguish themselves from the liberal models of the UK and
US, but also from most countries in continental Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990).
The Scandinavian or Nordic public sphere is considered to be part of the
ideal model of an extended ‘Nordic model’ that has its normative preconditions
in democratic culture, egalitarianism, and social inclusion (Engelstad, Larsen,
and Rogstad 2017). Despite the commonalities with other modern, in particular
European, societies, the particularities of the Scandinavian and Nordic welfare
societies give the Scandinavian and Nordic public spheres specific characteris-
 Eurostat, “Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex: Annual ag-
gregated data (rounded),” accessed 31 March, 2017. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/
show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en.
24 Knut Lundby, Pål Repstad
tics. The specificities are partly due to the neo-corporatist character of the Nordic
countries, with state intervention, support, and subsidies in all areas of the pub-
lic sphere – including the area of religion (Furseth 2017, 222) and of media (Sy-
vertsen et al. 2014). In Scandinavia, churches and mosques, newspapers and
public broadcasting, political parties and NGOs alike, receive state funding in
order to stimulate the public sphere; with a deep respect for the freedom of ex-
pression and the freedom of religion.
Freedom of expression has been enshrined in the law in all of the Scandina-
vian countries for more than 150 years, with Sweden’s 1766 freedom of expres-
sion law being the first in the world. With an amendment to the Constitution
in 2004, the Norwegian government even obtained the responsibility to establish
an infrastructure for ‘an open and enlightened public discourse’ (§100). Howev-
er, the freedom of expression is not without exceptions. Hate speech, threats,
harassment, discrimination, defamation, the invasion of privacy, libel and slan-
der, are not accepted. National and security interests also impose restrictions.
However, freedom of expression is a strongly held value in Scandinavia (Kierulf
and Rønning 2009; Rønning 2013).
Defence of this freedom ended in violent conflicts in the Middle East when
Muhammad cartoons from Denmark were displayed, which became a transna-
tional media event (Eide, Kunelius, and Phillips 2008). Freedom of expression
becomes a fragile human right when statements could be immediately distribut-
ed into other contexts with digital mediation (Carlsson 2016). Religiously framed
threats by radical Islamists were defended in Norwegian court on the basis of
freedom of expression.¹² Norwegian media use the freedom of expression to criti-
cize religion, Islam, and Muslim groups. At the same time, researchers document
that Norwegian journalists and editors are becoming more careful with what and
how to publish, in order to avoid attracting reactions from radical Islamists (Elg-
vin and Rogstad 2017).
Researchers (Midtbøen, Steen-Johnsen, and Thorbjørnsrud 2017) have used
the term ‘boundary struggles’ to describe the contestations of free speech in
the public sphere in Scandinavia. The focus on discursive patterns in the public
sphere, following the tradition from Habermas, which is discussed within insti-
tutional settings by Engelstad et al. (2017a), need to be complemented with a
perspective on the boundary work going on in the public sphere, Bernard Enjol-
ras (2017) argues. The public sphere is a social space where cognitive and sym-
 Ubaydullah Hussain was, in 2015, found guilty of threats against journalists, but the courts
accepted his support for Islamist terror attacks in public statements. However, on 4 April 2017, he
was sentenced to nine years in prison for terror recruitment to IS. The verdict was confirmed in
higher court on 18 January 2018.
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bolic struggles over recognition take place, he holds. This implies struggles over
the symbolic boundaries to who belongs and who doesn’t. This view of the pub-
lic sphere ‘as a social space where cultural struggles are fought, where the moral
order is shaped, maintained, and contested’ (Enjolras 2017, 304), fits with the
perspective in this book on how religion is contested in various settings. With
public religion, social interactions, identifications, and interpretations must be
observed. Still, the institutional frame matters. In our case, the frame set by
the media system is of prime interest.
1.8 ‘Media Welfare States’ in Global Connectivity
The Scandinavian welfare states should also be considered ‘media welfare states’
that stand on four pillars: First, the media are regarded as part of the communi-
cation services that offer public goods and therefore should have extensive cross-
subsidies, as well as obligations for universality. Second, editorial freedom is se-
cured through self-governance by the media professional associations and, part-
ly, by law. Third, in their cultural policies, the government’s responsibility en-
compasses a ‘media manifold’ (Couldry and Hepp 2017, 56) that aims to secure
diversity and quality. Fourth, solutions to economic and cultural challenges
are sought in consensus through cooperation between the main stakeholders:
the state, the media and communication industries, and the public (Syvertsen
et al. 2014, 17).
This media system is regarded as a cornerstone of Scandinavian democracy,
and the standards of the news media are of particular importance. Availability of
a diversity of news sources to all citizens, equality and pluralism in media own-
ership and formats, and the critical assessment of how the news media perform
their watchdog task, are criteria that are applied in the Media Democracy Moni-
tor (Donk and Trappel 2011). Sweden comes out as a ‘mixed media model under
market pressures’ (von Krogh and Nord 2011), which is an apt characteristic of
the news media system in Denmark and Norway also.
The states support and guard this democratic Scandinavian media system
through laws, public funding and subsidies, and by an active media policy
and state support for the telecom industries and digitalization. The Scandinavian
countries are thus prominent examples of the ‘democratic corporatist model’
that was laid out by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini in their classic comparison
of media systems (2004). Stig Hjarvard disagrees with them that Scandinavia will
drift towards a liberal model, similar to that known in the UK and North Amer-
ica. He argues that mediatization (see Chapter 3) implies a further mutual adap-
tation between media and politics (Hjarvard 2013, 46–47). Hallin and Mancini
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recently (2016) admitted that the hypothesis of a convergence towards a liberal
model has to be abandoned. This is confirmed by Sigurd Allern and Mark
Blach-Ørsten’s study on Scandinavian news media as political institutions: The
ongoing commercialism has produced no more than a revision of the democratic
corporatist model. Scandinavia still has large state-owned public service media
corporations (see Chapter 5). In Scandinavia, ‘a significant involvement of the
state in the media sector has and continues to coexist with strong protection
for press freedom and a deeply held respect for journalistic autonomy’ (Allern
and Blach-Ørsten 2011, 101).
Despite the corporatist and consensual frame, tensions over media policies
in the Scandinavian media welfare states intensify as competition from net-
worked media and the global connectivity of corporations (van Dijck 2013)
change the economic and communicative foundations of the ‘legacy’ mass
media (Svensson and Edström 2016).
Scandinavians are highly connected, thanks to advanced technological net-
works that include almost everyone. In Norway, 97 percent of the population had
Internet access in 2015, in Denmark 92 percent, and in Sweden 91 percent, com-
pared to an EU average of 83 percent.¹³ Nearly all Scandinavians with access are
daily Internet users.¹⁴ The social media are popular.¹⁵
Although the national media policies have left the legacy media in Scandi-
navia in relatively strong positions, the ongoing transformations relating to fur-
ther digitalization of the media industries do shake the Scandinavian media
landscape. Much of the reading, listening, and viewing will move to digital serv-
ices. Newspapers were, in 2015, read daily by 72 percent of all Norwegians, with a
larger share online than in print. The reading shares were somewhat lower in
Denmark and Sweden, and the pace of change from print to online news dif-
fered. While reading print papers dominated in Sweden, a small majority of
Danes preferred online news. Online radio and television consumption is not
specified in the comparative statistics. In total, 75 percent of the Danes listened
to radio daily in 2015, against 69 percent among the Swedes and 59 percent in
Norway. Eighty-one percent of the Swedes, in total, watched television daily in
 Nordicom, “Mediestatistik,” [Media statistics], accessed 30 June 2017. http://nordicom.gu.se/
sv/mediefakta/mediestatistik.
 Norway 89 percent, Denmark 87 percent, Sweden 82 percent in 2015, against an EU average
of 67 percent. Source: Nordicom, ibid.
 In Norway, 73 percent of 16–74 year olds reported using social media in 2015, in Denmark 65
percent, and in Sweden 62 percent, against an EU average of 50 percent. Source: Nordicom, ibid.
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2015, compared to 70 percent of the Danes and 67 percent of the Norwegians.¹⁶
These figures imply that legacy mass media achieve high audience numbers in
Scandinavia, whether in traditional forms or in online services.
The human ‘connectedness’ among Scandinavians thus extends to ‘connec-
tivity’, where information about social media users is absorbed into corporate
systems behind the platforms which they use to communicate, like Facebook.
‘Connectivity’ is the ‘advanced strategy of algorithmically connecting users to
content, users to users, platforms to users, users to advertisers, and platforms
to platforms’ (van Dijck and Poell 2013, 9). Through the media dynamics (see
Chapter 3) in this ‘culture of connectivity’ (van Dijck 2013), the small-scale Scan-
dinavian populations communicate among themselves and, at the same time,
are integrated into large-scale globalization.
1.9 Concluding Note
It is difficult to sum up briefly what characterizes Scandinavia, especially if we
want to grasp the nuances and contemporary changes.We have described a com-
paratively happy, harmonious, peaceful, safe, and egalitarian corner of the
world. We have also shown that Scandinavia is becoming increasingly inter-
twined in European and global processes: right-wing populism, radical Islam-
ism, immigration, and a general economic crisis in Europe. Just one warning:
It would be too simplistic to see Scandinavia as a kind of Paradise Island,
now threatened from outside. We have tried to nuance and modify the picture,
pointing at internal dynamics, diversity, and tensions within the region, often
in interaction with global tendencies.
On a more specific level, religion is a contested public issue in the changing
Scandinavian media welfare states. Chapter 2 outlines patterns of Scandinavian
attitudes on the matter, Chapter 3 takes on the media dynamics, and Chapter 4
introduces the understanding of religion for the case studies to follow.
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Chapter 2
Attitudes: Tendencies and Variations
Abstract: This chapter presents an overview of religiosity and attitudes to reli-
gious diversity in media and other public spaces based on a cross-Scandinavian
survey conducted in 2015. Although Scandinavians in general have a weak per-
sonal connection to religion, Christianity still holds a privileged position as an
expression of cultural identity. Scandinavians express support for equal rights
to practice religion, but also doubtfulness towards public expressions of religion.
More than one-fourth of respondents discuss news about religion and religious
extremism regularly. There is a widespread sentiment that Islam is a threat to the
national culture, even though most respondents state that they oppose an open
expression of hostile attitudes towards foreigners. Political orientation and gen-
der are salient aspects that shape diverging opinions regarding tolerance or
scepticism towards the public visibility of religious diversity. Furthermore,
Danes and Norwegians are more critical of public expressions of Islam than
Swedes.
Keywords: survey, religiosity, political orientation, gender, Islam, religious ex-
tremism
2.1 Introduction
Social and political transformations in each society, and on a global scale, are
challenging the formerly largely homogeneous culture and self-understanding
of the Scandinavian countries. These changes shape attitudes to increasing reli-
gious diversity in the populations and the higher visibility of religion, in partic-
ular, of Islam, in the public debates that are discussed in Chapter 1. Since
changes in values were first measured in the 1980s the World Values Survey In-
stitute¹ has described Scandinavia as the place in which late-modern secular–ra-
tional and self-expression values are ranked highest in the world. Given this
 World Values Survey, Institute for Futures Studies, accessed 23 Aug 2017, http://www.iffs.se/
en/world-values-survey/
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background, how are Scandinavians responding to the new diversity of religious
expression in public spaces, and to the role of the media in this situation?
In order to provide a context for the following case studies of controversies
over religion in various media settings, this chapter presents an overview of re-
ligiosity and attitudes to expressions of religious diversity in the media and in
other public spaces. This overview is based on a cross-national, comparative sur-
vey. The first part of the chapter will present the common tendencies in the sur-
vey. In the second part, the differences between and within the populations in
Scandinavian countries will be discussed with regard to how social factors,
such as age, gender, religiosity, and political opinion, influence views on reli-
gion. Finally, we will briefly discuss how the survey findings compare to the find-
ings on religiosity and with attitudes to cultural diversity found in the European
Social Survey (ESS).
2.2 A Cross-National Comparative Survey
A survey with population representative samples in Denmark, Norway, and Swe-
den was undertaken by the project behind this book (see the Preface) in April
2015.² There were about 1,000 respondents aged 16 years and above in each
country³. The media coverage at that time was focused on the dangers experi-
enced by refugees crossing the Mediterranean, and on the terror attacks in
Paris and Copenhagen in January and February of the same year. The survey
was thus conducted a few months before the peak number of refugees arrived
in the Scandinavian countries in the autumn of 2015.
Data were collected through web panels. Such surveys cover the adult pop-
ulation with access to the Internet which, in Scandinavia, is almost everyone (see
Chapter 1, section 1.8). The survey is thus sampled to be representative at the
country level, but it does not permit meaningful statistical inferences about mi-
nority groups in the population.⁴ All of the data have been weighted by gender,
age, and geographical region.⁵
 The questions were formulated by CoMRel researchers in cooperation with TNS Gallup in Nor-
way (now Kantar TNS) and were translated into Danish and Swedish. The responses were collect-
ed by TNS Gallup in Norway and Denmark, and by TNS Sifo in Sweden, in the period 16–21 April
2015 (Lundby and Jortveit 2015).
 1099 from Norway, 1006 from Denmark and 999 from Sweden. See table 2.2.
 This is due to the low number of minority respondents, including ethnic minorities (i.e. re-
spondents that answered that they or their parents were born outside Scandinavia) and small
minority religious groups.
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2.3 Scandinavian Religiosity: Believing and
Belonging
Our study confirms the World Values Survey findings that Scandinavians, in gen-
eral, have a weak personal connection to religion. As Figure 2.1 shows, fewer
than 10 percent of the respondents have a strong religious self-identification.⁶
The survey also shows that less than 10 percent report that they visit a religious
building to attend a service or prayer meeting each month or more frequently. At
least one-third of the respondents in each country do not identify themselves as
religious. Religious identification is weaker among Swedes and stronger among
the Norwegians and Danes.
Despite the low levels of religious self-identification, a majority of the re-
spondents in the survey state that they primarily feel affiliated to Christianity
as part of their culture or national identity. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the re-
ligious landscape of Scandinavian societies has historically been dominated by
 It was not weighted by education, which may imply some over-representation of higher edu-
cation.
 A variable showing the degrees of religious self-identification among the respondents was
constructed based on the two following items in the survey: ‘To what extent do you regard your-
self as religious,’ and ‘To what extent do you regard yourself to be a believer.’ Those who iden-
tified themselves with these terms fully or to some extent are considered to have a ‘strong or
moderate’ religious self-identification. Those who did not, or to a small extent, regard them-
selves as ‘religious’ or ‘believers’ have a ‘weaker or no’ religious self-identification (see further
Lundby et al. 2017)
Figure 2.1 Religious self-identification in Scandinavia. Percentages. From CoMRel survey, April
2015.
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Lutheran majority churches with strong connections to the state. The majority of
the populations are still members of these churches. As suggested by Grace
Davie, the normal stance in terms of religion in the Nordic countries can be char-
acterized as ‘to belong without believing’ (Davie 2005, 135). Religion, in the form
of Christianity, thus seems to retain significance as a form of cultural belonging
for Scandinavians, even though a minority of them identify as ‘believers’.
2.4 Political Orientation
The Scandinavian societies have historically been characterized by a relatively
stable party structure that is organized primarily around an economic left–
right dimension. In recent decades the growth of new political parties, such as
environmentalist and right-wing populist parties, have challenged the traditional
structure and introduced new political cleavages in which cultural values repre-
sent a key dimension (Lövheim et al. 2018; Flanagan and Lee 2003).
In the survey, political orientation is analysed by combining data on the re-
spondents’ political party preferences with information from the Chapel Hill Ex-
pert Survey on party positions, in terms of views on democratic freedoms and
rights (Bakker et al. 2015). Based on this information, we have placed the survey
answers in one of three categories: ‘libertarian/post-materialist’, ‘centre’, and
‘traditional/authoritarian’.⁷ The distribution of political orientation in the three
Scandinavian countries is shown in Figure 2.2.
As the figure shows, in Norway and Sweden nearly 12 percent of the respond-
ents can be categorized as having a traditional/authoritarian political orienta-
tion, on the basis of their political party preferences. In Denmark, political par-
ties with a traditional/authoritarian orientation have greater support among the
respondents, with 19 percent of the surveyed population. The tendency to polar-
 Examples of ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ parties include Enhedslisten and the Liberal Alliance
in Denmark, Venstre in Norway, and Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet de Gröna in Sweden. Exam-
ples of ‘traditional/authoritarian’ parties include the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, Kristelig Folk-
eparti, and Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, as well as Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden. Parties that
occupy the ‘centre’ include Socialdemokratiet and Venstre in Denmark, Arbeiderpartiet and
Høyre in Norway, and Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna in Sweden. A respondent is classi-
fied as being ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ if his or her preferred party scores between 0 and 3 on
the GAL–TAN scale, ‘centre’ if the party scores between 3.01 and 6.99, and ‘traditional/author-
itarian’ if the party scores between 7 and 10. ‘Other’ includes respondents who said they
would not vote, or who would vote for a party that was not included in the survey.
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ization between libertarian/post-materialist and traditional/authoritarian orien-
tations is also somewhat stronger in Denmark than in the two other countries.
2.5 Attitudes to Religious Diversity
A particular feature of the Scandinavian society and culture is the strong empha-
sis on individual self-expression, combined with equal treatment of all citizens,
administered by a strong welfare state (Trägårdh 2011). As discussed in Chapter 1,
a tendency to link equality with similarity is particularly strong in Scandinavia
(Gullestad 2002, 46). How, then, do the Scandinavians respond to increased het-
erogeneity of religious beliefs and practices in society?
More than 70 percent of respondents in the survey agree that all religions
should be respected, and more than half of Norwegians and Danes, and almost
two-thirds of the Swedes, strongly or partially agree that all religious groups
should be entitled to the same rights in society. On a general level, freedom of
religious expression thus seems to be supported in Scandinavian societies. How-
ever, when asked about tolerance for particular expressions of religion in public
spaces, opinions differ depending on the religion. Around 80 percent of respond-
ents from all Scandinavian countries agree that a cross, church tower, or other
Christian symbol may be visible on buildings in public space. Seventy-five per-
cent also agree that signs showing the location of a mosque should be visible.
But, when asked about minarets being visible in public space, support drop to
about 60 percent of respondents in Sweden and Norway, and 56 percent in Den-
mark.
That the tendency to support publicly visible expressions of religious faith is
conditioned by the particular religion in question is also evident in responses to
Figure 2.2 Political orientation in Scandinavia (GAL–TAN scale). Percentages. From CoMRel
survey, April 2015.
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questions about the display of religious symbols in particular social contexts.
Table 2.1 shows stronger support for pupils in school to express their religious
faith through wearing a cross rather than a hijab in all the Scandinavian coun-
tries. This tendency is also found amongst teachers in high school, hospital staff,
news presenters, and police officers, although the strength of support differs de-
pending on the professional group. While a majority of respondents accept that
teachers should be free to express their religious faith by wearing a cross, less
than half support police officers publicly expressing their faith in this manner.
Table 2.1 Should people in the following groups be allowed to wear a cross or hijab to express
their religious faith? Percentage of respondents answering yes. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Denmark Norway Sweden
Cross Hijab Cross Hijab Cross Hijab
Pupils in school % % % % % %
Teachers in high school % % % % % %
News presenters % % % % % %
Police % % % % % %
Hospital staff % % % % % %
N   
Note: ’Do not know’ and ’Do not want to answer’ excluded from the tabulations.
The survey also asked respondents if they agreed that religious leaders have a
stronger right than others to express their views on cultural, moral, and ethical
issues in public. Seventy percent or more of the respondents disagree with this
statement for Muslim leaders, but also more than 60 percent oppose Christian
leaders doing so.
These findings suggest that Scandinavians, on an abstract, general level,
support a plurality of expression of religion in society, but that they are more
doubtful towards the expressions of Islam than Christianity. This tendency
seems stronger when public manifestations of religion are connected to state au-
thority, such as in the case of police officers or other state officials wearing the
hijab. Furthermore, the majority of respondents do not think religious leaders
should enjoy any privileged position on such matters.
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2.6 Media Coverage of Religion
The Scandinavian media model described in Chapter 1 implies that the media are
regarded by citizens as part of the communication services that offer public
goods, and that therefore they are expected to handle different religions and
world-views in an equal manner. A majority of Scandinavians still use conven-
tional mass media, such as newspapers, radio, and television, on a daily
basis.What, then, are their opinions about the ways in which media should en-
gage with both religion in general, and with controversial aspects of religious is-
sues in particular?
As can be seen from table 2.2 below our survey shows that, on the one hand,
Scandinavians do not think that the media should increase the coverage of reli-
gious topics or of the major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (see fur-
ther Chapter 5). On the other hand, the majority want the media to be more crit-
ical in their coverage of religion.
Table 2.2 Percentage of the respondents who fully or partially agree with statements on what
the media ought to do in relation to their coverage of religion. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
The media ought to… Denmark Norway Sweden
… give more attention to religious topics % % %
… give space to conflicts about religion % % %
… be critical of problematic aspects of religion % % %
… cover religion in satirical ways % % %
… invite dialogue when there are tensions over religion % % %
N   
Note: ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Do not want to answer’ included in the tabulations.
Furthermore, the table shows that a large majority in all three countries support
the notion that the media should engage with problematic aspects of religion, for
instance by giving space to coverage of conflicts, and by being critical and satir-
ical about religion, but also by inviting dialogue when tensions over religious is-
sues occur.
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2.7 Religion and Culture in Conflict
The survey findings reveal the contested nature of public expressions of religion,
in particular of Islam, among Scandinavians today. As shown in Figure 2.3, a ma-
jority of the respondents agree with the statement that religion leads to conflict
rather than to peace.
This question referred to religion in general. Against the background of
emerging political tensions over issues of immigration from Muslim countries
and integration policies, a survey question explicitly asked whether Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam are perceived as threats to national culture. The responses
concerning Islam are shown in Figure 2.4.
As the figure shows, there are differences between the Scandinavian coun-
tries. About half of the Danes (52 percent) fully or partially agree that Islam is
Figure 2.3 Looking at the world, religion leads to conflict rather than to peace. Percentages.
From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Figure 2.4 Do you consider Islam a threat to Danish/Norwegian/Swedish culture? Percentages.
From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
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a threat to their culture. Among Norwegians, almost half (47 percent) agreed
with the statement, while 38 percent of Swedish respondents see Islam as a
threat to national culture. The differences regarding the other world religions
is remarkable: only around 11 percent of all Scandinavians agreed that Judaism
is a threat to their culture, and 6 to 8 percent that Christianity represents a threat.
The survey was taken a few months before the escalation of the war in Syria
and the increasing number of refugees going to Scandinavia in the autumn of
2015. These events may subsequently have made the perception of Islam as a
threat even more pronounced. Furthermore, the question did not include any
specification of ‘culture’.We thus do not know how individual respondents inter-
preted the term, or to what extent these attitudes are related to other opinions or
actions. Finally, even though the results show a widespread negative sentiment
towards Islam in all three countries, the population is divided over the issue. A
third of Scandinavians disagree to some extent with the postulation that Islam
poses a threat to national culture.
Following the escalation of media reports on Islamist terror and the general
swing towards populism and nationalism in public discourse, one might expect
a similar pattern of scepticism towards immigrants in general. The survey shows
that between 13 and 18 percent of the respondents agree that hostile attitudes
towards foreigners should be accepted in society.While a majority, then, of Scan-
dinavians seem to oppose xenophobic attitudes, the countries differ also on this
issue. Sixty percent of Danes, 67 percent of the Norwegians, and 73 percent of the
Swedes answered that hostile attitudes to foreigners should not be tolerated. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows the need for a closer look at the relationship between the respons-
es of those individuals who perceived Islam to be a threat to national culture and
those who accept hostile attitudes against foreigners.
Figure 2.5 Agreement with the statement ‘hostile attitudes towards foreigners should be ac-
cepted’ among people considering Islam a threat to national culture. Percentages. From CoMRel
survey, April 2015.
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In all three countries, as Figure 2.5 shows, a majority of those who consider
Islam a threat to national culture do not tolerate hostile attitudes against foreign-
ers, while about a fourth of them tolerate such attitudes. If we look at the whole
population in the Scandinavian countries, those who tolerate hostile attitudes
against foreigners and are sceptical of Islam make up 10– 12 percent of the pop-
ulation. This finding also raises the question of whether some of the respondents
might interpret tolerance of hostile attitudes towards foreigners as part of an ar-
gument supporting freedom of expression, rather than a critique of other ethnic
or religious groups per se. These findings underline the importance of further
analysis of the relationship between attitudes that concern freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of religion, and tolerance of religious diversity. The present
study did, however, not provide data to conduct this kind of analysis.
2.8 Patterns of Similarity and Difference
The general tendencies in the survey’s findings, presented above, strengthen the
image that, against the backdrop of high levels of secular–rational values among
Scandinavian populations, religious diversity in the public sphere in Scandina-
via is a topic on which opinions diverge, and which gives rise to tensions over
cultural identity and common values (as suggested in Chapter 1). The similarities
and differences between Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes in the survey show the
need for a further discussion about how various factors of historical experiences
and social stratification in Scandinavian societies play into the general tenden-
cies. The World Values Survey shows that secular–rational values and self-ex-
pression values are more frequent among the younger generations, while tradi-
tional values and strong religiosity are more common among the older
generations. High levels of self-expression values are also connected to the tol-
erance of foreigners and gender equality. This makes it relevant to ask how the
main tendencies in the attitudes towards religion that are found in the survey
differ with regard to age and religious self-identification, as well as gender.
In this last part of the chapter, we present an analysis of differences between
the countries reported in the previous sections. The purpose of this analysis is to
test and validate whether central findings from the descriptive analysis hold
when we control for the effects of key independent variables, such as age, gen-
der, political opinion, and religiosity.We focus on differences that are related to a
number of issues from the survey’s findings which concern attitudes to expres-
sions of religious diversity in public spaces and to controversial issues regarding
religion, such as religious extremism and intolerance.
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2.9 Critique and Tolerance of Religion
We conducted regression analyses of five dependent variables. The variables in
the regression analysis concern two groups of questions. The first set of ques-
tions are those that have been discussed on a general level in the previous sec-
tions, that is, questions concerning attitudes to Islam as a threat to national cul-
ture, tolerance for hostile attitudes against foreigners, and satire of religion as an
expression of a critique against religion in public settings. For these variables we
conducted multinomial regression analyses. Here, we focus on the general find-
ings from the regression models. For detailed results and information on the
variables included in the analysis, please see table A.2 in the Appendix.
The general finding of a widespread concern about Islam as a threat to na-
tional culture is qualified by our analysis. Of the different social factors included
in the analysis, political orientation is associated with the strongest effect in
terms of differences in attitudes. Individuals with a traditional/authoritarian ori-
entation seem more inclined to agree with the statement, particularly if com-
pared to those with a libertarian/post-materialist orientation, but also, to a cer-
tain extent, if compared to individuals holding a centrist position. Besides
political orientation, there are statistically significant effects of gender and
age. Men are more inclined to agree with the statement that Islam represents
a threat than are women, and the older generations are also more inclined to
agree than the younger ones. Finally, Danes and Norwegians are significantly
more inclined than Swedes to regard Islam as a threat. The effect of religious
self-identification is not statistically significant.
This pattern is, to a large extent, replicated with regard to responses to the
statement about whether xenophobic attitudes should be tolerated. Individuals
with a traditional/authoritarian political orientation are more likely to agree that
such attitudes should be tolerated, while those identified as libertarian/post-ma-
terialist are more likely to disagree. The effect of gender is also statistically sig-
nificant, with men being more likely to agree with the statement than are
women. Again, Swedes are significantly more likely to disagree with the state-
ment about tolerating xenophobic attitudes than are the Danes and Norwegians.
Stronger religious self-identification and higher age are also associated with a
higher likelihood of agreeing with the statement. However, these effects are
far weaker than the effects of political orientation and gender.
The same patterns that show up in attitudes to Islam and to xenophobic
statements also seem to be relevant to questions concerning tolerance of satire
of religion in public discussions. The effects of gender and political orientation
are particularly strong, with men, and individuals with a traditional/authoritar-
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ian political orientation, more inclined to agree that such expressions should be
allowed in society. The effects of age, religious self-identification, and country
are also statistically significant, but the associations are not as strong as are
those of gender and political orientation.
2.10 Discussing News on Religion and Religious
Extremism in the Media
As the core of this study concerns contestations of public expressions of religion
in the media, the second set of questions referred to discussions of news about
religious extremism in the media. The survey included a question about the fre-
quency of discussing news coverage of religion and religious extremism. More
than one-fourth of the respondents answered that they discuss news on religious
extremism daily or weekly. The survey also shows that such discussions primar-
ily take place in settings like the home, and with friends. These findings will be
further discussed in Chapter 3. For the analysis in this chapter, we focus on how
factors such as age, gender, political orientation, and religiosity affect the prob-
ability of discussion of religious extremism. For these variables, we conducted
binomial logistic regression analyses. See Table A.3 in the Appendix for detailed
results.
The previous sections show that concerns about increased religious diversity
and how such concerns should be expressed in public discussions differ, in par-
ticular between respondents of different political orientation and gender, but
also with a person’s age, religiosity and country. Are there similar differences
among the quarter of the respondents that discuss news on religious extremism
daily or weekly?
The results show, firstly, that respondents with a high or moderate level of
religious identification seem more inclined to discuss news about religious ex-
tremism with others. Turning to political orientation we see that individuals
with traditional/authoritarian and liberal/post-materialist preferences are more
likely to discuss news on religious extremism with others compared to individu-
als voting for centre parties. Gender also has a strong effect with regard to like-
lihood of discussing news on religious extremism with others and on the con-
texts where these discussions take place. Men seem more inclined than
women to discuss news on religious extremism, and to discuss these issues in
the workplace and on social media. Women prefer to discuss such issues in
the family or among friends. Men also report higher participation in public de-
bate on religion, for example by participating in debate in print and online
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media. Men seem in general more critical of expressions of religion in public, es-
pecially Islam, and support critical coverage of Islam and Judaism in the media
more than women do.Women appear to be more supportive of the statement that
all religions should be respected. Finally, age has a strong effect when it comes
Figure 2.6 Influence of selected variables on discussions of news on religious extremism:
Substantive effects. Based on the CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Notes: Baseline in the two graphs (a and b) refers to the predicted probability of participating in
(a) a discussion of news on religious extremism and (b) an online debate on religious extremism
when all independent variables are held at their mean values. The remaining pillars in each
graph show how the probability of participating varies when we alter the value on each variable
from 0 to 1 while holding the remaining independent variables constant at their mean values.
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to discussions of news on religious extremism online. Individuals younger than
45 are more inclined to discuss religion and religious extremism online than
older generations.
2.11 Scandinavian Attitudes in European
Comparison
The survey findings show that although Scandinavians in general have a weak
personal connection to religion, Christianity still holds a privileged position as
an expression of cultural identity. Scandinavians express support for equal
rights to practice religion in general, but are doubtful towards public expressions
of religion that grows when these are connected to public institutions and offi-
cials, and explicitly references Islam. A majority in all three countries equate re-
ligion with conflict and support media engagement in criticism of religion, but
also wish that media would initiate dialogue about tensions over religious is-
sues. More than a quarter of respondents discuss news about religion and reli-
gious extremism regularly. There is a widespread sentiment that Islam is a threat
to national culture, even though most respondents state that they oppose the
open expression of hostile attitudes towards foreigners.
Our analysis of differences related to various social factors indicates that po-
litical orientation and gender are salient factors in shaping diverging opinions
towards toleration or scepticism of the public expression of religious diversity,
and of how such opinions may be expressed in society. There are also differences
across countries, where Danes and Norwegians seem more critical of public ex-
pressions of Islam than Swedes. These differences mirror to some extent histor-
ical and political differences between Scandinavian countries and social groups
as discussed in Chapter 1, such as the prominence of right-wing political parties
criticizing Islam in public debate.
To what extent do the general tendencies and differences emerging in our
survey represent a particular Scandinavian pattern, or are Scandinavians rather
becoming more like other European countries in attitudes to religious diversity?
We compared the patterns emerging in our survey and similar questions asked in
the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS)⁸ in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, with four
other Western European countries – Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the
UK. The comparison confirms that the Scandinavian countries have the relatively
 The questions and variables used in the ESS 2014 study can be found at ESS online analysis
module: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/ (Accessed 4 Aug, 2017).
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fewest people who consider themselves very religious. Also, gender differences,
especially in attitudes to ethnic and religious diversity, are rather more marked
in Scandinavian countries than in the other countries. In Scandinavia as well as
in the other countries chosen for comparison women score slightly higher than
men on most measures of liberal/post-materialist values.
Individual Scandinavian countries have some outlier results in the ESS rele-
vant to attitudes to mediatized conflicts involving religion. Sweden stands out (in
2014), for welcoming attitudes to Muslim migrants compared to a European aver-
age.⁹ Norwegians rate their contact with people from other ethnic or racial
groups less favourably than the European average.¹⁰ Finally, Danish respondents
give the most negative evaluation of laws against ethnic discrimination in the
workplace, with 12 percent judging these ‘extremely bad for the country’,
which is more than twice as high as anywhere else in Europe.
These differences between the Scandinavian countries belies the idea that
Scandinavia represents a homogeneous cultural entity. Looking at the particular
set of values asked about in the ESS 2014, individual Scandinavian countries are
closer to other European countries than to each other on some items. Sweden is
for example on several issues closer to Germany than to Denmark, which often
comes out closer to the UK. This suggests that a variety of social and political
factors are needed to explain attitudes to religious and cultural diversity. The dif-
ferences between the countries should be related to different experiences of mi-
gration and institutional multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), com-
bined with differences in the media representation of Islam and Muslims;
certainly, recent studies point to a more negative media frame in Denmark
than in Sweden (ECRI 2012; Lundby et al. 2018; see also Chapter 12), which
may in turn reflect different recent histories. For example, experiences of crises
such as the Muhammad cartoon affair have made the Danish debate about im-
migration and Islam somewhat more polarized than in other Scandinavian coun-
tries.
The CoMRel survey indicates that, within the group of respondents frequent-
ly discussing religion and religious extremism in the media, men are more in-
clined to engage in such discussions in public settings while women prefer pri-
vate settings like family and friends. The ESS data support that women in
Scandinavia seem to be more tolerant to religious diversity than men. Previous
research points to the importance of exposure to other religious faiths, through
 The ESS shows 37.6 percent of Swedes agreed with the statement ‘allow many to come and live
here’ compared to a European average of 11 percent.
 In Norway, 48 percent rate their contact at 7– 10 on a scale from 1 ‘extremely bad’ to 10 ‘ex-
tremely good’ compared to a European average of 57 percent.
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personal encounters and in communities, for tolerance of religious diversity
(Smith 2007, 351). The ESS includes questions about frequency and quality of
contact with people of other cultures.¹¹ There is no overall pattern across coun-
tries relating frequency of contact to gender. In quality of contact however, a
clearer pattern emerges. More women rate quality of contact very positively (7
and above on a scale of 1– 10) than men in the seven countries in our compar-
ison (except Germany), though the differences are small.
Further studies are needed to shed more light on the relationship between
people’s attitudes to religious and cultural diversity in society, and their liber-
al/post-materialist or traditional-authoritarian political orientation and gender.
Nevertheless, the general tendencies and differences revealed in our survey set
the stage for how contestations over religion are played out in the media and
how various individuals in the population engage with them. In this way, the
survey findings provide an important contextualization for the case studies in
the coming chapters of this book.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Media Dynamics
Abstract: Mass media and social media afford a communicative environment
providing a horizon of orientation for citizens about conflicts relating to religion,
and provide social actors with the tools to engage in such conflicts. Media may
insert various dynamics into conflicts and may occasionally become actors them-
selves in contestations over religious issues. This chapter applies a typology that
distinguishes among three different media dynamics: (1) media’s ability to ampli-
fy the communication and the ramifications of the reported events, (2) how the
world is represented, framed, in the media, and the ways in which the media be-
stow the communication of events with a certain narrative and dramaturgy and
work as arenas for the performative agency of various involved actors, and (3) the
various ways in which media as social and communicative environments come
to co-structure communication and actions. The terror attack on the French satire
magazine Charlie Hebdo is used as an illustrative example.
Keywords: media dynamics, framing, mediatization, mediatization of religion,
Charlie Hebdo
In this chapter, we will provide a conceptual framework for understanding the
active interplay between media, religion and society, with a special emphasis
on the various media dynamics that come into play during social and cultural
conflicts involving religion. The framework will also serve as a reference for
the subsequent chapters’ analyses of conflicts in mediatized religious environ-
ments.
3.1 Heated Debates
In March 2016, the Danish public service broadcaster TV2 aired a series of three
documentary programs with the titleMosques Behind the Veil. Through the use of
hidden camera and actors working undercover pretending to be Muslims who
were seeking guidance from imams in eight different mosques, the documentary
revealed that the advice given by some of the imams was in sharp contrast to
existing Danish laws and norms: In some of the mosques, they were taught
about Islamic rules for stoning and whipping, were encouraged to punish their
OpenAccess. © 2018, Stig Hjarvard, Knut Lundby. This work is licensed under the Creative
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children physically if they did not pray, and a woman was advised to stay with
her violent husband and learned she could not deny him having sex with her.
The documentary series spurred wide attention and discussion in other media
about the problems of a ‘parallel society’ that is governed by religious rules
and the series was the immediate cause of a political initiative to stop ‘hate
preachers’ as these imams became labelled in the political agreement between
a majority of the Danish political parties (Kirkeministeriet 2016).
The documentary series also met with severe criticism. Representatives of
Muslim organizations and mosques accused TV2 of presenting a very biased pic-
ture of the practices of imams in Denmark, and for destroying years of work by
the mosques in support of integration in Denmark (Westersø 2016). However,
criticism also came from other quarters. The Danish talk radio station Radio24-
syv examined parts of the raw tape recordings and criticized TV2 for deliberately
producing a much more one-sided picture of the imams’ practices than the ac-
tual material had provided evidence for (Graversen 2016).When the documenta-
ry, a year later, was nominated for the prestigious award for Danish journalism,
the Cavling Prize, it again met with severe criticism, this time from four univer-
sity researchers. In a lengthy newspaper article, Suhr et al. (2017) raised eight
questions to TV2 challenging the television station’s account of the apparent
misconduct of the imams in the mosques, for instance its use of undercover
agents. In its present form, the researchers argued, the documentary was ‘very
one-sided and in several instances it directly misrepresented the circumstances’.
Television documentaries using hidden camera and microphones have also cre-
ated discussions about Islam in other Scandinavian countries, for instance, the
documentary The State of the Nation (Rikets tilstand) from 2000, made by Norwe-
gian TV2, about the circumcision of Muslim women in Norway, and the Swedish
Mission Investigation (Uppdrag granskning) from 2012, made by SVT, about Swed-
ish imams’ advice to women about male suppression.
These cases not only bear witness to the heated public debates about Islam
in Scandinavian countries, but also illustrate how various media are implicated,
not only in reporting about these issues, but also in the very development of con-
flicts about religion. Danish TV2 not only tried to influence the public agenda,
but also paved the way for political action, including new legislation that nar-
rowed the freedom of speech for all religious actors and caused a change in pub-
lic administrative and financial procedures regarding religious institutions.
Media occasionally become active participants in such conflicts, for instance,
by pursuing a particular agenda and by becoming the target of severe criticism.
In short, the role of the media in the domain of religion has become a frequent
public issue in itself, in this case, TV2’s representation of reality became an im-
portant part of the dispute about Islam.
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3.2 The Mediatization of Religion
The integral role of media in the interactions between religious actors and
organizations and the wider culture and society has been subject to theoretical
considerations within the framework of mediatization theory. Generally speak-
ing, mediatization, as a concept, denotes the ‘long-term interrelation processes
between media change on the one hand and social and cultural change on
the other’ (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2010, 223). Applying this framework to
the institutional domain of religion, the mediatization of religion denotes the
processes ‘through which religious beliefs, agency, and symbols are becoming
influenced by the workings of various media’ (Hjarvard 2016, 8). Such changes
take place at both a structural level, i.e. the interdependencies between institu-
tional domains, such as religion, politics, and the media, and at the level of so-
cial interaction, i.e. the practices of individuals and organizations. For a series of
studies on the mediatization of religion in the Nordic countries, see Hjarvard and
Lövheim (2012).
In his study of historical mediatization processes in relation to the Protestant
Church of Norway, Lundby points out that it still enjoyed a relatively autono-
mous position in the early 1970s, and also that vis-à-vis the public service broad-
caster NRK, ‘there was still such a respect in NRK towards the Christian tradition
carried by the Church of Norway that very little media-adapted editing was ap-
plied to “religious programmes”’ (Lundby 2016, 32). Gradually, the various Nor-
wegian media, including NRK, acquired a more professional and independent
stance towards religion, as well as towards other societal institutions, such as
politics, and increasingly actors in the church and politics became dependent
on the media as a resource for communicating with their constituencies. Follow-
ing this, various media became an important source of information for the gen-
eral population about religious issues, and public discussions about religious is-
sues were increasingly influenced by the agenda of the news media, and only to
a lesser extent the agenda of religious institutions. In order to gain public atten-
tion through the news media, religious issues should fit the media’s news values,
and frequently religion became an issue when religious communities appeared
to be out of sync with the values of secular society, for instance, in relation to
gender, sexual orientation, freedom of speech, etc. (Christensen 2012; Hjarvard
2013).
The proliferation of the Internet and various forms of portable, interactive,
and online media, such as mobile phones and tablets, and the subsequent
spread of social network media, such as Facebook and Twitter, have intensified
and altered the media’s influence. The traditional mass media have been supple-
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mented by networked forms of communication that allow individuals and
groups to engage with each other more directly. This has changed the conditions
for social interaction: it has allowed official representatives of various religious
communities (pastors, imams, etc.) to engage more directly with both their fol-
lowers and the wider public, but it has also provided a new communications in-
frastructure giving the authority to both ordinary people and media celebrities to
voice opinions about religion independently of traditional religious authorities
(Clark 2011). The new media landscape has also altered the conditions for the
public’s engagement in political and religious conflicts. In their study of the
role of various forms of digital media for mobilizing protest (for instance, the Oc-
cupy Movement) Bennett and Segerberg (2013) distinguish between collective ac-
tion and connective action. The former concerns the traditional kind of protests
organized by high-resource organizations, such as political parties and interest
organizations. Connective action is, to a much lesser extent, or not at all, under-
pinned by formal organizations, and relies instead on crowd enabled networks
of likeminded individuals who use various digital media to organize and com-
municate their protests.
Although social network media allow for individual and personal engage-
ment, they also operate by collective and institutional logics. Dijck and Poell
(2013) point to programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication as un-
derlying logics, i.e. the norms, strategies, mechanisms, and economies of social
network media that co-structure the interactions between people in them. In this
way, social interaction becomes a hybrid social and technological phenomenon.
The structuring influence of social network media on social interaction and
opinion formation is reflected in the emergence of communicative ‘filter bubbles’
(Pariser 2011) and network patterns of ‘polarized crowds’ (Smith et al. 2014).We
will return to such implications of the social network media for opinion forma-
tion and for citizens’ willingness to discuss controversial issues, but first we
need to specify some general media dynamics that are at play during various
forms of conflict.
3.3 A Typology of Media Dynamics
In what follows, we will use mediatization theory as our point of departure from
which to understand the influence of various media dynamics in social and cul-
tural conflicts involving religion (Eskjær, Hjarvard and Mortensen 2015; see also
Driessen et al. 2017). By using the word ‘influences’ in relation to the media we
are explicitly avoiding the term ‘media effects’, i.e. the idea that media, at the
level of individual messages, may have a definitive influence on audiences’ opin-
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ion and behaviour. This may be the case under specific circumstances, but this is
not our point of interest here. Our perspective is not primarily a question of dis-
semination, of spreading the ‘message’ but rather how the media environment
conditions religious activity and influences religious representations. Our
claim is at once more modest and more comprehensive. More modest, because
we will not posit that media may have a determining influence on the outcome
of social interaction, including opinion formation or the escalation or downscal-
ing of conflicts. More comprehensive, because we locate the level of influence at
a structural level, i.e. the mediatized social environment and the conditions it
sets for human agency.
From the perspective of mediatization theory, the question about the influ-
ence of media on social interaction may more aptly be described as the ways
in which the integration and presence of media in social and cultural domains
come to condition, but not determine, the encounters between actors in everyday
life. Media have been institutionalized in different contexts as resources of inter-
action. From the point of view of the individual actor, a person or organization,
the media are the available tools that enable, limit, and structure communicative
interaction in various ways. These conditions will certainly vary according to the
media and social context in question, but at a more general level, we will in what
follows suggest that these conditions insert certain dynamics into the way in
which social interaction come to be spelled out, in our case, in relation to con-
flicts involving religion. These dynamics are, conceptually speaking, positioned
at the intersection between mediatization and mediation processes. The dynam-
ics are a result of the mediatized conditions, the institutional interdependencies
between media, religion, and society, but they concern the way in which actual
communicative interactions are performed and come to have a bearing on, for
instance, political and religious affairs.
Following Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær (2015) we may discern three dif-
ferent media dynamics: (1) amplification, (2) framing and performative agency,
and (3) co-structuring. This typology is inspired by a distinction by Meyrowitz
(1993) on different metaphors of the media, each focusing on different aspects
of their workings: (1) Considering the media as conduits draws our attention
to the media’s ability to influence the magnitude of communicative interactions;
(2) looking at the media as languages addresses the media’s formatting of mean-
ing during conflicts; (3) and considering the media as an environment focuses
our attention on the structural influences of the media environment, for in-
stance, as regards access to communicative resources (see Table 3.1). In order
to further specify the three dynamics, we will use the terror attack on the French
satire magazine Charlie Hebdo as an illustrative example, since this major and
tragic event encompassed all of these dynamics and may be more familiar to in-
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ternational readers than a national event in one of the Scandinavian countries.
The case of Charlie Hebdo also contextualizes this book within a wider European
setting.
Table 3.1 The influences of media dynamics in mediatized conflicts.
Media metaphor Dynamics Influence
Media as conduits Amplification Volume, speed, reach, level
of involvement




Media as environment Co-structuring Media practices both embed-
ded in, and constitutive of,
structural relations of power
Source: Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær (2015, 10)
3.4 Amplification
If we look at the media as conduits or channels of communication, an important
dynamic of the media is their ability to amplify not only communication, but also
the ramifications of the reported events. As such, it concerns the volume, speed,
and reach of communication and the subsequent level of involvement by people.
The violent attack on Charlie Hebdo’s editorial offices in Paris by two radical Is-
lamists on 7 January 2015, clearly demonstrates this dynamic. The attack imme-
diately became breaking news on a global scale. The subsequent police hunt for
the perpetrators and the additional attack, and hostage crisis in a Jewish super-
market in Paris, were followed intensely by news media and on the social media
in many countries, and the extremely high media attention helped to mobilize
worldwide demonstrations to protest against terrorism and in support of Charlie
Hebdo and free speech.
The target of the attack, the magazine Charlie Hebdo, also helped to amplify
the event and the controversy: The first issue of Charlie Hebdo after the attack
had a drawing of the Prophet Muhammad on the front page posing with a
sign that said ‘I am Charlie’. The magazine usually prints each issue in 60,000
copies, but this issue was printed in 7 million copies and it was distributed to
numerous countries and translated into several languages (Stelter 2015). The
worldwide attention to these happenings also created counter reactions to the
Western media’s reporting, in particular in the Arab and Muslim world. Here,
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the media coverage, demonstrations, and various political reactions, did not all
follow the Western media’s framing of the controversy as a question of terrorism,
and in Turkey and Egypt authorities took various measures to ban and limit the
distribution of the Charlie Hebdo drawing and of articles concerning the matter,
in order to de-escalate the conflict within their countries, but they were only
partly successful in this (Moore 2015; YaLibnan 2015). The global spread of the
news of the happening re-contextualized the conflict and gave it many more in-
terpretations. In the Philippines, for instance, Muslim demonstrators focused on
Charlie Hebdo as the perpetrator due to its new depiction of the Prophet Muham-
mad on the cover of the magazine (Agence France-Presse 2015).
3.5 Framing and Performative Agency
The second media dynamic reflects the fact that the media are not neutral vehi-
cles of information exchange, but involve a particular construction of the mes-
sage in terms of meaning and aesthetics. In a metaphorical sense, the media
are also languages through which the world is represented, framed, in particular
ways at the same time as the media bestow the communication of events with a
certain narrative and dramaturgy, and also work as arenas for the performative
agency of various involved actors. In the case of the Charlie Hebdo attack, the
Western news media almost unanimously framed the incident as a terrorist act
against the freedom of expression, clearly supporting the official responses,
not least, of Western-oriented governments. This framing of the attacks was, in
a sense, over-determined by a series of existing and overarching frames that
were developed in relation to similar attacks on freedom of speech, such as
the death threats against the author Salman Rushdie, and the cartoonists of Jyl-
lands-Posten’s Muhammad drawings.
‘Framing’, as a concept, has both psychological and sociological meanings,
including cognitive, social, and normative dimensions.Within media studies Ent-
man’s (1993) definition of framing highlights the selection of aspects of a per-
ceived reality and the salience these aspects are given; through these acts of se-
lection and salience-giving, media come to promote a ‘particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommen-
dation’ (ibid. 52). Following this perspective, we should not only pay attention to
the manifest textual frames, but we must also consider ‘framing’ as sense-mak-
ing processes that involve discursive struggles between competing frames, of
which some may have a dominant position. As reflected in several of the studies
in this book, the discursive couplings between ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islam’ seem to be
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a dominant aspect of the ‘problem definition’ in relation to Islam across class
room settings, the news media, and social network media.
The various Western mass media were not only framing the Charlie Hebdo
attack in particular ways, but were also actors in the conflict. As media, they
aligned themselves with the magazine under attack and its defence of freedom
of speech. On the day after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, many European news-
papers had removed all traditional news coverage in favour of a more artistic
statement expressing their contempt for the perpetrators and their support for
free speech. Newspapers became demonstrators. The perpetrators also tried to
use the mass media as a platform from which to express their own cause. Sim-
ilarly to other terrorist attacks, it did not just aim to cause damage and fear
among particular people, but also served to maximize media attention; as a ter-
rorist act it also had a performative dimension, exploiting the mediatized condi-
tion of contemporary society (Cui and Rothenbuhler 2017). During the subse-
quent hostage crises in France, two of the terrorists phoned the French radio
station BFM RMC to present their side of the story to a wider audience. The social
network media also helped to dramatize the events. Not least during the police
hunt after the perpetrators, social network media became not only the forums for
discussion and the expression of feelings, but also tools for people who were try-
ing to contribute to the hunt by collecting information about the perpetrators’
whereabouts. Framing and performative agency are intertwined with each
other. Using the media to perform in a particular way conveys the framing of
the message with a certain authority.When a significant number of state leaders
marched arm in arm in Paris in protest against the Charlie Hebdo attack, they
were not only performing an act of protest that was reported by the news
media, they were also giving authority to their own framing of the events, includ-
ing their treatment recommendations, i.e. the policies to fight terrorism.
3.6 Co-Structuring
If we finally look at the media as social and communicative environments we can
discern various ways in which media come to co-structure communication and
actions. As mentioned above, the media may be understood as resources for in-
teraction, but media resources are not evenly distributed though they are embed-
ded within power relationships. The ability to influence the agenda of news
media thus depends on your prominence as a news source, and, as many studies
have demonstrated, political elites and other power holders in society typically
have much easier access to the news media if compared to other sources. These
power relationships are, for instance, conceptualized in the elite-driven media
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theory (Hallin 1986), and this may, in the present case, explain why the main-
stream press in Europe was very strongly aligned with the mainstream political
parties. These power relationships are, however, not set in stone, but may – de-
pending on the specific circumstances and context – be challenged and circum-
vented by stakeholders who can acquire new legitimacy as sources. In the case
of the magazine Charlie Hebdo, before the terrorist attack it had been considered
a somewhat marginal and radical voice in the French media landscape, but be-
cause of the attack and the existing discursive fault lines around immigration
and Islam, it emerged overnight as a privileged voice and a unifying symbol of
French and European political forces that were rallying for freedom of speech,
and for democracy in general.
If the mainstream journalistic media presented a rather unified voice during
this conflict, other media allowed for a larger diversity of reactions to be heard.
Internet-based blogs, websites and social network media, such as Twitter and
Facebook, made it possible for laymen and less professional stakeholders to en-
gage with the conflict. A variety of Muslim voices were heard on social network
media, not only those expressing condemnation of the attack, but also those
questioning why they, as Muslims, were expected to voice a particular excuse
for such atrocities in which they had had no part. The structuring influence
on who gets to have a voice was also spelled out through legal means. The
French authorities were not at all happy with their level of information control
during the hunt for the perpetrators. The declaration of martial law was a
means with which to enforce their ability to also manage information flows.
3.7 Social Network Media, Participation, and
Contentious Issues
Above we have tried to sketch out how the mediatized conditions of contempo-
rary society introduce three general dynamics into the ways conflicts are spelled
out. In addition to such general dynamics, we may also discern more specific
patterns of influences from media. Recently, several studies in the USA (Hamp-
ton et al. 2014), Denmark (Kulturstyrelsen 2015), and Norway (Fladmoe and
Steen-Johansen 2017) have examined how social network media may influence
the ways that users engage with controversial issues in such media. These stud-
ies are methodologically fairly similar and provide empirical evidence for the ex-
istence of a ‘spiral of silence’ in relation to social network media. The ‘spiral of
silence’ is a middle-range theory that was developed by Noelle-Neumann (1984),
which suggested that citizens’ willingness to participate in debates about contro-
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versial issues depends on their perception of the extent to which others share
their opinion on the issue. If an individual person perceives her own argument
to be in the minority, she will be less inclined to discuss the issue openly with
others, and vice versa. At an aggregate level this implies that people sharing
this perceived minority position will engage less in discussions and thereby
their position will, overall, appear to be even more marginal. In this way, a spiral
of silence is gradually making majority positions more pronounced and minority
positions less pronounced. People perceiving themselves to be in the minority do
not necessarily change their opinion on an issue, but they abstain from letting
their voice be heard, and thus their argument will not carry weight in the debate.
The abovementioned studies examine citizens’ willingness to use social net-
work media for debate about controversial issues, as opposed to other contexts
of communication, such as discussions in private at the dinner table, attending
public meetings, and in public media. The controversial issues used as test ex-
amples differ in topic: the US study poses questions about Edward Snowden’s
revelation of national security information (Hampton et al. 2014), the Danish
study concerns Denmark’s participation in military warfare in foreign countries
(Kulturstyrelsen 2015), and the Norwegian study uses the publishing of religious
cartoons as its test case (Fladmoe and Steen-Johansen 2017). All three studies
confirm that fewer citizens would prefer to discuss such controversial issues
on the social network media, while they would be much more inclined to discuss
them in more private and intimate settings. This is confirmed in our own survey
from 2015. More than 1 in 4 Scandinavians said that they discuss news on reli-
gious extremism daily or weekly (see Chapter 2). This primarily takes place in
closed circles, e.g. at home and with friends, as shown in Table 3.2.
An important factor is the extent to which people can anticipate whether or
not their audience or co-discussants share their opinion on an issue. In private
settings, citizens usually perceive other participants to have more similar views
and they are more sure about other participants’ viewpoints, i.e. the level of un-
certainty about others’ arguments is lower. The US and Danish studies also sug-
gest that a higher level of uncertainty about others’ opinions, not only percep-
tions of a majority against one’s own viewpoint, may constrain participation
in debates. The Norwegian study, furthermore, points to the fact that the general
willingness to participate in such debates on social network media resembles the
situation in relation to other public media, such as newspapers, radio, and tele-
vision.
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Table 3.2 In which contexts have you discussed news on religious extremism in the last 12
months? Percentages. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Denmark Norway Sweden
At home with the family % % %
With friends % % %
At work or at school % % %
On social media (e.g. Facebook or Twitter) % % %
In the commentary fields of net newspapers,
or in net discussion forums
% % %
In church or other religious meeting places % % %
In cafés or similar locations % % %
N   
Base: All of the respondents who had discussed news on religious extremism during the year
before they were interviewed.
Social network media have been mentioned as possible venues for ordinary citi-
zens’ discussions about public issues in contrast to mass media’s debates, which
are often criticized for being populated by elite voices. It seems, however, that
social network media, in practice, are not such a democratic venue for discus-
sions about controversial issues. Social network media may allow for more voi-
ces to be heard, but they may – similarly to mass media – be prone to various
dynamics that inhibit many people from debating controversial issues and
that may reinforce the already existing divides between minorities and majori-
ties, creating ‘filter bubbles’, etc. Perhaps a final lesson to be learned from
these studies is that we cannot take the opinions articulated on the social net-
work media as being representative of general public opinion, particularly not
when it comes to controversial issues. The often fierce debates on social network
media are not necessarily one of the voices of an otherwise silent majority, since
many people abstain from taking part in debates here. Social network media
may amplify certain viewpoints, but it is exactly the amplification of a particular
framing of an issue that may cause other people to refrain from offering counter-
framings.
Understanding Media Dynamics 61
3.8 Media Dynamics and Human Agency
As demonstrated in this chapter, media may insert various dynamics into con-
flicts and media may themselves sometimes become actors in contestations
over religious issues. In these ways, media may condition conflicts about reli-
gious issues, but they neither determine the particular framings of the conflicts
nor the outcomes. Instead, the media afford a communicative environment that
provides an important horizon of orientation for citizens about these conflicts
and provides partisan social actors with the tools to engage in such conflicts
in order to push the public agenda in directions that are suitable to their stand-
points, politically, religiously, or otherwise. As the following studies in this book
also demonstrate, human actors are not just subject to the mediatized conditions
of conflicts, but are, to some extent, also knowledgeable about the various media
dynamics conditioning the framing of issues and the construction of public at-
tention. This human reflexivity about the role of media has made the media
into a kind of meta-issue in many conflicts: The very representation of religion
in various media, the mass media as well as the social network media, has be-
come a regular, sometimes even a dominant aspect of such conflicts. To engage
with contentious issues in the public realm involves not only the use of media,
but increasingly also an awareness of the various media dynamics that amplify
or silence particular voices, that frame issues in particular ways, and that invest
conflicts with a particular dramaturgy.
In conclusion: The framework on mediatized conflicts laid out above will
prove useful and relevant in forthcoming chapters. Contested religion in media
dynamics of cultural conflicts in Scandinavia could well be studied through me-
dia’s amplification, their framing and performative agency, and through the co-
structuring of communication and actions through the social environment.
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Mia Lövheim, Liv Ingeborg Lied
Chapter 4
Approaching Contested Religion
Abstract: Religion has become a matter of intensified public concern in contem-
porary Scandinavia, and the various media are the main arena in which Scandi-
navians encounter such controversies. Historically-rooted understandings of re-
ligion that are based on the Lutheran Church as both a public utility and
cultural resource, and the secular state as the regulator of religious freedom
and equality, have become re-articulated in newly emerging frames such as
the politicization, culturalization and securitization of religion. This chapter
presents the current volume’s overall approach to religion in contemporary
Scandinavia as a mediatized and contested social phenomenon. The chapter ad-
vocates a perspective from which ongoing contestations and negotiations among
a larger spectrum of actors are explored through an application of both substan-
tive and moderate social constructionist approaches to religion. The various ap-
plications and interplays of these approaches to religion may fruitfully contrib-
ute to the further development of the theory of the mediatization of religion.
Keywords: mediatized religion, contested religion, social constructionist ap-
proach, substantive definition, public sphere
In April 2016, the Swedish politician Yasri Kahn was interviewed on TV4 by a fe-
male reporter. At the end of the interview, he refrained from shaking her hand
with reference to his values and upbringing, since such physical contact between
men and women was considered to be ‘very intimate’.¹ Kahn is a practicing Mus-
lim and was, at the time, nominated for the national board of the Swedish Green
Party. During the weeks that followed, the ‘handshake affair’ dominated both the
Swedish media and political debate. At the core of the debate was the question
of whether Kahn’s refusal to shake hands with a woman could be seen as being
an expression of gender discrimination and therefore incompatible with demo-
cratic values, or whether a liberal, pluralistic society should be able to tolerate
a variety of ways of greeting and showing respect for other people. Khan referred
to his action as a ‘personal choice’, but his Muslim faith and his position as a
 Yasri Kahn, ‘Nu lämnar jag alla mina uppdrag för Miljöpartiet’ Nyheter24, 20 April, 2016, ac-
cessed 19 June 2017, http://nyheter24.se/debatt/840404-yasri-khan-nu-lamnar-jag-alla-mina-up
pdrag-i-miljopartiet
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Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commerical-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
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leading politician quickly turned the discussion into a debate about the bounda-
ries of the expression of religious beliefs in the public sphere.
This case illustrates how, during the first decades of the new millennium,
religion has become a contested topic in public debates in Scandinavia, and
how the media orchestrate tensions around the place of religion in the public
realm. As the Swedish example aptly shows, it is when religious organizations
or individuals ‘assume, or try to assume, a public character, function, or role’
(Casanova 2003, 111) that religion also becomes a matter of intensified public
concern. In such cases, religion becomes a site for tensions between the values
that are based on secular–humanistic ideals, such as gender equality, plurality,
and freedom of religion, and religion as a carrier of cultural values in the Scan-
dinavian countries.
This book explores how the media condition engagement with contested is-
sues regarding the legitimate expressions of religion in Scandinavian public set-
tings. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how such contestations can be ap-
proached, against the backdrop of theories about the public role of religion
and on the mediatization of religion. On the basis of these discussions, the chap-
ter presents an approach to analysing religion as a contested and mediatized so-
cial phenomenon.
4.1 State Church and Secularity: Models for
Understanding Religion
The relationship of the Scandinavian populations to religion is shaped by a
strong historical connection between the Lutheran Church and the state (see
Chapter 1; Furseth 2018). The British sociologist Grace Davie (2015, 135) has ar-
gued that Scandinavian populations refer to the church as a ‘public utility’.
This notion seeks to capture the seemingly paradoxical situation that is ex-
pressed in our survey (see Chapter 2) of the low levels of religious self-identifi-
cation combined with a strong cultural affiliation to Lutheran Christianity. As
‘public utilities’, churches are expected to perform public functions and social
roles that are related to a religious faith that is recognized to some extent, but
which is not actively practiced by the larger population (ibid.).
The notion of the church as a public utility can also be useful for under-
standing how Lutheran Christianity has acted as a model for the ways in
which Scandinavians perceive religion in general, and also its place in society.
Secularity, in the sense of a separation of state administration and the legal
and political systems from the influence of religious dogmas and authorities,
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and of religion as personal faith that is expressed in private life and within par-
ticular religious communities, is a strong feature of modern Scandinavian soci-
eties (Furseth 2018; Lövheim et al. 2018). As described in Chapter 1, the state is,
nevertheless, involved in regulation and the financial support of religion, belief,
and worldview organizations (see Chapter 11), as well as in approving the curric-
ulum for religious education (see Chapters 13 and 15). This model of a secular
state that supports the Lutheran majority churches as public utilities still per-
sists, despite being challenged by religious diversity and critiqued by human-
ist–atheist groups. This model further implies that Scandinavians typically rely
on the state to legally balance religious freedom and the equality of all citizens
with regard to private expressions of faith, as well as its public manifestations
(Kühle et al. 2018).
4.2 Religion in Public Space: A Contested Issue
The conception of the Lutheran state church as a public utility, religious faith as
expressed in personal life and certain organizational forms, and the secular state
as a guarantee for religious freedom and equality, have become normative mod-
els that shape attitudes to, and controversies around, the growing religious di-
versity in Scandinavia. Our survey (see Chapter 2) shows that attitudes to reli-
gious diversity in public spaces are complex and that opinions differ
depending on the various levels of public visibility and forms of religion (see
Beckford 2015). A large majority, 70 percent, of Scandinavians agree that all re-
ligions should be respected, and more than 50 percent strongly or partially agree
that all religious groups should be entitled to the same rights in society. It seems,
however, as if this acceptance towards religious beliefs primarily refers to reli-
gion as an individual right or as a part of civil society. Previous studies show
that a majority of Scandinavians are more sceptical towards the expression of re-
ligious arguments and symbols, for example, in politics (Lövheim et al. 2018).
Our survey confirms this, since most Scandinavians accept the public visibility
of religious symbols, such as a cross, church tower, and even signs showing
the location of a mosque and minarets, but oppose the right of religious leaders
to express their views in public. Expressions of Christianity are also more accept-
ed than those relating to Islam, both among public servants and in public set-
tings, including public service media.
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4.3 Politicization, Culturalization, and
Securitization of Religion
Recent studies show that references to religion have become more diversified
and debates about religion have increased in Scandinavian media in the past
decades (Niemelä and Christensen 2013; Lövheim and Linderman 2015; Døving
and Kraft 2013). However, these debates tend to cluster around two issues in par-
ticular. The first concerns tensions between religious diversity and what are per-
ceived as core social values, such as the rights of women, LGBTQ persons, and
children. In the media, these issues have become linked emblematically to
Islam and, to some extent, to conservative Christianity through topics such as
the hijab, circumcision, and the rights of young people to choose life partners.
The second issue concerns the legitimacy of various religious expressions,
where some expressions become portrayed as being ‘bad’ or as ‘pseudo’ forms
of religion. Such claims are typically made about Islam, but also about religious
expressions in the New Age spectrum, particularly when religious and economic
interests are assumed to overlap, and when key national traditions or institu-
tions are challenged. Debates in the Norwegian context about the so-called
‘Angel School’ (Astarte Education/Soulspring) that was initiated by the Norwe-
gian Princess, Märtha Louise, is an example of this (Døving and Kraft 2013).
These debates show how historical models of the role of religion in society
have become re-articulated in response to new challenges. They are expressed in
the increasing tendency to politicize religion in parliamentary debates, which
started in the late 1990s (Lindberg 2014; Ivanescu 2010). In these debates, it is
primarily the right-wing nationalist and populist parties that criticize Islam as
a threat to security and to national identity, and thus mobilize Christianity in de-
fence of cultural values. This use of religion to drive a political discussion about
national values and identity can be seen as part of what Brubaker (2017) terms a
shift from a nationalist to a ‘civilizationist’ position among nationalist–populist
parties in Western Europe. Here, the traditional opposition between the ‘people’
and the ‘elite’ is combined with an opposition between ‘the nation’ and those
groups that are characterized as threatening the nation, re-conceived in civiliza-
tional terms. While Islam becomes framed as a threat towards national culture,
Christianity is framed as a cultural and civilizational identity, connected to mod-
ern, progressive, and liberal values, primarily those regarding gender and sexual
identity. In this process, Christianity is selectively embraced ‘not as a religion but
as a civilizational identity, a matter of belonging rather than believing’ (Brubaker
2017, 14). In a similar way, liberalism and secularism are selectively embraced
and are used to legitimize ‘our’ way of life in opposition to Islam. Brubaker ar-
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gues that the combination of Christianity and secular liberalism to construct and
defend national identity is distinctive in Northern European debates (ibid.).
This use of religion to imagine the characteristics, as well as the boundaries,
of national identity and values is also connected to a securitization of European
public discourse, in which Islam, and Muslims in general, are framed as a poten-
tial threat to national security. This discourse has become established in the
media following the 9/11 attack in New York (Flood 2012), and it is reinforced
through frequent reports that connect Islam to social problems and political vi-
olence (see Knott et al. 2013; Niemelä and Christensen 2013; Hjelm 2015). Securi-
tization, as a media discourse, is also shaped by a country’s history of involve-
ment in international conflicts and political debates on immigration and
integration. In the contemporary Scandinavian situation, with experiences of mi-
gration and terror attacks in major cities, such frames become reactivated and
mobilized, and contribute to negative portrayals of Islam as a threat to national
security and culture in the media, as well as in political debates.
4.4 Media – A Major Site for Encountering
Religion
In the Scandinavian countries religion can be seen as a mediatized phenomen-
on, in the sense that the various mass media have become the primary source of
information about religious issues, rather than religious organizations (Lundby
et al. 2018). This is one of the main arguments in the theory of mediatization
as applied to religion (Hjarvard 2012, 2013; see Chapter 3). Hjarvard argues
that in this process religious symbols also become disembedded from their tradi-
tional context, and they are circulated and reinterpreted according to the pur-
pose of various media actors.
Our survey confirms that when asked about encounters with religion and be-
lief, Scandinavians most frequently choose television and newspapers. Next in
ranking come family, friends, and school or work. As the table below shows,
the Internet and social media are less frequent sites; somewhat more than 10
percent encounter religion through these media. Churches and other religious
sites are the least frequent options.
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Table 4.1 Contexts for the encounter with, or information about, questions related to religion
and belief. Percentages. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Denmark Norway Sweden
Yes No Yes No Yes No
In the family % % % % % %
Among friends % % % % % %
School or workplace % % % % % %
Through TV % % % % % %
Magazines (paper or digital) % % % % % %
Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) % % % % % %
Other websites % % % % % %
Radio % % % % % %
Church, mosque, other religious place % % % % % %
N   
The mediatization of religion, then, interacts with, and enhances, the processes
of social and cultural change in which the meaning and legitimacy of religious
beliefs, to a greater extent than before, become a matter for negotiation and con-
testation. This underlines a second aspect of mediatization, namely, that medi-
ated accounts of religion provide a ‘horizon’ for communication and interaction
about religion (Lundby 2013, 199). Such interactions take place between actors
with varying interests, such as media producers, religious and belief organiza-
tions, but also political parties, enterprises, and individuals. This situation in-
creases the possibility of tension between various, and perhaps conflicting, inter-
ests and values relating to the public role of religion. A further implication is that
the processes of ‘managing and producing consensus’ in line with views that are
consensually accepted by a particular audience, become more important (Clark
2012, 113).
4.5 Forms of Mediatized Religion
Stig Hjarvard (2012) has described three main forms of mediatized religion in
contemporary society, and these are defined by the extent to which religious ac-
tors and the logics of various media genres shape the public visibility of religion:
70 Mia Lövheim, Liv Ingeborg Lied
– Religious media refers to media organizations and productions that are pri-
marily controlled and performed by religious actors
– Journalism on religion refers to the ways that secular media, primarily news
media, bring religion to the political public sphere
– Banal religion concerns the ways that various forms of entertainment media
make religion visible in the cultural public sphere
Hjarvard’s approach to mediatization starts from an institutional level and em-
phasizes the ‘structuring influence of the media’ for social interaction and mean-
ing making (2014, 127). The implications of mediatization for changes in the sig-
nificance of religion in society is a question of continuous debate (see Lövheim
2014). On the one hand, mediatization can contribute to secularization, in the
sense that the public and collective role of religion as a social institution is weak-
ened. On the other hand, new ways in which various forms of media increasingly
make religion visible in late modern society can also be interpreted as a re-en-
chantment of the media, as increased agency for religious actors, and as the pro-
duction of new tools for religious creativity in media audiences. Studies of reli-
gious change in contemporary society show that, in order to grasp this spectrum
of the various outcomes of mediatization for individual and collective forms of
religion, the theory needs to be based on an understanding of religion that rec-
ognizes new varieties of institutionalized forms and aspects that go beyond cog-
nitive belief (Lövheim 2011; Lied 2012). A salient part of this criticism concerns
the way that the concept of ‘banal religion’ might reinforce the hierarchies of re-
ligious expressions in society in regard to what qualifies as ‘proper’ or ‘pseudo-’
religion (Axelson 2015; Kraft 2017).
These debates show that a more nuanced grasp of contemporary religion
and its complexities, as well as a more dynamic approach to the interplay be-
tween media development and religious change, is needed. This implies events
where increased engagement with religion can lead to changes within media
forms and genres (Lövheim and Axner 2014, 43). Siv Ellen Kraft (2017) argues
that phenomena that are categorized as ‘banal religion’ are New Age plots and
storylines that are taken over by the media, rather than the media production
of religion. Another example is how the increasing use of religion in debating
political issues in editorials and columns contributes to the challenging of a
strict secularist discourse that separates religion and politics in the media (Löv-
heim 2017). By using and discussing various forms of mediatized religion, this
book is part of an ongoing process in developing the theory of a mediatization
of religion (Hjarvard and Lövheim 2012; Lundby 2013).
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4.6 A Combined Analytical Approach
In a review of current research on the increased visibility of religion in western
societies, Titus Hjelm (2015, 8) points to the risks of confusing visibility and de-
bate over religion – as portrayed in, for example, the media – with an increasing
importance of religion among individuals, or of religious organizations in soci-
ety. The mediatization of religion implies that the contemporary media supply
people with symbolic resources for individual meaning making, as well as for
collective conflicts relating to religion. In this book, our focus is to study inter-
actions with representations of religion in the media among various publics,
how various media enable and structure these interactions, and how these inter-
actions relate to a larger debate about the place of religion in Scandinavian so-
cieties. It is, however, not to evaluate how mediatized religion affects individual
beliefs or particular religious organizations.
Our focus on interactions with the public and mediatized expressions of re-
ligion requires an approach to religion that is able to capture an interplay be-
tween previously established, institutionalized forms of religion and challenges
to the meaning and legitimacy of these forms that increased mediatization
brings, in the form of contestation and negotiation among a larger spectrum
of actors. As discussed in the previous section, a definition of religion that priv-
ileges certain historical institutional forms of, primarily, Christianity, is too nar-
row to account for this interplay alone. Likewise, a ‘culturalist’ ethnographically
inspired approach to religion as any form of meaning making that ‘moves be-
yond the mundane to the level of particular significance’ (Hoover 2006, 23)
makes it difficult to differentiate between various forms of meaning making,
and to account for how institutional forms of religion inform such interactions
(Hjarvard 2011; Lövheim 2014).
A way to meet the analytical challenge of analysing how the mediatized vis-
ibility of religion informs interactions in various public settings that are explored
in this book, is to combine two interrelated approaches to religion. Previous
studies of changes in the public visibility of religion on an institutional level
in the Scandinavian countries have used the classical, substantive definition
of religion that is offered by Michael Hill (see Furseth 2018):
The set of beliefs which postulate and seek to regulate the distinction between an empirical
reality and a related and significant supra-empirical segment of reality; the language and
symbols which are used in relation to this distinction; and the activities and institutions
which are connected with its regulation. (Hill 1973, 42–43)
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This kind of definition specifies religion to be a particular form of meaning mak-
ing that is expressed in beliefs, language, and symbols that concern a ‘supra-em-
pirical segment of reality’. Furthermore, it specifies that religion is expressed in
social ‘activities and institutions’, such as churches, mosques, prayer, or the
wearing of a hijab. For the present discussion, this kind of definition serves
the purpose of identifying when certain institutionalized forms of religion
emerge in the public debate, and how these become reinforced or challenged
in these interactions. As the following case studies show, media producers
and audiences in mediated contestations of religion in Scandinavia often refer
to particular discursive and social forms of religion, such as fundamentalism,
Islam, or the Lutheran Church. A substantive definition is useful in identifying
such forms through words, symbols, images, and claims that refer to a transcen-
dent or supra-empirical dimension. Furthermore, such a definition is useful in
identifying actors that claim to represent, or become associated with, particular
social forms of religion, such as Christian, Muslim or interfaith organizations
(see Chapters 11 and 12).
The substantive approach to religion is, however, less useful for analysing
how religion becomes contested in social interactions. References to Christian
values or Muslim practices in political debates or in populist arguments for a civ-
ilizationist position can take a substantive form, as in explicit references to par-
ticular organized forms of religion, such as the Islamic extremist group ISIS or
the symbol of the Christian cross. ‘Common sense’ references to religion that cir-
culate in conversations at the workplace or among friends and family can also
refer to substantive elements albeit in a more implicit or general form. However,
the meaning of these references cannot be decided solely on the basis of a sub-
stantive definition of religion. As the survey findings indicate, Scandinavian re-
spondents may discuss mediatized representations of Islam as a way of articulat-
ing sentiments of a threat to national culture, rather than a concern with beliefs
in transcendent beings, or the meaning of certain practices.
Several studies in this book analyse such situations, where symbols, tradi-
tions, practices, and artefacts are given meaning as being ‘religious’ through var-
ious uses, contestations, and negotiations, and how social identities and rela-
tions are formed from such interactions. In order to analyse such interactions,
a definition that focuses on the substance of religion must be combined with
an approach that focuses on the meaning and role given to religion, when this
term is used in a particular situation of social interaction.
Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, in their introduction to the book Religion,
Media, and the Public Sphere, argue that religion needs to be studied as ‘practi-
ces of mediation’ that ‘claim to mediate the transcendental, spiritual, or super-
natural and make these accessible for believers’ (2006, 7). By emphasizing the
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practices of mediation this brings into focus that the meaning and legitimacy of
certain forms of religion is an outcome of how – through different material forms
and practices – it is mediated. This approach thus makes mediation an intrinsic
part of what constitutes religion.
Approaching religion as an intrinsically mediated phenomenon has many
parallels to James Beckford’s social constructionist² approach to religion
(2003: 3). Beckford starts from the deregulation of religion in advanced industrial
societies, where religion has come ‘adrift from its former points of anchorage but
is no less potentially powerful as a result’ (Beckford 1989, 170). His conclusion is
not that historical, institutionalized forms of religion lose significance in this sit-
uation, but that such expressions of religion remain a ‘potent cultural resource or
form which may act as the vehicle of change, challenge or conservation’ (ibid.).
However, the meaning and function of such expressions of religion in society
have become more contested, and therefore less predictable. Fitting with the
focus in this book on how religious meaning and authority, through mediatiza-
tion, become contested, Beckford argues that questions about what religion is,
and about its place in society, become a ‘“site” where boundary disputes are en-
demic and where well-entrenched interest groups are prepared to defend their
definition of religion against opponents’ (2003, 13; see Hjelm 2015, 10).
This kind of social constructionist approach underlines that the meanings of
religious beliefs and practices, the ways in which they claim to mediate the tran-
scendent and regulate social relations, is subject to change through processes of
social interaction. Previously institutionalized or ‘sedimented’ meanings associ-
ated with religion in a society constitute ‘authoritative guides not only to usage
of the term but also to social action’ (Beckford 2003, 4). Nevertheless, new ways
of using such forms, and disputes about their proper use and meaning, also
mean that they are changing. In this way, the meaning of religion is not fixed,
but is constructed in particular social settings, in negotiations between various
meanings and interests that are articulated by religious authorities, actors in
media, voluntary organizations, teachers, and politicians. The task of researching
religion from such an approach thus becomes to ‘analyse the processes whereby
the meaning of religion is, in various situations, intuited, asserted, doubted,
 The terms social ‘constructionism’ and ‘constructivism’ for conceptualizing human construc-
tion of meaning in modern society are used in various ways in literature. In choosing the term
‘social constructionist’ we emphasize the importance of social interaction and material aspects
for the construction of meaning rather than focusing on individual cognitive processes (see
Hjelm 2014:6–7). Couldry and Hepp (2017:21) uses the term ‘social constructivism’ but argues
in a similar manner for the significance of social and material aspects in order to understand
the role of the media in the social construction of reality.
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challenged, rejected, substituted, re-cast, and so on’ (ibid., 3). The emphasis on
relations of power and material conditions in particular situations of social inter-
action also means that the strength of various constructions, in terms of their im-
plications for structuring individual perceptions and actions, varies and needs to
be part of the analysis.
4.7 Studying Contested and Mediatized Religion
The case studies in this book approach religion through the combined analytical
approach outlined in this chapter in various ways depending on the authors’ dis-
ciplinary perspective, empirical material, and level of analysis. In this way, the
book as a whole captures various aspects of how religious expressions in public
spaces become thematized and enacted through the media as objects of conflict,
or as resources to handle social and cultural tensions.
The following chapters analyse how particular religious organizations and
practices become represented in the media, and situations where symbols con-
nected to a certain religious tradition, such as the Muslim hijab or the Christian
cross, become the subject of contestation in social interactions. Chapters 7, 8,
and 10, discuss questions as to how particular media affordances in public serv-
ice media and local newspapers influence the ways in which religion is repre-
sented in the public realm; this includes the representation of religion through
certain frames, the selection of actors for representing various claims, and the
strategies that are used to present alternative images of religion.
In other chapters, the combined analytical approach to religion is used to
study settings in which mass mediated representations of religion become ob-
jects of contestation, negotiation, and reinterpretation in situations of social in-
teraction, such as social media (Chapter 6), classrooms (Chapters 14 and 15), and
local civic settings (Chapters 11 and 12). Here, the authors analyse assumptions
and discussions about religion and religious people, and social relations and po-
sitions formed on the basis of various understandings of religion, for example,
where ‘religion’ is used to articulate ‘common’ values among and differences be-
tween various social groups in society.
The interplay between a substantive and a social constructionist approach to
‘religion’ that is proposed here can, through these various applications, be fruit-
ful in developing the theory of the mediatization of religion. It aligns with the
discussion around how to relate an institutional and a social constructionist tra-
dition in mediatization theory through a common focus on social interaction and
media’s role in the communicative construction of socio-cultural reality (see
Lundby 2013, 196, 200; Couldry and Hepp 2017). The social constructionist per-
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spective emphasizes that forms of mediatized religion – such as journalism on
religion, religious media, and banal religion – need to be approached as contin-
uous and always (re‐)situated processes. While recognizing media as an impor-
tant agent in the shaping of such expressions of religion, it shifts attention to
the process of the continuous reshaping and reinterpretation of such expres-
sions – in which a variety of actors take part – as they circulate and are engaged
in new environments. By focusing on how religion is given meaning in social in-
teraction, we can also refine the theory on the mediatization of religion in rela-
tion to the role that media users play in the communication dynamic.
Finally, an analysis of mediatized religion that combines a substantive and a
social constructionist approach may contribute to the discussion about the vis-
ibility and significance of religion in the public sphere. The heightened visibility
of religion in the media means that religion becomes ‘more visible, present and
hence available for mobilization, contestation and criticism in the public sphere’
(Herbert 2011, 627). Approaching religion through a combined focus on institu-
tional forms and the contestation of these in mediatized situations of social in-
teraction can enable a better understanding of when, how, and with what impli-
cations such processes unfold in contemporary Scandinavia.
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Chapter 5
Perspectives: Cross-Pressures on Public
Service Media
Abstract: Through online services, the Scandinavian public service broadcasters
have managed to retain strong positions as public service media (PSM) among
the audiences in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Social and political changes
in the Scandinavian populations influence the ways PSM involve themselves
in conflicts that relate to religion. The growing cultural and religious diversity
of the Scandinavian countries, along with digitalization and commercialization,
shape PSM publics with varying, and perhaps conflicting, interests and needs.
This has put the PSM under political pressure to alter their programming. On
the one hand, their obligation to provide a common, and perhaps even a unify-
ing, public space for the whole nation, in some cases, has become more pro-
nounced. On the other hand, they are encouraged to take into account the multi-
plicity of voices and subcultures that exist among their audiences and users.
Keywords: public service media, radio, television, religion, culture
Public service media (PSM) occupy a strong position in the Scandinavian coun-
tries and they continue to play important roles in the dissemination of informa-
tion and discussions about issues of public interest and contestation involving
religion. In some cases, PSM may become the subject of such conflicts when con-
troversies develop around the representation of religion. Our empirical analyses
concerning the roles of PSM in such conflicts are spelled out in detail in the sub-
sequent three chapters, with a case study from each of the three countries.
‘Public service media’ are national ‘broadcasting’ corporations that have de-
veloped a presence on the Internet alongside ‘linear’ radio and television trans-
missions. PSM companies may be commercially or publicly funded. In both
cases, they have a public mandate that is derived from the national parliaments,
and they report their activity to national bodies.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, we will characterize the his-
torical origins and institutional contexts of the present Scandinavian public serv-
ice organizations and their obligations, and compare these to other media sys-
tems. Secondly, we consider the contemporary challenges that PSM face in
view of both a changing media environment and a more diverse population,
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in terms of religion and culture. Thirdly, we provide a framework for the case
studies (in Chapters 6, 7, and 8).
5.1 Historical Origin and Institutional Context
Although media with public service obligations may be found in many countries
around the globe, they clearly have a different and more prominent position in
the media systems in Scandinavia compared with, for instance, the role of the
public service media in the US or Eastern Europe. In contrast to countries
where PSM play minor roles, PSM programmes have historically been utilized
by a majority of the populations in Scandinavia. Although there today is compe-
tition with other providers, public service radio and television still hold a strong
position in the national media landscapes. The historical, institutional, and po-
litical contexts of PSM in Scandinavia are important to consider in order to un-
derstand the possibilities and dilemmas that public service media face when po-
litical, social, and cultural conflicts are increasingly interpreted through
religious frames.
The PSM in Scandinavia are the continuation of state-owned corporations
under specific broadcasting guidelines and policies that are monitored by bodies
appointed by the governments. In effect, there was a radio and television mo-
nopoly in all three Scandinavian countries until the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury. Following digitalization and the spread of the Internet, these corporations
have expanded their public service activities to most digital media platforms, for
instance, computers, tablets, and mobile phones. The public service broadcast-
ing corporations in Scandinavia have thus moved from PSB, public service
broadcasting, to PSM, public service media (Lowe and Bardoel 2007), as these
corporations now operate on cross-media platforms (Carpentier, Schrøder, and
Hallett 2014). The Scandinavian corporations were ahead with these develop-
ments. We apply the term PSM to the multi-platform services that emanate
from the established ‘broadcasting’ corporations.
PSB in Scandinavia was inspired by the BBC,which was developed in Britain
in the 1920s by the first General Director, John Reith. The BBC was founded on
the idea that it should not be for-profit, like the private radio companies in
the US, nor should it be directly state controlled, as was the case in authoritarian
regimes, such as the Soviet Union. Public service also meant national coverage
and a national monopoly (Briggs 1995). This was during the early days of radio.
Reith considered religious programming to be part of the public service mission
and put religion under the national public service monopoly. He introduced re-
ligious talks and the broadcast of church services on Sundays, but kept a tight
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grip on them. Speakers had to submit their manuscripts to the BBC in advance.
The senior clergy were sceptical, as they found the broadcasting of church serv-
ices to be an invasion of a secular body into a theological domain. Reith an-
swered by developing a church service designed and delivered specifically for
radio which became very popular among the audience, but which was contested
by the leaders of various religious groups (Wolfe 1984, 3– 17). In the BBC’s edi-
torial shaping of religious rituals and messages, an early mediatization of reli-
gion (see Chapter 4) can thus be observed.
Since the inception of the BBC, the meaning of the concept of ‘public service’
has changed over time. It has been applied in relation to shifting policy purposes
on the role of broadcasting in society, or for various ideological stances. The dis-
tinction between American and Scandinavian radio was continued when televi-
sion was introduced (Linderman 1993). There has been a sliding away from Re-
ith’s sense of ‘public service’ as a public utility, to one where broadcasting is
carried out in the service of the public sphere and, further, to broadcasting in
the service of the individual listener or viewer (Syvertsen 1999). This latter mean-
ing of the term is strengthened by the intensified commercialization and the
many media user options that are given by digitalization, and by the general in-
dividualization of society.
5.2 The PSM Companies in Scandinavia
It is typically the former monopolies and publicly owned PSM corporations that
are listed as ‘public service’ entities in scholarly works (Syvertsen et al. 2014; Hu-
janen, Weibull, and Harrie 2013). However, it is reasonable to include commer-
cial corporations with a government-issued mandate and public service obliga-
tions.
Denmark’s TV2 has public service obligations for both its main national tele-
vision channel and the regional network, and they form the advertising-funded
counterpart to the purely license-financed DR (formerly Danmarks Radio) televi-
sion outlets. Both companies offer Internet based services. DR also runs public
service radio channels. Radio24syv is a licence funded private public service na-
tional talk radio channel with public service obligations.
In Norway, NRK (Norsk rikskringkasting), with television and radio channels
and Internet services, is the state-owned PSM. There are commercial companies
with public service mandates and obligations as well: TV2 offers television chan-
nels and applications on the Internet. The radio companies P4 and Radio Norge
are both listed as public service (allmennkringkasting).
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In Sweden, the radio broadcaster SR (formerly Sveriges Radio) and the tele-
vision branch, SVT (formerly Sveriges Television), are separate public service
companies, alongside the educational broadcaster UR (Utbildningsradion),
which all also provide Internet services. The three companies are owned by an
independent foundation. The Swedish Parliament decides on the mandate of
the companies, but is not represented on the boards. There is no acknowledged
commercial PSM in Sweden. TV4, the only commercially funded media company
that can broadcast from Sweden, pays a yearly fee to the state.
5.3 Scandinavian PSM in a Comparative
Perspective
In Northern Europe, PSM have been regarded as a cornerstone of and as a con-
tributor to democracy. However, technological, economic, and political changes
challenge the position of PSM (Ibarra, Nowak, and Kuhn 2015). Reality may not
match the ideals. Based on a study of 56 countries around the world Damian
Tambini (2014) points out the problems that are occurring for the public service
media: dwindling political support, governmental interference, declining audi-
ence rates, disputes on the PSB remit with private interests, and the contentious
transition into digital PSM solutions.
In the Nordic ‘media welfare states’, public service broadcasting and its ex-
tension into PSM stands strong on all of the four pillars that are pointed out by
Syvertsen et al. (2014): They are considered public goods, enjoy editorial free-
dom, are part of a wider cultural policy, and they work in cooperation with
the state, the media industries and the public as main stakeholders. However,
this strong position is challenged by national market competition and the inter-
national media environment, and editorial autonomy is always at stake in Nordic
public service media (Nissen 2013).
Within the Nordic region, we concentrate on the three Scandinavian coun-
tries (see Chapter 1). With the proactive move to public service multimedia com-
panies, the Scandinavian PSBs have defended their position and legitimacy. The
political challenge is to maintain a viable balance between demands from the
state, the market, and the civil society, e.g. in questions on whether the licence
fee should be kept or replaced by another form of funding (Lund and Lowe 2013).
The Scandinavian PSBs have managed to keep high user attendance during the
transition into PSMs (Nissen 2013). They still dominate listening and viewing fig-
ures, but are, at the same time, fighting against dwindling attention among
young people and are trying to compete with the growing interest in streaming
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services, like Netflix and HBO.¹ The multiplatform series Skam from NRK, on
young people’s identity struggles in relation to love and religion, captured
huge audiences in Norway, Denmark, and beyond (Bjerkan and Aanstad 2017,
2), demonstrating that the PSM are able to attract a new generation (Sundet
2017).
Social media and other new media services may mould the meaning and
shape of public service media, as ‘publics are brought into being through histor-
ically specific media practices’ (Hirschkind, de Abreu, and Caduff 2017). Contem-
porary public service media are ‘public’ primarily as a result of their public man-
date, which is issued by the national government to reach the entire population.
However, they extend their publicness by inviting their users to actively partici-
pate on PSM digital platforms (Lowe 2010), thus catering to collective publics
among their audiences (Livingstone 2005; Moe 2010). In sum, they remain public
by demonstrating their ‘public value’ in a competitive media market (Lowe and
Martin 2014; Donders and Moe 2011).
5.4 Contemporary Challenges to Public Service
Media
The ongoing changes with digitalization and commercialization towards a more
competitive media environment and the growing differences in the sociocultural
background of the public, put cross-pressure on PSM. On the one hand, they are
increasingly prompted to cater to audiences as consumers in a media market,
and therefore seek to maximize audience ratings. On the other hand, they are ob-
liged to provide cultural programming that primarily caters to minorities or to
high-brow segments of the population. While experts may be invited to discuss
religious conflicts, audience interests may be geared towards popular coverage
of religious topics. The Swedish media scholar Gunilla Hultén points, in a similar
vein, to the conflicting pressures on public service media as they balance be-
tween the ambition to increase diversity and ensure market shares, and at the
same time keep democratic commitments and relate to issues critical for immi-
gration (Hultén 2016, 336).
PSM have to handle the dilemmas that arise of inclusion and exclusion and
find strategies to include minority groups without reproducing stereotypes. The
logics of the media market, national political considerations, and social and cul-
 Relevant statistics are available from Nordicom, http://nordicom.gu.se/en/statistics-facts/
media-statistics
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tural developments thus interact with each other in various ways, providing both
possibilities and constraints through which PSM can engage actively with reli-
gious conflicts.
5.5 Public Service Under Emerging Diversity
There is a built-in tension in the PSM between facilitating critical discussion and
contributing to common cultural points of reference. This also applies to the cov-
erage of religion. The growing cultural and religious diversity of the Scandinavi-
an countries make the public to which PSM cater increasingly diverse, with vary-
ing and perhaps conflicting interests and needs. This put PSM under political
pressure to alter their programming. On the one hand, their obligation to provide
a common, and perhaps even a unifying, public space for the whole nation has,
in some cases, become more pronounced while, at the same time, they are also
encouraged to take into account the multiplicity of voices and cultures that ac-
tually exist among their audiences and users.
Politically, these developments have led to demands for the public service
media to strengthen their commitments to the national culture, as a form of cul-
tural defence against globalism and multiculturalism. This has been supported,
not least by right-wing national populist parties, such as the Danish People’s
Party, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Sweden Democrats. At the same
time, more liberal and left-wing cultural and political actors have argued for
the public service media to acknowledge the growing diversity in these societies
and to provide more culturally and religiously inclusive programming. The mixed
pressures on the PSM have had varying outcomes: The balancing act between
PSM serving a common national culture, together with a culturally diverse pop-
ulation, has been spelled out somewhat differently and also reflects the political
situation in each of the Scandinavian countries.
The formal obligations of the key PSM organizations NRK, SVT and DR, dem-
onstrate these differences in relation to the ways in which they balance different,
and potentially oppositional, considerations. In the current stipulations of the
Norwegian NRK’s obligations (NRK-plakaten), it is clearly stated that ‘NRK
must strengthen the Norwegian language, identity, and culture’ and therefore
‘a large part of its offerings must have a Norwegian background and reflect Nor-
wegian realities’ and ‘communicate the cultural heritage of Norway’. At the same
time, it also states: ‘NRK must communicate knowledge about different groups
and the diversity of Norwegian society. NRK must create arenas for debate and
information about Norway as a multicultural society’. With regard to religion,
we also see obligations that point in the directions of both unity and diversity:
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‘NRK must reflect Norway’s religious heritage and the diversity of outlooks and
religions in the Norwegian society’ (NRK 2014).
In the case of the Danish DR, we find similarly ambiguous obligations that
point towards both unity and diversity in the ‘Public service contract 2015– 18’,
which is a contract between the state and DR. Here, it is stipulated that ‘DR must
put special emphasis on its role as the promoter and communicator of Danish art
and culture and the Danish cultural heritage, including the Christian cultural
heritage.’ As a new addition to the public service contract it has, for example,
been explicitly stipulated that DR, in its annual overview, must report on ‘DR’s
communication of the Christian heritage’, a demand supported by the Danish
People’s Party. DR must also ‘gather the Danes in big and small communities
with content, experiences, and shared events’ at the same time as it must ‘reflect
the diversity of culture, philosophy of life, and living condition between the var-
ious parts of the kingdom’. It is furthermore stipulated that DR must support in-
tegration into Danish society (Kulturministeriet 2014). The official obligations of
the Danish DR seem to emphasize national culture and a national unifying role
(at the expense of cultural diversity), a focus which is somewhat less evident in
the Norwegian NRK.
The official obligations for Swedish SVT put less emphasis on the culturally
unifying dimension. The responsibility to cater to the national language, Swed-
ish, is clearly visible, but, generally, the ‘Licence for Swedish Television AB’ (Kul-
turdepartementet 2013) puts more emphasis on diversity. It states, for instance,
that ‘SVT must reflect the many different cultures and cultural expressions exist-
ing in Sweden’ and ‘programming activities must as a whole be based on per-
spectives of equal rights and pluralism’. In general, Swedish public service
broadcasters have a mandate from the Swedish government to provide education
and entertainment to all citizens, and that includes guidelines about independ-
ence, impartiality, and factuality, and the value of freedom of speech. Swedish
public service radio has, since 2008, been commissioned to represent the varia-
tions in the Swedish population from a perspective of equality and plurality,
within a framework of impartiality and factuality. Cultural plurality is to be
seen as a ‘natural part’ of the planning and evaluation of SR’s and SVT’s activ-
ities. During 2015, Swedish public service television (SVT) also renewed its policy
on plurality. Religion, faith, and other life views are to be included among the
perspectives from which SVT is to carry out its coverage of Swedish society. In
the balancing act between serving a common national culture and multicultur-
alism, the Swedish SVT thus seems to be more obligated to consider cultural di-
versity if compared to the two other Scandinavian PSM companies.
Changes in policies towards increasing the diversity in PSM show that dur-
ing the latter part of the 20th century these were often focused on providing spe-
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cial programming services (e.g. news and cultural affairs) for minorities, some-
times in the languages of the minorities in question. This type of minority pro-
gramming still exists, typically for indigenous minorities, such as the Sami or
the Greenlandic minorities, but such policies have increasingly been criticized
for supporting ghettoization within the national culture. During recent years, di-
versity has instead been stimulated within the overall programming for, in prin-
ciple, all audiences, since this is seen as a way to both encourage integration and
to make minorities visible. This ‘mainstreaming’ (Horsti and Hultén 2011) of cul-
tural diversity policies in the PSM has also been a reaction to religiously based
controversy and concern in the Nordic countries. As Horsti and Hultén argue
(2011), the non-integration of some minorities has become a major concern in
the early 21st century after a number of events that seemed to create a polariza-
tion between ‘Muslim’ and ‘European’ values.
The ‘mainstreaming’ approach to diversity has, in some cases, had the effect
of making PSM managers more conscious of questions relating to diversity, be-
cause the visibility of minorities in mainstream programmes has become a
more pertinent issue when compared to the strategy that was based on minority
programming. In Swedish SVT, the so-called headscarf episode from 2002
prompted the development of diversity policies. The episode concerned a Muslim
woman who was denied a position as a television programme host because she
wished to wear her hijab. The head of SVT’s corporate responsibility department,
Johan Hartman, argued that this incident revealed the need to update SVT’s pol-
icy on diversity, saying, ‘These types of questions are not always highly priori-
tized, but the headscarf debate placed diversity concerns into focus in a new
way’ (quoted from Horsti and Hultén 2011, 219). It is, however, not only PSM
managers and programme producers, but also audiences and politicians who
may react to the visibility (or lack of visibility) of religious minorities and major-
ities in the PSM. As our case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate,
the question about how to represent and frame cultural and religious diversity in
the PSM may be the cause of controversy in and of itself (Lövheim and Axner
2011).
5.6 Genres and User Interest
The public service media encompass several media forms (radio, television, and
Internet-based services) with a range of genres that cover news, current affairs,
and entertainment, with a particular responsibility for minorities and children’s
programming. Within this wide repertoire, the Scandinavian public service
media are involved in all three forms of mediatized religion (Hjarvard 2012).
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There is critical journalism on religion within news and actuality programmes.
Entertainment programming contains what Hjarvard (2012) has termed ‘banal re-
ligion’, the popular cultural uses of bits and pieces of religious symbols and ref-
erences remixed into drama series and other popular programmes. The third
form of mediatized religion is ‘religious media’, usually produced by religious or-
ganizations on their premises.
Within the Scandinavian PSM, the continued practice, inspired by the early
BBC, of transmitting Christian worship services and of keeping space for devo-
tions based on a Christian tradition come close to the category of religious
media. These genres are usually regarded as classical ‘religious programmes’,
along with psalms and music programmes with a Christian reference. The cate-
gory is now renamed ‘life stance’ programmes. However, the diversity is still lim-
ited. Although the PSM company has editorial responsibility, most of these pro-
grammes are dominated by the Christian religious tradition (and primarily the
Lutheran majority churches). In this sense, these programmes could, to some ex-
tent, be regarded ‘religious media’ (see Lundby et al. 2018).
Table 5.1 Should proclamation programmes in DR/NRK/SVT refer to several religions or only to
Christianity? Percentages. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Denmark Norway Sweden
The PSMs should not transmit such programmes from any religion   
All religions should have the same share of such programmes   
The programming should relate to the number of members   
Most of such programmes should refer to Christianity   
All such programming should refer to Christianity   
Do not want to answer / Don’t know   
Sum   
(N) () () ()
User expectations may differ according to genre. For instance, in a debate
programme or talk show with online audience interaction, audiences may expect
a certain level of tension, and may be disappointed if the invited speakers are too
cordial towards one another. Similarly, some audiences may have very strong
opinions that religious devotional programmes have no place on PSM and that
religion should only feature in the news or in educational programmes. Yet oth-
ers may believe that there is too little religious programming across all genres,
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and demand that Christianity receive far more positive exposure. In our survey
(see Chapter 2) we asked about people’s attitudes towards the ‘religious pro-
grammes’. In Denmark and Norway, the question was related to DR and NRK, re-
spectively, both carrying radio and television channels. In Sweden, the question
was restricted to the television company SVT. The proclamation programmes are
themselves contested among the audiences, as seen from Table 5.1.
Due to journalistic standards in the regulations of the Scandinavian PSMs
which require unbiased and objective coverage, one might expect the PSM users
to share this intention. This is not the case when it comes to the coverage of the
world religions, where there is a similar pattern in attitudes on the coverage of
Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Although a majority, around half of the popula-
tion, fully or partially agree that their PSMs should cover all three religions in an
unbiased and objective way, there is a considerable portion of Scandinavians
who do not think these religions deserve such coverage. One in 4 Danes fully or
partially disagrees that the coverage needs to be unbiased and objective. This ap-
plies regardless of which religion is at stake. Among the Swedes this is the case for
1 of 5, with the Norwegians positioned in between. (See Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Public Service Media should only cover Islam/Judaism/Christianity in an unbiased
and objective way. Percentages. From CoMRel Survey, April 2015.
Notes: For the Danes both DR and TV2 are included as PSM. The Norwegian answers are about
NRK only, covering radio as well as television, while the Swedish answers are on SVT television
only. Number of responses (N): Denmark 1003, Norway 1090, Sweden 990.
* ‘Do not want to answer’ plus ‘Don’t know’
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It seems, thus, that Scandinavians take a stance that leans against religion in
general in public service media, regardless of which religious tradition in ques-
tion.
5.7 Implications for Authority
The previous sections outline the conditions offered by PSM in mediating the in-
creased visibility of religious diversity in Scandinavia, in particular with regard
to conflicts that concern the public role of religion. Religion is increasingly be-
coming a diverse and contested phenomenon in the Scandinavian societies, in-
fluencing the production of programmes on religion in PSM, and shaping the
conditions for their reception and for interaction among media users.
With the change to multi-media platforms, public service media have gone
through a transformation, from being monopoly broadcasting to competing
cross-platform media companies, which is parallel to the transition José Casano-
va (2003) describes for public religions in the modern world. They need to ac-
commodate to a shift from the idea of a unitary morally homogeneous nation
that is grounded in an (assumed) moral consensus, to a morally, culturally
and religiously pluralistic society that must strive for common ground, and a
fragile consensus, through public deliberation (Casanova 2003, 128).
The transfer of authority and of an assumed consensus on values and iden-
tity are the links between these changes in public religion and the transforma-
tions of the public service media. To release audience participation in contempo-
rary PSM, the religious actors appearing in the media must be able to express
themselves quickly and clearly in debates and must also relate to a common in-
terest in the public good.
Our studies, to a large extent, draw upon mediatization theory (see Chap-
ter 3), and in particular on the mediatization of religion (see Chapters 3 and 4)
and the dynamics of mediatized conflicts (Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær
2015). Mediatization, in general, challenges existing religious authorities and in-
troduces new or alternative bases for knowledge and authority. ‘Changing media
structures challenge existing forms of religious authority at the same time as
they allow new forms of authority to emerge – forms that have a more individ-
ualized and temporary character and rely on popular cultural forms’ (Hjarvard
2016, 15). This applies to Scandinavian PSM which still allow designated space
for worship and devotions in their programming schedules but mostly cover re-
ligion as a contested phenomenon in news and in diffuse forms of ‘the religious’
in entertainment programmes. The case studies in this section of the book dem-
onstrate the complexity of the implications of mediatization on authority, which
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is a global phenomenon (Hoover 2016). In the study of People and Belief in SR
(Chapter 8), media producers mainly reinforce, rather than challenge, traditional
religious authority (chairpersons, imams, professors, mostly men). In the Danish
case relating to the documentary series Rebellion From the Ghetto (Chapter 7), DR
brings in new voices, offering them authority through the careful planning of the
debate across media platforms. In the Norwegian ‘cross case’ (Chapter 6), media
users turn to a Facebook group to massively critique – or defend – the visibility
of religion in PSM news bulletins and in society at large.
Media users seem to react in very similar ways across very different mediat-
ized conflicts (Abdel-Fadil 2016). The following chapters deal with the contested
visibility of religion in public service media. To what degree, and in what ways,
have these Scandinavian media institutions become actively involved in repre-
senting a more diverse spectrum of religious actors and opinions? How do the
media users actively respond to the programmes through interactions and inter-
pretations? These are the questions explored in the three case studies on contro-
versies over religion in the public service media.
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Chapter 6
Nationalizing Christianity and Hijacking
Religion on Facebook
Abstract: Yes to wearing the cross whenever and wherever I choose (YWC) is a
Facebook group that was established in November 2013 to campaign for the
right of a television news anchor to wear a cross pendant. YWC with its more
than 100,000 likes, swiftly became a locus for discussing religion in society in
general. A range of participants, with various agendas and modes of interaction
are drawn to YWC: conservative Christians, nationalists, humanists, fervent sec-
ularists, and ardent atheists – ‘hijacking religion’ in multiple ways. Among those
positive to Christianity, it is for the most part construed as either a religion of
‘identity’ or ‘compassion’. This chapter builds on ethnographic research and fo-
cuses on the generic positions, repetitive patterns of communication, writing
styles, and modes of enacting the conflict(s). There is a particular emphasis
on how people’s emotions, narratives, and worldviews shape the way they en-
gage with mediatized conflict and play into the internal group dynamics.
Keywords: mediatized conflict, hijacking religion, Christianity, social media, na-
tionalism
6.1 Introduction
A Norwegian TV news anchor called Siv Kristin Sællmann wore a bejewelled
cross pendant while presenting the news in the autumn of 2013. Little did
Sællmann know that this deed would spark a huge controversy about religion
and public service media (PSM), or that more than 120,000 people would
‘like’ a Facebook group that supports her right to adorn herself with the cross
while reading the news.
The Facebook group Yes to wearing the cross whenever and wherever I
choose¹ (hereafter abbreviated to YWC) was created as a campaign group, but
swiftly developed into a multifaceted online space where conservative Christians
and other concerned citizens continue to discuss religion. YWC provides both a
window into what PSM audiences think about the NRK news anchor neutrality
 Ja til å bære korset når og hvor jeg vil in Norwegian.
OpenAccess. © 2018, Mona Abdel Fadil. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Non Commerical-NoDerivs 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110502060-011
policy and their varying opinions about what religion’s position in society ought
to be. There is a clear tendency that the YWC participants’ specific stance on the
initial cross controversy correlates with a parallel stance on religion in society.
For instance, those who advocate for the visibility of the cross on PSM, also
rally for the increased visibility of religion in general – and vice versa (Abdel-
Fadil, 2017). It is also clear that antipathies towards a particular religion may
serve to conflate positions on religion and immigration, a tendency that is not
exclusive to YWC (see chapters 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12).
Wearing a cross was swiftly deemed a breach of NRK neutrality policy for
news anchors. The policy prohibits the use of all religious and political symbols,
a fact that is often neglected by many participants in YWC. Thus, the NRK cross-
verdict only served to fuel the discussions in YWC. At the peak of the conflict in
November and December of 2013, YWC had more than 120,000 likes. The number
of likes has since fluctuated up and down as people have joined and left the
group in protest. Among those actively expressing their opinions in YWC, I
have identified five main clusters of participants: conservative Christians (CC),
nationalists (N), humanists (H), fervent secularists (FS), and ardent atheists
(AA). Some individuals may be betwixt and between clusters. The categorizations
are based on my analysis of statements and interaction patterns and function as
analytical tools.
In this chapter, I will illustrate how participants from these clusters typically
engage with conflict(s) and with one another in YWC. As will be elucidated, at
the very core of the performance of conflict(s) are struggles over religion. I will
focus on constructions of and contestations of Christianity in particular. Before
delving into the empirical examples, I situate the study by sharing a few reflec-
tions on methodology.
6.1.1 Methodology
This is an online ethnography of YWC, i.e. it is an in-depth and longitudinal re-
search of YWC as an online environment. Since observation is the main method,
I am able to also focus on participants’ conduct and interactions with one anoth-
er, and not only on the words they utter. Due to the overwhelming amount of
YWC data, the study is delineated in time. The time period under study runs
from November 2013 when the page was created to December 2013, covering a
six-week period during which activity on the page reached its peak. Data collec-
tion was conducted in 2015 and comprises all posts, comments, and replies dur-
ing these six weeks. I observed, logged, and coded all verbal interactions, repet-
itive communication patterns, positions, and roles in the group. In ethnographic
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research, data collection and analysis is a highly immersive process which does
not abide by the ‘data saturation’ principle. Instead, ‘more of the same’ type of
data is highly valued and seen as an opportunity to subject initial patterns dis-
covered in the data to further rounds of coding, to deepen the analysis. The ad-
vantage of this approach became clear when I stumbled across a small cluster of
ardent atheists a couple of months into the analysis. I subsequently discovered
that this group left a huge mark on the debates they threw themselves into.
In order to systematize my data, I kept a field diary, which includes: 1) a
‘methods log’ of methodological challenges and solutions, 2) ‘observations
notes’ which includes preliminary analysis and reflections, and 3) a ‘coding
log’ containing tweaks and adjustments of substantive codes. I coded the data
within four main parent codes – themes, roles, styles, and arguments – using
the qualitative analysis software program Nvivo. I will write in ethnographic
present.
Tricia Wang’s adaptation of Clifford Geertz’ iconic notion of ‘thick descrip-
tions’ is a good fit for what I do:
Thick Data is data brought to light using qualitative, ethnographic research methods that
uncover people’s emotions, stories, and models of their world (Wang 2016).
I was particularly interested in how people’s emotions, narratives, and world-
views shape the way they engage with mediatized conflict (see Chapter 3) and
the internal group dynamics of YWC. The longer I observed variations of interac-
tions and bursts of emotion in YWC, the more I realized that the term ’flaming’ is
not very useful as an analytical category unless it signifies something more spe-
cific or elaborate than simply passionately stirring up a debate. My understand-
ing of the term ‘flaming’ deepened during the ethnographical study.
Quotes in this chapter are reconstructions based on generic positions, repet-
itive patterns of communication, writing styles, and modes of enacting the con-
flict(s). The decision to reconstruct rather than quote verbatim is based on 1) my
interest in generic narratives and typical group dynamics, for which reconstruc-
tions suffice, and 2) ensuring the anonymity of those who participated in the de-
bates. This methodological choice is available to me, because generic narratives
are ubiquitous in YWC.
Critics may view reconstructions as tampering with the data. Yet, the idea
that verbatim quotes are pure, or unspoiled by the researcher’s selective choices
and subjectivities is an illusion. Reconstruction is already in much of what eth-
nographers do. Most notably, those of us who translate quotes from one lan-
guage to another are very much involved in reconstructing narratives, and adapt-
ing words, stylistic choices, and arguments in ways that we best believe
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represent that individual’s worldview in another language. But, we also recon-
struct when we omit ughs, spelling mistakes, punctuation mishaps, or cut and
paste from various parts of an interview or dialogue in order to provide a
more succinct slice of data. Speaking of which, I have, save for a couple of ex-
amples, not included any spelling mistakes or CAPSLOCK, extreme punctua-
tion!!!!!!! or emoticons (in this case, mostly smileys, crosses, hearts, and angry
faces) in my reconstructed quotations. This is because I have not systematically
coded and analysed the patterns in which such visual embellishments occur.
Quotes are twinned with pseudonyms and the first letters of the cluster that I
code such a statement within, for instance ‘CC’ for ‘conservative Christian’. At
times it is difficult to determine which cluster a statement belongs to. Therefore,
some quotes are assigned a double label such as ‘N/CC’. The frequency with
which each pseudonym appears in a reconstructed exchange is intentional,
and aimed at giving the reader a taste of the different sizes of the clusters,
their gender compositions and how many people from one cluster are typically
active in a debate.
Technologically, Facebook is structured in a way that gives rise to a partic-
ular set of media dynamics. Pinned posts are not always read, and the same
question or comment may be made repeatedly without any regard for what
the person(s) just before may have said. Typically, users’ responses cross each
other, partially due to the Facebook structure ‘reply to reply’, which can be cha-
otic in terms of who is replying to what – and whom – especially when hundreds
or thousands of comments are involved. Users who are not seasoned Facebook
users will be unaware of the difference between replying to a comment and re-
plying to a reply, contributing to random placement of their replies. There is also
a time lag, and when many people are responding to a post, comments may be
delayed before appearing, creating a mismatch with regards to which reply a
comment belongs to. This slight chaos may help explain why many comments
go largely unnoticed in the maze of Facebook comments. This chapter gives
the reader a unique insight into typical types of exchanges and the internal dy-
namics of YWC, and what the various types of participants are fighting for and
believe in.
6.2 Various Enactments of Conflict in YWC
6.2.1 Protesting the Cross Ban
Olga/CC: Norway is a Christian nation. We cannot accept that the cross is banned here. It
makes no sense. This is Norway. We are Christian.
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Rudolf/CC: I’m outraged! How can they ban the cross? It is a very important symbol of our
Christian identity.
Christian/N: Muslims can’t just come here and demand that we have a cross ban in Norway.
We have to protect our heritage from immigrants.What will they demand next? Erasing the
cross from the Norwegian flag?
Heidi/H: Holy moly! There is a lot of anger in this group because of this misunderstanding. I
repeat: There is no cross ban in Norway.
Magdalene/CC: I refuse to abide by this ridiculous verdict. I shall wear my cross with pride,
and nobody can stop me.
Laila/CC: I can’t believe that I am not allowed to wear the cross anymore in Norway.What is
the world coming to?
Rita/N: If they don’t like the cross they should go home.
Heidi/H: Take a deep breath. Unless you are an NRK news anchor, you can wear a cross
pendant anytime and anywhere you like.
Conservative Christians and nationalists are the largest clusters and contain both
women and men, with no noteworthy gender imbalance. Their enactment of the
conflict can be said to dominate the page, and hence conservative Christians and
nationalists play an active role in shaping the conflict(s). Conservative Christi-
ans, nationalists, fervent secularists, and ardent atheists often employ the lan-
guage of ‘speaking out’ and ‘speaking the truth’ (Abdel-Fadil 2016). They also
claim to be the silent majority or the real voice of the people, which is a charac-
teristic of other mediatized conflicts too (Figenschou et al. 2015). Particularly
among the conservative Christians and the nationalists, the idea that YWC pro-
vides a platform to say what needs to be said, but is often dismissed by politi-
cians, journalists, etc., circulates. Conservative Christians (and at times national-
ists) claim to speak for the Christian nation. This starting point is significant in
terms of affect, and shapes much of their emotive engagement with the mediat-
ized conflict. Papacharissi (2015) speaks of ‘affective publics’ which is an apt de-
scription of how participants in YWC respond to the postulate that there is gen-
eral cross ban in Norway. Such claims mobilize strong emotional responses.
Similarly, nationalists evoke emotive engagement based on fear of loss of nation-
hood.Yet such claims do not stand uncontested. Humanists, ardent atheists, and
fervent secularists ferociously battle against this reading of their nation and na-
tional identity.
The quotes illustrate how the various clusters of debaters perform the con-
flict for each other, but do not always interact with each other in a way that in-
volves ‘listening’ to other perspectives. Trigger themes, emotional cues, and emo-
tive reactions fuel the dynamics of mediatized conflict and push the buttons of
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individual debaters (Abdel-Fadil 2016). Conservative Christians typically rein-
force the idea that there is a cross ban or proclaim that they plan to defy the (al-
leged) cross ban just seconds after humanists have pointed out that there is in
fact no general cross ban in Norway. The idea that there is a general cross ban
in Norway is emotional ammunition for many conservative Christians, causing
them to react and repeat this postulate as if it were true. The sense of a threat-
ened Christian identity and a fear of the extinction of Christianity are tangible.
The focus becomes on preserving Christianity in Norway. Nationalists tend to
spur emotions and amplify the conflicts, by transforming the conflict into one
about the nation. They typically contribute to an escalation of the conflict by en-
gaging in spiralling argumentation and by evoking a series of worst-case scenar-
ios well suited to trigger emotive reactions from conservative Christians, declar-
ing that the cross will be obliterated from everything including the Norwegian
flag itself (ibid.). Both conservative Christians and nationalists can be said to ad-
here to ‘Christianity of identity’.
Notably, nationalists lament Muslims and immigrants taking over Norway
and tend to direct their emotive triggers towards fellow nationalists and the con-
servative Christians in an attempt to fuel their fury and entice them into buying
into the narrative of threatened nationhood. Stylistically the nationalists can be
said to erupt into the ‘enraged fan’ level of negative emotion in their outbursts
(Michailidou and Trenz 2015).
At the opposite end of the emotional spectrum, the humanists perform the
role of mediators. Humanists, unlike the majority of other debaters, generally
do not get entangled in highly emotionally charged renditions of the conflict. In-
stead, humanists attempt to defuse tensions, debunk myths, and create space for
a constructive debate – although they do at times display signs of exasperation
with other debaters’ efforts to trigger one another. Unlike other clusters, human-
ists are a small cluster, in which a handful of women are extraordinarily active.
Humanists leave a mark on practically all of the selected debates, displaying
what appears to be a tireless dedication to remediate the conflicts in a reconci-
liatory manner. A couple of the humanists copy and paste the same lengthy an-
swer time and time again, but others tailor their responses to each exchange. No-
tably, humanists primarily address conservative Christians, presumably in the
hope of disrupting the partial overlap between conservative Christians’ and na-
tionalists’ narratives. Humanists promote Christianity as compassion as a coun-
ter-narrative to Christianity as identity.
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6.2.2 Saving Christianity and the Nation
Torgrim/CC: We must protect our Christian heritage before it is lost forever.
Rita/N: Wake up!!!! Protect Christianity in Norway before it’s too late. Muslims and immi-
grants are taking over. Politicians are giving away our country.WAKE UP before it’s too late.
Georg/N: For me personally, Christianity is not important. But, Christianity is part of Nor-
wegian heritage and we cannot deny that.
Sonia/CC: I wear my cross with pride and I don’t think anybody has the right to tell me not
to wear the cross. This is Norway. Norway is a Christian country.
Georg/N: Christianity is the cornerstone of Norway. Nobody, not Muslims, atheists, or sec-
ularists can change that.
Olga/CC: I will wear my cross wherever I please and there ain’t nothing anyone can do to
stop me!
Rudolf/CC: If we do not wake up now – and protect our Christian heritage – there may not
be any traces of Christianity left.
Christian/N: Protect Norway before it’s too late. Muslims and immigrants are taking over.
Politicians are GIVING AWAY our country.
Therese/CC: Muslims are not to blame, it is the secularists and atheists who have de-Chris-
tianized Norway.
Frida/CC: Are we really not allowed to wear the cross anymore in Norway? I haven’t had any
bad experiences and I wear my cross every single day.
Oskar/AA: Most Norwegians are far too rational to believe in Christianity or religion. You’re
trying to sink the nation with your stupidity.
Oskar/AA: In order to believe in god, you have to close your eyes to facts and have half a
brain. You Christians are delusional.
Rudolf/CC: Your passionate anger about this proves that deep down you know that He ex-
ists.
This exchange illustrates how protecting Christianity is often conflated with pro-
tecting the nation, particularly for the nationalists but also to a certain degree for
the conservative Christians. It also provides a glance at how the participants take
turns in blaming a variety of others,which in fact is a recurring dynamic in medi-
atized conflicts in general (Abdel-Fadil 2016; Eskjær et al. 2015).
An overwhelming majority of conservative Christians (and nationalists) ap-
pear to either fuel or express no resistance to the postulate that there is a general
cross ban in Norway. Yet, the occasional conservative Christian interjects with a
sincere question (and some confusion) inquiring whether there is in fact a ban
and if others experience negative incidents. Such lone comments rarely provoke
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a response. Nationalists produce a significant number of emotive comments that
appear to be designed to either heat up or derail conversations, by transforming
the conflict into one about immigrants/Muslims threatening the nation. Like-
wise, ardent atheists, a tiny, exclusively male cluster, specialize at stirring up
emotions among conservative Christians.
Conservative Christians’ main concern is the preservation of Christianity.
They rally for more visibility of Christianity in public spaces, and often equate
the nation with themselves. The sense that wearing the cross is an act of defi-
ance, and a brave act of standing one’s ground, is a claim repeated by several
conservative Christians, and lends authority to the postulate that there is a
cross ban. Conservative Christians in their own rendition exhibit resolution
and agency when both wearing the cross, and when arguing passionately for
the right to wear the cross. These are considered heroic acts of taking a stand
against injustice and hence very important steps towards preserving Christianity
from complete extinction.
At times conservative Christians express an unveiled disdain for the ardent
atheists and fervent secularists. Other times they see the aggressive attacks from
the ardent atheists as a sign of a believer in denial, which may well be the worst
possible insult to ardent atheists. Yet I do not believe that the intention of the
conservative Christians in those instances is to cause offence. Based on my anal-
ysis of a number of such exchanges (and the context they appear in) I believe
that such projections are sincere, if somewhat bizarre.
Nationalists repeatedly mention how they do not consider themselves Chris-
tian, but that Christianity goes hand in hand with ‘Norwegianess’. Nationalists
focus extensively on the preservation of ‘Norwegian heritage’. In their own ren-
dition, conservative Christians and nationalists see themselves as representing
the majority of Norwegians, and consider Norway as a ‘Christian nation’ founded
on ‘Christian cultural heritage’. Christianity thus becomes a religion of identity
even for nationalists who do not believe in God.
Ardent atheists, much like the humanists, are only a small group of individ-
uals. But unlike the humanists who have managed to engage with practically all
the debates, ardent atheists only leave a mark (albeit a significant one) on a tiny
fraction of debates. Ardent atheists appear to only sporadically visit the Face-
book group, while humanists comment on practically all the debates. It is invar-
iably the ardent atheists who pair their narrative with ‘flaming’ behaviour and
exploit the full potential of emotive cues. Ardent atheists are unique in that
they enter a debate, bellow antagonistic commentary or insults, and then disap-
pear into thin air. The conduct of ardent atheists is distinct from the behaviour of
all other types of participants, and warrants being described as ‘flaming’ behav-
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iour. This is also the only cluster composed nearly exclusively of men. The fiery
debates ardent atheists ignite rage on long after they’re gone.
6.2.3 Religion of the Nation
Olga/CC: Norway is Christian. But, atheists and secularists are willing to deny our Christian
heritage.
Jenny/FS: Norway ain’t Christian! It is a secular state.
Rudolf/CC: We religious people of different faiths need to stick together. We have common
interests in preserving religion in society, unlike secularists and atheists who would be
happy to see religion disappear altogether.
Alfred /CC: Secularists and leftists think they own the country. But, they don’t. Christianity
is the state religion and most Norwegians are Christian.
Jenny/FS: Actually Christianity is not the state religion any more and the stats don’t back up
the argument that most Norwegians identify as Christian.
Christian/N: Muslims threaten Norway’s Christian heritage.
Niklas/FS: Hell no. The majority of Norwegians don’t believe in anything! And stop this rac-
ist spew. Muslims and immigrants have nothing to do with the NRK verdict on the cross.
Rita/N: I don’t consider myself Christian, but Christianity is part of our Norwegian heritage.
We can’t stand by while foreigners take over Norway and push away Christianity.
Niklas/FS: Racist pricks!
Thor/AA: Clinging on to archaic, violent, make-believe gods is not gonna save Norway. It is
you who need saving. From your own stupidity.
Geir/AA/FS: You lot are holding Norway back. It is a good thing you are not actually a ma-
jority.
Georg/N: Christianity is a Norwegian religion.
Thor/AA: This goes to show you how ignorant you are. Christianity is not made in Norway,
you dimwit. Neither do most Norwegians consider themselves Christians.
Magdalene/CC: They’ve banned the cross, Christmas celebrations.What will they ban next?
Alcohol? Pork????? This nonsense has to STOP!!!!.
When conservative Christians talk about the Christian nation and how the ma-
jority of Norwegians are Christians, ardent atheists and fervent secularists pro-
test, and often refer to recent statistics on the matter to back up their claim. Fer-
vent secularists are a much smaller cluster than the nationalists and
conservative Christians, but appear similarly gender-balanced.
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Sometimes comments can fit into more than one analytical category as ex-
emplified in this reconstructed exchange. For instance, the generic argument
that Norway isn’t Christian can be classified as fervent secularist or ardent athe-
ist. Much like how there may be overlap between some conservative Christians
and nationalists, or humanists and conservative Christians.
Ardent atheists are primarily concerned with protecting the nation from the
stupidity of religion. They talk to all Christians but specifically target conserva-
tive Christians. The uniqueness of the ardent atheists lies in their mode of per-
formance: they often participate briefly in a debate, by dispensing an antagonis-
tic atheist agenda and decrying all believers as a bunch of imbeciles, before
disappearing. This suggests that the ardent atheists may be more intent on per-
forming the conflict in a manner that leaves a mark on the debate and the other
media users than actually engaging in an exchange of positions over time. Their
main point of departure is that all religions are bad, and believing in God is irra-
tional.
Nationalists in the Facebook group talk among themselves in a way that
fuels and intensifies the existing conflict, but also in a way that that tries to
tempt conservative Christians with their worldview by transforming the conflict
into one about protecting the nation from its demise and introducing new con-
flicts, between Muslims and Christians, and foreigners and Norwegians. Muslims
(and to a lesser extent immigrants) are singled out as the archenemy of the na-
tion.
Indifference characterizes nationalists’ personal affiliation to religion. To na-
tionalists, Christianity is good because it is ‘Norwegian’, and by default every-
thing Norwegian is good. The presumed ‘Norwegianess’ of Christianity is contest-
ed and also ridiculed by others in YWC. The postulate that Christianity as
‘Norwegian’ is dismantled by those who see Norway as a secular, atheist, or a
multi-confessional nation. Fervent secularists, ardent atheists, humanists, and
even conservative Christians may be critical of this claim and mock the territorial
claims of ‘Christianity being made in Norway’.
6.2.4 Defining Christianity
Rita/CC: Muslims are a threat to Christianity.
Henrik/CC: To me Christianity is about compassion. It is about spreading the love and treat-
ing your fellow human with compassion. You cannot single out Muslims and say that this
doesn’t apply to them. That is not how Christianity works.
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Therese/CC: It makes me sick to my stomach that some people in here use Christianity as an
excuse to spread hatred and scapegoat Muslims and immigrants. I can’t think of anything
less Christian.
Tina/HC: To me Christianity is about compassion. For all humankind.
Ingrid/CC: As Christians we are supposed to love one another as part of God’s grace.
Jacob/CC: I don’t think that Muslims are our enemy. On the contrary we share many of the
same values and concerns. Muslims are not the problem. Atheists and secularists are.
They’re the ones who want to do away with religion all together.
Georg/CC/N: Muslims threaten our Christian values, demanding special rights and forbid-
ding our Christian traditions like Christmas celebrations.
Heidi/H/: What happened to ‘love thy neighbour’? Did you miss that Sunday school class?
Jonathon/FS: This is seriously the most conspiratorial, nonsensical racist spew I have ever
read. If anybody is ruining Norway it is you lot of fucking imbeciles. For instance you ‘An-
ders Nordson’ you spew out a lot of unintelligent xenophobic bullshit and expect us to take
you seriously.
Nancy/CC: Muslims are fellow believers. We have no fight to pick with Muslims or vice
versa.
Thor/AA: Christianity is peaceful, my ass. You’ve got blood on your hands. That cross you
are so passionate about represents centuries of violence and ignorance.
Edvard/AA: Religions are dumb and nonsensical. Christianity is a far cry from enlighten-
ment. You are all delusional.
Magdalene/CC: I wear the cross I inherited from my grandmother with pride.
Teodor/N: Muslims are cockroaches infesting our society.We must get rid of them immedi-
ately before it is too late.
Wilhelm/N: Immigrants and Muslims are violent criminals, who want to rape our women,
yet you keep letting them in. They want to force their intolerant sharia law on Norwegians.
Edvard/AA: YOU are a threat to HUMANITY!!
Magdalene/CC/N: It just makes no sense. Muslims cannot come here and prance around in
their hijabs and what not, and we’re expected to cover up our crosses. MADNESS!
Selma/FS: You call yourself Christian but you are all raging racists. I have had it with you
lot. There is no hope for you.
Tina/HC: Christianity is about being compassionate towards everyone. Twisting Christianity
to spread an anti-Islamic message is profoundly un-Christian.
The range of positions that may be expressed in a simple short exchange such as
the one above is – remarkable. The exchange illustrates the typical dynamics of
debates, how the various participants’ comments at times get posted in a zigzag
pattern. Only an alert or cautious reader will realize who is answering whom,
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and about what. In addition, some participants turn a blind eye to what others
think and dedicate their undivided attention to hammering their own perspec-
tive. The result is a somewhat confusing collection of perspectives that appear
in random order. The example of a conservative Christian recounting how wear-
ing her grandmother’s cross is of personal significance is a very typical com-
ment. Such comments act as both an affirmation of faith, and signal an affective
value to the cross itself (including through who it belonged to previously). Here,
the personalized relationship to religion is evident in that the cross becomes a
source of everyday comfort. Still, the comment appears random and unrelated
to the other comments next to which it appears – which is also a typical charac-
teristic of the group dynamics.
There is an obvious tension between Christianity as a religion of identity,
and Christianity as a religion of compassion (see chapter 10).² Some conservative
Christians’ approach to Christianity overlaps with nationalists’ in the sense that
they too adhere to Christianity as a religion of identity – and link its significance
and preservation to the nation. In such instances, the main difference between
conservative Christians and nationalists is that the conservative Christians
avow a personalized faith thereby embracing both a national and a personal
Jesus –whilst the nationalists stay clear of any personal faith-based commitment
to Christianity. Humanists, especially those with a Christian leaning, share com-
mon ground with conservative Christians. Still, some conservative Christians
have overlapping ideas with nationalists. Christians of various leanings make
multiple claims about Christianity. Their performance of the conflict unravels
tensions within those who believe that Christianity – however they define it –
is worthy of preservation. As a result, YWC functions as a space for negotiating
what the essence of Christianity is, or ought to be, and why.
For a subset of conservative Christians, the ‘religiousness’ of Muslims is sin-
gled out as a positive shared experience and pitted against the secularization of
Norway. For those conservative Christians, Muslims are considered an ally in
their efforts to prevent Norway from becoming entirely secularized. Most of the
conservative Christians are summoned to perform the conflict(s) based on
their fear of extinction of Christianity. A sub-strand of the conservative Christians
fear for all religions, and move to protect religion in the public sphere, because
they worry that religion will have to make way for either an entirely atheist or an
entirely secular outlook. In this sense the conservative Christians are divided in
 Ádám and Bozóki (2016, 146) operate with a seemingly similar distinction between ‘National
Christianity’ and ‘Christianity as a religion of love’, but do not go into great detail about what
this means.
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their fears.While the majority of conservative Christians in this online milieu fear
the possible extinction of Christianity, some conservative Christians fear for the
death of religion.
Ardent atheists repeatedly claim that Christianity is irrational and violent, as
are all religions. But it is Christianity and particularly conservative Christians
that are the target of the ardent atheists’ wrath. And conservative Christians
take the bait. The conflict lines erupt and conservative Christians continue to
fall into the trap of intensified conflict performance, long after the ardent athe-
ists have left the ‘room’.
6.3 Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict(s)
in YWC
6.3.1 Who Talks to Whom?
Fervent secularists talk mainly to nationalists (and the conservative Christians
who resemble them) and try to fire them up – but often become unhinged in
the process. Nationalists primarily talk to conservative Christians, and attempt
to entice them with their ‘us vs. them’ worldview. Ardent atheists exclusively ad-
dress the conservative Christians and repeatedly tell them what pinheads they
are.While ardent atheists allegedly hate all religions in equal measure, in prac-
tice they single out Christians as their primary target of disdain, but reserve their
most impassioned performances for very conservative Christians. Conservative
Christians for their part talk to all the other clusters – mainly because they re-
spond to how they are being portrayed, attacked, or befriended by others.
They may at times respond to atheists, humanists, and nationalists, but their pri-
mary audience appears to be fellow Christians, who they hope will be seduced
into joining their cause of preserving Christianity.
While several of the clusters are gender-balanced, there are two exceptions
with highly distinct forms of interaction. Firstly, the predominantly male cluster
of ardent atheists who only pick a few small corners of the online debates to re-
peatedly lash out at conservative Christians – before making a run for it. Second-
ly, the handful of humanist women who are highly prolific and leave a unique
reconciliatory mark on nearly all the selected debates, exhibiting a prolonged
commitment to the mediator role. Humanists also primarily address the conser-
vative Christians (and the odd nationalist). They debunk myths and attempt to
soothe and engage in dialogue with the conservative Christians, in contrast to
the diametrically opposite ‘drop a bomb and run’ approach of ardent atheists.
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Still, some of the Facebook users are far less concerned with what other par-
ticipants write, and mostly focus on what they themselves feel. As I have written
about in detail elsewhere, affect is abundant in the Facebook discussions and a
recurring component of mediatized conflicts in general (Abdel-Fadil 2016). As il-
lustrated in this chapter, all of the participants display emotions in the modes in
which they engage with both the conflicts and one another. Nationalists, fervent
secularists, and ardent atheists voice their anger. Such venting appears to simul-
taneously function as a form of entertainment – particularly for ardent atheists
who mostly direct their rage at the conservative Christian participants. Conserva-
tive Christians predominantly express anger, intermingled with fear. Humanists
convey exasperation, albeit in a patient manner, but their aim is to stir up feel-
ings of compassion among fellow debaters.
6.3.2 Contesting the Essence of Christianity
A striking feature of the debates in the Facebook group is the detailed negotia-
tion of what Christianity is all about, and of the symbolic meaning it holds in the
various participants’ eyes. Christianity is interpreted, brokered, and adhered to
in a multitude of ways. For instance, some of the conservative Christians convey
the personal meaning Christianity holds for them through their emotional at-
tachment to a particular cross pendant that brings them closer to God. Nation-
alists see Christianity as a signifier of Norwegian nationhood and identity –
but their understanding of religiosity is void of personal faith. Ardent atheists
consider Christianity the cradle of ignorance and irrationality. Fervent secularists
regard Christianity a threat to a healthy state and society. Humanists view Chris-
tianity as a (non-exclusive) source of positive values on which a compassionate
and just society can be modelled upon. In most clusters there is a tangible inter-
nal cohesion when it comes to the big issues. The participants within a cluster
may well have different degrees of embracing and expressing a stance, but
their core beliefs are similar. For example among nationalists, ‘Muslims should
go home’ is a much milder version of ‘Muslims are cockroaches and infesting our
land’, but they are de facto variations of the same standpoint, namely: ‘Muslims
do not belong in Norway’.
Conflicts in YWC are enacted in a way that pits Christians not only against
Muslims, atheists, and secularists, but ultimately pits Christians against Christi-
ans. Those who self-identify as Christians in YWC perform the conflicts in dia-
metrically opposite ways based on their adherence to Christianity as either a re-
ligion of identity – or – compassion. One of the central tropes of ‘Christianity as
identity’ is ‘Christian heritage’, coupled with Muslims and immigrants being per-
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ceived as a threat. It is a narrative of identity preservation and defence. Adhering
to Christianity as compassion entails making an effort to put an end to the vil-
ifying of Muslims and immigrants and is reminiscent of what Woodhead and
Heelas call (2000, 71–72) ‘religions of humanity’, in which ‘compassion’ is a cen-
tral trope. Humanists, both those who explicitly identify and don’t identify as
Christian, are united by the idea that Christianity as a religion dictates compas-
sion to all humankind, and that compassion is a core Christian value. A strand of
conservative Christians join forces with humanists in this reading of Christianity.
Rather than animosity, these conservative Christians feel an affinity with pious
Muslims who are believed to share a common moral outlook. To these conserva-
tive Christians (and humanists), attacking Muslims in the name of Christianity is
seen as the antithesis of the foundational values of Christianity. This is a narra-
tive of faith and love.
Similar findings surface in the book Saving the People: How Populists Hijack
Religion, which collects case studies in several European countries (Marzouki,
McDonnell, and Roy 2016). The term ‘hijack religion’ is used to connote how
Christianity is increasingly infused with particular traits that serve specific ideo-
logical goals. A core finding is that when populists hijack religion, they focus
only on ‘belonging’, rendering ‘belief ’ superfluous. Moreover, populist religion
revolves around the tropes ‘restoration’ and ‘battle’, and is adamant about the
preservation of Christian heritage from the threat of extinction or foreign take-
over (Marzouki and McDonnell 2016, 2). In this way, Christianity is viewed as
an identity but divorced from both faith and Christian values, which are deemed
either too leftist or too conservative (Roy 2016a, 91). Populists are only interested
in ‘Christianity in its cultural form’ argues Peace (2016, 104). According to Roy
(2016b, 186) Christianity is predominantly expressed in terms of national identity
and its proponents ‘are Christian largely to the extent that they reject Islam’. Roy
(ibid., 190) makes the intriguing argument that while populists speak of identity,
churches speak of faith. Based on the European case studies of populism, Roy
(ibid.) argues that Christianity functions as a marker of identity, and serves as
a platform to ’distinguish between good “us” and bad “them”’. Roy goes on to
assert that: ‘when evoking the Christian identities of their nations populist lead-
ers tend to refer to symbols such as the cross, rather than theological dogma’
(ibid., 186). Taken together then, the conclusion from Saving the People seems
to be that the more one identifies with Christianity as culture, the less likely it
is that one will identify with Christian values or faith.
This argument is a good fit for the nationalists in YWC, but does not neces-
sarily hold true for the bulk of the conservative Christians. What characterizes
them is precisely the entanglement of Christianity as identity and Christianity
as faith. Conservative Christians may well be more interested in symbols than
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dogma, but they most certainly also articulate genuine expressions of ‘belief ’.
Therein lies a potential theological tension with the faith-based Christianity of
compassion (see chapter 10). Still, the conservative Christians who embrace
Christianity as identity in YWC seem to do so wholeheartedly. In contrast, several
active members of Norway’s newly established conservative Christian Party (Par-
tiet De Kristne) have expressed a combination of anxiety about the survival of
Christianity and remorse about adopting a selective love that only extends to par-
ticular neighbours (Brekke n.d.). In this sense several members of the Christian
Party appear to be betwixt and between Christianity as identity and Christianity
as compassion. This discrepancy may perhaps be related to politicians being bet-
ter versed in reflexive conversations than ‘ordinary people’ online, or it might be
a result of methodology and the medium of expression, or a combination. Cer-
tainly Christianity of identity is pitted against Christianity as compassion in
YWC, but not by a single individual who claims to adhere to both. Rather, scores
of ‘others’ criticize nationalists and conservative Christians who adhere to Chris-
tianity as identity for replacing the core value of ‘love thy neighbour’ with ‘hate
thy neighbour’.
6.3.3 Sacred Values
Religion in itself is a trigger theme that pushes participants into affective modes
of enacting conflicts. For many of the participants a number of the themes of dis-
cussion very close to the heart. Participants are at times protecting their founda-
tional worldview or values they consider sacred. This raises the emotional stakes
in the conflict, and renders its enactment important at both the personal and
symbolic level. To the nationalists it is Norway as a nation that is held sacred
and must be protected from contamination. Conservative Christians consider
Christianity/Christian heritage sacred, and strive to preserve Christianity from ex-
tinction. To fervent secularists it is anti-racism which is at stake. They fiercely op-
pose building a xenophobic sense of belonging. For humanists, human compas-
sion and knowledge are both held sacred. Forming informed decisions that
benefit humankind and promote compassion is the overarching goal. To the ar-
dent atheists, it is ultimately rationality and their own perceived superiority for
being non-believers which trumps all other concerns, and is the sacred value
worth fighting for. Fervent secularists unleash their anger on both conservative
Christians and nationalists, but it is xenophobia and not religion per se that
winds them up. Against this backdrop, it seems evident that many parallel con-
versations take place, fuelled with competing and at times diametrically oppo-
site concerns.
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Sacred values can also be used for leverage. For instance, ardent atheists re-
peatedly exclaim that Christianity is nonsense and Christians are imbeciles.
While I do not question the sincerity of such attacks, I think the point not to
be missed is that these are highly intentional efforts to cause rupture and attack
the core beliefs and sacred values of conservative Christians. Baumgartner’s
(2013) analysis of blasphemy as a ‘profound offence’ and a form of ‘inter-subjec-
tive violence’ appears highly fitting for the both the intent and the effect ardent
atheists have on conservative Christians. Baumgartner (2013, 58) describes how
‘blasphemy functions as a tool to produce and enforce negative stereotypes of
followers of a particular religion’. Crucially, ardent atheists enact the conflict
in that particular way precisely because it is a profound offence and does psy-
chological harm to the conservative Christians. I would add two observations.
First, dispensing ‘profound offenses’ may in itself be a form of entertainment.
Sometimes people are drawn to conflict because its enactment is a cherished
pastime (Abdel-Fadil, 2017). Second, a value need not be religious for it to be
held sacred or attacked in a blasphemous way. For instance, the fervent secula-
rists go ballistic about racist and overly religious content precisely because it
constitutes a ‘profound offence’ to what they hold sacred, namely an anti-racist,
unequivocally secular state.
6.3.4 Who Hijacks Religion?
Will the populists’ hijacking of religion receive legitimacy from Christianity’s var-
ious churches or ‘rightful owners’? and who ultimately owns the ‘copyright’ of
religion? asks Roy (2016b, 190). These types of questions latch onto longstanding
discussions about the authority of religion, the legitimacy of lay interpretations,
and the societal role of religion. In YWC, it seems evident that both ‘Christianity’
and ‘religion’ can be hijacked and infused with the sacred values of a spectrum
of people who have vested interests in particular readings of religion. For in-
stance, I would argue that ardent atheists also hijack ‘religion’, imbuing the con-
cept with all shades of bad. For the ardent atheists religion is equated to imbe-
cility. Humanists paint Christianity as a religion of compassion. For most
conservative Christians the fear of extinction dictates their religious outlook,
placing them within a religion of identity understanding of Christianity –
where Christianity is simultaneously seen as the true path to salvation, and su-
perior to other religions. Against this backdrop, I do not think it is accurate to
state that Christianity has been exclusively hijacked by a very conservative agen-
da or an exclusivist approach to religion only. The concept ‘hijacking religion’
can be critiqued for erroneously connoting that religion can be stripped of its
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‘true’ meaning or purest form. Yet, particularly in the case of the mediation of
very specific or absolutist definitions of religions I believe ‘hijacking religion’
is analytically useful. In employing ‘hijacking religion’ in a broader conceptual
sense one may elucidate how various understandings of religions are often in-
fused with a range of political agendas, that may range from ‘leave me be’ to fan-
tasies of ‘world domination’.
This online ethnography of YWC complements previous quantitative and
qualitative approaches to mediatized conflicts. The strength of this study lies
in in its methodology. In delving into the particular specifics and thick descrip-
tions of YWC, it becomes possible to draw new conclusions, that may be general-
izable and may nuance – and add to – our body of knowledge about how media
users engage with conflicts about religion. In this chapter, I have highlighted
how various clusters of YWC participants behave and express their emotions
in a multitude of ways, and I illustrate how these enactments and interactions,
in turn, play into the mediatized conflict(s) about religion. The stubborn ethno-
graphic determination to analyse huge chunks of data from one particular com-
munity may yield surprising and very valuable results, such as the unearthing of
an entirely new cluster of participants, in this case – the ardent atheists – who
left a significant mark on YWC. This discovery may serve to widen scholarly un-
derstandings of the spectrum of worldviews that may entangle with one another,
even in highly particular milieus such as YWC, and may thus balance out view-
ing online spaces as mere ‘filter bubbles’. It also points to the importance of ob-
serving and analysing online behaviours and emotive responses within a group.
Similarly, this chapter sheds light on how the participants’ gender may play into
the intensity and type of enactment of conflict, and – the emotional labour in-
volved. As evidenced by the case of YWC, gender may also be constitutive of
an entire cluster, and at times a small cluster of women can do the work of an
entire army of men. Together these findings, nuance and add a layer of empirical
detail to claims that men participate ‘more’ in online debates about contentious
issues (see chapter 2 & 16). Future qualitative studies must therefore pay close
attention to – and flesh out – gender-specific ways of engaging with mediatized
conflicts about religion. Similarly, future studies ought to take into consideration
that a range of social actors, be they secular, atheists, secular religious, or rad-
ically religious may seek to hijack both their own religion, and the religion of
their selected ‘other(s)’ in an attempt of political gain and as part their enact-
ment of conflict. Rather than consider ‘hijacking religion’ unique to nationalists
and conservative Christians, it may be more fruitful to view the ‘hijacking of re-
ligion’ as a more universal phenomenon and an integral part of the performance
of mediatized conflicts about religion, across the globe.
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Chapter 7
Planning Public Debate: Beyond
Entrenched Controversies About Islam
Abstract: The contentious public debates about Islam in Scandinavia may to
some extent be characterized as an entrenched conflict, upheld by stereotypical
framings and fixed rhetorical positions. This case study examines public service
media’s ability to facilitate public debates that move beyond such ingrained po-
sitions. Through interviews with key professionals behind the TV documentary
Rebellion from the Ghetto, we examine the strategies for generating public debate
about cultural and religious problems.We furthermore analyse online and offline
debates, with particular focus on the inclusion of minority voices and how fram-
ings of religion enter and influence the discussion. By consciously downplaying
the role of ‘religion’ and framing conflicts in terms of personal experiences and
universal themes, the documentary managed to set the scene for a debate in
which young Muslims’ various experiences were given authority, thereby allow-
ing the debate to transcend the usual ‘us–them’, ‘majority–minority’ framing of
these issues.
Keywords: debate, Facebook, Islam, minority voices, public service
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the role of public service media in generating and fa-
cilitating public discussions about controversial issues related to Islam in Den-
mark. Existing research has often demonstrated that news media tend to focus
on religious conflicts and frame Islam in stereotypical ways that may reinforce
rigid juxtapositions between the majority of ethnic Danes, ‘us’, versus the ethnic
minority of immigrants with a Muslim background, ‘them’ (Madsen 2002; Yilmaz
2016). As a result, news media may at times reproduce and reinforce existing dis-
courses and conflicts among ethnic Danes and Muslim immigrants rather than
challenge these entrenched positions. Research into public opinion concerning
Islam also reveals that critical attitudes towards Islam are not only or primarily
a feature of media discourses. Both in Denmark and other Scandinavian coun-
tries, a majority of citizens feel that Islam poses a threat to their national culture
(Lundby et al. 2017). We should take care to not regard this opinion as synony-
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mous with a general resentment towards immigrants since a majority of citizens
who consider Islam a threat to their national culture do not endorse hostility to-
wards foreigners. That said, public criticism of Islam has been actively used by
right-wing populist parties in all Scandinavian countries to mobilize against im-
migration in general and from Muslim countries in particular. This political strat-
egy has been fairly successful, with the result that over the past couple of deca-
des, populist parties have become major political parties in Scandinavian
parliaments (although with different roles in the individual countries) and
have exerted issue ownership over the immigration agenda (Rydgren 2011; Lin-
droth 2016). In light of this and other major political conflicts that have become
intertwined with the immigration issue, such as the international war on terror
and the Muhammad cartoon crisis, most of the mainstream political parties in
Denmark and other Scandinavian countries have gradually adopted more critical
attitudes towards immigration in general and Islam in particular.
It is against this backdrop that we wish to examine whether and how it is
possible to engage the public in discussing potentially controversial issues in-
volving Islam and Muslim immigration without necessarily reproducing stereo-
types of Muslims among ethnic Danes.We do not aim to provide yet another an-
alytical ‘deconstruction’ of existing dominant discourses and media’s role in
reproducing negative stereotypes but seek instead to thread a more ‘constructive’
path. On the basis of a single case study, we examine how conscious awareness
of the existing discursive landscape and deliberate debate planning may play im-
portant roles in creating public debates that move beyond entrenched positions
concerning religion, Islam, and immigration. Specifically, we examine the televi-
sion documentary series Rebellion from the Ghetto (Oprør fra ghettoen), broadcast
in 2015 by the Danish public service broadcaster DR on its niche channel DR2.
The documentary tells the stories of four ethnic minority youths and their rela-
tionships to the cultural and religious norms of their parents’ generation. The
documentary generated public debate across various media platforms, focusing
on controversial topics, such as concealed love affairs and homosexuality as well
as broader debates concerning the role of minorities and minority religion in
Danish society.
In our analysis of the public debate, we look at the interlocking of a gener-
alized public sphere constituted through mass media and a series of sub-publics,
which are often articulated through various social network media such as Face-
book.We wish to study how discussions in both mass media and social network
media framed the problems presented in the documentary series and to what ex-
tent discussions also involved a more diverse set of voices, including ethnic mi-
nority voices. To summarize, our three main research questions are as follows: (1)
What are the intentions and strategies of the producers (the commissioning
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broadcaster DR and the production company Plus Pictures) in terms of generat-
ing and moderating public debates about religious and cultural problems? (2) To
what extent did the public debate involve ethnic minority participants? (3) Which
framings became prominent in the debate following the documentary series Re-
bellion from the Ghetto?
Methodologically, the study is based on qualitative and semi-structured re-
search interviews (Kvale 1996) and textual framing analysis (Entman 1993) of
the debate in publicly accessible media. The analysis builds upon a theoretical
typology of mediatized conflicts (Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015; see
Chapter 3) that highlights the role of media in framing and co-structuring con-
flicts. In the case of Rebellion from the Ghetto, the mediated debate involved
not only particular framings of religious and cultural conflicts but also conscious
efforts by the producers to take into account pre-existing public framings of con-
tentious issues, which to some extent enabled them to co-structure the discus-
sions beyond entrenched positions of existing debates about Islam.
Figure 7.1 New voices in Danish television. Saja, ‘Sami’, Muna, and Moe from the Danish
television documentary series Rebellion from the Ghetto. It was produced by Plus Pictures and
broadcast on DR2 in 2015. ‘Sami’ appeared anonymously in the programme. (Photo: Plus Pic-
tures / Photographer: Simon Dixgaard.)
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The programme and our analysis also address the borders between religion
and culture. Ever since Clifford Geertz’ (1966) work on religion and culture, it has
been common in scholarly circles to view religion as a dimension of culture. A
more popular understanding may regard religion as distinct from culture, distin-
guishing between what is true, essential, and eternal (e.g. Islamic religion) and
what is manmade, contextual, and historical (e.g. Islamic culture). However, in
the public debate on Rebellion from the Ghetto, such clear distinctions do not
seem to exist. To the contrary, the two concepts are often used interchangeably
and as containers for the same content. This may in part be a result of the docu-
mentary series’ initial framing of problems as secular, cultural, and universal,
rather than as religious and specific.
7.2 Producer Intentions
In December 2015 and January 2016, we carried out four interviews with key ac-
tors involved in the production of and public communication surrounding Rebel-
lion from the Ghetto. The interviews focused on expectations, intentions, and re-
lationships in the production phase as well as evaluations of the effects and the
roles of various actors in the debate. From the production company, we inter-
viewed one of the two directors, Louise Detlefsen, as well as producer Mette
Heide. The communication specialist Line Bilenberg, who was hired externally
to promote the documentary, was our third informant. We also interviewed DR
senior editor and head of documentaries Mette Hoffmann Meyer, focusing on
DR’s role in the initial production phase and public discourse surrounding Re-
bellion from the Ghetto.
The DR editor provided the initial idea for the documentary, wishing to ex-
plore what she perceived as a more general problem of social control and every-
day violence in immigrant families. She got the inspiration for this topic and
framing from the poems of the young Danish writer Yahya Hassan, who has
fiercely criticized the parental generation of immigrants in Denmark on the
basis of his own experience (Hassan 2013). Despite Hoffmann Meyer’s power
as commissioning editor, the relative autonomy of the production company
should not be overlooked. The initial objectives of the documentary seem to
have gradually changed after the project was adopted by Plus Pictures. Executive
producer Mette Heide describes a process in which the directors – through a
lengthy and ‘academic’ research process – developed a more nuanced under-
standing of the social reality they intended to describe. Heide continues:
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[The directors] were casting and talking to people, and in their ‘fieldwork’ they could see
there were softer values and some themes that would be relevant for a larger group of peo-
ple, namely who you can partner up with in your love life. As directors of the documentary,
they were very clear on this. It’s of no use if we make another ‘us versus them’ story with
this violent image of immigrant culture. It’s important that we make a film where they [the
ethnic minority youth] can recognize themselves and that at the same time gives insight for
Danish-Danish viewers. You might say we changed what we’d originally been asked to pro-
duce along the way.
Producer, Mette Heide, Plus Pictures. Interviewed by authors on 18 December 2015
The production company did not, however, have completely free rein, and the
commissioning editor interfered when she found it necessary. This became par-
ticularly clear when deciding on the title of the series, with the DR editor insist-
ing on Rebellion from the Ghetto. No one from the production company was
happy with this title since it revived negative ‘us versus them’ stereotypes, but
they had to live with it. This disagreement about the title reveals DR’s ’business
as usual’ logic when it comes to representing Islam and Muslims. The DR editor
does speak of approaching the topic with an open mind, but her focus is the con-
flict between immigrant, minority norms and those of the majority society. In
contrast, the directors are more interested in making a television series in
which the conflicts take on a universal character concerning love, sex, and gen-
erational conflict while differences between majority and minority groups be-
come less divisive.
DR has a longstanding professional relationship with independent produc-
tion companies, including this company, Plus Pictures. In the case of Rebellion
from the Ghetto, we see a dynamic relationship between DR and Plus Pictures,
with the public service broadcaster taking part in several steps of shaping and
producing the documentary. Plus Pictures naturally influences the shaping of
the programme, but we also see the production company playing an important
role in orchestrating initiatives designed to generate public debate about the
themes of the documentary series. It is important to note that the professionals
in question from Plus Pictures articulate a strong personal commitment to public
service values: Public service ideals seem just as deeply embedded in the private
company as in the public organization.
7.3 Talking About Islam
The director of the documentary Louise Detlefsen says that the team was ‘talking
a lot about religion [Islam]’ throughout the production. There is clear awareness
that Islam is a controversial and difficult subject. In the eyes of the production
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team, the main difficulty seems to be the polarized range of pre-existing stances
that dominate public conversations about Islam – Islamists on the one side and
Islam-bashers on the other – and that it is hard to avoid being pushed into one of
these positions. The communication specialist Line Bilenberg argues that it was
important to deal with this problem in advance in a very explicit way when talk-
ing to the various people involved in the documentary: ‘If there’s an elephant in
the corner of the room, then say it. Don’t pretend it’s not there. So, say it out
loud: “My biggest fear is that this is going to be about Islam”.’ The young char-
acters in the film did not want their problems to be interpreted in light of Islam
and instead regarded problems with their parents and wider social network as
cultural issues. The production team wanted to replace the scornful criticism
of first-generation immigrant parents they had experienced in, for instance,
the poems of Yahya Hassan with a more mature and nuanced critique. In the
eyes of the communication specialist, this was the documentary’s new and
ground-breaking feature: The main characters take centre stage as (part of)
the rational and compassionate mainstream ‘we’, instead of standing outside
as either victims or aggressors. The strategy was to focus on showing the partic-
ipants’ problems as more general – or even universal – instead of something spe-
cific to Muslims. This approach was designed to create space for a conversation
that would be less easily hijacked by the usual polemic positions in the debate
about Islam.
DR editor Mette Hoffmann Meyer does not have the same concerns. She is
not particularly interested in downplaying the role of Islam and religion but in-
stead simply states that she tries ‘to treat this as I would any other topic’, tying
this to general claims of balance and impartiality. Furthermore, she explicitly
distances herself from activist documentary films with a particular message,
which seek to persuade audiences to think in particular ways:
I actually don’t believe activist documentary films have any great impact. If you sense right
from the start that there’s a hidden agenda, or as often the entire programme is cut to make
you stop eating pork or drinking French wine, you get bored and intimidated. Do they think
I am stupid, or what? If you make activist film, you want to twist the story to brainwash the
viewer – want to guide people toward something in particular. I actually don’t think acti-
vism is a public service role. I think we need to create knowledge and understanding and
insight. And then, I suppose, it’s up to the individual to take a position on it. Perhaps even
seek further knowledge. In other words, I believe in making people curious and asking
‘Why?’
Senior Editor Mette Hoffmann Meyer, DR. Interviewed by authors on 1 December 2016
The production team from Plus Pictures does not necessarily disagree with this.
Executive producer from the production company, Mette Heide, supports an im-
122 Stig Hjarvard, Mattias Pape Rosenfeldt
partial position, saying ‘we’re not promoting any particular position’ and ‘you
can’t – and shouldn’t – try to control and manipulate opinion’. She thus posi-
tions herself between a traditionalist and impartial role of public service broad-
casting as merely a forum for public debate and a more activist conception of
public service media as an actor that intervenes to make a difference in public
debate. This latter position does not necessarily entail that the television series
carries a persuasive message, which is what DR’s editor argues against. The ac-
tivist position does, however, seek to engage audiences to discuss problematic
issues in new ways.
7.4 Engaging the Audience: Building Public
Debate
The director and the communication specialist are strikingly clear in their ex-
planations of the purpose of the programme. The programme seeks to engage
ethnic minority youth in the debate surrounding the themes of the documentary:
homosexuality and individual freedom to choose the partner you want. Bringing
these themes to the ethnic youth and engaging them in dialogue became the
documentary’s raison d’étre for director Louise Detlefsen:
It wasn’t the typical DR2 audience we were looking for. It’s wonderful that the programme is
shown on the Danish TV channel DR2, and they are the ones we produced it for, etc. But
clearly, our own motivation was that it was the young people with a non-Danish ethnic
background who we wanted to talk about these themes. We wanted to have a discussion
internally. Could we start a conversation? This was clearly what we wanted to do.
Director, Louise Detlefsen, Plus Pictures. Interviewed by authors on 18 December 2015
On a more general note, the director points out that the interest in ethnic minor-
ity youth and Islam comes from a general social commitment, and it is in a sense
’accidental’ and comparable with the interest she has in other social issues, such
as poverty.
The producer is largely in agreement with the director on this issue. A free-
lance communication specialist was hired to plan and organize the debate, and
with special focus on moving it into the realms of Danish ethnic minority youth.
There were two steps in this strategy. First, to gather a diverse group of existing
young ethnic minority debaters (role models) and engage them in debating the
themes of the documentary on various media platforms. Second, to arrange a
series of screenings of the documentary in typical ‘ghetto areas’, thereby taking
the debate back to the environment the documentary explores. Engagement with
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the ethnic minority community was important for the subsequent marketing of
the television series and the framing of the debates following the broadcast.
This priming of ethnic minority opinion leaders to engage with the issues raised
by the television series ensured there would be people and arguments to build
upon when the programmes were eventually broadcast and when the debate
in the general news media and social media took off. As communication special-
ist Bilenberg states, ‘you can’t set an agenda if only the media write about it, and
no one pays attention to it in social media. You can’t set the agenda if you only
have what is called a journalistic approach. You also need to have debaters or
politicians or some other people’. The initial screenings with young ethnic debat-
ers also allowed Bilenberg to get an early account of possible frames and criti-
cism that could arise when the programme was broadcast. On this basis, she
was better equipped to stimulate the subsequent debate in line with the original
intentions of Plus Pictures.
Curiously, the strategy was based not only on a professional evaluation of
how to maximize the programme’s reach but also fuelled by personal frustration
on the part of key members of the production team. This sense of indignation
seemed to drive even the communication specialist in her professional efforts:
Both instructors felt… – and I felt – an indignation that we haven’t got any further [with
integration]. It’s important that these [young ethnic minority] voices come out. Quite sim-
ply, because they’re voices we’ve lacked in the debate. If we can reach out to this target
group, the effect will be that it may be more legitimate to talk about these things. So it’s
a huge help. This thing when something is being said on TV – nationwide – that you in
one way or another suddenly create a space where it’s permitted to talk about things.
External communications specialist Line Bilenberg. Interviewed by authors on 7 January
2016
The statement by Bilenberg also bears witness to the strategy of using the au-
thority of television to create space for discussions in civil society, both online
and offline. The aim was thus less to attract the attention of political decision
makers than to allow new voices to emerge.
In addition to the task of stimulating debate in general, the communication
specialist was hired to take care of various forms of crisis communication. Expe-
riences from other Plus Pictures productions had shown that debates could be-
come very harsh, including hate mail and death threats targeted at the main
characters in the documentary. Especially when dealing with young and non-
professional sources, it is important to have a support function for these kinds
of debates, including professional advice for the characters about when to en-
gage – or not engage – in social media debates. As a whole, the production com-
pany’s strategy seems to reflect a public service ethos of a more activist variety; it
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is less concerned with usual parameters of success in the broadcasting industry,
such as higher viewer ratings (popularity) and professional recognition. Instead,
the strategy bears witness to a much more idealistic approach and suggests a
conviction that the documentary can initiate real societal change.
7.5 Minority Voices in the Debate
The critical question is, then, to what extent the television series managed to cre-
ate a public debate in mainstream news media and social network media with a
greater representation of minority actors’ voices (MAV). In this analysis, we dis-
tinguish between strong and weak MAV representation. Inspired by Jacobsen et
al. (2013), we define strong MAV representation as when the primary actor in the
commentary has a visible minority background. In most cases, this is when the
author/host has a visible minority background, but we have also coded interview
protagonists as strong MAV. Weak MAV is when a minority actor is mentioned
and quoted or paraphrased in a comment.
Representation of MAV is often regarded as a measure of media outlets’ suc-
cess at including minorities (Jacobsen et al. 2013). There may, however, be other
factors behind a particular frequency of MAV representation than the media’s
openness to diversity and minorities. Nadim (2017) reports from a Norwegian
study that individuals with minority backgrounds do not necessarily find it dif-
ficult to access public debate but may nevertheless be reluctant to participate be-
cause they are often ascribed a fixed role in such contexts as being representa-
tive of a particular minority group. Based on these insights, we propose a
theoretical understanding of MAV representation that takes into account the will-
ingness of and ability for minority voices to make themselves heard.
We use a recent study of news and current affairs debates about Islam and
Muslims as a benchmark for comparing the representation of minority voices in
the debates about Rebellion from the Ghetto with the more general pattern of
MAV representation. In their study of minority actor voices in four Danish news-
papers’ coverage of Islam, Muslims, and racism, Jacobsen et. al. (2013) find 11
percent weak MAV representation and 13 percent strong MAV representation, re-
sulting in a total of 24 percent MAV representation. The study concludes that ‘the
reporting was rather one-sided and exclusive of minority voices, and when Mus-
lims were given voice, the same few publicly visible and vocal actors appeared.
At the same time, the lives and opinions of the less visible majority of Muslims
more or less vanished in the Media coverage’ (Jacobsen et al. 2013, 53). Not only
were no minority actors represented in three-quarters of the articles about Islam,
Planning Public Debate: Beyond Entrenched Controversies About Islam 125
Muslims, and racism, but news media seem to present a narrow range of minor-
ity sources.
In order to acquire an overall understanding of the media debate, we
screened and collected material from a broad range of online, broadcast, and
print media, compiling a sample of debate and opinion pieces explicitly address-
ing Rebellion from the Ghetto. We found relevant material from roughly two
weeks leading up the TV premiere at the start of December 2015 until one
week into January 2016, thus covering a period of approximately seven weeks.
In this period, we registered 10 opinion pieces from six different national print
papers. From broadcast radio, we look at three long-format debates. One of
these is from DR and has a general reputation of being critical, devoting time
to background and counter-perspectives. The other two long-format radio de-
bates were derived from two episodes of Rushy’s Roulette, a weekly debate pro-
gramme focusing on integration and immigrant culture and hosted by the public
service Radio 24/7. Our evaluation of the online debate material singled out the
official Facebook site of the show Rebellion from the Ghetto (40 posts, 184 com-
ments) as well as from the official site of DR2 (the channel that aired the film; 1
post, 40 comments) and the official Facebook page of the daily newspaper Polit-
iken (1 post, 338 comments) as central online hubs for the public discussion. The
Facebook sites were all lightly moderated, e.g. removing hateful commentary.
The coding of MAV representation in the debates about Rebellion from the
Ghetto in the printed press and broadcast radio reveals an extraordinarily high
representation of minority voices. Table 7.1 shows the representation of minority
voices in ten opinion pieces in the press and in three radio debates.
Table 7.1 The distribution of Minority Actors’ Voices (MAV) in debates about Rebellion from the
Ghetto in the press and broadcast radio.
Press ( items) Broadcast radio ( items)
Weak MAV % %
Strong MAV % %
Total MAV % %
With nine out of ten of the items including a MAV in the press debate, and with
40 percent having a minority representative as the primary voice, it is clear that
MAV representation is high in this part of the debate. A condition of unusually
high representation becomes even clearer when we consider the debate in broad-
cast radio, where nearly nine out of ten debate participants/hosts have minority
backgrounds. The debates found online also feature high MAV representation,
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though not quite on the same level as in press and broadcast radio. An analysis
of 562 comments from the three Facebook sites in the study show that MAV is
represented in well over half the total comments (61.5 percent). On Rebellion
from the Ghetto’s Facebook site (Oprør fra Ghettoen), MAV representation in 74
percent of the comments is remarkably high, and somewhat comparable to the
level in the press debate, whereas the two other websites have MAV representa-
tion in approximately half the comments. MAV representation in the online de-
bates is summarized in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 The distribution of Minority Actors’ Voices (MAV) in debates about Rebellion from the









Weak MAV % % % .%
Strong MAV % % % %
Total MAV % % % .%
The debate about Rebellion from the Ghetto has a significantly higher occurrence
of minority actors’ voices compared with in the average news and current affairs
debate. We note that the established and edited media outlets (the daily press
and broadcast radio) have a significantly higher number of minority actors’ voi-
ces than we find on broad spectrum Facebook pages. Also, when considering the
‘public visibility’ of the actors present in the debate, it is clear that many new
voices are making themselves heard, especially online, where only few of the mi-
nority voices contributing to the debate are individuals who are familiar from the
ongoing public debate. It is also interesting to note that, in quite a few of these
online and radio conversations between different minority actors, we find no
non-MAV participants. The public service radio debates presenting a full panel
of ethnic minority voices are good examples of this. The result is a debate
that, at least on a structural level, challenges traditional ‘us versus them’ and
‘majority–minority’ juxtapositions.
7.6 Public Debate About Rebellion from the
Ghetto
In order to analyse the main arguments and discursive positions in the various
debates, we apply framing theory as developed by Entman (1993) and others. Ac-
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cording to Entman (1993), frames provide texts with a specific perspective by im-
plicitly or explicitly proposing a problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. We distinguish between two
types of framings, each operating at a different level of generalization: specific
frames and general frames. Specific frames are more definitive articulations of
‘problems’, ‘explanations’, ‘moral evaluations’, ‘recommendations for action’,
or any combination of these. Since our textual material in some cases includes
very short interventions, it is not possible to identify all these dimensions in
every intervention, and in some cases these dimensions are present in only ru-
dimentary form. General frames are central organizing principles that are social-
ly shared (Reese 2001), i.e. that occur persistently across larger sections of tex-
tual discourses and represent a general ‘interpretative package’ (Gamson and
Modigliani 1989). Both general and specific frames are understood as issue-spe-
cific frames, in contrast to generic frames that may be used across various the-
matic domains (de Vreese 2005).
Our textual analysis revealed three general frames in the debate. The first
typical general frame is what we have dubbed Immigrant culture (religion) is op-
pressive. Here we find immigrant culture and/or religion singled out as a critical
problem. This problem definition is sometimes substantiated with reference to
reports and social research focusing on immigrant ghettos. In other cases, prob-
lems are explicitly linked to qualities inherent in the immigrant and/or Muslim
culture, thereby explaining the problem with a more explicitly essentialist under-
standing, as expressed in this letter to the editor from a Berlingske reader:
The young people feel frustrated, split between the interests of their cultural background
with a very purely patriarchal, male-dominated culture, and the culture of freedom and in-
dependence that we in Denmark are so proud of, and which the young people in the film
long to be able to live in.
Jan Hald, ‘Integration’ letter in Berlingske, 13 December 2015
Some of these specific frames lack solutions to the proclaimed problems of im-
migrant culture, ending in vague, sometimes sentimental formulations of hope
that ‘the young Muslims will see change’ (P.A. Pedersen 2015) or that they will
‘continue so that their children will be able to live the dream we all have’
(Hald 2015). The debates do not clearly distinguish between culture and religion;
to the contrary these concepts tend to be used interchangeably. This may in part
be a result of the documentary series’ attempt to downplay the explicitly reli-
gious aspects of the issues.
Other comments do come up with solutions or calls to action: One frequent
recommendation is that heterogeneous immigrant and religious culture should
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be promoted and accepted more broadly (Piil 2015). This recommendation is per-
haps unsurprising, given that it aligns with the central theme of the documenta-
ry. Another recommendation for action is part of a recurring theme in the mate-
rial, namely a meta-perspective in which media involvement is part of the focus.
Here it is stated that critical media representation of immigrant culture and Islam
is an important tool for countering social problems within immigrant environ-
ments. Some of these discussions are remarkably nuanced, weighing and assess-
ing the various arguments. One example is a long post on Rebellion from the
Ghetto’s Facebook site that acknowledges the generally negative media represen-
tation of Islam but also warns against keeping this media critique on autopilot.
This post recommends normalization of the representation of Islam and Mus-
lims, and from this follows a reasonable inquiry into, for example, social prob-
lems (Oprør fra Ghettoen 2015).
The second general frame precisely concerns media representation of young
Muslims. Here the central problem is that the representation of young Muslims in
Rebellion from the Ghetto is stereotypical. According to this frame, the television
series is basically another victim story, lacking nuance. The story does not make
the Danish audience confront its own violence and social control but confirms
the fiction that this phenomenon belongs to immigrant families:
Precisely by avoiding the exploration of the nuances, the documentary turns Muna [a cen-
tral character] into a hand puppet delivering a cliché victim story typical of Danish TV’s
representation of ethnic minorities. This is sad because [Muna’s] story deserves to be told
in full, with all its ambivalence and despair. That would generate identification instead
of fascinated outrage and might even remind Danish viewers of the power relations in
their own families, instead of confirming that social control only exists among Muslims.
Johanne Mygind, ’Egen stemme’ in Weekendavisen, 4 December 2015
One solution to this problem is to let the young Muslims represent themselves –
as artists and producers. Another recommendation is to involve Muslims in the
everyday media landscape as subjective individuals with expertise in many other
subject areas, such as the economy – and not to constantly single them out as
outsiders or ‘the other’ (Piil 2015). This general frame obviously has a meta-qual-
ity as well since it evaluates the media’s representation of Islam and Muslims.
The third general frame also has a self-reflexive meta-layer. Here, however,
the reflexivity concerns the debate itself. One aspect of this framing focuses
on new female voices, which seem more frequent and more diverse. The moral
here is that it is important that young women start speaking for themselves in
public debates, and the recommendation is for continued recognition and sup-
port for this new development. Another aspect of this frame focuses on homo-
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sexuality among immigrants as an important topic. The young ethnic minority
homosexuals represent an extremely vulnerable group that can be helped and
normalized if the public debate sheds light on this taboo topic. Some debaters
also speak of increasing discord among young Muslims. Some Muslim youths
take part in shaming and social control of other young Muslims, making their
lives miserable:
On the one hand, we find young ‘new Danes’ who can no longer keep up appearances or
want to compromise their own freedom and liberal rights. And on the other hand, we find
the young ‘new Danes’ who surpass even their parents’ ability to abide by conservative val-
ues, and thereby interpret any deviation from the parents’ cultural and religious customs as
a final departure from the tradition. It’s the youth rebellion fighting itself.
Geeti Amiri, ’Nydansk ungdomsoprør svigtes af sine egne’ in Ekstra Bladet, 7 December
2015
This divide, it is asserted, is a huge problem, obstructing more rapid integration
of the young generations. Instead, it is suggested, young Muslims should stand
together in solidarity and defend each other’s rights to individual choice (Oprør
fra Ghettoen 2015). Religion is also considered in this moral evaluation: One de-
bater asserts that the young Muslims who use religious arguments to target docu-
mentary participants as sell-outs are in fact being hypocritical: These critics lack
real religious conduct or knowledge. Their lack of empathy and solidarity with
young peers who are facing social difficulties is disturbing and should be seen
for what it is, nasty bullying (M.C. Pedersen 2015). A final aspect of this framing
is constituted by new citizen-driven organizations The Neighbourhood Mothers
(Bydelsmødrene) and Baba – Fathers for Change (Baba – Fædre for Forandring).
Both seek to involve the parental generation in the younger generation’s social
problems through dialogue. These organizations are typically active in local
areas – arranging meetings and community events – but are usually absent
from the media debate. They try to make a difference locally, including by recog-
nizing the horizons and sensibilities of the parental generation.
To summarize, the debate that surrounded Rebellion from the Ghetto is char-
acterized by the following: First, we find a relatively limited number of general
framings. This testifies to a focused debate that stays on the track proposed by
its initiators, although the debate also involves critical voices against the fram-
ings of the documentary’s producers. Second, there are remarkably few radical
and aggressive standpoints. As noted above, the specific topic of integration
and Islam is by default synonymous with contentious conflict in the media,
and public debates often feature a very aggressive tone. This is not the case
for this documentary. The debate about Rebellion from the Ghetto is on the
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whole quite sober. Third, debaters seem interested in discussing how different
media and public figures act with regard to religion and minority culture. We
call this meta-talk, which is characterized by two aspects in particular: 1)
There is a focus on (classic) media representation, typically formulated as a cri-
tique of the established media’s ability to adequately represent minorities. It
should be noted that we also find a defence of the established media’s right
and duty to scrutinize all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion. 2) New ac-
tors in the debate are highlighted: the young female voices, the sexual minori-
ties, and the parental generation. These new actors in the debate become a sep-
arate topic of discussion. Broadcast radio in particular is working on this
framing. This brings us to a fourth point: The production team’s intentions
seem to materialize in reality. There is extensive reflection on the quality and na-
ture of the debate from different angles, and ethnic minority youths play a prom-
inent role in the discussions, often as active protagonists.
7.7 Conclusion
Public service media are under special obligations to both engage with critical
issues in society and provide forums for informed public debate, and in the
case of Danish public service media under a specific obligation to work for inte-
gration (see Chapter 5). Often these obligations are fulfilled by communication of
already existing critical positions in the debate and giving voice to traditional
and well-established voices in the field. As this case study has demonstrated,
public service media may also – occasionally – succeed in raising critical issues
independently of traditional political actors and at the same time engage other
and less frequent heard voices in the debate. To succeed with this in an already
established – and to some entrenched – political conflict requires not only an
interesting programme with a series of selected and well-researched stories to
ground the argument, but also a conscious effort to develop and organize discus-
sions in particular ways among different audiences, online as well as offline, and
a strategy to create synergy between debates in different kinds of media and be-
tween different actors.
This conscious approach is certainly not a guarantee of success, and the de-
bates surrounding Rebellion from the Ghetto could easily have taken another
course. The production team also expresses a certain relief that the debate
about the programme was not significantly affected by some of the traditional
positions in the public debate concerning Islam and immigration. The producer
Mette Heide mentions that if, for instance, the Danish right-wing populist party
Dansk Folkeparti had entered the debate, it could have gone in very different di-
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rection. An interesting lesson from the case study seems furthermore to be that,
by consciously downplaying Islam as a religion, the series allows discussions to
follow a somewhat different path than might otherwise have been the case. The
result is not that religion or Islam are neglected in the debate; to the contrary,
religious issues are frequently addressed. But because critical issues are not ini-
tially framed as a critique of Islam as such, more immigrants with Muslim back-
grounds felt inclined to enter the debate.
Our analysis also demonstrates how the mediatized conditions of contempo-
rary cultural and religious conflicts may not only or always deepen conflicts.
Through critical awareness of the role of media in public controversy, it is pos-
sible to use media to stimulate new ways of engaging with such conflicts. The
media dynamics of mediatized conflict, amplification, framing and performative
action, and co-structuring (Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015; see also Chap-
ter 3) can also be mobilized to support a more sensitive and nuanced debate
about controversial issues. The advance screening of the documentary series
among ethnic minority groups and particularly among individuals with a recog-
nized position within these communities worked to amplify and frame the docu-
mentary’s arguments in a particular way, which helped set the scene for subse-
quent interventions. The conscious framing of the problems as not being about
religion but as individual, cultural, and universal issues also helped make the
debate diverse. The combined professional resources of DR and Plus Pictures al-
lowed these media actors to influence the overall structure of the debate as it oc-
curred in broadcast radio and the documentary’s official Facebook page. The
public service media’s ability to raise such discussions is not limited to factual
genres such as documentary but may also involve entertainment genres such
as comedy shows (Hjarvard and Rosenfeldt 2017).
The mediatized conditions of the debate were, however, evident to more
than just the people behind the documentary. As our framing analysis shows,
meta-discussions about the (problematic) role of media in relation to these is-
sues are integral to public discussions about integration and Islam. This reflects
a growing public awareness of the mediatized conditions of such conflicts, yet as
our analysis demonstrates, these conditions do not necessarily intensify conflicts
or get participants to dig deeper into even more entrenched positions. Neverthe-
less, moving a debate out of entrenched positions requires not only good will but
also professional media expertise, resources, and an institutional framework –
such as public service – that can deploy expertise and resources in practice.
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Chapter 8
Contradicting Ideals: Islam on Swedish
Public Service Radio
Abstract: Cultural and religious diversity are contested topics in Swedish public
debate. This chapter analyses how the radio programme Människor och tro (Peo-
ple and belief) enables and structures the actors and issues that become heard in
this debate, particularly with regard to Islam and Muslims. The programme aims
to present an alternative to the dominant negative media discourses by equally
representing Christianity and Islam in reports, inviting Swedish Muslims to pres-
ent experiences and opinions on various news events, and enabling debate be-
tween religious organizations, experts, and listeners through phone-in sessions
and social media. Despite these efforts, the programme tends to reconstruct,
as well as challenge, the dominant frames of Islam as a problem for Swedish so-
ciety and for the relations of power between the majority and minority voices in
public debates. The chapter explores how contradictions between the traditional
ideals and formats of public service radio and its ambitions to produce a more
nuanced and diverse image of religion contribute to this outcome.
Keywords: public service radio, Sweden, Islam, phone-in session, women
Public service media (PSM) faces challenges both regarding changes within the
media landscape and due to the enhanced religious and cultural diversification
of the “public” that it is commissioned to service. As described in Chapter 5,
Swedish public service broadcasters seem, in comparison with Norway and Den-
mark, more obliged to consider this dimension in the balancing act between
serving a common national culture and enhancing cultural pluralism. Människor
och tro (People and belief), the programme which is the focus of this chapter, has
been broadcast weekly in its current format on Swedish public service radio
since the 1990s. This long history makes it unique in a Swedish, as well as in
a Nordic context, as a current affairs programme that is focused on religion.
The P1 channel features high-quality news about politics, science, and art and
it reaches an audience of about 14 percent of the population (Kantar Sifo
2017). As part of this genre, Människor och tro is a programme that primarily
serves an educated, middle-aged segment of the public, and its audience num-
bers a few percent of the Swedish public. This, however, makes the programme
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an interesting example of how public service media seek to manage the cross-
pressures between, on the one hand, obligations to service the traditional seg-
ment of high-brow listeners and, on the other, the need to attract a new and
younger audience with a more diverse cultural background and expectations
of popular coverage of religious topics. As shown in a recent survey (see Chap-
ter 2), Swedes stand out among the Scandinavians as being more tolerant to-
wards public expressions of religious diversity, in particular of Islam. In recent
years, migration to Sweden has increased, particularly since 2015 as a result
of the escalating war in Syria. Combined with growing support for right-wing na-
tionalist political opinions, cultural and religious diversity have become highly
contested topics in Swedish public debate.
Through its mandate to serve all citizens, public service radio plays an im-
portant role in enabling and structuring the visibility of issues and of various
perspectives concerning religion in the public sphere. This also means that pub-
lic service programmes on religion can become arenas for enacting controversies
about the legitimate place of religious values and actors in society. In this chap-
ter, we ask how the programme Människor och tro represents religious diversity
in Sweden, with a particular focus on the visibility of actors, perspectives, and
issues related to Islam.
8.1 Public Service Media and Religion in Sweden
As in the other Scandinavian countries, public service media have a strong po-
sition in Sweden. Despite challenges from other media providers, 58 percent of
the population still listen to public service radio (SR) daily (Nordicom 2016).
More than 60 percent trust public service media and have a positive view of
the broadcasters (Ipsos 2016). The change from minority programming to a main-
streaming of cultural diversity policy, which is described in Chapter 5 (see also
Horsti and Hultén 2011) is reflected in a renewed policy, brought into being in
2015, in Swedish public service television and radio. Religion, faith, and other
life views are to be included among the perspectives from which Swedish PSM
are to carry out its coverage of Swedish society.
Studies of the coverage of Islam in Swedish news media (Axner 2015; Brune
2006) show that Islam, Muslim believers and Muslims as a social category are
predominantly represented in connection with international conflicts, terrorism,
and extremism. News about Islam in Sweden tends to focus on tensions between
Islam and the rights of women, and discrimination against Muslims. Although
exceptions exist, the everyday life of Muslim believers and the variety among
various traditions and ways of practicing Islam is less often portrayed. Brune
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(2006, 91) argues that Swedish news media therefore produces a powerful and
repeated othering, primarily of Muslims, who are turned into the carriers of char-
acteristics that are seen as being unwanted in Swedish culture. These dominant
trends are reported in studies that focus on news media and that use quantitative
methodologies based on search words such as ‘Islam’. In order to get a fuller un-
derstanding of the representation of Islam and Muslims in Swedish media it is,
therefore, important to study different kinds of media and to analyse representa-
tion in particular media formats in-depth.
The general guidelines of Swedish public service radio emphasize plurality
and an ambition to counter prejudices and stereotypes, as well as to look for
‘new and unexpected voices’.¹ The specific policy formulations for representing
ethnicity and religion, or life views (livsåskådningar), state: ‘We allow in all con-
texts participants from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds to be presented
as individuals and not primarily as representatives of a particular group.’ The
policy goes on to say that religious affiliation should not be stated unless ‘rele-
vant for context’, and words such as ‘fundamentalist’, ‘militant’, or ‘Islamist’
should be used with great care.
8.2 Människor och tro: Current Affairs and
Insider Perspectives
The programme Människor och tro is presented as a ‘current affairs program
about societal issues that concern religion and politics in Sweden and the
world’.²
The programme aims to provide in-depth coverage and historical, as well as
future-oriented, perspectives and comments. Människor och tro comes under the
editorial unit that produces programmes on society (samhällsredaktionen). The
editorial staff for Människor och tro consists of two to three people (one pro-
gramme host, one producer and/or a researcher). About 40 reports in a year
are commissioned from freelance journalists. A typical programme is 44 minutes
long and consists of a couple of longer reports, including interviews or discus-
sions with invited guests, a brief presentation of the current news on religion,
 Sveriges Radio, “Mångfald,” 2011, accessed 3 July 2017, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/grup
psida.aspx?programid=3113&grupp=20752&artikel=5790804
 Sveriges Radio, “Om Människor och tro,” 2012, accessed 3 July 2017, http://sverigesradio.se/
sida/artikel.aspx?programid=416&artikel=5285914.
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and reports by international correspondents. The programme is moderated by a
programme host and includes possibilities for listeners to interact with the edi-
torial staff, and with each other, through phone-in sessions, email, Facebook,
and Twitter.
The policy document (programbeställning) of 2016 for Människor och tro
specifies that the programme should examine the impact of religion on individ-
uals and society and identify and debate upon crucial topics that concern reli-
gion and values. It also prescribes that the programme should ‘take part in peo-
ple’s everyday reality’, and that the ‘insider perspective should saturate the
programme’. Individuals who are ‘experts on their own situation’ should be
given a salient role. During 2015, the programme was commissioned to interact
with the audience and to try out a format of broadcasting discussions from pla-
ces outside of the studio, such as libraries and other public spaces.
This chapter will focus on the representation of Islam and Muslims in Män-
niskor och tro in all of the broadcast programmes between January 2014 and April
2015 (62 programmes in total). Starting from the theory of mediatization and re-
ligion, we will analyse how the media logic of a current affairs programme on
public service radio conditions the programs’ engagement with contested issues
about religion. We will discuss the relationship between the policy and the aim
of the programme, the format of reports, interviews, phone-in sessions, and the
Facebook group, and the outcome, in terms of different representations of Islam
and Muslims in the programme.We have also interviewed the editorial staff and
the producer who worked on the programme during the timespan of our analy-
sis. The interview took place at Sveriges Radio’s (SR) headquarters in Stockholm
in September 2016.
8.3 Mediatization of Religion and Conflict
As discussed in Chapter 4, the mediatization of religion takes several forms. One
of these, journalism on religion, refers to how news media and opinion journal-
ism bring religion to the political public sphere. This implies that religious ac-
tors, beliefs, and practices will be presented in a way that conforms to the criteria
of newsworthiness and critical inquiry.
Simon Cottle (2006, 3) argues that a mediatized conflict is a part of the proc-
ess through which a democratic society can define, challenge, and defend impor-
tant values in the public sphere. In Cottle’s understanding, the role of the media
in this process is performative, rather than passive and reflective. To understand
the role of the media in tensions and controversies involving religion, we use the
framework presented by Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær (2015; see Chapter 3).
138 Mia Lövheim, Linnea Jensdotter
They suggest that the way in which the media add a dynamic to a conflict can be
analysed through three processes: amplification, framing and performative agen-
cy, and co-structuring. In this chapter, we will primarily focus on the dynamics of
framing and performative agency, which concern ways in which the media influ-
ence the representation of a conflict, its dramaturgy, and how various actors can
perform in a situation. Framing describes the process through which media pro-
ducers ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient’ in
order to ‘promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman 1993, 51–52). Frames
are produced through the use of certain keywords, phrases, stereotyped images,
sources of information, etc., that ‘provide thematically reinforcing clusters of
facts or judgments’ (ibid.). Frames work through referring to, and reinforcing, so-
cial conventions, or the ‘stock of commonly invoked frames’, in a particular con-
text. Framing has implications for the performative agency of the various actors
involved. Different frames construct different kinds of positions for acting, and
different possibilities for the presenting of arguments in the media. These posi-
tions for agency are also structured by the formats and genres of a particular
form of media.
In news media, events are framed according to what Kent Asp describes as
the institution of ‘news media logic’. This institutional logic works as ‘a con-
straint on action since its values and rules reduce uncertainty and provide an
overall structure that shapes the behaviour of both the news organizations
and individual news journalists’ (Asp 2014, 259). News media logic works
through a combination of shared professional norms, values, and standards
for the production of news. Two important values underpinning the power of
news logic (Figenschou, Thorbjørnsrud, and Larsen 2015, 130) is a belief in the
significance of news, and the role of journalists as the watchdogs of democracy.
These values make journalists into privileged interpreters of ‘what goes on in the
world and how to talk about it’ (ibid.). News media logic builds on, and repro-
duces, certain generic news frames, such as conflict, economic consequences,
and the attribution of responsibility. These frames are often constructed as nar-
ratives, which include the roles of both antagonists and protagonists as the ac-
tors in a conflict.
Brune (2006, 93–94) identifies four kinds of discursive discrimination in the
representation of migrants in the daily press. These are: exclusion from the dis-
course, often through invisibility; negative representation; objectification by the
exclusion of needs and interests; and the normalization of discrimination. These
categories reflect how framing can normalize or legitimize problem definitions or
treatment recommendations that discriminate against certain groups of people,
based on their religious beliefs and practices. In Swedish news media, Muslims
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and presumed Muslims are predominantly represented as the perpetrators or the
victims of violence. In very few cases are Muslims portrayed as actors who are
willing and able to make a constructive contribution to Swedish society
(Axner 2015, 28).
A particular kind of news frame is the human-interest frame. This frame
works through making social and political issues interesting through personali-
zation, individual cases, and model stories (Figenschou, Thorbjørnsrud, and
Larsen 2015, 131). As Figenschou, Thorbjørnsrud, and Larsen (2015) show in
their analysis of asylum conflicts in Norwegian media, these stories tend to
focus on the idealized victim, in the form of individuals displaying innocence,
morality, and a pleasant personality. The human-interest framing, on the one
hand, represents an alternative to the dominant news logic frames of negative
representation and objectification. On the other hand, human-interest stories
tend to construct one-dimensional characters and hide the complexity of a situa-
tion. This may disfavour individuals who fail to display the characteristics of
ideal cases, and contribute to a differentiation between “good” and “bad”
cases within minority groups. In this way, the human-interest frame can be
seen as a form of mediatization of societal conflicts and tensions, in which
more complex, structural, or group-based arguments are superseded by a
focus on singular events and persons (ibid. 2015, 141).
8.4 Representing and Framing Islam: Reports
The first step in our analysis of how the ideals of diversity and nuance are im-
plemented inMänniskor och tro’s representation of Islam,was to analyse the pro-
gramming time for topics on Islam in relation to those on other religions from
January 2014 to April 2015. This was followed by an analysis of how Islam was
connected to other societal issues that were addressed in the programmes.
Each report in the programmes was categorized by religious tradition, theme,
and region. Invited guests and interviewees who were either presented or self-
identified as Muslims were categorized by religious affiliation, profession, and
gender. We have also categorized the roles that guests or interviewees were
given in the programme as ‘expert’, ‘religious leader’, or ‘ordinary believer’.
In looking at the representation of different religions, Christianity and Islam
are most frequently presented, with an almost equal share of reports during the
period. Judaism is covered in 10 percent of the reports. Almost half of the reports
focus on Sweden, 19 percent on the Middle Eastern region, and 16 percent on Eu-
rope. In terms of themes, the programme lives up to its aim to cover ‘the inter-
section between religion and politics’: the most frequent theme, 22 percent of
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the reports, was political issues. Nine percent focussed on terrorism, and an
equal amount on theology and culture. Other themes are much less frequent.
Looking at co-occurrences between the themes, we see that reports on Christian-
ity also take up issues that are related to politics and theology, culture, and
LGBTQ rights. Reports on Islam tend to focus primarily on religious extremism
and politics in both the Middle East and Europe, followed by resistance to,
and harassment of, Muslims in Sweden and Europe. Turning to invited guest
and interviewees, our analysis shows that the Christian denominations are
more often represented than the Muslim denominations. Of the persons invited
to discussions in the studio during the time period, 32 came from a Christian
context and 9 from a Muslim context.
Even if topics such as international conflicts and terror attacks by violent
and extremist Islamist groups dominate, several programmes also discussed
the situation of Muslims living in Sweden. Frequent topics are the discrimination
against Muslim women by members of their own community, as well as by ethnic
Swedes; attitudes toward politicians with a Muslim background; discrimination
and islamophobia; and radicalization among young Muslims. Three of the pro-
grammes on these themes were broadcast from public places outside the studio,
where a live audience entered into the debate with reporters and a panel of in-
vited guests from political parties and civil society.
8.5 Critique and Nuances: Contradicting
Demands?
Människor och tro has a mandate to debate on crucial topics that concern religion
and values, but also to counter stereotypes about religion through focusing on
people’s everyday reality and an ‘insider perspective’, not least concerning
Islam. Our interviews with the producer who is responsible for current affairs
programmes, Louise Welander, the programme editor, Tithi Hahn, and the re-
porter, Jalal Lalouni, revealed some dilemmas that relate to the ways in which
these ambitions should be realized. One of these was that religion has generally
become a more visible issue in the media during recent decades.When other cur-
rent affairs programmes and news journalism increasingly focus on religion re-
lated news, such as the war and the terror attacks that are carried out by the so-
called Islamic State, this increases the demand for Människor och tro to produce
a more profound analysis and to find alternative perspectives to the dominating
news logic. However, this demand was not matched with the resources to enable
it to ‘dig deeper’ into current news events, or to produce longitudinal, scrutiniz-
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ing research on particular issues. Furthermore, the fact that religion is becoming
more of a hot topic in the regular news flow made it more difficult to find par-
ticipants for interviews and debates in the studio. Several issues, they remarked,
were perceived as being controversial, and representatives of some religions felt
overly exposed and vulnerable to criticism.
Our analysis reveals the efforts of the editorial team to give voice to a broad
range of Muslims in Sweden, such as women, youth, and lay people. Neverthe-
less, in looking at the profession and gender of these guests, it is clear that male
imams and chairpersons of Muslim organizations in Sweden, along with re-
searchers, politicians, and activists in public debates, dominate among the invit-
ed guests in the studio (21 of 32). Individuals presented as Muslims were also in-
terviewed, for example in connection with the attacks in Paris, Belgium, and
Copenhagen in 2014 and 2015, or about the situation of Muslims in Sweden.
Among these interviewees, young women and mothers dominate (19 of 28). A
common format in reports is that experiences of such ‘ordinary Muslims’ are fol-
lowed by comments and discussion among invited religious leaders and experts
in the studio. This format can be seen as a kind of framing, in that such com-
ments privilege particular problem definitions, interpretations, evaluations, or
recommendations for the treatment of events and experiences. This framing
also affects the performative agency of the actors involved in the programmes.
The subject position of an interviewee who shares her or his experiences is
changed into a position of object or example in a discussion in which this person
is not able to take part on equal terms. However, two programmes break from
this format in giving young Muslim women the role of commentators on recent
media debates about Muslim men controlling young women’s dress and behav-
iour in suburban communities.
8.6 Giving Voice to ‘Ordinary People’: Phone-In
Sessions
The phone-in sessions are presented as an important strategy through which
Människor och tro can achieve the purpose of including insider perspectives
on religion, and strengthen dialogue with listeners. Phone-in programmes, as
a genre in public service media, invite listeners to participate in a radio pro-
gramme through sharing their views and opinions on a specific topic (Nordberg
2006; Thornborrow 2001). Our analysis in this section focuses on the organiza-
tion of the interaction between participants in phone-in sessions, and what im-
plications this has for the performative agency of the different categories of par-
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ticipants. Does the dynamic of the phone-in sessions in Människor och tro differ
from the framing that is commonly used in reports about Islam and Muslims in
Swedish society? Do they provide for other forms of performative agency for ac-
tors who come from minority religious groups to present their perspectives on
the presence of religion in the public realm?
Six phone-in sessions took place between January 2014 and April 2015.³
Three of these addressed the role of Islam in Swedish society: ‘Humor, scorn,
hate speech or blasphemy?’ (October 2014), ‘In what spaces should religion be
allowed?’ (April 2015), and ‘Should religious free schools be allowed?’ (October
2015⁴). In Människor och tro, the programme host moderates the phone-in ses-
sions. Listeners are encouraged to call in either before or during the session,
and to send emails to the programme. Staff at the switchboard of SR perform
a first sorting of callers, off air.⁵
The call-in sessions are organized following a similar pattern. The host
opens the session by referring to a current news event that is related to the chos-
en theme. One or two calls from listeners, or occasionally emails and Facebook
posts, are presented. These comments or questions from listeners are followed by
responses from a panel of invited guests, followed by a few more calls, or emails
and Facebook posts. In two of the programmes short clips from previous radio
programmes are inserted. The first session, on humour and blasphemy, opens
with a mix of examples from previous programmes, such as a recording of
Pussy Riot’s performance ‘A Punk Prayer’ in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the
Saviour in 2012, a news clip about the Muhammad cartoons controversy in
2005, and a song from the film Life of Brian (1979). The host presents the
theme of ‘the increasingly multifaceted debate on what is allowed to be said,
and what not, about religion’. Listeners who ‘may have reflected on, or who
have experiences with this topic’ are invited to call in. Five callers participated
in the programme: one man who self-identified as a Sikh, one women identifying
as Christian, and one woman and three men representing a secular standpoint.
The callers’ opinions on the need for criticism of religion and their experiences
of disrespect and violation of religious faith were commented on by two guests:
Mona Samadi, a university lecturer in civic law and Islamic law, and Jakob
Heidbring, university lecturer in civil law and freedom of speech. Furthermore,
Christer Sturmark, the chairperson of the Swedish Humanist Association, and
Tuve Skånberg, of the Christian Democratic Party, were invited to call in and dis-
 The other sessions concerned euthanasia, freedom of consciousness and abortion, the new
female Archbishop of the Church of Sweden, and prenatal diagnosis.
 This session was added to the original period of study due to its relevance.
 This sorting was not part of the study.
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cuss the theme, due to recent political initiatives that had been taken by these
organizations.
The second programme, on the space that religion should be allowed in
public, opens with references to whether police officers should be able to
wear religious symbols, the allowance of church bells or the muezzin’s calls to
prayer in public spaces, and end-of-school celebrations in churches. Six callers
participated in this session – three men and three women. Two of these had
names that signal that they have origins from a country other than Sweden. Ar-
guments ranged from claims about Sweden being a Christian country, the impor-
tance of the plurality of religious expressions in the public sphere, and opinions
that religion should be expressed in private life or within assigned buildings,
and not in other public spaces. Invited guest commenting on the topic and
calls were Göran Greider, editor-in-chief of the Social-Democratic leaning news-
paper Dala-demokraten, Tara Twana, from the Swedish Humanist Association,
and Carl-Henric Jaktlund, the then editor-in-chief of the Christian daily Dagen.
The third session, on allowing religious free schools in Sweden, opened with
a provocative question from the host about whether these are to be seen as a ‘a
unique possibility for integration, or a tax-financed obscenity’. Nine listeners
participated through calls and email. Six of these were women, of which the
first – a religious education teacher – argued against religious schools, on the
basis that they contradict the law relating to the provision of equal education
for all pupils. Two men who self-identified as Muslims, also called in. Both of
them argued that religious schools are needed, by reference to their own expe-
rience of a lack of understanding for the importance of religious plurality in reg-
ular Swedish schools. These opinions were commented upon and discussed by
Elisabeth Sandberg, the opinion editor of the Christian daily Dagen, Christer
Sturmark, of the Swedish Humanist Association, and Claes-Göran Aggebo,
from the Swedish National Agency for Education.
8.7 Dynamics: Moderation, Commentators, and
Space
Previous research on phone-in programmes has shown a high degree of structur-
al regularity in terms of the pre-allocated turns to talk and the distribution of
such turns between speakers. This framework both enables and limits the possi-
bilities for participation, in terms of who can speak to whom,when, and for how
long (Thornborrow 2001, 119, 121). Our analysis of the interactions in the phone-
in sessions of Människor och tro shows that the intermediary role of the host is a
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salient feature. The host opens the programme and moderates the exchange be-
tween the callers and the invited guests by inviting opinions, asking questions,
or interrupting and closing down other participants’ speeches.
The regular pattern is that callers comment on the theme only, but invited
guests comment on both the theme and the opinions of callers. All the pro-
grammes include exchanges between callers. However, these exchanges are
brief, and when debates or quarrels arise they are interrupted by the host, for
example through call closings such as: ‘I am sorry to interrupt, but many
more people are waiting to share their opinions,’ or ‘I just need to say that
our programme time is coming to an end, but I hope this debate will continue.’
In the sessions on the public place of religion and on religious schools, there are
examples of brief direct exchanges between a caller and an invited guest. Never-
theless, it is clear that the host directs these exchanges through follow-up ques-
tion, or by inviting another speaker to speak. Furthermore, the phone-in sessions
in the studio usually end with a round of comments from the invited guests and
a summing-up comment from the host, which strengthens this pattern.
Phone-in sessions in Människor och tro differ from those in other phone-in
programmes broadcast on Swedish public service radio (Nordberg 2006) in a
number of ways. They are brief and are structured as part of a programming
time of less than one hour. They also differ in the frequent use of invited guests,
who function as commentators on calls. Our analysis shows a pattern in regard
to whom the callers and invited guests represent. Guests are representatives of
secular humanist associations, Christian politicians, newspaper editors, re-
searchers, and state officials. Callers predominantly represent native Swedish
people (men more than women),who often identify as being secular or Christian.
Of the 22 people who participated through calls, mail, or Facebook posts in the
three sessions that we analysed, only two self-identify as Muslims, and one as a
Sikh. Muslims, however, often become represented by other callers, or guests
who speak for them, in statements such as: ‘I think Muslims are thinking
that …’. This pattern of representation means that Islam and other minority reli-
gions are primarily commented on by representatives of native Swedish people,
by secular social institutions, or by Christians.
An additional feature which adds to this dynamic is the access to space. The
host and invited guests share the studio space, while callers only share air space
for a limited time. Being in the studio or on the telephone also affects the pos-
sibility of having a voice in the discussion. Callers’ talk is often of poorer sound
quality than the talk of the host and the panellists. Comments such as, ‘I cannot
hear you properly – can you repeat or speak up, please? Are you with us? We lost
contact with X’ are frequent in the host’s interactions with callers.
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David Herbert, Tracey Black, and Ramy Aly (2013, 536) point out, in an anal-
ysis of discussions about religion in the online forum ‘Have Your Say’ on the BBC
World Service channel, that in spite of constraints to interactivity by the technol-
ogy and the news media discourses, these debates illustrate the potential to en-
able complex dialogue among individuals from different contexts about common
concerns. Joanna Thornborrow (2001, 134), in her study of phone-ins to BBC
Radio 1, discusses how the possibility of callers debating with politicians, or
other authorities in society, gives the caller the position as a questioner of au-
thorities and dominant discourses.
Our analysis shows that the format of the phone-in sessions in Människor
och tro made it difficult for listeners to interact directly, and also to actively
react to the framing discourses and production processes which structure the
programmes. The host and the invited guests had more speaking time and
shared the studio space, and thus had an ability to express their opinions that
was greater than that of the listeners who called in. Furthermore, the prominent
role of the host in directing follow-up questions and inviting speakers into the
conversation, defuses the potentially powerful role of the ordinary person as a
questioner of people in institutional positions of power in society. Interviews
with the editorial team revealed another aspect that contributes to this pattern.
This concerned the tension between combining a plurality of perspectives with a
qualified analysis of a topic. While the team strived to find representatives from
other groups than ‘academics’ who tended to be male, middle-aged and of Swed-
ish origin, and who might contribute with everyday experiences of religion, they
also argued that guests had to ‘fit the format’, meaning that even if some people
might have had very interesting and relevant experiences they had to be able to
articulate these in a short timeframe and during a heated debate. This illustrates
the significance of an ability to express arguments in a clear, rational, discursive
form in order to participate in the programme.
These aspects contribute to an asymmetrical, rather than a symmetrical,
framework of mediated interaction in the programme. The pattern of representa-
tives from majority groups in society who comment on other religious groups,
contributes to the framing of minority religions, here, primarily Islam, as the
issue or problem at stake in the debates. This framing can contribute to, rather
than challenge, a normative understanding in Swedish society that a secular or
Christian model for public expressions of religion can be tolerated, but that other
religious expressions are an anomaly or problem that must be solved (see Chap-
ter 4). The asymmetry between callers and invited guests also risks reinforcing,
rather than reversing, the institutionally inscribed roles of elites and common
people in the public discourse. This pattern, as well as the importance of ex-
pressing arguments in a particular linguistic form, is probably reinforced by
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the fact that Människor och tro is a public service programme, with an aim to
supply an educated, middle-aged segment of the population with high-quality
news and in-depth perspectives.
8.8 Positive Role Models and Identification: A
Hijab on Facebook
A second forum for interactions with the audience is Människor och tro’s Face-
book page. As pointed out in Chapter 5, PSM are challenged to reach out to
younger audiences through digital media. Facebook and Twitter are recent addi-
tions to the programme, and the editorial team expressed to us that they still
struggled somewhat to integrate these platforms into their work. They found it
difficult to get a dialogue going between posters and, due to the lack of time
for moderation, they often refrained from promoting more controversial topics
from the radio programme, since this might generate antagonistic discussions
that they were not equipped to handle.
The most liked and shared posting on the Facebook page during the study
concerned a police student named Donna Eljammal. The posting, made on 1
April 2015, followed an earlier interview in the programme (3 April 2014) and in-
cluded an image of her wearing a hijab and a police uniform:
Donna Eljammal is the first student at the Swedish National Police Academy who wears a
headscarf. When the media drew attention to this in a 2011 debate, support and hateful
comments online followed. More than three years later, Donna is representing Södertälje
Police Office as a receptionist. ‘The response here has been surprisingly positive,’ she says.
The post received 1,385 ‘likes’ and 61 comments, and it was shared 63 times from
the Facebook page. In addition, the post was shared from the archives of text
published by sverigesradio.se over 3,000 times in various social media. In com-
parison, the second most noticed posting, about a teaching student in training
who was harassed for wearing a headscarf received 55 ‘likes’, zero comments,
and was shared five times.
Only two of the comments expressed criticism of the veiled police student.
The majority are positive, short statements that thank and encourage Donna El-
jammal. The following is one of the longest and most elaborate:
You are a role model for many women who do not dare to fight for for the profession of their
dreams, and you are a strong woman who shows what your heart chose!! Fight on, even if it
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might be hard sometimes. You change society by showing what you chose and how strong
you are! Very nice, mashalah.
The names of posters and the frequent adding of ‘mashallah’⁶ at the end of posts
indicate that the majority of posters come from, or affiliate themselves with, a
Muslim religious tradition. A few of the commenters also engaged in brief discus-
sions about the professions that Muslim women can take up, and how they
should dress in public. The editorial team of Människor och tro posted four
short statements expressing appreciation for the positive comments, and invita-
tions to listen to the programme. Donna Eljammal herself posts once, saying,
‘Thanks everyone for the nice comments. They strengthen and warm my heart.
(Feel proud after all these nice comments.)’
The form and content of the Facebook interaction differs in many ways from
the patterns discerned in the phone-in sessions. The Facebook interactions have
a low degree of moderation and are not commented on by the invited on-air
guests. The majority of posters seem to be identifying with Donna Eljammal as
young Muslims in Swedish society, and various opinions on Muslim women’s
dress in public spheres are expressed. The posting is widely ‘liked’ and shared.
However, there is a low degree of interaction between posters.
This example illustrates how Människor och tro seek to realize the policy of
Swedish public service radio to counter prejudices and give voice to individuals
as ‘experts on their own situation’. As pointed out in our analysis of the reports,
young Muslim women are often chosen as interviewees, and, on two occasions,
as invited guests, to give their perspective on issues raised in the programme.
This strategy can, on the one hand, be seen as an alternative to the ‘discursive
discrimination’ of minority groups in news media framing. In the original post-
ing, the ‘surprisingly positive response’ at the police office to a veiled police
woman is contrasted with previous ‘hateful comments’ in media and online de-
bates. Giving voice to the experiences and opinions of young Muslim women
counters invisibility and the stereotypical representation of Muslim women as
victims derived of agency. On the other hand, the young Muslim women who
are fronted in the programme are, like Donna Eljammal, representatives of
Islam in a way that aligns with an established model of religion in Sweden: as
an expression of personal belief and as a human right that is also compatible
with democratic values, such as gender equality (see Chapter 4). Donna Eljam-
 The Arabic expression ’mashallah’ can be used in a literal religious sense, as a neutral generic
saying (detached from its religious roots), or even ironically. Due to the context of commenting
on wearing the hijab as a religious symbol, we surmise that it is here being used religiously.
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mal thus becomes a symbol of how a young Muslim woman ideally should take
part in, and contribute to, Swedish society. This strategy is also an example of
the ambiguous implications of using a human-interest frame in media represen-
tations of Islam. By fronting a particular ideal case, this frame aligns with dom-
inant secularist media discourses that tend to dichotomize between religion as
personal faith or as an ideology with political claims (Lövheim 2017). While re-
ligion is seen as being problematic for a democratic society in both of these dis-
courses, religion as an expression of individual human rights can be accepted,
as expressed in the uses of the human-interest frame. This kind of conditioned
acceptance of religion as a public expression in Swedish society can, on the
one hand, be seen as an example of how the media contribute to the processes
of negotiating important values in a democratic society – in this case, how to
accommodate religious freedom and certain values of the (secular) majority of
society (see Lövheim and Axner 2011; Cottle 2006, 3). On the other hand, it
shows how ‘alternative’ media frames can contribute to upholding a distinction
between ‘good’ religion, as practised by individuals in the private sphere, and
‘bad’ religion, as public expressions that generate tensions between various
opinions and groups.
8.9 Conclusion: Balancing Contradictory Ideals
Cultural and religious diversity have become increasingly contested topics in
Swedish public debate. As part of the public service media, Människor och tro
enables and structures what actors, perspectives, and issues are expressed in
this debate, particularly with regard to controversies that relate to Islam. Swed-
ish public service radio has high ambitions to present an alternative to the dom-
inant media discourse that represents Islam as being connected to terrorism and
extremism as social problems, and to provide a nuanced insider perspective,
rather than repeating the stereotypes of particular groups.
This chapter has shown that Människor och tro provides an equal represen-
tation of Christianity and Islam, in terms of programming time, but that Islam is
still largely placed in the context of extremism and terrorism. The programme’s
editorial team strive to counter stereotypes by allowing ‘ordinary’ Swedish Mus-
lims to comment on such events and to present their experiences and opinions.
These are often women, which indicates an effort to give a voice to a minority
group. The Facebook posting about the police student, Donna Eljammal,
shows an ambition to give a voice to practising Muslims who have found a
way to present their religion in public, which has resulted in ‘positive’ responses
and has challenged stereotypes about Islam among the Swedish public. The am-
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bition of the phone-in sessions, to provide a more nuanced public discussion
than those seen in the established news formats, is hindered by the structure
of the interaction, where the voices of ordinary Muslims are few and, to a
large extent, they become framed by the dominant discourses on Islam, which
see it as a ‘problem’ in democratic secular societies. In the words of Sonya Sher-
efay, a participant in Människor och tro’s public hearing on radicalization in the
Stockholm suburb Tensta: ‘I think you should not just come to us when there is a
problem, radio. You should come also when things are good!’
The editorial staff and producers are well aware of the generally negative
media image of Islam, and they also know that their way of reporting can repro-
duce this. However, in response to our finding that most of the reports repeat the
image of Islam as being connected to conflicts and terrorism, they responded
that it is not their assignment to portray ‘everyday Islam’. There has to be a
story, they argued, in order for the programme to portray Islam ‘in a good
way’. This difficulty of combining critical reporting with a more nuanced
image of Islam was enhanced by reactions from listeners who, most prominently,
were critical of the programme for focusing too much on Islam and covering up
‘dark sides’ of religion such as conflicts.
The producers also emphasized the need to differentiate between journalis-
tic programmes on religion, and ‘religious programmes’, such as worship in re-
ligious communities. Människor och tro belongs firmly to the first category, and it
is thereby commissioned to report on religion in a critical and factual manner.
This tension between an ambition to nuance the news media’s framing of
Islam and the ideals of good journalism is mirrored in the editorial teams’ expe-
riences of communication with what they termed ‘religious people’. They had ex-
perienced the ways in which ‘religious people’ felt that they were asked the
wrong questions, or were forced into unknown and awkward territory by journal-
ists. One of the reporters explained, ‘Religious people do not accept debate as a
format, where various opinions are tested against each other. They are reluctant
to enter into a format where they cannot control what is being communicated.’
In sum, our analysis of the reports, the interactive formats, and the inter-
views with the editorial team of Människor och tro illustrate several aspects of
the dilemmas that public service media face in balancing traditional ideals
and formats, and the ambition to communicate a nuanced image of religion.
As a current affairs programme that is traditionally catering for elite segments
of the population, the editorial team of Människor och tro follows the traditional
journalistic ideals of public service media. The frequent use of invited guests,
such as researchers, politicians, other journalists, and leaders from religion
and belief organizations, to comment on the experiences and opinions of listen-
ers, follow an attempt to present a critical, in-depth analysis that differs from or-
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dinary news media. However, as these experts often refer to explanatory frames
that present public expressions of Islam as a problem in Swedish society, they
tend to strengthen a division between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ public religion. This ten-
dency is strengthened by journalistic ideals and standards, the ‘gut feeling’ of
what makes a ‘good debate’, in the phone-in sessions, which tend to privilege
the voices of established experts, rather than ordinary listeners. In this way,
our analysis of Människor och tro reveals some of the dynamics of the ways in
which public service radio enables and structures the visibility of issues, actors,
and perspectives that represents Islam and Muslims in contemporary Sweden.
These dynamics are shaped by, and contribute to, the public sentiments against
religion, in particular, Islam. Swedish citizens may be more tolerant towards ex-
pressions of Islam in the public sphere than their Scandinavian neighbours, but,
as our analysis shows, the possibility for Muslim citizens to make their voices
heard is still structured by the traditions, rules, and values that are formed by
the majority of the participants in this public discourse.
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Perspectives: Theorizing Mediatized Civic
Settings and Cultural Conflict
Abstract: This chapter reflects on how the interplay between national media
frames and discourses, social media, and user-generated content works out in
practice in civic settings. It argues that while social media in theory break na-
tional elites’ representational monopoly, in practice successful challenges
(which would shift mass media frames and overall public opinion) are rare; rath-
er, voicing of alternative views mostly results in the formation of networked
counter-publics, with potential to challenge mainstream views but also to in-
crease polarization. These dangers may be exacerbated by an increasingly un-
even spatial distribution of both religious diversity and anti-immigrant senti-
ment, shown in levels of religious participation by ethnicity and voting
patterns by region. The challenges posed for local governance by this situation
are outlined, and possible solutions briefly considered, drawing on evidence
from the literatures on superdiversity, contact theory, and political participation.
Keywords: mediatized civic settings, spatial distribution of diversity, digital hy-
bridization, agency, networked crowd
9.1 Introduction
This chapter sets the scene for the case studies of mediatized cultural conflict in
the three chapters that follow. None are neighbourhood studies in a classic eth-
nographic sense, but rather range across scales to capture the interplay between
them created by intensified media communications. Hence Repstad (Chapter 10)
examines connections (and disconnections) between national media frames, po-
litical discourse, and local media representations in his study of the discourse on
refugees amongst churches in Southern Norway; Liebmann (Chapter 11) traces
links between national media frames, social media posts, the funding of local
inter-faith groups, and the experiences and actions of residents in multi-ethnic
neighbourhoods in Eastern and Southern Norway; and Hansen and Herbert
(Chapter 12) investigate how Muslims in the Greater Copenhagen area in Den-
mark respond to a negative national media frame, and reflect on the conditions
OpenAccess. © 2018, David Herbert. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Non Commerical-NoDerivs 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110502060-014
shaping the formation and acceptance of multiple identities as a key ingredient
in cooperative community relations.
The aim of this chapter is to situate these case studies in the broader context
of theories and empirical work relevant to the relationship between mediatiza-
tion and other processes of social change at work in local civic settings. While
there are studies of various relevant factors including the role of transnational
media networks in the lives of diasporic minorities (Gillespie, Herbert, and An-
derson 2010; Rinawwi 2012), citizens’ use of media for a sense of public connec-
tion (Couldry and Markham 2008), and the mobilizing capacities of Web 2.0 so-
cial media for social protest (Theocharis 2013), the impact of mediatization on
relationships and experience in local settings remains relatively underdevel-
oped, creating a gap between locality (and especially urban, as the main
locus of religious diversity in contemporary European societies) studies and
media studies. This section of the book, drawing on both CoMRel and its sister
project Cultural Conflict 2.0: The Dynamics of Religion, Media and Locality in
North European Cities,¹ seeks to address that gap.
In their introduction to media dynamics in Chapter 3, Hjarvard and Lundby
provide a framework for conceptualizing media as embedded in and partly con-
stitutive of social relations, outlining three types of dynamics through which
media permeate and reshape them (amplification, framing and performative
agency, co-structuring). They also emphasize, especially in their conclusion,
that individual agency can still make a difference to outcomes, despite the pow-
erful structuring forces at work. This chapter seeks to build on that account by
examining how civic dynamics interact with media dynamics, and the conditions
under which this interaction occurs, drawing on perspectives from a range of re-
sources to conceptualize mediatized civic settings and the forms of agency emer-
gent within them.
9.2 Mediatized Civic Settings
The city … does not end with the visibly observable. … Urban spaces are becoming hybri-
dized, meaning they are composed through a combination of physical and digital proper-
ties. (Gordon and de Souza e Silva 2011, 1, 14)
In mediated societies – societies where media institutions have a dominant role and most,
if not all, of our information about what is going beyond our immediate locality on comes
from media – it is impossible to separate the recognition individuals get from each other
from the way media resources are distributed. (Couldry 2011, 48)
 Grant No. 231344. Our thanks to the Research Council of Norway for funding this project.
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How people experience their own neighbourhood of residence, and those they
work in, pass through or visit, has always been mediated by the impressions
of others, whether through local gossip, newspaper accounts, or perhaps by trav-
el guidebooks in the case of larger cities and favoured tourist destinations. How-
ever, changes in media technologies and their uses have significantly altered and
arguably intensified the role of the media in shaping our experience of locality.
First, the combination of digital mapping, geo-locating, and social media
technologies has changed how we perceive and negotiate our way around
local areas, especially but not exclusively in cities, because of the dense net-
works of digital information available for users to navigate the urban environ-
ment, using smartphones and other networked devices. Thus, as Gordon and
de Souza e Silva (2011) argue in the first opening quotation, localities and espe-
cially urban spaces are becoming ‘hybridized’, with digitized layers of informa-
tion interposed between us and the physical environment by navigation tools,
often embedded with commercial recommendations, photos and videos posted
on platforms such as YouTube and Instagram, and commentary in blogs and
on platforms such as Twitter. Indeed, this abundance of information creates
the need to filter out what is most useful, attractive, or entertaining, producing
selection processes enabled by social media platforms which may, ironically for
technologies which are often widely available, intensify existing patterns of so-
cial segmentation, stratification, and inequality (Boy and Uitermark 2016).
Second, this production and circulation of urban imagery and other user-
generated content breaks the representational monopoly of local and national
leaders, as well as that of the one-to-many media platforms which have helped
leaders disseminate their messages and secure consent for their policies – plat-
forms ranging from parish magazines and political pamphlets to regional news-
papers and national television and radio (Watt 2008). Using social media, audi-
ences may become not mere observers but participants who can contest and
challenge received understandings, as they fill comment sections on websites,
tweet their thoughts, share their ideas on Facebook, post YouTube videos, or re-
circulate content (which, at scale, can generate the phenomenon of content
‘going viral’). And yet the evidence of our case studies suggests that local actors
still have limited power to challenge national media frames; indeed, social
media may function predominantly rather as channels to reinforce dominant
stereotypes, both by recirculating stereotypically framed material, and by pro-
ducing new material framed in terms of dominant stereotypes.
In Chapter 11 Liebmann draws on fieldwork from Groruddalen, an East Oslo
suburb with a large ethnic minority population, and Kristansand in Southern
Norway. In opening, she uses a vignette from Groruddalen which provides a
good example of both the digital hybridization of locality and the unintended
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stigmatizing effects of a potentially emancipatory technology. She describes the
injured response of local resident ‘Zunair’ to a video posted on social media by
another young man, an ethnic Norwegian from the other side of town, who re-
corded his apparently ‘horrific’ experience of an accidental visit to Groruddalen
when he overslept on the train. While the stigmatizing video, posted by a mem-
ber of an ethnic majority and feeding into existing media stereotypes (ECRI
2015), may readily gain traction in the social media marketplace, minority
views may struggle to attract similar levels of attention. Hence while social
media offer new vistas on localities and in theory the possibility to challenge
mainstream and official representations, in practice minority voices may be
drowned out by a torrent of re-hashed stereotypes, and the weakening of official
representations mainly serve to remove barriers that once obstructed this flow.
Similarly, the findings of Chapters 10 and 12 tend to support the view that
while Web 2.0 technologies in theory offer media audiences opportunities to par-
ticipate in, and hence potentially co-construct, emergent media landscapes, in
practice, at least in these cases, the sense of a national media frame, fed by pow-
erful transnational media discourses, remains dominant, offering limited oppor-
tunities for interruption, let alone co-construction. Thus, in his study of local
church discourse on refugees in Chapter 9, Repstad finds no warrant for national
media and politicians’ claims that church leaders’ liberal views on asylum are at
odds with those of local congregations. Yet neither the preponderance of positive
attitudes of active local Christians towards refugees, at least as presented on
church websites and in newsletters, nor their practical mobilization to support
refugee welfare, nor the liberal statements of the national leadership of the
most powerful religious institution in Norway, the Lutheran church, appear suf-
ficient to interrupt dominant national media and political discourses. Indeed,
this case fits with the narrative of historical mediatization described by Hjarvard
and Lundby in Chapter 3, which holds that ‘in order to reach public attention
through the news media, religious issues should fit the media’s news values.’
On the other hand, Repstad’s case shows that the national negative media
frame does not determine the content of local discourses; while the local may
not interrupt the national, at least the local retains some autonomy.
In Chapter 12, Hansen and Herbert report that ethnic Danish and minority
heritage Muslims in Copenhagen often expressed exhaustion at their experience
of an unrelenting flow of negative mainstream representation, and most experi-
enced apparently little sense of empowerment flowing from their social media
participation. However, some research has found social media significant in pro-
viding space for minority empowerment. For example, in the Netherlands Leurs,
Midden, and Ponzanesi (2012) report on how the social media platform Hyves
was used by Dutch Moroccan women to organize street protests against Dutch
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politician Geert Wilders’ proposal for a ‘kopvoddentax’ (‘head-rag tax’), an-
nounced to Parliament on 16 September 2009. Organized online under the head-
ing Wij Willen Geen Hoofddoek Verbod! (We want no headscarf ban!), the site at-
tracted 15,000 followers and led to protests in several locations across the
Netherlands before the proposal was dropped. The researchers locate this activ-
ity in the broader context of Internet discussion platforms providing ‘hush har-
bours’ for sharing experiences of hostility and offering mutual support in the
context negative public framing of Islam and Muslim practice in the Nether-
lands. For example, one platform for Dutch Moroccans, Marokko.nl, ‘is estimated
to reach a remarkable 70 to 75 percent of Moroccan-Dutch youth in the age cat-
egory of 15 to 35’ (ibid., 159). The researchers conclude that these online spaces:
not only offer an important critique of mainstream media debates on multiculturalism, but
also create space for alternative bottom-up interpretations of everyday practices of multi-
culturalism in the Netherlands. (ibid.)
Internet forums and social media platforms have also provided the organization-
al infrastructure for acts of inter-religious solidarity in Denmark and Norway, in-
cluding the human ring formed around the synagogue in Oslo organized by
young Muslims in the wake of the shootings at a synagogue in Copenhagen in
February 2015 (Hovland 2015). Social media use enables rapid and widespread
mobilization across space; thus, the ring of solidarity idea was a response to
an attack in Denmark which led to action in Oslo, Norway, then was re-used
in Bergen, and an earlier ‘March Against Terror’ in September 2014 in Oslo
was re-used in Kristiansand.² In such mediatized events, the use of urban
space is both enabled through the digital infrastructure supporting its organiza-
tion and amplified in impact by the circulation of the images generated. Thus,
while our case studies show some negative impacts of social media on minority
stigmatization, there are clearly other sides to the story.
Such social media networks may be understood as constituting ‘counter-
publics’, meaning ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated
social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses … to formulate opposition-
al interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ (Fraser 1990, 67), and
which may produce ‘offline’ social and political action. This role of social
media does not seem to fit easily into the typology of media dynamics in medi-
atized conflicts supplied by Hjarvard and Lundby in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1; see also
Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015, 10). Perhaps it best fits the metaphor of
‘media as environment’ and the dynamic of ‘co-structuring’, as the affordances
 Observed by Sivin Kit for the Cultural Conflict 2.0 project, field notes September 2014.
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of the social media platform structure the form that contributions to debates take
(a kind of formatting – Instagram enables curated visual representations, Twitter
favours aphoristic sloganeering etc.). However, while the platforms used operate
in a broad commercial environment shaped by relations of power (Facebook, In-
stagram, and Twitter are all monetized commercial platforms), so that the media
practices of users are in some sense ‘embedded in … structural relations of
power’, it is not clear how this influences them, and social media practices dis-
played on these platforms do not seem necessarily to reinforce these ‘relations of
power’, but rather, may, under some conditions (modestly) redistribute power
across networks, and indeed at a local level (by virtue of the concentration of
network participants within a locality), for example by distributing counter-im-
ages, as with the positive representations of refugees in local church communi-
cations found by Repstad (Chapter 10).
While Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær recognize that ‘the relationship be-
tween media and conflict does not constitute a one-way street from media to so-
cial actors’ (2015, 10), and write of social actors ‘using’ media and media being
‘implicated in stratified systems of social power’ (ibid.), neither ‘use’ (by an in-
tending agent) nor ‘implication’ within a stratified system seems to quite capture
the networked dynamics of social media power. Rather, the power of social
media is somehow more ‘distributed’ – not so much under the control of power-
ful individual (or corporate) actors as mass media power – yet capable of being
activated by the posting of a single image, as the term ‘going viral’ suggests.
Maybe this is a kind of ‘co-structuring’, though not of an incremental, gradual
kind, as that term may suggest, but something more rapid and volatile; such
power is the product neither of individual will nor of institutional formation,
but rather of the networked crowd. Perhaps then, Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Es-
kjær’s (2015) model could use an extra, fourth media metaphor, that of the ‘net-
work’, with its characteristic dynamic of ‘circulation’ and ‘influence’ of ‘in-
creased volatility’ which creates ‘potential for disruption of dominant
representations, but also for their retrenchment’.
The counter-publics enabled by social media – whether ethnic minority
hush harbours or regional subcultures (such as Repstad’s churches in Chap-
ter 10) – also suggest a mechanism which might disrupt the ‘spiral of silence’
dynamic (Noelle-Neumann 1984) identified by Hjarvard and Lundby (Chapter 3),
whereby majority viewpoints become more dominant in public discussions as
dissenters become reluctant to contribute, once a dominant position is establish-
ed. Certainly, our Danish interviewees (Chapter 12) illustrate this spiral, as inter-
viewees expressed reluctance to contribute to public forums due to the over-
whelmingly negative responses received. However, the formation of social
media networks might also interrupt this process, by providing forums in
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which minority opinions form a critical mass empowered to challenge dominant
positions.While this might contribute to a ‘filter bubble’ effect (Pariser 2011), in-
creasing fragmentation of public opinion, this is unlikely for minorities, who are
not likely to be unaware of dominant media frames. Rather, such counter-publics
can enable the strengthening of minorities through the development of solidar-
ity, and may empower them to intervene in the public sphere at opportune mo-
ments (as with the anti-head scarf ban protest, or the human ring initiatives).
Furthermore, both Scandinavian and Dutch counter-publics discussed sug-
gest the importance of spatial relations for grasping the dynamics of interaction
between media and locality. In several cases, online activity galvanizes protest
enacted at specific significant sites; and in Groruddalen we see an example of
the uneven spatial distribution of religious diversity in Scandinavia, which, it
will be argued, is central to understanding the dynamics of mediatized civic con-
flicts in this region.
9.3 Place Matters: The Uneven Spatial
Distribution of Religious Diversity, Practice,
and Fear of Difference in Scandinavia
Non-European immigrants tend to be more religious – typically Muslims or Christians –
than their host populations. … The limited evidence for second-generation minority popu-
lations suggests that religious decline will occur more slowly (if at all) among them than it
has among the majority population. … We may begin to see ‘de-secularization’ in Western
Europe in the coming decades. Indeed, this is already visible in the continent’s religiously
vibrant immigration cities. (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012, 71–86)
Debates for or against the banning of the construction of mosques and/or minarets reveal
the tumultuous transition of Muslims from the status of the invisible migrant worker to that
of visible Muslim citizenship. … Public visibility is approached therefore as a radically dis-
ruptive, transgressive, provocative form of transformative agency that is intrinsically related
to the political process of becoming citizens. (Göle 2011, 383)
The presence and hence experience of religious diversity in Scandinavia, as else-
where in Europe, is not evenly distributed spatially. Rather, it is the major cities
which are the sites of significant religious diversity, due both to initial immigrant
settlement patterns and ongoing residents’ constraints and choices. Thus, it is in
the Scandinavian capitals of Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm, and some larger
regional cities such as Malmö, that higher concentrations of visible minority
populations exist, often focused residentially in particular neighbourhoods. It
is here that Pentecostal churches and mosques are mostly located (where plan-
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ning permission can be obtained), and it is on these neighbourhoods that media
attention is often focused, with coverage of religion uneasily mingled with anxi-
eties about public safety, urban disorder, and criminality, and prone to prolifer-
ate into periodic moral panics (Bangstad 2011).While immigrant, especially asy-
lum seeker, settlement policies to some extent offset these patterns, for example
creating settlements of Sri Lankan Tamils (mostly Hindu) in the coastal towns of
Arctic Norway (Guribye 2011), the pattern of urban concentration predominates.
Indeed, it is not just religious diversity that is unevenly distributed spatially,
but religious participation. As pointed out in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Scandina-
vians have amongst the lowest levels of religious observance in the world, but
the immigrants, and especially refugees, arriving in Scandinavia’s major cities
come from some of the most religiously observant societies globally, notably
from Africa and the Middle East. While it should not be assumed that all will
wish or choose to maintain this observance, assumptions informed by seculari-
zation theory that minorities will rapidly assimilate to Northern European norms
in this respect are not supported by empirical studies.
Thus, van Tubergen (2006) found that British and Dutch immigrants (from
several major religions, and 12 percent with no religious affiliation) had a weekly
congregational attendance rate of 34 percent and 33 percent respectively (ibid.,
10), compared with national rates of 17 percent and 12 percent, suggesting con-
siderable differences between migrant and majority populations. Amongst Mus-
lims, Güveli and Platt (2010, 1027) found weekly mosque attendance rates for
British and Dutch Muslims of 67 percent and 47 percent respectively, roughly
four times higher than amongst the national population in both countries. Sup-
porting these findings, Maliepaard, Lubbers and Gijsberts (2012) found that
amongst Dutch Muslims, whereas data before 1998 suggested a ‘linear trend to-
wards secularization over time and over generations’, evidence from 1998–2006
shows a ‘striking revival among the second generation’, leading them to con-
clude that, ‘forces of secularization such as educational attainment and genera-
tional replacement gradually lose their predictive power’ (2012, 359).
Similar patterns may be found in Scandinavia. Certainly, fear of the conse-
quences of religious diversity also seems to be unevenly distributed spatially
here, paradoxically highest in areas of least diversity, especially where these
are near major urban centres; a ‘halo effect’ of media-driven anxiety about the
ethnic other. One source of evidence for this is voting patterns: support for
anti-immigrant political parties is strongest in areas with fewer immigrants
and ethnic minorities. Thus, in Denmark in the 2015 elections support for the
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) was strongest in the areas of
162 David Herbert
Southern Jutland (Sydjylland) and Sjælland, located away from the major urban
centres (Politiken, 2015³). In Norway, support for the Progress Party (Fremskritt-
spartiet, FrP) in the 2013 elections was strongest in rural and small-town areas
close to major urban areas (e.g. Vestfold with 19.5 percent and Telemark with
19 percent, compared to Oslo with 11.7 percent [Statistics Norway 2015]⁴). This
pattern repeated in Sweden’s 2015 elections, where the Swedish Democrats
were strongest outside Stockholm in Södermanlands län (13.4 percent) and out-
side Malmö in Blekinge län (14.1 percent), while in Stockholm proper the party
received 5.8 percent and in Malmö, 8.9 percent (Statistics Sweden 2017⁵). These
lower rates in the major cities are more than the effect of minorities themselves
not supporting these parties – as these groups constitute small minorities in
most areas, and tend to vote less (Scuzarello, 2015), these voting patterns mostly
reflect differing majority population preferences in urban and rural areas.
So,why are people living in areas with fewer immigrants more worried about
immigration than those living in areas with more immigrants? Survey evidence
points to the processes which might be involved. Duffy and Frere-Smith analysed
Ipsos-MORI polls conducted in the UK from 2006–2011, finding that immigration
was consistently perceived as a much greater problem nationally (69–76 per-
cent) than locally (15–28 percent; 2014, 90). This suggests a dominant role for
the national media in the production of anxieties about immigration (closely as-
sociated with religious diversity in the Scandinavian context). The mechanism
could be that those who live in areas of lower immigrant concentration fear
what they perceive through the media, which tend to over-represent conflict in
general (due to its higher ‘news value’, Jewkes 2011), and especially conflict re-
lating to immigration and Muslims (ECRI 2015). In this context, short-term en-
counters such as visits to major cities tend may be read in the light of dominant
media narratives. In contrast, residents in major cities, accustomed to living with
diversity, are less fearful of it but aware (again, through the media) of concerns
elsewhere in society. Either way, we find an uneven pattern of concern, with
media coverage likely to be the major factor shaping it.
This evidence of the power of media frames to shape our perceptions of
other localities – beyond our immediate neighbourhood where we must rely
 Wikipedia, s.v. Wahlkarte Folketing Dänemark 2015, last modified 19 June 2015, https://com-
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wahlkarte_Folketing_D%C3%A4nemark_2015_da.svg
 Statistics Norway, “Storting election 2013: Valid votes, by party/electoral list and county,”
http://www.ssb.no/196612/storting-election-2013.valid-votes-by-party-electoral-list-and-county.p-
er-cent-sy-7
 Statistics Sweden, “General elections, results,” http://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statis-
tics-by-subject-area/democracy/general-elections/general-elections-results/
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on mediated sources – comes from the UK, but there are good reasons to think
that similar mechanisms are at work in Scandinavia. While concerns about im-
migration are higher in the UK, concerns about religious diversity run at similar
levels – for example, the wish to restrict Muslim immigration runs at the same
level in Denmark and the UK (46 percent agree with the statements ‘allow
few’ or ‘no’ Muslim immigrants), at comparable level in Norway (34.4 percent),
though significantly lower in Sweden (19 percent, European Social Survey
2014). Thus, the scale of public concern is broadly similar. But more importantly
the key ingredients – powerful negative media frames shaping perceptions of im-
migration and Islam, and an inverse relationship between local experience of di-
versity and anxieties about it – are present in each case; in the UK, residents in
‘low migration small towns and rural areas’ are twice as likely to want to restrict
immigration as residents in ‘superdiverse’ London (Duffy and Frere Smith 2013,
22), similar to the distribution suggested by voting patterns in Scandinavia.
9.4 Governance and Challenges for Civic
Leadership
Mediatisation changes the logic of governance. It introduces new stakes for governance ac-
tors as their actions are … perceived through a media gaze. (Uitermark and Gielen 2010,
1327)
In the kind of mediatized civic environments described, local (as well as nation-
al) leaders face new challenges in the management of cultural conflicts. As na-
tional and international conflicts percolate through different media channels,
they may create or amplify local tensions. When satellite and digital communi-
cations transcend national borders, local disputes may escalate rapidly into in-
ternational incidents, as with the Danish Muhammad cartoons controversy in
2005–2006 (Lindekilde, Mouritsen, and Zapata-Barrero 2009). Similarly, since
people are entangled in extensive and complex media landscapes, local civic re-
lations may be affected by distant events, or even by their anticipation. For ex-
ample, Uitermark and Gielen (2010) found in their study of the Amsterdam
neighbourhood De Baarjes in aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh in
2004, that local government officials were strongly influenced by their anticipa-
tion of national media coverage, adopting a kind of proactive media-oriented
stance, more than they were informed by a detailed grasp of local civic dynam-
ics, with damaging consequences for the latter in the long run.
This mediatization of local politics needs to be understood in the context of
the neo-liberalization of governance in Northern European cities, part of a global
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pattern. While Scandinavian societies may be less affected than others, due to
the strength of social welfare model of democracy, they are not exempt. Neolib-
eralism is understood here as ‘a series of contemporary projects of capital accu-
mulation that, beginning in the 1970s, sought to reconstitute social relations of
production including the organization of labour, space, state institutions, milita-
ry power, governance, membership and sovereignty’ (Glick-Schiller 2011, 213–4).
Neo-liberal ideologies advocate increasing the scope of market logics, bringing
purchaser–provider relationships into areas of social provision previously domi-
nated by the welfare state and professional norms, and emphasizing the ex-
change value of urban space at the expense of its multiple use values (Lefebvre
1991).
In the field of local governance, as elsewhere, this is has led to a disruption
of established relationships between residents, welfare institutions, and local au-
thorities. For example, analysing the case of the Dutch national community de-
velopment agency Wijkalliantie (Neighbourhood Alliance), which they see as in-
dicative of trends across Western Europe to bring private entrepreneurial
organizations into local governance, Uitermark and Duyvendak argue that ‘frag-
mented and transparent institutions have to compete in a new landscape domi-
nated by periodical evaluations and quick shifts in policy … Flexibility for fi-
nancers, including politicians, administrators and charities, has at the same
time meant instability for professionals and citizens’ (2008, 117).
So, in contrast to previous practice where, through processes of consultation
and discussion, ‘residents defined which discourses were legitimate’, now ‘gov-
ernmental organizations formulate a discourse that primarily reflects the con-
cerns of … their financially and politically powerful partners … and subsequently
try to find residents who are willing and able to ground this discourse institu-
tionally in disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ (ibid., 115).
Parallel impacts of mediatization and neo-liberalism are suggested by Lieb-
mann’s study of organized cultural encounters in an Oslo neighbourhood (Chap-
ter 11). First, local projects must compete for funding in a competitive environ-
ment (neoliberalism), then mediatization shapes what funding is available,
especially national media-driven frames of reference formed by anxieties related
to security, which influence the cultural programmes of local organizations.
Thus, the influence of media frames may be refracted both through local govern-
ment policies (as in the Dutch examples) and national funding programmes (as
in Groruddalen and Kristiansand), impacting local civic dynamics.
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9.5 What Makes Diverse Neighbourhoods Work?
Converging Evidence, and a Research–Policy
Rupture
A feature common to many European countries is that the body of scientifically based
knowledge on immigrant integration has increased substantially, while at the same time
public authorities seem to have become less interested in making use of the assembled
knowledge. … Although the idea of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ has gained wide recog-
nition discursively, strong evidence also exists that politicians and policymakers often use
scientific research for symbolic rather than instrumental purposes. (Scholten 2015, 2)
In concluding this introduction to shaping cultural conflicts in mediatized civic
settings, and given the challenges facing local leaders implied by this account, it
may be useful to consider briefly empirical evidence and theories on what makes
diverse neighbourhoods ‘work’, and, given the problem of the spatial distribu-
tion of anxieties about cultural difference, to ask, what might reduce fears in
less diverse regions? In addressing these topics, on the one hand there is good
news that several theoretical perspectives and a range of empirical studies con-
verge on which features help make diverse neighbourhoods work (and may be
transferable to less diverse areas), and on what impacts on the anxieties that un-
derlie prejudices. On the other hand, as Scholten argues, it is unfortunate that
across Europe, precisely because of the dominant media frames concerning im-
migration and Islam that they must negotiate and the political dynamics these
have generated, politicians and policy makers are reluctant to act on such evi-
dence-led recommendations.
First, several theories (superdiversity,Vertovec 2007; contact, Al Ramiah and
Hewstone 2013; political participation, Scuzzarello 2015), are both well-ground-
ed in empirical studies and concur that development and public recognition of
multiple, intersecting, and overlapping roles and identities is critical to success-
ful social integration. In other words, seeing that others who are different in
some respects (e.g. religion, ethnicity) also have overlapping interests and
roles (e.g. as parents, neighbours, school governors, tenants, etc.), combined
with a basic level of civility in public contact, seems sufficient to form the
basis of mutual recognition necessary for the development of trust between
neighbours and a localized sense of a shared public good, even in very diverse
neighbourhoods (Wessendorf, 2014). On this basis engagement with and accept-
ance of divergent aspects of identity may develop.
In fact, it seems that conditions in more diverse neighbourhoods, with an es-
tablished history of migration and with many immigrants from different back-
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grounds, seem work in favour of civic integration (Hickman and Mai 2015). This
may be because in these conditions it is difficult for the binary categories around
which prejudice is formed (us and them, long-time resident and newcomer, Mus-
lim and Dane, as we shall see in Chapter 12), to develop. And this may be why
less diverse regions pose greater challenges, as it is easier for such binary cate-
gories to take hold. Nonetheless, programmes which build on contact and para-
contact theory show that even in some of the most unpromising conditions (e.g.
in Israel–Palestine, where ‘natural’ inter-ethnic contact is limited and binary cat-
egorization reinforced by most social processes), school programmes which com-
bine education with extended contact and constructive interaction can have a
major impact on attitudes (Berger et al., 2016).
9.6 Conclusion
This survey of evidence on the relationship between the changing media land-
scape, civic settings and cultural conflict, framing Scandinavia in a European
context, suggests complex challenges facing both future research and policy.
While macro, structural factors have always impacted local civic relations,
which in turn have their own logics not reducible to structure, and national
and regional media have long been a significant link between scales, the evi-
dence reviewed suggests social media significantly intensifies and complicates
these links, introducing new dynamics whose effects are hard to predict, as
they include both amplifying the dominance of national media frames (e.g. me-
diatization of local governance in Amsterdam), and empowering marginalised
groups to resist the political effects of such framing (the Dutch Muslim anti-
headscarf ban campaign). For researchers, this implies the need for constant at-
tention to factors operative at different scales and their mediated interconnec-
tion. For policy makers and advisers, the challenge has the added difficulty
that the field has become not just intensely mediatized but politicised by popu-
list discourses which frame relations between majorities and minorities antago-
nistically, mobilizing a divisive binary worldview which ‘pits a virtuous and ho-
mogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous “others” who are
depicted as depriving … the sovereign people of their rights, values, identity,
and voice’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3). Furthermore, this competitive
framing may be intensified by the neo-liberalization of local governance.
Under these conditions, evidence based policies of inclusion meet a sceptical re-
ception, even when based on well-grounded theories, as both may be dismissed
as mere ‘expert opinion’ in populist rhetoric. But, surely in Scandinavia, with its
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traditions of social equality, high value placed on education and inclusivity, they
may yet prevail?
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Moral Involvement or Religious Scepticism?
Local Christian Publications on Asylum
Seekers
Abstract: Norway’s Christian leaders have been directing a stream of almost
unanimous criticism at the present (2017) Conservative and populist govern-
ment’s increasingly restrictive policy on refugees and asylum seekers. Some
have claimed that the criticism from Christian leaders is an elite phenomenon,
and that local Christians are more positive to the adopted restrictions, as well
as to proposals for an even more restrictive policy. This chapter presents results
from a study of local Christian publications from August 2015 to April 2016. Pub-
lications online and on paper from 52 local organizations and congregations in a
region in Southern Norway have been analysed. The results indicate that local
Christian congregations and organizations welcome and support arriving refu-
gees and asylum seekers, and to the extent that they comment on political is-
sues, they support the criticism coming from their national leaders. The local
publications studied can be seen as a kind of counter-information to national
right-wing populist politicians and media trying to create ‘official fear’.
Keywords: refugees, migration, local publications, local Christianity
10.1 A More Restrictive Policy
After the general election in autumn 2014, Norway got a so-called blue–blue gov-
ernment, a coalition between the Conservatives (Høyre) and the Progress Party
(Fremskrittspartiet). The Progress Party in particular, has placed scepticism to-
ward immigration very high on their agenda (Fangen and Vaage 2014). Progress
Party member Sylvi Listhaug, serving the government since December 2015 as
Minister of Immigration and Integration, has been criticized for using harsh lan-
guage against immigrants and asylum seekers.¹ While still Minister of Agricul-
 From January 2018, Listhaug was no longer Minister of Integration, but Minister for Justice,
Public Security and Immigration. In March 2018 she resigned from Government after heavy criti-
cism from the opposition.
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ture and Food, she told the press that she, a Christian, considered leaving the
Church of Norway because she disliked the bishops’ criticism of the govern-
ment’s refugee policy. In an interview in the Christian daily Vårt Land on 4 No-
vember 2015, she criticized the bishops directly, referring to ‘a tyranny of good-
ness’ haunting Norway. Later, on 5 February 2016, she followed up on her
criticism in the newspaper VG, stating that the church is not for everyone, as
it has become a political actor for leftists, a player likely to destroy the welfare
society due to its stance in favour of free immigration. In response to another
bout of criticism from bishops, she said in an interview with the weekly Morgen-
bladet on 8 April 2016: ‘It is not for the bishops to define who is a Christian and
who is not, or who has the right form of Christianity and who does not’. Further-
more, in an interview with the newspaper Aftenposten on 7 January 2016, she ex-
pressed concern about the future of her children if immigration to Norway gets
out of control. When presenting some restrictive reforms in Norwegian refugee
policy in an interview with the newspaper VG on 29 December 2015, Listhaug
used an old Norwegian metaphor, stating that refugees cannot expect ‘to be car-
ried into Norway on a chair of gold’.² According to the Atekst software program
for retrieval and analysis of newspaper material, Listhaug’s statement about the
chair of gold was quoted and commented on 360 times in Norwegian newspa-
pers and magazines in paper format from the time when it was published
until the end of 2016. She even got international attention, for example in the
Independent on 21 October 2016, after posting a statement on Facebook the
day before attending a conference on integration that Norwegians ‘eat pork
and drink alcohol’, and those who come to Norway should adapt to that.
Clearly, Sylvi Listhaug, has been a central figure in the immigration debate
since she took over as minister, but it should be noted that the government has
been standing behind her proposals, and that some of the restrictions have been
supported by some of the political parties outside the government as well. On a
less rhetorical and more concrete level, Sylvi Listhaug, on behalf of the govern-
ment, sent for consultation several proposals for a more restrictive policy toward
refugees and asylum seekers in December 2015 (Ministry of Justice and Public Se-
curity 2015). The proposals included a stricter policy on family reunion, and lim-
itations concerning unaccompanied minor asylum seekers. According to the new
proposals, instead of a permanent permission, minor adolescents would only get
a temporary permission to stay in Norway. The consultation process resulted in
protests from several organizations, lawyers, and even administrative agencies
 It should be added that all the newspapers quoted so far are independent of political parties
and considered mainstream media in Norway.
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under the government. Many of the consultation responses claimed that some of
the proposals contradicted international law and human rights conventions.
However, the government decided to maintain almost all the proposals (Ministry
of Justice and Public Security 2015–2016). When presenting the news in media
interviews, among them in Aftenposten on 6 April 2016, Sylvi Listhaug expressed
as a positive quality of Norwegian immigration policy that it would be the strict-
est in Europe. The proposals were discussed in the Parliament in June, and many
of the proposed restrictions were formally adopted, such as permission for the
police to stop asylum seekers at the border in times of crisis. However, the
most controversial ones, concerning unaccompanied minor asylum seekers
and a more restrictive family reunion policy, were not.³
10.2 Protests from Church Leaders
Five or six decades ago, many church leaders, especially in minority churches,
argued against Christian involvement in politics, recommending individual
Christian conversions and Christian upbringing of new generations as better
strategies for a better world, rather than political efforts. Exceptions from the
rule of political non-involvement were Christian ‘core issues’ such as abortion
and financial state support for Christian schools.
Gradually Norwegian church leaders have approached the political field on
a broader scope of issues, such as socio-economic equality, climate, and pollu-
tion. In the 1990s, churches found on their literal doorsteps the politics of refu-
gees and immigration, as several asylum seekers responded to their cases being
rejected by seeking asylum in churches. Most of these refugees and asylum seek-
ers were Kosovo Albanians. During the peak year of 1993, about 140 local
churches of various denominations had asylum seekers in their church buildings
for short or long periods, a practice that church leaders generally accepted as le-
gitimate in acute situations (Vetvik and Omland 1997). In 1997, 25 Norwegian
church leaders from various denominations presented a common statement
warning against fear of Muslims (Haugen 2010).
Today general warnings against political involvement are almost non-exis-
tent in churches, except among Jehovah’s Witnesses and a few small faith com-
munities. Reservations against direct church support for specific parties are still
widespread, but for the past three or four decades, church leaders in Norway
have often placed themselves in a centre-to-left position in many socio-political
 See the newspaper Dagsavisen, 11 June 2016, for an overview of the Parliament’s decisions.
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issues. They are concerned with climate and environmental issues, as well as
equality and justice, nationally and globally. Many also claim that public immi-
gration policies are too restrictive. Leaders are more conservative in matters of
family policy and sexuality, as well as in bio-ethical issues. This is shown in
an interview study of Norwegian national religious leaders from 2011 (Furseth
et al. 2015, 153– 157). However, especially the Church of Norway has seen a recent
liberalization of attitudes, including in the matter of same-sex marriages. In
April 2016, the Church of Norway General Synod accepted same-sex marriage
ceremonies in churches, and in February 2017, a new liturgy was introduced.
A similar centre-to-left socio-political profile is documented in a previous
study of 118 national and regional leaders in the Church of Norway (Gulbrandsen
et al. 2002). This study showed that the church elite turned out to be the most
politically radical group of all Norwegian elites. They preferred environmental
concerns to economic growth, they were the strongest proponents of increased
wage equality, and they opposed regulation of immigration based on labour
market needs.
Many individual bishops and other church leaders have issued criticisms of
Norwegian asylum politics. The website of the Church of Norway, as well as the
websites of many minority churches and umbrella organizations, like the Council
for Religious and Life Stance Communities (STL) and the Christian Council of
Norway, show a centre-to-left engagement in many current socio-political issues,
including criticism of the present government’s restrictive immigration policies.
Together with several humanitarian and political organizations, the Christian
Council of Norway, with most Christian faith communities as members, takes
part in the so-called Forum for Asylum Politics, a meeting place for organiza-
tions involved in asylum politics. In November 2016, this forum issued a joint
statement, strongly criticizing restrictive decisions made recently or planned
by the government. The forum protested against initiatives such as plans to re-
move refugee status for Somalian refugees, reduction of economic support for
families with children in refugee reception centres, and an increasing number
of returns of refugees to Afghanistan (Asylpolitisk forum 2016).
The involvement by Norwegian Christian leaders was summed up by colum-
nist Sven Egil Omdal some years ago, in the newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad on 1
March 2014:
Christian leaders have turned into a humanitarian vanguard. When someone feels cold,
weeps or is afraid of Norwegian state power, more and more often a bishop or Christian
general secretary is nearby, offering warmth, comfort and vigorous protest.
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10.3 Criticism from the Churches – An Elite
Phenomenon?
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Christian leaders have been overwhelm-
ingly critical to government policy. In 2016, however, a few Christian leaders
voiced scepticism toward the profile of churches and Christian organizations
in these matters. One of them was Vebjørn Selbekk, the editor of the conservative
Christian newspaper Dagen. In an interview with the newspaper VG on 6 Febru-
ary 2016, he stated that he sympathizes with Sylvi Listhaug, claiming that the
question of immigration must be solved politically and that the church has no
special competence in the field. Erik Furnes, general secretary of Indremisjons-
forbundet, a conservative, low-church inner mission organization, expressed
similar views. In an editorial in the organization’s magazine Sambåndet in
April 2016, Furnes reminded readers that it is the politicians who have a respon-
sibility to ‘take care of the totality of concerns’ and criticized church leaders for
having voiced statements that were too specific against the policy of the govern-
ment. In an interview in Vårt Land on 6 February 2016, Furnes warned against
one-sidedness from the church, stating that he, to some extent, understood
Sylvi Listhaug.
In early 2016, Vårt Land published a couple of interviews pointing to an al-
leged cleavage between Christian leaders and the local grass roots. A local pol-
itician from the Christian Democrats, Torolf Nordbø, claimed in an interview on 2
February that the lack of immigration control is worry number one among many
people at grassroots level, and author Lars Akerhaug told a journalist on 1 Feb-
ruary that, while visiting some local Christian communities to present his books
on extremism in Norway, he noticed an undercurrent of scepticism toward Mus-
lims. Akerhaug quoted statements like ‘all Muslims can lie; it is part of their re-
ligion’, and ‘the Muslims have come to take over Norway’. As the Christian lead-
ers have a different view, these opinions are seldom voiced in public, he said,
adding that these views come from the grass roots members and from visitors
who may not be members of the congregation.
So, my question is whether the Christian criticism of the government’s refugee
policy is just an elite phenomenon, while Sylvi Listhaug and the government have
broad support at the local and grassroots level in the Christian communities.
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10.4 A Study of Six Municipalities
My study is based on local Christian websites, Facebook pages, parish magazines
and local organizations’ publications in the town of Kristiansand in the south-
ernmost part of Norway, as well as in five surrounding municipalities: Birkenes,
Lillesand, Søgne, Songdalen, and Vennesla. In total, these six municipalities, sit-
uated in the Agder region, have about 130,000 inhabitants and is part of an area
sometimes referred to as Norway’s Bible Belt, known for its vital and diverse
Christian involvement in the majority Church of Norway and in a wide range
of minority churches and Christian organizations. Christian faith and participa-
tion in organized Christianity are more widespread here than in other areas of
Norway (Botvar, Repstad, and Aagedal 2010). Although a softening of the strict-
est and most pietistic religious traditions has been observed in recent decades,
active Christians still seem to be more conservative and restrictive in matters of
morality in the region of Agder than elsewhere in Norway (Repstad 2009; Mag-
nussen, Repstad, and Urstad 2012; Repstad 2014). Hence, it is not unreasonable
to believe that if Christians in this relatively conservative region are critical to-
wards the government’s restrictive policy against refugees and asylum seekers,
the same will be the case for Christians in other regions.
I have systematically studied websites, Facebook pages, and printed publi-
cations from 52 local congregations and Christian organizations, using a combi-
nation of counting and a more hermeneutic qualitative analysis. There is no com-
prehensive overview of the number of such publications available in these
municipalities, but I believe I have reviewed most of the material published
from August 2015 to March 2016. Not all local faith communities and organiza-
tions publish electronically, but most of them do, so I would dare to say that
my study captures the general sentiment in local Christian publications in the
area during the period in question. Like many other European countries, Norway
experienced a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers during
these months, followed by a marked decrease. At some point during this time
frame, there seemed to be a marked national change in rhetoric about refugees
and asylum seekers, in the media as well as in public opinion. From October to
November especially, there was a shift from empathy and care to more concern
for strictness and control. It will be interesting to note whether this shift is re-
flected in the local Christian publications as well.
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10.5 A Widespread and Stable Local Christian
Concern
What did I find? Publications from 28 of the 52 congregations and organizations –
over half of them – mentioned refugees and asylum seekers during the eight
months analysed. Most statements are connected to local humanitarian efforts,
and there are many recommendations to take part in such volunteer work. These
projects are sometimes organized by the congregations or organizations them-
selves, sometimes in cooperation with others, either municipal bodies, other
Christian communities, or humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross.
A main finding is that not one single statement from the 52 local Christian
organizations expressed support for the government’s asylum politics and its
proposals for a more restrictive policy. This does not mean that many of the pub-
lications explicitly objected to the restrictive policy, but some did voice a protest.
An employee in the Salvation Army in Kristiansand was invited to speak at an
event in one of Kristiansand’s largest minority churches, the Evangelical Luther-
an Free Church, and according to the report in the magazine of this faith com-
munity, Frikirkeaktuelt, in November 2015, she had ‘much to say about what,
in her opinion, is an unsuccessful policy’. She criticized several concrete propos-
als for a more restrictive line of action. A pastor in the Pentecostal congregation
Filadelfia in Kristiansand quoted Angela Merkel’s statement that fear is a poor
adviser. He concluded by asking whether we in Norway are meant to be only
five million inhabitants: ‘Could we not be seven? We have enough space, and
we have an economy enabling us to meet the challenges of our continent’, he
wrote in Filadelfiamagazinet, March 2015. The local congregation of the Church
of Norway in Søgne some miles west of Kristiansand encouraged its members on
its Facebook page in September to take part in a demonstration outside the town
hall to show the politicians that they ‘welcome the refugees to Søgne’. This was
before a meeting where the local council was to decide how many refugees (if
any) the municipality should receive. The Christian social welfare organization
Blue Cross housed many asylum seekers in Kristiansand during an acute period
in the early autumn of 2015, when several refugees arrived on the night ferry from
Denmark. Twice that autumn, the Blue Cross organized benefit concerts for ref-
ugee help, and a well-known singer-songwriter in Norway, Ole Paus, was inter-
viewed on the Blue Cross website, encouraging people to turn their backs on
the attitudes of the Progress Party. On the website of the Pentecostal congrega-
tion Betania, we found before Christmas 2015 a feature article on Budget Hotel in
Kristiansand, which served as a temporary home for 82 refugees. Here the au-
thors took issue with the oft-used term lykkejegere (fortune hunters): ‘Had we
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been in the same situation, we too would probably have stopped at nothing in
our hunt for happiness and a better life’. Finally, City Mission pastor Bjarte
Leer-Helgesen in Kristiansand has a much-read Facebook page where he, on
16 December 2016, wrote ironically about Sylvi Listhaug and her use of the
term ‘tyranny of goodness’.
There are some more statements with a political sting, but most of the 28
congregations and organizations writing about asylum seekers mention various
humanitarian initiatives, inviting members and others to take part in these. Ex-
amples are refugee cafés with low-threshold language training and social con-
tact, football for young asylum seekers, collection of clothes for asylum seekers
living in temporary emergency centres, and organized systems of refugee hosts.
As mentioned, many initiatives were the results of cooperation, such as the wel-
come centres for refugees in Vågsbygd Church and in the parish hall of the Ca-
thedral in Kristiansand. Christian social welfare organizations such as the Blue
Cross, the Salvation Army, Christian Intercultural Work (KIA), and the Church
City Mission in Kristiansand are doing their share, and so are several minority
churches, such as the Evangelical Lutheran Free Church and local Pentecostal
congregations.
The lowest level of activity was found among low-church organizations often
associated with so-called ‘prayer halls’ (bedehus). These have a long tradition of
being ‘within, but not controlled by’ the Church of Norway. Only two out of 13
organizations in this category mentioned refugees or asylum seekers in their
publications. This part of the Norwegian Christian landscape has shrunk in num-
bers and resources recently. Furthermore, they have a religious tradition charac-
terized more by words and dogma than by a focus on ‘good deeds’. However,
there were exceptions: According to their website, the local branch of the Norwe-
gian Lutheran Mission established a café with language training and homework
assistance for immigrants every Tuesday.
The minority churches are at least as active as the Church of Norway, possi-
bly because active members in the minority churches are used to taking initia-
tives themselves. They have less bureaucracy and a shorter distance between
thought and action. I do not have direct evidence of such an explanation in
my empirical material; it should be considered as a hypothesis for further re-
search.
There is no significant change in frequency or content of the texts about ref-
ugees during the period analysed. Neither is there any indication that the efforts
to help are a kind of disguised missionary or conversionist project. Here, the ac-
tivists at the local level seem to follow the recommendations given in a statement
from the Christian Council of Norway (2009) about baptism of asylum seekers,
where it is stated that ‘no one should be manipulated to adopt a faith through
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some exploitation of their vulnerable situation or their wish for protection’. Such
exploitation may exist, especially in some charismatic milieus (Stene 2016), but
there were no traces of it in the publications analysed. The reasons given in every
case for encouraging people to help were a combination of general ethics and
the occasional reference to Biblical recommendations to help people in need,
such as the Pentecostal congregation Betania’s reference on their website to Mat-
thew 25:35–40⁴ when asking people to bring winter clothes for asylum seekers to
Betania’s office for further distribution.
How are the refugees and asylum seekers presented? In general, these pub-
lications are rather modest and ascetic in their use of pictures and advanced lay-
out. That said, Norwegian helpers are presented more often than the asylum
seekers with names and pictures, and those who are quoted in the text are nearly
always Norwegian helpers. However, the texts are dominated by care and respect
for asylum seekers, presenting them as human beings in need of help, and char-
acterizing them more as motivated people with resources than as pitiful, calcu-
lating or selfish creatures.
How valid are the findings? The study covers a limited area, so the potential
for mechanical generalizations to Norway is limited. However, unsystematic vis-
its to websites in other parts of Norway (including Oslo and the county of Horda-
land) seem to confirm the tendencies found in the south. And, as mentioned be-
fore, Agder is a comparatively conservative region in Norway, both politically
and religiously, so it is a reasonable hypothesis that we may find even stronger
criticism of the government’s immigration policy elsewhere.
We cannot rule out the possibility that there is some informal and hidden
support for a restrictive immigration and refugee policy among grassroots Chris-
tians. The same can be said about a possible scepticism against Muslims. Most of
the texts that I have looked at were written by employees or volunteers at the
local level; some might call them members of local elites, or at least local opin-
ion leaders. Be that as it may, there are no indications of such scepticism in the
analysed material, and I can add that the threshold for member response on the
organizations’ Facebook pages does seem to be quite low. Support for my conclu-
sions can also be found in the fact that very few Norwegian priests or pastors in
local congregations have expressed negative attitudes against asylum seekers
and immigrants (Haugen 2014).
 ‘For I was hungry and you gave me food….’
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10.6 A Change of Sentiment
I have not found a massive and unanimous, explicit support for a more liberal
policy. 24 of the 52 organizations, mainly in the low-church milieus, were silent
about asylum seekers and refugees, and most of those who mentioned them rec-
ommended local humanitarian projects without political comments. However,
all the statements within the field of politics clearly went against restrictions pro-
posed by the government and/or criticized government rhetoric, especially from
Immigration Minister Sylvi Listhaug. Furthermore, the strong recommendations
to help can also be interpreted as indirectly political in the heated debate in
2015–2016, when Christian leaders were stigmatized as ‘tyrants of goodness’, al-
though my interpretation here should not be stretched too far.
The study gives no indication that organized Christianity at the local level
followed the change from generosity and empathy to control and fear that
took place some weeks before Christmas in 2015 in some media, among some
politicians, and in parts of public opinion. Many indications of this change
can be mentioned. A change from a concern to help to a sceptical attitude
seems to have been a general European phenomenon. Researchers behind a con-
tent analysis of newspapers from eight European countries (not including Scan-
dinavia) summarize their findings like this:
Temporal trends: the narratives of the coverage changed dramatically across Europe during
2015. The sympathetic and empathetic response of a large proportion of the European press
in the summer of 2015 and especially in the early autumn of the same year was replaced by
suspicion and, in some cases, hostility towards refugees and migrants, following the No-
vember attacks in Paris. (Chouliaraki et al. 2017, 2)
A study of regional and local newspapers and regional TV in the south and north
of Norway showed a similar shift, although not as dramatic as the European
study. The authors have analysed 10 local and regional media from August
2015 until July 2016. What they call the perspective of help was the most prom-
inent one, but the relative number of items with this perspective decreased from
November 2015. The total number of articles about refugees also decreased sig-
nificantly from January 2016 (Hognestad and Lamark 2017, 12).
A similar change took place in the Liberal–Conservative Aftenposten, Nor-
way’s biggest newspaper. Charlotte Åsland Larsen (2016) has conducted a quan-
titative and qualitative study of this newspaper during two periods of time, Au-
gust–September 2015, when many asylum seekers started to arrive, and January
2016, when Norwegians looked back on a year with a large influx of asylum seek-
ers, and before it was clear that immigration was on the decline. Solidarity and
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care for refugees dominated the newspaper’s news coverage during the first pe-
riod, while what Larsen calls a discourse of burden became more frequent in the
second period. There was also a sharper focus on refugees as individuals during
the first period. For example, refugees were more often presented by name and
picture during this period. During both periods, Norwegian journalists, politi-
cians and experts were the chief speakers rather than the refugees themselves.
Discourse about refugees as threats was also present in Aftenposten, but in
very few cases. This approach was presumably more widespread in other
media, not least in social media.
10.7 Influential Media – But There are
Countermoves
Some politicians, especially members of government from the Progress Party,
have tried to trigger worries about uncontrolled immigration and radical Islam
after the relatively large number of refugees that came to Norway in 2015. As
for the media’s more general role, they no doubt have the power to influence
popular opinion, especially in alliance with national politicians. In the terms
of Zygmunt Bauman (2016), the fear that is a general trait in all human existence
can be translated into official fear, where those who are different are marginal-
ized through a number of mechanisms, such as stereotyping, scapegoating,
and moral paralysis. On a more concrete level, media studies often conclude
that reports about refugees tend to be stereotypical, and that they feature in
the news in connection with negative topics and events (for an overview, see Fig-
enschou, Thorbjørnsrud, and Larsen 2015, 129). These three Norwegian media re-
searchers have analysed several Norwegian media’s presentations of asylum pol-
itics and asylum seekers from 2011 to 2014. Their picture of the media coverage is
ambiguous. They claim that Norwegian politicians and bureaucrats get a lot of
space in the media to promote what they call a strict, but fair immigration
and refugee policy. At the same time, they note that concrete narratives about
specific individuals are often told as well.⁵ A typical example is when individuals
are introduced and encouraged to tell their dramatic stories, often when they are
refused refugee status by Norwegian authorities. According to the researchers,
these narratives can function as criticism of a strict policy, as they resonate
with and appeal to an intuitive, common-sense morality. However, at the same
time, the events narrated are presented mainly as isolated single events, and
 See also Chapter 3.
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not related to any political context. Therefore, these stories can contribute to
greater division between those who deserve to stay and those who do not.
Thus, they may end up as slightly idealized narratives about people who deserve
to stay, without any critical searchlight on the rules and their interpretation.
The results of my study may be conceived as a sign of the limited power of
national media and national politicians. The profile of the local publications can
be considered a kind of counter-information, stressing humanitarian and Chris-
tian responsibility. Such counter-information can probably be of more signifi-
cance if individuals relate to each other than if they are more isolated media
users. Moreover, direct contact with refugees – something many of the local
Christian activists have – will probably dismantle some stereotypes about Mus-
lims and refugees in general. The old contact hypothesis formulated by Gordon
Allport (1954), claimed exactly that: Personal encounters will reduce prejudice
and increase mutual understanding. The thesis has often been criticized, but it
seems robust, especially when the situation is not strongly conflictual to begin
with. A large meta-study including more than 500 studies confirmed this some
years ago (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). In the words of the famous composer
and record producer Phil Spector’s first hit: ‘To know, know, know him is to
love, love, love him’. More recent studies from Denmark have also strengthened
the contact hypothesis: Personal contacts at work and in neighbourhoods in-
crease tolerance toward ethnic minorities, as members of the minorities appear
less threatening, and majority members who gain more concrete knowledge of
minority people also understand their situation better (Thomsen 2012; Rafiqui
and Thomsen 2014).
Local media seem to be quite vital and important in Norway, possibly be-
cause of a general ideology in many regions in the direction of decentralization.⁶
The media that I have studied fall in the category of religious journalism, that is
publications edited by religious institutions (Hjarvard 2012; see also Chapter 3).
This probably limits the scope of influence to Christian in-groups. On the other
hand, such publications tend to spread their own message without necessarily
following trends in the national and more secular media, and may be important
for the identity-forming in the groups.
So, if there are worries among Christians in and around Kristiansand about
Islam and immigration, such worries seem overshadowed by a simple Christian
ideal of helping those who need help. It is interesting that this moral commit-
ment is found in very broad parts of the Christian landscape, not only among
mainstream and comparatively liberal adherents of what Nancy Ammerman
 See Chapter 1 on the territorial dimension in Scandinavian politics.
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(1997) in her studies in America called ‘Golden Rule Christianity’, but also
among conservative Evangelicals.
The main findings in this study can be discussed in a broader class perspec-
tive. Active Christians in Norway belong mainly to the middle class (Repstad
2010, 384). In an interview study of middle class morality and values in Norway,
the researchers find that representatives of this class state ‘that they dislike rac-
ists, the intolerant, the dishonest, those who are judgmental etc.’ (Skarpenes,
Sakslind, and Hestholm 2016, 14). The authors claim that such statements reflect
a value hierarchy culturally rooted in Christianity and humanism. The hero in
this Christian–humanist repertoire resembles the Good Samaritan, they claim.
Another hero is the socially responsible citizen. The discourse in the local Chris-
tian publications that I have studied, is in accordance with this middle-class
moral profile.
A final point: a trend toward a more sensual Christianity, an aestheticization
of religion in a wide sense, is reported in several recent research reports from
Norway (Repstad and Trysnes 2013; Løvland and Repstad 2014). These reports
point to an increasing significance of religion’s experiential and emotional di-
mension, and less weight on dogmatic and theological aspects. Processions
are getting longer, sermons are getting shorter. In preparation for confirmation,
young people learn fewer commandments and light more candles. Sometimes an
interest in aesthetics is read as a sign of superficiality and of a noncommittal at-
titude. Søren Kierkegaard’s criticism in that direction still has some influence in
Scandinavia. However, aesthetics in a wide sense – that which appeals to the
senses and the emotions – can be important resources to form sentiments and
encourage practices. Our study indicates that this shift in lived religion does
not necessarily empty Christianity of its immediate ethical content.
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Media, Muslims and Minority Tactics:
Compelling Dialogues in Norway
Abstract: The chapter investigates dynamics of minority–majority religious inter-
action in two localities in Norway with a strong Muslim presence and considers
the ways in which media, based on conflictual representations, comes to co-
structure interaction relating to lived religion and conduct of citizenship. The
chapter asks: How do Muslims active in interreligious initiatives in Kristiansand
and Oslo relate to the media portrayals of Islam and in what ways does the cov-
erage influence their engagement? The study argues that attending, and partic-
ipating in, interreligious forums can be understood as a minority strategy to
cope with, counter, and calibrate perceived negative media portrayals since
these actions are ways of performing belonging to the Norwegian nation and
conducting citizenship. As the interreligious forums provide an occasion for
the Muslims to self-present in ways that allow them to demonstrate their Norwe-
gian belonging, the Muslims’ public conduct and self-representations, nonethe-
less, becomes restricted by the forums’ diversity governance.
Keywords: Norwegian Muslims, banal securitization of Islam, cultural citizen-
ship, interreligious dialogue, Muslims and media.
11.1 Introduction
Zunair¹ is a young, male Muslim from Groruddalen in eastern Oslo. I met him to talk about
a film project that he was involved in on former Syrian fighters from Norway [syriakrigere]²
and, more generally, his view of media and being Muslim in Norwegian society. Visibly
upset, Zunair recounted how on social media he had recently come across a video featuring
a young, ethnic Norwegian man from West Oslo who divulged how he had accidently ended
 All names in this chapter has been changed by the author due to reasons of anonymity.
 These are sometimes synonymously referred to as ’foreign fighters’ (fremmedkrigere) and com-
prise Norway-based Muslims, often affiliated with IS, who travel to Syria or Iraq to become
trained by and participate in the civil war on behalf of IS or less frequently, Al-Qaeda. If they
return, these Muslims are considered a threat to the nation due to their radicalized religious
worldviews, militant training and acquisition of social networks among international terrorists
(PST 2016, 13).
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up at Vestli station in Groruddalen as he had fallen asleep on the tube. Zunair clearly took
offense to the video as the man talked about his allegedly horrific experience of suddenly
finding himself in an unknown yet highly stigmatized part of town. (Field notes, June 2016,
Oslo)
To many Norwegians, Groruddalen has become a metaphor for cultural, ethnic,
and religious diversity, but to critics it symbolizes a piece of ’anti-Norway’, no-
tions that figure frequently in media coverage (Eide and Eriksen 2012, 7). Located
in the outskirts of the eastern part of Oslo, Groruddalen constitutes a suburban
area, which due to its numerous social housing blocks and high number of im-
migrants has gained a reputation of social deprivation and ’white flight’.³ Yet, as
for many other Norwegian Muslims, Groruddalen is the place Zunair, his friends,
and family call home.
Over the last 45 years, Norway has become an increasingly diverse society
due to immigration. But even as the country from the 1970s and onwards has
seen a religious pluralization due to an influx of immigrants and refugees, Chris-
tianity clearly continues to dominate the religious scene. Christianity also enjoys
a privileged position in relation to the extant political system, and it constitutes
the largest religion in terms of followers. The second largest religion is Islam,
brought about by recent decades’ immigration from Muslim majority countries
such as Pakistan and Somalia. As Norway enshrines the principle of freedom
of religion in government legislation, all registered faith and life stance com-
munities receive public funding equivalent to their number of members, and re-
ligious minorities are basically free to operate as they wish. However, issues re-
lated to multiculturalism, Islam, integration, gender equality within minority
religions, social cohesion, and the extent to which Norway shall be(come) ’multi-
cultural’ are much-disputed topics, and tensions between the newly secular
state, Christian–secular majority society, and religious minorities certainly
exist (Fox 2008).
According to a survey by the state Directorate for Inclusion and Diversity
(IMDI), in recent times Muslims have received more coverage in Norwegian
mass media than any other topic,⁴ and Muslims are depicted in almost exclusive-
ly negative ways, regularly portrayed as posing a threat to the Norwegian nation
(IMDI 2009). Another recent study shows that in Norwegian news bulletins dur-
ing 2015, Islam was mentioned more than nine times as often as Christianity (Mi-
 Nowadays, Groruddalen is usually categorised along two topical axes in public debates: social
problems and an increasing number of immigrant residents (Eriksen and Vestel 2012, 18).
 The prime minister excluded.
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chelsen 2016, 6).⁵ When it comes to religion featured in mass media, debate ma-
terial on Islam such as opinion pieces has replaced the everyday mentioning of
Christianity and the latter’s roles and values within society (Michelsen 2016, 7).
The same pattern may appear in social media (see Chapter 9). Correspondingly,
the ComRel survey (see Chapter 2) shows that in 2015, 47 percent of the Norwe-
gian respondents perceived Islam as a threat to ’Norwegian culture’ whereas, for
instance, only 12 percent thought of Judaism and 8 percent of Christianity in such
terms (Lundby 2017, 8). While the Norwegian media environment around Mus-
lims is far from the hostility projected in Danish media frames, the findings
do support the notion of Islam being overrepresented in the media compared
to the relatively low number of Muslims living in the country – estimates suggest
less than 4 percent (Østby and Dalgard 2017). Likewise, the findings also indicate
a widespread tendency of associating Islam with conflicts and tensions and illus-
trate how mediatized radical and far-right discourses on essential cultural differ-
ences have had an impact on the population (see Mårtensson 2014, 238).
11.2 The Study and Its Context
Departing from the way in which media shapes conflictual frames on Islam and
Muslims in Norway and beyond, this chapter engages with how Norwegian Mus-
lims, active in various interreligious forums, relate to media portrayals of Islam
and come to engage, and self-present, in local civic settings. Interreligious initia-
tives such as public dialogue meetings offer idealized conversations that display
harmonious multi-religious diversity as a reaction to transformations and (po-
tential) tensions in society.⁶ Thus, a growing number of studies focus on citizen-
ship as subjective experiences of inclusion or exclusion and as a process through
which people may come to affirm or contest their belonging to the community
through different practices (see van Es 2016; Yuval-Davis 2011).
 The growing focus on Islam in the Nordic countries’ news media is additionally documented
by the NOREL research project comparing religion in the daily press in Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, Norway, and Sweden (see Niemelä and Christensen 2013).
 Thereby, the meetings serve as exemplars of inclusive religiosity as civilized behaviour in
cross-religious encounters. As shown elsewhere (Liebmann 2017), the formation of a cultivated
form of religiosity links closely to civilizing processes, and through these mechanisms to the for-
mation of moderate and liberal citizens who, peacefully, can interact and co-exist. Then, what is
ultimately performed and ’rehearsed’ in many interreligious forums is the conduct of formations
of cultural citizenship through enactment of respectable, proper, and inclusive religiosity.
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The present case study investigates the dynamics of minority–majority reli-
gious interaction in localities in Kristiansand and Oslo with a strong Muslim
presence and considers the ways in which media, based on the conflictual rep-
resentations, co-structures interaction relating to lived religion and conduct of
cultural citizenship. It asks: How do Muslims active in interreligious initiatives
in Kristiansand and Oslo relate to the perceived media portrayals of Islam and
in what ways does the coverage influence their engagement? The chapter argues
that attending, and participating in, cross-cultural interreligious forums and ini-
tiatives can be understood as a minority strategy to cope with, counter, and cal-
ibrate negative media portrayals since these actions are ways of performing be-
longing to the Norwegian nation and conducting Norwegian citizenship.
Qualitative in its scope, the study is based on ethnographic fieldwork con-
ducted at and around interreligious initiatives in Kristiansand and Groruddalen
in Oslo during 2015 and 2016, including 26 interviews with people active in var-
ious interreligious forums and informal conversations with local citizens and
journalists. Organizational documents and media coverage are also included
in the analysis.Whereas Groruddalen is part of the Norwegian capital and is cul-
turally, ethnically, and religiously highly diverse due to its high number of resi-
dents with immigrant backgrounds, Kristiansand is the municipal and county
capital of the West-Agder region in the religiously rich Sørlandet (The Southern
County), which has mainly experienced immigration from Pakistan, Chile, Viet-
nam, and, more recently, Poland.
11.3 Targeted Muslims in Norway
An ethnic Norwegian woman in her 60s, whom I interviewed in Groruddalen
where she had been living her entire adult life, and where she is active in various
interreligious initiatives, also noted how Muslims she knew personally inadver-
tently risked becoming the centre of negative and inaccurate media attention by
way of local media coverage:
Brynhild:When we partake in The Ellingsrud Days, it’s often young people who act as con-
venors. And this year it was a young man, he was 17 years old, and he was interviewed by
the local newspaper. They requested a picture of him, and he took a picture of himself wear-
ing [his ancestral] national costume with white layers, a tunic. That was the photograph,
and he was bearded too [in the picture]. And subsequently, the photograph was shared
in a web forum called document.no. And they said, ’Is this the best Ellingsrud has to
offer? A picture of someone wearing a night gown and being hate-bearded? That is siding
with…’ And then they compared it [the photograph] to IS and extremists, so, that was un-
fair. And I know the guy [in the photograph] and he stands for totally different values.
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In this excerpt, Brynhild refers to how the media can transform certain content
and generate a mediatized conflict (see Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015)
around Islam. These conflicts might occur even when the Muslim in question
is simply being active and engaged in an intercultural, local community festival
set to promote community participation and generate social cohesion at the local
level – a task that is otherwise held in high regard and considered very much in
sync with values held to be at the core of Norwegian majority society (Eide and
Eriksen 2012, 10; for a discussion of the role of Norwegian festivals, see Ryan and
Wollan 2013). This way, Brynhild’s experiences testify to the way in which the
media plays both performative and constitutive roles for the development of con-
flicts in contemporary society aside from merely reporting on pre-existing con-
flicts (Cottle 2006, 9). Moreover, the case referred to by Brynhild substantiates
that lots of Muslims in Norway experience stigmatization in their everyday
lives and that they, at different levels of society, are treated as members of ’sus-
pect communities’, singled out as devious by the media and the state (Manchan-
da 2010).
Speaking to Zunair, who in the introduction to this study disclosed the dis-
comfort he felt when his neighbourhood was perceived as a dangerous place for
members of majority society, he also highlighted a documentary film project,
originating from a mosque in Groruddalen, as a response to the media’s – and
majority society’s – linkage of violent religious extremism with Islam. Further-
more, he stressed how religious extremism and radicalization especially have
during the last few years come to be associated almost exclusively with Islam
by authorities and mass media in Norway, including on occasions in which Mus-
lims had nothing to do with the perpetrated attacks in question. Perhaps this
tendency was most lucidly displayed in the immediate aftermath of the events
of 22 July 2011, when for a few hours, the fatal attacks in Utøya and government
buildings in central Oslo were connected to Islam and perceived as being acts of
radical Muslims when, as it turned out, Anders Breivik – a white, far-right and
then self-proclaimed Christian, was behind the attacks (see Andersson 2012, 418).
Another male Muslim from Groruddalen, affiliated to a different Islamic or-
ganization undertaking dialogue work, likewise reflected on the way in which
Muslims are being depicted and perceived, and he explained his, and his organ-
ization’s, involvement in dialogue efforts to counter the fact that religious ex-
tremism is routinely connected to Islam:
Farid: But during the last year there has been so much conflict and unrest in society attach-
ed to religion that we think it’s important to bring up things that unite and which point to
the potential for tolerance and comprehensive things.
Interviewer: Which conflicts are you referring to?
Media, Muslims and Minority Tactics 191
Farid: You see, right? It is ˗ we did have the cartoon crisis for example.We have IS, we have
terrorism attached to Islam. It is Islam that essentially is being linked to a lot of these
things. For example, after the cartoon crisis, right? So, what we did, as a starting point –
we also held conferences about it, we had Charlie Hebdo, we had a conference called ’Je
suis Charlie’, and then we posed a lot of questions – and we had some experience with
it as we’re devoted to those exact things, concerns, with blasphemy, and people feeling in-
sulted, who want to kill somebody because of something.
Farid describes how during the last few years his organization has been occupied
with arranging various conferences and facilitating dialogue around tensions
and conflicts that repeatedly emerge between Muslims and non-Muslims, in
this case primarily outside Norway. Doing so, Farid indicates how Muslims are
frequently induced to take a defensive stance, which compels them, and espe-
cially those involved in interreligious efforts, to constantly navigate, and strive
to prevent, Islamophobic prejudices from increasing and cross religious-conflicts
from escalating. Correspondingly, Farid characterizes the situation of societal
tensions and heightened media awareness, in this case referring to the attack
on the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, as ’playing Monopoly and mov-
ing back to Start.Whether it is Theo van Gogh or Je Suis Charlie or whatever, we
[repeatedly] have to pull out the same pamphlets and start all over’.
Wagas is a male Muslim born and raised in Kristiansand where he now lives
and works. Describing how Wagas himself used never to experience anything
discriminating in his hometown of Kristiansand, he recalled how he was recently
verbally attacked by an elderly ethnic Norwegian woman: as Wagas was on a
casual Sunday trip to a local beach to feed the ducks with his young children,
he, it appears, had missed a sign post that prohibited animal feeding. While
the children were enjoying themselves and the ducks eagerly ate the food, a
woman approached the dark-skinned family and ’screamed and yelled’ at
them in English for not being able to read a simple sign post and not abiding
by the rules when ’coming here [to Kristiansand]’. Apparently, and mistakenly,
she had assumed that Wagas and his children were part of the refugee group,
which had come to Norway in 2015 and been given huge media coverage.
Wagas was subsequently able to rebuke her in eloquent Norwegian. Nonethe-
less, incidents like this one clearly influence Wagas and his sense of belonging
in the local and national community. He says:
Wagas: To me, since I was born and raised here, I feel that Norway is my country.When I go
to Pakistan, it’s like going on a holiday.When I return home from Pakistan, I feel like com-
ing home. It’s not until recently that I started to feel a little disapproved of, and a bit label-
led, and I’ve never felt that way before. Now, during the last two to three years, in terms of
the refugee crisis, I feel a little bit like: ’Shit!’ You feel as if – even though you’ve lived here
and you’re here − you’re still not a part of this society. And I see myself as quite resourceful
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in many respects, so when I feel that way, I’m sure many other [Muslims] feel the same. […]
I don’t have to dwell on it, but still, I’ve got this feeling, and I only just got it. I’m 39 years
old, and I just got it recently. That’s a little sad!
As illustrated by their various accounts, Wagas, Brynhild, Zunair, and Farid all
point to how macro events also play out at the civic and individual levels in
terms of psychological insecurities that condition diverse ways of societal be-
longing and participation. In other words, they address how securitization of is-
sues, such as migration, Islam, and ethnic minorities, is not only a tool in the
hands of politicians but occurs in the broader political culture on an everyday
basis and is closely linked to psychological and media frames and to various cit-
izenship strategies (see Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011, 272). As noticed by
several studies of the nexus between media frames and social interaction, polit-
ical discourses and media frames do much more than simply reflect and depict
(Mårtensson 2014; Entman 1993). As will be further elaborated upon later (see
Chapters 14 and 15), the selection and activation of media frames in the coverage
of a given issue structures and impacts the way in which audiences come to
think of the issues in question; that is, frames are not only essential to forma-
tions of identity but also to the way in which people interact with each other
as social interaction tends to occur around prescribed and pre-structured forma-
tions.
11.4 Banal Securitization of Islam: Dialogues and
De-Securitization
Across religious divides, most of my interlocutors who were engaged in interre-
ligious initiatives mentioned their participation in interreligious dialogue efforts
as a way of accommodating lesser antagonisms between religious (and secular)
fractions, and thereby prevent immoderate and extremist views. In this respect,
some reflected on the media’s emphasis on ethno-religious tensions in order to
sell its stories; negative media depictions of Muslims were emphasized by half of
the interviewees, though this was not necessarily part of their motivation in vol-
unteering in various interreligious initiatives. However, nearly all Muslims
stressed negative media portrayals of Muslims as a key factor to their engage-
ment within these initiatives. A characteristic that they to a certain extent shared
with representatives of the other minority religions.Yet, as media and politics are
highly interrelated (Meyen, Thieroff, and Strengeri 2014), media inadvertently
comes to influence funding opportunities and interreligious solution models,
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and, thereby the way in which certain social problems are framed and associated
with Islam.
Gro, a young woman representing a new religious movement and actively
participating in and leading different interreligious initiatives in Oslo, described
how Islam and Muslims constitute a significant object of media representation
and how she had noticed that Muslims, consequently, are posited at the core
of various de-radicalization measures:
Interviewer: How come that topic [extremism] takes up so much space?
Gro: In our case, it’s because we got funding to work with it. And, in addition, because it’s a
topic we have selected due to our work with faith and life stance dialogue. Essentially, we
felt that majority society demands from us that we bring up extremism as extremism is at-
tached to religion. […] What we have done is to focus on religious extremism, on what it is,
and what extremism as a phenomenon entails, and to show that it exists within all reli-
gions; it’s not just in Islam. […] So, we have, when applying for funding, it’s that kind of
funding that is announced at this point; that is, funding to work with extremism. So, we
have jumped on that wave. […] And often, this is my personal opinion, it’s implicit within
the call that you’re dealing with Islam. […]
Interviewer: How do you get the sense that it’s really about Islam?
Gro: Because it’s a lot like ’today’s challenges’, ’integration’, ’radicalization of youth’, and
the only thing the media – since this is what you’re trying to deal with – everything that is
part of the news coverage today, I think, is just Islam, Islam, Islam and everyone, everyone
has forgotten about Breivik being Norwegian, everyone has forgotten that Breivik was active
just a few years ago.
In the interview, Gro effectively links the media coverage of Islam to governmen-
tal announcements of various funding opportunities related to cross-religious
dialogue and de-radicalization; she points to the way in which authorities’ grow-
ing interest in interreligious dialogue is intermingled with negative media cover-
age of immigrants and especially Muslims – a fusion I suggest calling ’banal se-
curitization of Islam.’ The concept ’securitization of Islam’ (see Cesari 2013)
refers to the central rhetorical tropes, partly induced by the media, which portray
Muslims as threats to national security in Western societies. Furthermore, as ob-
served by political scientists Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2011,
275), securitization is also an everyday phenomenon and ’banal securitization’
thus refers to the everyday practices in which issues or people are categorised
in stereotypical terms in response to macro-logical events with local ramifica-
tions. In these processes, it is not only phenomena, objects, or identifications
that become securitized, but also subjectivities (ibid.). Thus ’banal securitization
of Islam’ refers to the way in which Muslim citizens, in Norway and beyond, are,
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on a daily basis, rendered as potentially suspicious by being demarcated and
stigmatized.
Elaborating on whether Farid’s organization had convened any interreligious
events that were less successful, Farid highlighted an increased level of general
attentiveness towards dialogue initiatives and came to focus on the interest that
Norwegian authorities recently have taken in interreligious dialogue:
Farid: Yes, absolutely! We have had very few attendants as well, so it’s up and down. …
Lately [people’s interest] has increased as many see the need for interreligious dialogue ex-
actly because the world has become a more dangerous place in many respects. And religion
is a factor in that, and that’s why many see the usefulness, right? Many asylum seekers have
arrived in Norway, there’s been some murmuring among religious groups, some extreme
groups such as Profetens Ummah and others who have made themselves noticed, right?
And in that regard, it’s also important, and I clearly see that authorities emphasize inter-
religious dialogue in that they organize more in that direction, they encourage [people]
to [participate in] it. … Actually, at this point, the climate is well-suited for religious dia-
logue.
Here, Farid touches on how authorities link interreligious initiatives with de-rad-
icalization. The authorities’ coupling of interreligious initiatives with de-radical-
ization constitutes an interesting, yet rather camouflaged, instance of religious
diversity management:⁷ As interreligious events are based on the implicit as-
sumption that there is an incompatibility that threatens the intended peaceful
interaction between the dialogue partners if disagreements are not reduced or
resolved (Malik 2013, 500), from an outer perspective, interreligious forums
help create platforms from which public parties are able to conduct and trans-
form religious minorities into moderate and liberal citizens of the modern nation
state (Amir-Moazami 2011, 13– 14, 25).
As the populist discourse has increased the pressure on young Muslims es-
pecially to take a stand in the perceived conflict between ’Norwegianness’ and
’Islam’, there is, however, at the same time an institutional structure that strives
to guarantee important rights for individual and community members: Norway is
among a number of European welfare states that enable a certain degree of cul-
tural and religious diversity, and the country has facilitated, and often promoted,
 Since 2014, the Ministry of Culture has announced annual funding opportunities, ranging
from 50,000–400,000 NOK (about 5,000–43,000 Euros), for interreligious events held to create
mutual acceptance and respect between faith and life stance communities and to promote the
societies’ common values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights, and to prevent rad-
icalization. These funding opportunities are consistent with the government’s Action Plan
against Radicalization and Violent Extremism (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2014, 3).
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cultural diversity instead of demanding full assimilation from new citizens. An
important aspect of Norwegian diversity management is the funding of organiza-
tions by and for ethnic minorities, either in the form of project subsidies or struc-
tural funding (Ghorashi, Eriksen, and Alghasi 2009). These funding opportuni-
ties also apply to interreligious forums that can get financial support from the
municipality, the county, and the state.
As Muhammad, a young Muslim man from Kristiansand, argued in response
to a question of what he wanted to gain from his involvement with interreligious
dialogue initiatives, being engaged in interreligious efforts affords him a feeling
of social inclusion and belonging:
Muhammad: In a way ˗ to become acquainted with one another. Again, this has to do with
prejudices, right, prejudices. That I’ll come across a Christian, and then we’ll chat at the
[interfaith] meeting. And then I’ll become acquainted with him.We have a lot in common,
at least when it comes to peace efforts. Here in Kristiansand.We can do something good for
our town. I’ll greet a Buddhist, and then I’ll find out that he has been a teacher, for exam-
ple, he’s been a teacher at my school, and then I’ll get to know him.When I’ll meet a Chris-
tian or a Buddhist, in a way, I’ll feel more secure when talking to them. … I felt that when
we, Muslim youngsters, handed out peace pamphlets produced by FTL.⁸ We feel that, okay,
we’re part of society, also, we work to obtain peace. Just the fact that we went out, I felt that
it was good for us, because then we feel that we’re a part of this society, and that we do
something good, we contribute to something good. That in itself ˗ then I don’t feel isolated,
right?
By being active in an interreligious forum, Muhammad feels that he is doing
something ‘good’, considers himself included in society and less isolated. This
is supported by Akmal Ali, former imam in the Kristiansand Mosque and current
member of the mosque board committee and actively involved in a local interre-
ligious organization. In an op-ed on the topic in a widely read local-regional
newspaper, Ali writes: ’It is very important that Muslims, Christians, Humanists,
Buddhists, Ahmadiyyas, Bahais, and people from all faith and life stance com-
munities sit together in dialogues. Because, essentially, it is about cooperating to
support beneficial values. […] Dialogue builds upon trust that, again, leads to
your own faith and viewpoints being listened to.’ (Ali 2017, 28). In other
words, engagement in interreligious forums is an investment that will lead to
the recognition of minority religions and giving them a voice, and a place, in
Norwegian society.
Several research projects on first- and second-generation ethnic minority
youth in Norway have concluded that reactions against essentialist categories
 Forum for Tro og Livssyn (Forum for Religious and Life Stances), in short: FTL.
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and negative media portrayals of migrant, ethnic, and religious minorities are
among the central drivers for identity work, that is, processual experiences of
identity, belonging, and recognition (Andersson 2005, 2010; Jacobsen 2006; Fan-
gen 2008; van Es 2016).⁹ As illustrated throughout this chapter, many Muslims
clearly feel stigmatized and stereotyped by the media and, thus, their engage-
ment in various interreligious initiatives can be understood precisely as part of
a tactic to overcome and disrupt these negative portrayals. People disrupt or sub-
vert stereotypes when they present themselves in ways that contradict these ster-
eotypes. Disruption can be a deliberate strategy, but people may also subcon-
sciously challenge popular perceptions simply by behaving differently from
what is commonly expected (van Es 2016, 14). This way, the studied Muslims’ en-
gagements in interreligious forums and embedded self-representations can be
understood as a way of creating acceptance for Muslims in the society in
which they live. Sociologist Anna Halafoff, too, has noted how multi-faith partic-
ipants recounted that interreligious initiatives in Australia provide a platform for
Muslim communities to differentiate themselves from terrorists, to dispel nega-
tive stereotypes, and to affirm their commitment to non-violent principles
(2011, 460). As will be elaborated below, engaging in interreligious initiatives
constitutes a way of coping and aspiring to counter the ’banal securitization of
Islam’.
Speaking to a highly placed employee within a central interreligious forum,
Ingunn, she explicitly referred to the nexus between core values in Norwegian
society and the scope and efforts of the national interfaith body, Council for Re-
ligious and Life Stance Communities in Norway (STL):¹⁰
Ingunn: You see, what’s up with this interreligious dialogue is, essentially, that it’s a train-
ing in community participation, and in a way, it is participation training in democracy de-
velopment, and in that way, it’s training in the Norwegian model. … STL is a secular proj-
ect. It’s not a religious organization. It’s a secular project working with politics as well as
dialogue, right? Between the faith- and life-stance societies. And – as within all projects –
you have got to have some root concerns, and in STL it’s ’democracy’, ’co-determination’,
’participation’, and ’human rights’.
Sociologists Grete Brochmann and Anne Grødem argue that in many respects the
Norwegian welfare model constitutes a grand societal integration project with
three central components: democracy, modernization, and citizenship (2013,
 The term ’identity work’ addresses the dialectics between ’outer’ categorical aspects and
’inner’ personal aspects in these processes (Andersson 2000, 291).
 Name in Norwegian: Samarbeidsrådet for tros- og livsynsamfunn, in short: STL.
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59).¹¹ This perception supports Ingunn’s observation on the nexus between STL’s
scope and core values in Norwegian society such as democracy, co-determina-
tion, (community) participation, and human rights and, furthermore, that secu-
larly informed interreligious dialogue essentially consists of participation train-
ing in democracy development, and consequently, that engagement in these
forums basically revolves around conducting Norwegian citizenship through ed-
ucation and training in the Norwegian welfare model.
Adding to this, sociologist Willem Schinkel illustrates that citizenship as a
legal status does not guarantee being perceived as belonging to the (imagined)
community. Migrants and their descendants must prove to majority citizens that
they have acquired certain ’essential’ virtues to be accepted as part of society –
an acceptance which Schinkel refers to as acquiring ’moral’ or ’virtualised citi-
zenship’ (2008, 20). Yet, members of ethnic or religious minority groups are by
default presumed to lack such virtues, simply because they are associated
with a specific minority culture or religion. In effect, ethnic and religious minor-
ities are to a much higher extent obliged to continuously demonstrate – or per-
form – their national belonging in order to not (be perceived to) pose a threat to
the community or the national order.
If we invert Ingunn’s statement, it is possible to see how interreligious fo-
rums provide an opportunity for the Muslims involved to self-present as peace-
ful, equality-orientated, democratically minded, and secular-accepting and,
through this, also come to affirm their commitment to Norwegian society. As cit-
izenship entails full membership of the nation as a community, it is much more
than a matter of formal and legal rights and responsibilities. Participation in
civic society and creation of a sense of belonging are not only central compo-
nents in identity work, but also in subverting stereotypical notions that endorse
the ’banal securitization of Islam’. In turn, such engagement can be understood
as constituting part of a Muslim minority strategy to create stronger ties with ma-
jority society and conduct cultural citizenship.
 If one is to maintain a societal framework, new members must be made part of society
through the welfare model. Effective welfare states do not want to have large numbers of people
that fall through the safety net, disturb regulated working life, burden social budgets, or even-
tually undermine solidarity (Brochman and Grødem 2013, 60).
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11.5 Engaging in Interreligious Dialogue as a
Tactic of Belonging: Muslims in Minority
Contexts
Internationally, Norway is renowned for its diplomatic efforts and is regarded as
an egalitarian, peace-loving nation, where concepts of human rights are histor-
ically well established (McIntosh 2014, 71). A strong welfare state, relatively small
class differences, and a woman-friendly labour market are other characteristics
of Norwegian society (Andersson 2012). Even as media portrayals of Muslims are
framed in terms of conflict, the Norwegian public debate has nonetheless been
characterized as a mellow ’consensus culture’ compared to the often heated de-
bate climate in the other Scandinavian countries (Stenius 2010), and the national
self-image is characterized as innocent (Gullestad 2002; Berg Eriksen, Homp-
land, and Tjønneland 2003). Correspondingly, status is internally ascribed to at-
titudes – and performances – of being a ’good’ Norwegian citizen through dem-
onstrations of tolerance, kindness, honesty, and democratic attitudes (Skarpenes
2007).
Interreligious forums and initiatives fit into this perhaps paradoxical setting
well, as they are suitably placed to, in a peaceful and patient manner, counter
cross-cultural and religious ignorance, prejudice, and intolerance and ultimately
foster understanding, stability, and peaceful co-existence through organised cul-
tural encounters such as public meetings, community festivals, and other cross-
religious get-togethers. Compared to the other two Scandinavian countries, inter-
religious forums enjoy a more profound public voice and a higher standing in
Norway. For instance, interreligious forums such as STL constitute a nationally
well-known interest group partaking in mainstream, accepted forms of multicul-
tural religiosity, and STL itself holds a prominent place in society reflected by the
public support of the otherwise politically neutral Royal House of Norway and by
a 2015 state-funded commissioned evaluation report of interreligious dialogue
efforts in civil society (see Brottveit et al. 2015).¹²
From this perspective, and through their interreligious engagement, the Mus-
lims studied take part in identity work through which they project images of
themselves as sociable and peace-seeking citizens; that is, when engaging in in-
 STL has nine local branches across the country plus a youth forum and is, to an increasing
degree, frequently approached by the media when policies on religion are debated or conflicts
around religious issues need contextualization and commenting on (interview with STL chair-
man, September 2016).
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terreligious initiatives, they inadvertently cast themselves as inhabiting traits
and attitudes in sync with societal values highly regarded in Norway. As noted
by Schinkel, demonstrating acquisition of essential ’virtues’ such as being civi-
lized, peace-seeking, honest, kind, tolerant, caring, and democratic is a way of
testifying their belonging to the Norwegian community – even as the community
is imagined. Correspondingly, as members of an ethnic and religious minority
group, they effectively mirror themselves in social imaginaries of ethnic Norwe-
gians as non-radical and consensus-seeking, particularly peaceful, kind, toler-
ant, caring, and democratic citizens (Liebmann 2017).
In recent years, religious minority groups in Europe have adapted their dis-
courses and strategies to a context of religious revitalization by engaging in in-
terreligious councils or associations.¹³ This also means that religious minority
groups are aware of how they must adapt to the ’rules of the game’ and repeat-
edly and actively demonstrate, or perform, being part of ’good’, ’mainstream’, or
’accepted’ religious communities in order to be recognized (Griera 2012, 583,
Liebmann 2017). Likewise, the ’religiously correct’ behaviour of some religious
minority leaders – such as that of Muslims – is under greater public scrutiny
than the rest, which forces Muslims to play the ’religiously correct’ role more in-
tensively (Griera 2012, 583).
During the autumn of 2016, a telling case of the tacit regulations that often
underlie European Muslims’ public conduct arose in Kristiansand. Below the
headline ’I just follow what the Quran says’, in a widely read local–regional
newspaper, the then local imam in Kristiansand, Abdikadir Mahamed Yussuf,
was quoted saying, ’We Muslims have our religion. If the Quran or the Hadiths
say it’s okay to attend birthday parties, we say okay. I don’t believe they say that.
That’s why we say, “Do not attend birthday parties”.We don’t say “you’re wrong
and it’s forbidden”, but “you shouldn’t”’ (Kristensen 2016, 16). Yussuf ’s views –
and not least the interpretations and debates the interview generated – resulted,
first, in his temporary absence of leave, shortly followed by his withdrawal from
the imam position after a board meeting in the local mosque steering committee.
The reaction to the imam’s statement is quite telling of the cultural-religious nav-
igation required by Muslims, and especially Muslim officials, to avoid uproar in
the public realm and what a member of the Mosque committee to me described
as ’a set-back’ in the relations between Kristiansand-based Muslims and local
authorities. A different case study shows equally well how an interreligiously
 Sociologist of religion, Mar Griera, argues that a policy paradigm based on the ’seculariza-
tion thesis’ has been replaced by a new paradigm grounded on the fear that the revitalization of
religion would undermine urban and social cohesion (2012, 572).
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convened de-radicalization seminar based in Kristiansand repeatedly came to
posit Islam as an organizing principle around which the intended unpacking
of violent religious extremism’s generic entities revolved in spite of the seminar’s
religious minority-inclusive objectives (Liebmann forthcoming).
11.6 Conclusion
Based primarily on ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with people active in
various interreligious forums, this chapter has explored how Muslims involved
with interreligious initiatives in Kristiansand and Oslo relate to media portrayals
of Islam and in what ways the coverage impacts their engagement. To capture the
everyday framing, and stigmatization, of Muslims as threats to national security
in Western societies – a phenomenon partly induced by the media – the chapter
suggested applying the notion ’banal securitization of Islam’. The term refers to
the way in which Muslim citizens are regularly rendered as potentially suspi-
cious. The study, ensuingly, illustrated how engaging in interreligious initiatives
constitutes a way of coping, and aspiring to counter and circumvent notions that
endorse the ’banal securitization of Islam’. By doing so, Norwegian Muslims can
both perform and affirm their commitment to Norwegian society, thus demon-
strating their acquisition of essential citizenship ’virtues’ such as being civilized,
honest, kind, tolerant, and caring. As the interreligious forums provide a recog-
nized platform and an occasion for the Muslims to self-present in ways that
allow them to demonstrate their peacefulness, orientation towards equality,
democratic-mindedness, and acceptance of secularism, the Muslims’ public con-
duct and self-representations are accordingly managed and conditioned by the
interreligious forums and their inherent governance of religious diversity.
Rather than focusing on the empowerment and freedom the forums may pro-
vide, this study has stressed the conditions and restrictions that apply to all
members of interreligious initiatives – but which perhaps operate more intensely
in relation to media and stigmatized groups such as Muslims.Whether to analyti-
cally emphasize agency on the one hand, or societal structures on the other, re-
flecting on empirical implications constitutes a research dilemma that is mir-
rored by longstanding scholarly discussions. Yet, as contemporary studies of
interreligious initiatives tend to have an applied scope based upon the implicit
assumption that interreligious forums generate empowerment and room for mi-
nority agency, this chapter has favoured a structurally informed, critical stance
towards the way in which civic organizations working with, and along, media
portrayals of Islam may also come to form, discipline, and restrict Muslims’ be-
haviour and self-representations.
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Chapter 12
Life in the Spotlight: Danish Muslims, Dual
Identities, and Living with a Hostile Media
Abstract: We examine ethnic Danish and ethnic minority Muslim (n = 15) re-
sponses to the negative media frame they experience, and their efforts¹ to
build viable dual identities – ways of being Danish and Muslim. The reported
media negativity is triangulated with evidence from ECRI media reports, public
opinion surveys, and reports on government policies and institutions. We find
that interviewees’ experiences vary with their visibility as Muslims, so hijab
wearing women and men of colour report most negativity in public environ-
ments. We also find that efforts to pro-actively project a positive social media
image of Islam vary by time since conversion, gradually declining. Danish Mus-
lim challenges in forming dual identities are compared with those of Swedish
(Malmö) and British (London) Muslims. We examine why London Muslims
more readily construct dual identities than Malmö Muslims – despite greater
negativity in national surveys and barriers to voting. The implications for cultur-
al conflict in Scandinavia are discussed.
Keywords: dual identity, media framing, social media, visibility, conversion
Across the Western world, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001, Islam and Muslims tend to be viewed through a hostile, conflictual
frame in media and public discourse, a frame only reinforced by the rise of
the so-called Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, and the series of recent IS in-
spired terrorist attacks in European capital cities, including Copenhagen in 2015.
Such conditions create a challenging public environment for Muslims through-
out the West. However, judging by reports from the European Commission
Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), it seems that the media frame in Den-
mark is particularly negative, even by comparative European standards, a situa-
 We recognise that the conditions facing Muslims in Western societies vary greatly, and that
talk of ‘the West’ includes hugely diverse societies. However, we use the term while recognising
the risks of over generalisation for three reasons: it was used spontaneously and often by our
participants; it is cumbersome to constantly qualify the term; and we contend that there are fea-
tures shared by many Western societies –market economies, democratic institutions, an empha-
sis on the importance of freedom of speech – that are relevant to the topic.
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tion exacerbated a lack of representation of, and hence ’voice’ for, Muslims in
public media (ECRI 2012, 28). Furthermore, the situation is also longstanding.
Thus, as early as its second report on Denmark (2001) ECRI expressed concern
about the climate surrounding Muslim and Islam in Denmark (2006, 25).
By the time of third report, 2006, in the wake of the Muhammad cartoons
controversy (2005), this concern had grown, to the extent that ECRI was express-
ing ‘deep concern that the situation concerning Muslims in Denmark has wors-
ened since its second report’ (ibid.). In the fourth report (2012) these concerns
persist, evidenced by accounts of bias in reporting of criminal cases: ‘some
media report the ethnic background of a suspected criminal when this is not nec-
essary for understanding the information, but that criminal offences committed
by Danes against groups of concern to ECRI are underplayed’ (ibid. 28), and by a
continuing lack of opportunities for minorities to express their views in the
media.
Judging by these reports, there is clearly a negative media climate for Mus-
lims in Denmark; this is not to say the media is exclusively negative towards
Muslims or that all sections of the media are negative, but that negativity is suf-
ficiently prevalent to be of concern for human rights groups, and part of the ev-
eryday experience of our interviewees (see also Jacobsen et al. 2013). How, then,
do Danish Muslims experience this hostile media frame, and how do they cope
with it? In particular, given the capacity of social media to enable ‘media contra-
flow’ (Cottle 2006), whereby individuals and groups can respond to stigmatiza-
tion by developing their own counter-representations and counter-narratives,
how far and in what ways do Danish Muslims engage in such practices? And,
in terms of the work of self-presentation (Goffman 1959) needed to maintain
group- and self-esteem in the face of stigmatization, how do they represent
themselves and construct a viable public identity? In this chapter we address
these questions using data from interviews with 15 Muslims from mixed ethnic
majority and minority backgrounds from the Greater Copenhagen area. We
also comment on the conditions which structure the formation and public ac-
ceptance of dual and multiple identities, and on how this might be linked to pos-
itive integration outcomes.
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12.1 Context: Public Attitudes, Culture, and
Public Institutions
In mediated societies – societies where media institutions have a dominant role and most,
if not all, of our information about what’s going beyond our immediate locality comes from
media – it is impossible to separate the recognition individuals get from each other and the
way that media resources are distributed. (Couldry 2011, 48)
How Danish Muslims experience the negative media frame is likely to be signifi-
cantly shaped by their interactions with ethnic Danes and by how they are treat-
ed by Danish public institutions. There is not necessarily a perfect fit between
dominant media frames and public attitudes; audiences are active, bringing
their own experiences and thinking to their interpretation of media representa-
tions (Livingstone 2015). However, as Couldry (2011, 48) points out, on issues
where the public is largely dependent on the media for information, media
frames are likely to play a decisive role. So how widely shared is the dominant
negative media frame in Denmark by the Danish public?
Widespread negativity towards immigrants in Denmark in general, and espe-
cially towards Muslims, is evident in European Social Survey (ESS, 2014) data.
Thus, 46 percent of Danes agree with the proposition that the government should
allow ‘few or no Muslims’ to come and settle in their country, a finding consis-
tent the YouGov figure of 45 percent of Danes having a negative impression of
Muslims (Dahlgren 2015). Furthermore, 42.3 percent of Danes agree with the
proposition that ‘immigrants take out more than they put in’ in terms of taxes
and services, suggesting a competitive framing of the relationship between immi-
grants and the majority amongst a substantial section of the population, which is
likely to reinforce societal divisions.
Danes also score highly on measures of a sense of cultural superiority. Thus,
59.9 percent of Danes agree with the proposition that ‘some cultures are much
better than others’ (ESS 2014, second only to Norwegians, at 64.4 percent), an
attitude which might provide fertile ground for forms of ‘cultural racism’
(Blaut 1992), and provide weak foundations for practices which value the contri-
bution to society of culturally different others. Furthermore, 29.8 percent of
Danes agree with the statement that ‘having a law against ethnic discrimination
in the workplace is bad for the country’, the highest in Europe, with those con-
sidering having such a law as ‘extremely bad’ in Denmark (12 percent) more than
twice that of the second placed country (Switzerland, 5.9 percent). Such strong
public rejection of anti-discrimination laws may impact on Muslim minorities
if they seek to challenge workplace discrimination, and contribute to a climate
where Muslims feel unwelcome.
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Of course, opinions expressed confidentially in surveys do not necessarily
translate into publicly expressed attitudes or behaviour. However, the CoMRel
survey (see Chapter 2) found that 18.2 percent of the Danes agree that ‘hostile
attitudes towards foreigners should be tolerated’, suggesting that public expres-
sion of xenophobic views is acceptable for a significant minority. Further evi-
dence suggests that the challenging public environment extends to Danish gov-
ernment policies and public institutions. Thus, researchers have argued that
government policy discourse has contributed to reinforcing a binary division be-
tween ‘Muslims’ and ‘Danes’ by de-legitimizing conservative Muslims voices
through an overly broad official discourse on radicalization (Kühle and Linde-
kilde 2012). In this process Muslims who hold conservative views on gender
and sexuality, which overlap with those of some in the majority population
and had been previously considered part of legitimate difference in values, are
grouped together with extremists.
Barriers to inclusion in public institutions are caused not just by overt hos-
tility, but produced also as an unintended consequence of strongly marked dif-
ference arising from a history of relative homogeneity. As Nielsen comments in
his introduction to Islam in Denmark: The Challenge of Diversity, if one is not Lu-
theran or of Lutheran heritage then:
in the Danish context, the institutional structures are such, however, that it is difficult to
avoid being reminded that one is somehow different. Although one of the most secular so-
cieties in Europe, Danish society and institutions are thoroughly impregnated with Luther-
an Christianity. Normally less than 3 percent of the population is in church on Sundays …
[but] 80 percent are members of the state-sponsored Lutheran church. (2012: 3–4)
Nielsen describes Danish Muslims as caught in the crossfire between ‘a nation-
alist populism with right-wing tendencies and a more outward-looking spectrum
of pluralist and cosmopolitan perspectives’, which results in ‘a continuous chal-
lenge for Muslims – and others, but especially non-Christians – to take advant-
age of the freedom of assembly and organization guaranteed by the Danish con-
stitution’ (Nielsen 2012, 4).
We interviewed Muslims from Copenhagen, the largest and most diverse city
in Denmark. Although it is not necessarily the case, a range of evidence suggests
that minorities in large cities often take the lead in developing new institutions
and identities which help to establish a sense of belonging in society, which then
spread to groups in other parts of the country. One of the reasons for this is the
diversity of minority communities in large cities; whereas in small cities minority
religious communities might be dominated by a single ethnic group, this is less
likely in large cities, meaning that if groups are to create institutions based on a
shared religious identity, they need to cooperate on multi-ethnic lines. In Copen-
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hagen, there is evidence of this; for example, the Grand Mosque in Copenhagen
(Hamad Bin Khalifa Civilisation Centre), opened in 2014, and the feminist orient-
ed Women’s Mosque, which opened in August 2016, are both organized on multi-
ethnic lines (The Local.dk 2016). Reciprocally, the public authorities in large cit-
ies often also take the lead in recognizing diversity and developing practices and
policies which enable migrant integration (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). And,
as shown in Chapter 9, anti-immigrant sentiment tends to be lower in large cities.
Given these conditions, one might expect Muslims in Copenhagen to be at the
forefront of developing strategies to negotiate the hostile national media frame.
12.2 Sampling, Sample, and Method
This chapter draws on qualitative interviews with 15 Muslims from the Greater
Copenhagen area in Denmark. Five were Muslims from ethnic minority back-
grounds, while ten were ethnic Danes who had converted to Islam, for periods
of between six months and 15 years before the interview. We chose to interview
both groups because we hypothesized each may negotiate the media frame and
handle identity challenges in different ways. Previous research had located con-
verts on a pronounced fault line in Danish society, where a marked boundary be-
tween ‘Danes’ and ‘Muslims’ is perceived to exist (Jensen 2008, 390). Indeed, in a
striking passage Jensen describes converts as having ‘become … members of the
immigrant minority’ in the eyes of ethnic Danes (ibid.), suggesting a remarkable
process of ethnicization worthy of further study. Straddling such a boundary,
converts might provide unique insights into ways of negotiating the hostile
media frame. Conversely, because of their visibility and ‘double otherness’ (eth-
nically and religiously other), and potential to draw on a range of (including
media) resources from transnational networks, ethnic minorities also promise
to provide distinctive insights.
Among the converts, six were females and four males. Their ages ranged
from 18 to 42 years, with three of the males being in their forties, the other 21.
Among the females, one was 18, the others in their twenties – between 21 and
29. The three older males all converted to Islam near the millennium, one in
year 2000 and two in 2002 – shortly after 9/11. One female converted in 2007,
while the others had converted within the past four years. Among the ethnic
Muslims, one is female and four are males. The female was 29 years old, while
the age of the males ranged from 19 to 29. All five ethnic Muslims were born
in Denmark, but have diverse family backgrounds from Turkey, Pakistan, Pales-
tine, and Lebanon.
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Interviewees were chosen because of their active media engagement – such
as in local newspapers, and on Facebook and Instagram – where they deal in
different ways with the negative media frame in Denmark in relation to Muslims
and Islam. Through these media practices they publicly engage in discussions
and debates about Islam and Muslims, or in other ways display their Muslim
identity, e.g. by posting pictures of their hijabs and/or quotations from the
Quran and Muslim teachers or philosophers on Facebook and Instagram.
The study used semi-structured interviews, conducted between August 2015
and March 2016. After initial questions about name, age, and date of conversion
(where applicable), all respondents were asked the same four main questions: 1)
how do you view the Danish media, especially the representation of Muslims and
Islam? 2) what social media do you use? 3) how do you use social media? 4) do
you think that the ways in which Islam and Muslims are presented in the Danish
media has any impact on your life and/or on how you behave in public? These
main questions were followed by several ‘follow up’ questions, e.g. about the
strategies the interviewees adopted in relation to the negative media frame in
Denmark.
In the following sections, the responses will be analysed around two themes.
First, how Muslims from different backgrounds attempt to construct a viable
identity in a hostile media environment, and second, the uses and forms of
self-representation developed, both in person and using social media.
12.3 Discussion: ‘In-Betweens’: The Struggle to
Construct Viable Identities
Based on our data, we can initially state that being a Muslim in Denmark – re-
gardless of ethnic origin – is to a high degree to be ethnically marked. Or in other
words: you are considered (and consider yourself to be) part of an ethnic minor-
ity when you are or, more strikingly, become a Muslim. Such is the binary distinc-
tion prevalent between being Muslim and being Danish experienced by our con-
vert interviewees, and attested in previous studies (Jensen 2008), that becoming
Muslim trumps being ethnically Danish; as one of our interviewees, Henrik² (see
further below), puts it, ‘Henrik … used to be Danish – or still is Danish – but in
cultural terms is not Danish anymore because he is Muslim.’ (Henrik, 40-year-old
male convert, Copenhagen).
 Subjects’ names have been changed to protect their anonymity.
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This is very different to the findings of studies in some other locations. For
example, Alyedreessey (2016) interviewed 36 converts contacted via central Lon-
don mosques, and while most reported considerable tensions with their families
and other difficulties (indeed a quarter gave up their Islamic faith), none ex-
pressed this in terms of a change of ethnicity. We shall return to this puzzling
contrast in the conclusion.
Further, we can initially state that all respondents have basically accepted
the social fact of the mutual exclusiveness of Danish and Muslim identities as
a starting point, even though they continued to struggle to overcome it. The visi-
ble Muslims (marked either by dress, self-presentation, or skin colour) experi-
enced many tensions in this regard, mainly due to resistance from their own fam-
ilies and friends and/or due to the conflictual public environment towards
Muslims in Denmark. In this section, we will consider how this ethnic minority
status affects our respondents’ identity construction.
The ‘Invisible Muslims’
To construct a viable dual (Muslim and Danish) identity in a ‘hostile’ or ‘conflic-
tual’ public environment and to negotiate the tensions between these identities
is, for most of our respondents, an ongoing struggle. First, we address those re-
spondents (white, male) whose Muslim identity was not publicly apparent to
ethnic Danes (either through clothes or skin tone), hence ‘invisible’ Muslims.
Of these, only one did not feel conflicted in his identity: 21-year-old Brian from
Copenhagen.
In April 2009, at the age of 16, Brian converted to Islam, and as he stated, he
has never looked back since. Prior to his conversion³ to Islam, Brian was, in his
own words, ‘a wild young man’, whose primary focus and favourite activity was
to ‘party and chase ladies’. At some point during his 16th year, he got tired of this
lifestyle, and began to search for ‘something’ – he did not know what he was
searching for, only that he wanted and needed ‘something new to fill out my
life with’. During this process Brian began to chat with a male convert to
Islam from his neighbourhood. Every Friday the neighbour went to Friday Prayer
in a local Mosque and after a couple of weeks, Brian decided to visit the Mosque.
Since that day, Brian has considered himself a Muslim. He began to study Islam
 Most of our interviewees preferred the term ‘reversion’ to ‘conversion’, because the former im-
plies a return to Islam understood as the original faith of all humanity, and hence better fits their
theological view. We use ‘conversion’ for ease of understanding.
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daily – and still does. He began to pray five times every day, he stopped drinking
and chasing ladies, he stopped eating pork, and lastly, he changed his name. For
Brian, there is no ‘middle way’: either he is a Muslim,with all that it entails, or he
is not. Therefore, Brian claims that he does not experience tensions in negotiat-
ing between a Muslim and a Danish identity – simply because he has, in his
words, erased his Danish identity, symbolized by his change of name:
When I converted I was like … the identity that I had before, I left it behind me. Because
when you are convinced of something, you cannot only commit to half of if – that is, if
you are convinced that this is the right thing for you. Then you have to embrace it. So,
for example, if there is a discussion about ‘us’ and ‘them’, I feel I belong to ‘them’ in
some way. I feel I belong on the other side, in a way. Because the other identity is in a
way left behind. And a new identity has been constructed, in a way. And now I am Muslim.
And I have changed my name. (Brian, Danish convert, 21 years old)
Like Brian, both 40-year-old Henrik, 40-year-old Jørgen, and 42-year-old John are
ethnic Danish males who have converted to Islam. However, unlike Brian none of
these claim to have have completely erased their Danish identity, and unlike
Brian, all three say that they sometimes or often experience tensions in relation
to their dual identity – not so much due to direct hostility towards them and their
religion, but more due to what Henrik calls ‘the hostile atmosphere in general in
Denmark’. He says, ‘The media and especially the politicians spend most of their
time trying to split people. That is what burdens and saddens me’. Additionally,
Henrik, Jørgen, and John say that this tension is rather new.
As mentioned in the previous section, the three male converts in their forties
all converted to Islam at the beginning of this century, one in year 2000 and two
in 2002, that is, shortly after the September 11 attacks on the US. Likewise, all
three male converts in their forties tell that they, during the first eight to ten
years after reversion, did not think so much about their ‘Muslim-ness’ and ‘Dan-
ish-ness’, or rather, their ‘Muslim-ness’ as opposed to their ‘Danish-ness’, simply
because they very rarely did get confronted with their dual identity as problem-
atic. For example, during our interview with Henrik we had a long talk about
how things had changed for him as a Muslim since he converted to Islam
prior to the September 11 attacks on the US. According to Henrik, he never
thought about his identity during his first years as a Muslim – about whether
he was Muslim and/or Dane, because ‘of course, I am both’. However, during
the past five years or so, with politicians, the public, and the media all focusing
on the contradictions between Islam and ‘Danish-ness’, Henrik, as well as Jørgen
and John, has been forced to reflect upon his identity in a new, different and
deeper way. And for all three this reflection has meant that they all today con-
sider themselves as belonging to the Muslim minority in Denmark – as belonging
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to another ethnicity and culture. However, even though Henrik does not consider
himself Danish in cultural terms anymore, he still considers himself to be a
Dane. That is also the reason why he experiences tensions between his Danish
and Muslim identity, and why he often tries to show those around him that he
is not a dangerous man – just a normal Danish man, at least by birth, who
also happens to be Muslim. Thus, he expressed a wish to:
show who you are as a person, tell the world that Henrik, who used to be Danish – or still is
Danish, but in cultural terms is not Danish anymore because he is Muslim – is a good per-
son. He is still a human being, he still has good values, he does not adhere to ISIS or other
oppressive worldviews. (Henrik, Danish convert to Islam, 38 years old)
In similar ways, this is also what the two other male converts in their forties said
during the interviews.
Visible Muslims: Part 1
Our data indicates that it is especially – though not entirely – the visible Mus-
lims, that is the Muslims from ethnic minority backgrounds and the female con-
verts, who all wear the hijab, who experience tensions in relations to their reli-
gion and construction of a viable dual identity. Or put differently, the data
indicates that the visible Muslims face resistance in a more direct way than
the invisible Muslims, i.e. the male converts.
Unlike Brian, Henrik, John and Jørgen, the six female ethnically Danish con-
verts, the one female minority Muslim, and the four male minority Muslims are
visibly Muslim. All females wear the hijab, and all males are dark-skinned and
have dark hair, two have long beards and one wears an Islamic rope and a tur-
ban. Besides being highly aware of their visibility as Muslims, all 11 visible Mus-
lims expressed frustration over not being fully accepted as Danes due to them
being visible Muslims. However, the focus of the concern this causes, among
the female converts on the one hand and the Muslims from ethnic minority back-
grounds on the other hand, and the consequences the lack of acceptance has for
the two groups, seems to be different. Thus, our data indicates that especially the
female converts are highly preoccupied with issues related to their own families –
to resistance and lack of acceptance from their own family members and their
own belonging in their families – and not with lack of acceptance from society
in general. This – lack of acceptance from society in general – was on the con-
trary what most concerned the minority Muslims. Some examples can help dem-
onstrate this tendency in our data.
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In 2008, at the age of 15, Sonja converted to Islam, meaning that, when we
met Sonja at a café in Copenhagen in January 2016, she had been a practicing
Muslim for eight years. With a smile on her face, Sonja referred to herself as
some kind of ‘Danish-Muslim closet-feminist’ – in this context meaning that
she silently fights for the rights of other female Muslims in Demark, inside the
Muslim milieu as well as (maybe especially) outside. When we explored this
theme further, Sonja began to talk about her family and about the resistance
she had met in her family during the last eight years. Sonja, like several other
female converts, told us about episodes in her family, at family dinners, etc.,
where relatives had reacted quite strongly to her conversion to Islam. When
faced with reactions like these, the female converts often feel that their identity
and ‘belonging’ is being challenged, that they do not belong anywhere – neither
in their families, nor in Denmark. In this regard, Sonja said:
Some family members of mine do not like Muslims, and say disgusting things about them.
That makes me sad. Because I am also Muslim, I am just like ‘them’, because I have the
same understanding of Islam as ‘they’ have. In addition, it is obvious that there is a divi-
sion between me and the others in my family, because they do not like Islam. They do not
know how to deal with the situation, what to say to me. (Sonja, age 23, female convert to
Islam)
Even though Sonja does find it unfair that some family members and others out-
side her family treat her differently – or badly – because she is a Muslim, she has
accepted that being a Muslim in Denmark can be challenging. Likewise, Sonja
has accepted that being a Muslim includes an ongoing negotiation about identity
and belonging. However, basically, Sonja does not consider Islam and Muslims
to be ethnically marked, meaning that she basically does not consider herself as
part of an ethnic minority – just a Danish Muslim. Though, due to the anti-Islam-
ic atmosphere in Denmark in general, and specifically within certain circles in
her own family, Sonja feels that she has been forced to take a stance in this re-
gard. Therefore, for the most part, Sonja feels like an outsider, as one of ‘them’ –
that is, as belonging to the Muslim minority in Denmark.
Like Sonja, all female converts say that they consider themselves as belong-
ing to the Muslim minority in Denmark. But unlike Sonja, not all consider this an
‘unwanted necessity’, but rather something they have chosen as part of the pack-
age of being Muslim in Denmark. This is especially the point of view of recent
female converts such as Kirstine and Louise, who converted six months and
one year before the interview respectively. These recent women converts are
also the most eager to ‘fight’ or try to counterbalance the hostile atmosphere to-
wards Islam and Muslims in Denmark (see more below). Contrary to Louise and
Kirstine, both Sonja, 20-year-old Kathrine and 29-year-old Maria, who converted
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three and five years before the interview respectively can be said to have largely
given up this ‘fight’, or at least to have grown tired of trying to counter negative
stereotypes about Islam and Muslims. The same goes for the Muslims from eth-
nic minority backgrounds we interviewed during this study.
Visible Muslims: Part 2
Twenty-three-year-old Omar from Copenhagen is a lively Islamic debater, who
often participates in public discussions and debates about issues related to
Islam and Muslims. During our interview with Omar we both asked him why
he spends so much time debating these issues, and how the often negative at-
mosphere towards Muslims in Denmark affects him in any way. To this, he an-
swered:
It is … difficult not to really belong anywhere.You know,when I am in Turkey, I am not fully
accepted as a Turk. And when I am in Denmark I am not fully accepted as a Dane. So, who
am I and where do I belong? I mean, this is not a question I am struggling with today. But I
used to. (Omar, ethnic Muslim, 23 years old)
Similarly, 29-year-old Hadyia told us that she, due to this ‘in-betweenness’ strad-
dling a Danish, ethnically foreign, and Muslim identity, had spent her entire
teenage years figuring out who she is and where she belongs. Today she has
come to peace with her dual identity, even though she is aware that this dual
identity might not be accepted in society generally.
Due to the Danish media and her visibility as a Muslim, Hadyia is very keen
on keeping some of her Islamic values – those that she knows are at risk of being
labelled ‘radical’ – to herself, e.g. her views on the Islamic veil, halal meat, ho-
mosexuality, etc. As such, she expects that she never will be able to fully blend
her two identities.
12.4 Self-Presentation: Islam as ‘Project Identity’
Even though the Muslims from ethnic minority backgrounds and the female con-
verts experience tensions in relations to their dual identity, due to their visibility
as Muslims, their religion is at the same time both one of their most prominent
identity markers and a means through which they can articulate their identity,
feminist standpoints, and political values; in short, Islam presents as a ‘project
identity’ in Castells’ (1996) sense, meaning it is a source of critique of existing
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societal arrangements, pointing to an alternative social order. Our first example
in this regard is 19-year-old Amman from Copenhagen.
Amman was born and raised in Copenhagen. His parents are from Palestine,
but have lived in Denmark for the past 26 years.We met Amman at a small Mos-
que in Copenhagen, where he spends much of his free time, studying Islamic law
and literature. One theme that Amman particularly focused upon during the in-
terview was the way in which many journalists, politicians, and ordinary people
see terrorism and Islam/Muslims as synonymous. For Amman, as well as for 29-
year-old Adil, it is important to try to counterbalance this tendency. Therefore,
Amman has decided to grow a long beard. By letting his beard grow, Amman
wants to show the Danish people that the fundamentalist branches of Islam
do not have a monopoly on the long beard, quite the contrary –young, well-in-
tegrated Muslims can also wear a long beard:
Just because the Wahabi branch of Islam have long beards, that does not mean that they
have a monopoly on the beard … or that I, for that reason, have to shave off the beard.
On the contrary, I have the beard to show that they do not have monopoly on specific Is-
lamic values. (Amman, ethnic Muslim, 19 years old)
Like Amman, Adil is also very conscious about his physical appearance. Adil
wears an Islamic robe and a turban every day. This was a conscious decision
he made some years ago – that he is a devout Muslim, who will not hide his re-
ligion to appease the public. Thus, Amman and Adil seem to handle tensions
about their religion in the same manner: They try to disrupt the stereotypical
connection between displays of Islamic orthodoxy and a sense of threat by show-
ing that devout Muslims, who wear Islamic clothes or grow long beards, can be,
and should be seen as, good citizens.
In different ways, several female converts use similar strategies. For exam-
ple, in the previous section, we saw that Sonja called herself a ‘Danish-Muslim
closet feminist’. Also, the views expressed by Louise, Kristine, and Maria suggest
that they can appropriately be labelled ‘Danish-Muslim feminists’, even though
they do not use that word to describe themselves. However, through what they
say, what they do, the makeup they put on, the colourful headscarves and gar-
ments they wear, the pictures and statements they post on Instagram and Face-
book, etc., they all try to express both who they are and what they believe in, and
in particular that it is possible to be both a Muslim and what they see as a free,
modern, woman at the same time.
During our six interviews with female converts, all six talked about the
hijab/veil, and oppression and freedom. Contrary to popular opinion, our re-
spondents maintain that wearing the hijab or veil is not the same as being op-
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pressed, quite the opposite. For example, according to Maria, she was often treat-
ed as a ‘sexual object’ before she took on the hijab. Today, wearing the hijab,
Maria feels relaxed and free. This was also something Louise talked about.
Like Maria, Louise also felt that especially young males often used to treat her
as an ‘object’, prior the taking on the hijab. Today, that is not the case anymore.
In addition to this – and to some degree due to it – Louise also considers herself
more special and feminine today than prior to conversion and especially before
taking on the veil; as well as making her feel special (in the sense of positively
distinctive – noticed, in a good way – but also better respected), wearing the
hijab has also made Louise more conscious about her appearance in public.
When we met Louise, she had been wearing the hijab for two months. We
therefore asked her whether this visibility had changed her identity and/or pub-
lic appearances in any way. This she confirmed:
After I began to wear the veil and I sit on a train … I can put some Arabic music on, on my
headphones, and then turn the volume up, so that people around me can hear it. I do not
know why, but I just want people to see that it is OK – nothing bad will happen, just be-
cause I am Muslim. Moreover, if I greet someone on the train, when I get in or on my way
out, then I greet them in Arabic. I probably just have a need to say, that it is OK to be a
Muslim, that it is not dangerous. I just want to tell the positive story about Islam in public.
(Louise, 24 years old, convert)
And lastly, besides making her feel more distinctive as a woman and as respon-
sible for counterbalancing stereotypes about Muslims, the hijab has also become
a fashion item for Louise, and, again, a tool through which she can show the
public that she is still a ‘normal’ woman with normal interests – e.g. fashion:
Louise: I sometimes use Instagram now that I wear the veil. Because there are so many pic-
tures of how to arrange the veil. Therefore, I use Instagram to see how others arrange their
veils and what style they have.
Interviewer: Do you post similar pictures?
Louise: Yes. Or no, not of clothes in general, only pictures of my veil, face and so on. I
mean, after I have taken on the veil, I have become like, ‘Oh, now I have to take a new pic-
ture and post it’. So that people can see that it is actually really beautiful to wear the veil.
The last example we will discuss is 18-year-old Kirstine. Kirstine is a very ener-
getic young woman, with a fast and sharp mind and tongue. She is politically
volunteering, active on several boards at school, in her neighbourhood, etc.
Like several other women converts, she has faced strong resistance from within
her own family. Thus, to show both her parents and surroundings in general that
she is still the ‘same, good old Kirstine’ regardless of religion, she is still doing
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volunteer work at the Christian congregation where she formerly was a member
and her parents still are members. In addition, she also has a feeling that people
often consider her to be a ‘dumb’ or suppressed, young woman now that she has
become a Muslim – or as if ‘the veil had shot down my intelligence’. This annoys
Kirstine, as she is an elite student at her school and in general is very devoted to
her studies and to getting a higher university degree after high school. She con-
siders herself to be a ‘normal’ young girl, and she uses Instagram to show that to
her followers. Several times every day Kirstine posts pictures of herself wearing
the hijab, red lipstick, and heavy makeup around her eyes. Sometimes she lets
the ‘pictures do all the talking’, and sometimes she writes a short text to the pic-
tures, about her being a young, modern, and free woman – certainly not a re-
pressed or foolish woman.
12.5 Danish Muslims in Comparative Context
The impact of negative media framing seems to be dependent on the interview-
ees’ visibility as Muslims, with those who are more visible (whether by dress or
ethnicity) experiencing it more strongly and relentlessly. It is experienced as
frustrating and tiring, with tiredness shown not only in reported feelings, but
in a tendency amongst converts gradually to become less active in attempts to
pro-actively combat negative stereotypes. However, the very visibility that results
in a sense of being permanently under scrutiny can also be mobilized as part of a
strategy to combat stereotyping, both amongst ethnic minority males and female
converts, by combining the adoption of markedly Muslim styles of dress and
grooming with behaving in exemplary ways, both by ethnic Danish and Muslim
standards. For women, this includes combining hijab with makeup, using fash-
ionable styles, and excelling in studies; for men this may mean being scrupu-
lously polite and considerate. Thus both genders use strategies to subvert stereo-
types which link Islamic dress to insularity and radicalism (for men) or
submissiveness and stupidity (for women).
Our interviewees were not key organizers of online ‘counter-publics’ (see
Chapter 9), but all belonged to and to differing extents were active in such
groups (e.g. for hijab fashion), and drew social and emotional support from
them. This support, as well as mosque attendance, the example of the Prophet,
prayer and private study, helped them to cope with the psychological strain of
‘living in the spotlight’.
Finally,we compare our findings with that of a study conducted partly on the
far side of the Øresund Bridge, in Malmö, Sweden,which may shed some light on
why the formation of dual (Danish and Muslim) and multiple (e.g. Danish Turk-
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ish Muslim) identities are proving so hard to achieve, and on the conditions
which might more readily enable their formation. It may also illuminate the in-
terplay of media with other factors shaping both identity formation and the in-
tegration of contemporary European societies.
Scuzzarello (2015) compared participation in elections and the formation of
dual identification amongst Somalis and Poles in Ealing, West London and
Malmö, Sweden, municipalities of similar size (between 310,000 and 340,000,
and with high proportions of foreign-born population; 31 percent in Malmö
and 57 percent in Ealing; ibid., 1221).We shall focus on the Somalis, who, as Mus-
lims, are the most relevant comparison group for our sample. Somalis, in both
municipalities, have low economic activity rates (20 percent employment), and
tend to be portrayed as poorly integrated in national media.While voter registra-
tion and access to polling was easier in Malmö than Ealing, Scuzzarello found
that ‘Somali participants in Malmö tend to vote to a lesser degree than those
in Ealing’ (ibid., 1224). She concludes that this was because Somalis in Ealing
were more readily able to form multiple identifications, because Muslim, Somali,
and British identities were experienced as compatible, and this in turn made
them feel entitled and motivated to vote (ibid., 1228). In contrast in Malmö, So-
malis felt they were still viewed as immigrants and not accepted as Swedish: ‘So-
malis’ identification with the superordinate group (i.e. Sweden) has not been so-
cially validated by the majority society.’ (ibid., 1229). For example, one
interviewee, who had lived in Sweden from age three, stated:
When I am [in Kenya] they call me Swede because I haven’t lived there for years, but
when I am in Sweden I’m an immigrant. […] I cannot feel wholly Somali or wholly
Swedish. (Somali man, 20–29 years old, Malmö)
The formation of multiple identities in Ealing seems to relate to a sense of ac-
ceptance into the host society mediated by what is practiced and perceived as
normal at neighbourhood level, and recognized by local state institutions, for ex-
ample:
There is something called British Muslim [here] and that’s normal for [the English].
Muslims having the mosque and halal meat, Eid celebrations and that’s a normal thing. [It
makes you feel] comfortable and … recognized … and that means you’re also going to be
part of that [country]. (Somali man, 50–59 years old, Ealing)
In Ealing culture and religion define what you do, how you do it. I think this has a lot to do
with British society allowing multiculturalism. It’s not like that in other countries in Eu-
rope. (Somali woman, 20–29 years old, Ealing) (ibid.)
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Acceptance at a local civic and state level seems to translate into an identifica-
tion with British national identity, an identification which leads to positive affect
and a desire to participate:
What does it mean to be a UK citizen? To contribute to society and to be part of it, really, not
just sitting back. (Somali woman, 20–29 years old, Ealing)
To be a UK citizen [means] I don’t know … I’m quite proud of being British. (Somali man,
20–29 years old, Ealing)
This identification occurs despite a very negative media frame in the UK (similar
to Denmark), and much higher levels of negativity towards immigrants and es-
pecially Muslims; 38.6 percent of Swedes agree the country should ‘allow
many Muslims to come and live here’ compared with 11.4 percent of British;
only 18.7 percent of Swedes said ‘allow few’ or ‘no Muslims to come and live
here’, compared with 46 percent of British.
It may be that Scuzzarello’s findings are an artefact of comparing a district in
a global city (London, with 9 million population, of which white British are a mi-
nority, 2011 census), with a medium sized Swedish city; perhaps a comparison
between Stockholm and a medium-sized British city with a large minority pop-
ulation would reverse the result. The findings for Poles support this; few Poles
voted in either city (three from a total sample of 30, ibid. 1223), and their national
identification remained wholly Polish; but they felt more at home in London
(pre-Brexit) than Malmö. The dual identification they had developed was with
London rather than Britain; in contrast with the Somalis, none of the Poles de-
scribed themselves as Polish-British. But then British institutional multicultural-
ism, developed from the 1970s to 1990s, and still largely maintained in schools
and public institutions despite its rhetorical rejection by national governments
since 2001, was not built to accommodate white Europeans (a possible factor
in Brexit), but South Asian Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, and was influenced
by an American black empowerment movement which celebrated dual and mul-
tiple identities. So, battles won in previous decades – over accommodation of
dress, food, and public celebration of various religious festivals – and discourses
developed then – e.g. British Asian, Black British, and later, British Muslim and
British Hindu – may have created a legacy from which British Somali Muslims
now benefit.
This legacy is not limited to London or the UK; while specific civic and na-
tional histories shape the form which institutional multiculturalism takes (and
support for it), its varieties are found globally, including in Sweden (Vertovec
and Wessendorf 2010). However, a multiculturalism rooted in collective struggles
for equality (UK) may prove more resilient, and have wider societal resonance,
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than one imposed by a liberal welfare state (Sweden). Furthermore, in more his-
torically homogeneous societies, it may be more difficult to prevent the forma-
tion of the binary us/them, immigrant/native distinction which works against
the formation of multiple identities.
12.6 Conclusion
Returning to Denmark, here we find a combination of UK level negativity to-
wards Muslim immigrants (46 percent in both the UK and Denmark support
the statements ‘allow few’ or ‘allow no’ Muslim immigrants compared with 19
percent in Sweden, ESS 2014), with a history of Lutheran hegemony and homo-
geneity, but less mitigated by government-led attempts to introduce institutional
multiculturalism than in Sweden. Hence the challenges facing ethnic and new
Muslims witnessed in this chapter. In relation to furthering understanding of me-
diatization in a comparative context, our findings suggest that while media are
powerful structuring forces, other factors also shape national dynamics, e.g. gov-
ernment support for institutional multiculturalism, the historical legacies of Lu-
theranism (Scandinavia) and Empire (UK), and the influence of civil society-led
anti-racist struggles, as seen here. This suggests that to properly understand the
dynamics of mediatization in specific cases, media dynamics need to be rigor-
ously contextualized by broader processes of historical and social change, and
are best viewed comparatively.
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Abstract: This chapter presents two empirical case studies of religious education
(RE) in Norway and in Sweden. In addition to introducing the Upper Secondary
School section of the present volume, the chapter explores how media materials
and discourses are being extensively used in a similar fashion as part of RE in
both countries. Media materials and discourses serve to both contextualize the
content of the subject and to legitimize RE by showing why religion is relevant
for contemporary Norwegian and Swedish society; thus, they form an important
part of the RE lessons. Applying a mediatization perspective, we argue that this
use of media impacts both the choice of topics addressed and the way they are
presented, as it inserts various media dynamics into the pedagogical practice of
religious education.
Keywords: mediatization, religious education, representations of religion, media
materials
As participation in institutionalized religious practice is on the decline in the
Scandinavian countries, the media seem to fortify their role as the main source
of information about religion (Lövheim and Bromander 2012, 16–24). The claim
that what most people know about religion, they know from the media is often
made (Hjarvard 2008; Lundby and Gresaker 2015). Our survey, presented in
Chapter 2, supports this claim. TV and the newspapers are rated highest as the
context in which people encounter questions related to religion and belief.
When it comes to young people, the focus of this essay, we have to take into ac-
count another such context, and that is the school.¹ Non-confessional religious
education (RE) is mandatory in both Norway and Sweden, and although not a
major subject, youth still regularly encounter religion throughout primary and
secondary school.
However, school is not just a source of information about religion; it is a site
where religion is contested. As schools are primarily regarded as public institu-
 This is not reflected in the survey. Most respondents are over 18 years old, and are thus not in
school.
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tions, the role of religion in school is a controversial topic in both Norway and
Sweden, and is often a matter of public debate. RE is also constantly changing
to accommodate the growing diversity of contemporary Scandinavian society. On
an institutional level, RE can be seen as a social arena where young people en-
gage with religion, and as a site where the meaning of religion, and various rep-
resentations of religion, are contested and negotiated.
This section of the book explores RE in upper secondary schools, through
data from two empirical studies, one in Norway and one in Sweden. The purpose
of the present essay is twofold. First, we will describe some aspects of the school
systems in Norway and Sweden, and how RE is organized in the respective coun-
tries. This chapter will also function as an introduction to the other chapters in
this Upper Secondary School section of this book. Secondly, we will account for
some of the findings from the two studies, in which we examine the use of media
within the context of RE. We approach this study with an institutional mediati-
zation perspective. Regarding RE as a site for contestation of religion, we look at
how media materials and media representations are used and engaged with in
the pedagogical practice of teaching and learning about religion. Mediatization
theory states that in modern society, the media are established as an institution
in their own right, and other institutions come to depend on the media in their
everyday practices and communication (Schrott 2009; Hjarvard 2013). This may
alter institutional practices, as dynamics inherent in the operations of the media
thus influence the interactions within the said institution. The integration and
presence of media may thus come to condition, but not determine the encounters
between actors in everyday life (see Chapters 3 and 4).
The research’s focus is on the use of media in RE. Here, we employ a broad
conception of media that includes media technology, platforms, materials, and
discourses.² We examine how representations of religion and topics related to re-
ligion, in the form of media discourses and materials produced by and for the
mass media, play a role in the lessons observed. We argue that media represen-
tations form an integral and consistent part of the practice of RE as a way to re-
late the content of the subject to contemporary society. This, however, has some
ramifications for how religion is engaged with, as various media dynamics come
to influence the classroom practice.
 See Chapter 14 for a detailed description.
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13.1 The Swedish and Norwegian Context –
Religion and School
Religious education is organized in a great variety of ways across Europe (e.g. Kuyk
et al. 2007; Davis and Miroshnikova 2012). The national context seems to be one of
the most important factors in how each country does RE (Schreiner 2014), and the
specific relationship between church and state seems to be particularly influential
in RE’s organization (Loobuyck and Franken 2014, 169). The historically close ties
between state, schools, and church in Norway and Sweden appear to have led to
a similar process of transforming RE from denominational teaching in the state re-
ligion into a non-denominational school subject (Ferrari 2014, 29). Both countries
have organized RE as an integrative subject,³ meaning that children with different
religious and non-religious backgrounds are taught together about different reli-
gions (Alberts 2007). RE is viewed as a regular school subject and is mandatory
for all students throughout primary and lower secondary school, as well as for stu-
dents in most of the upper secondary school programs.⁴ One of the rationales be-
hind this kind of RE is that knowledge about religions is an important competency
in multicultural and multi-religious societies. This trend can also be seen in the rec-
ommendations from the European Council to its member states regarding the inclu-
sion of religious and non-religious convictions within intercultural education (Jack-
son 2014).
The school systems in Norway and Sweden are an important part of the con-
text here. Both countries see education as a key part of their welfare state systems,
in which the state should provide citizens with equal opportunities for free educa-
tion, regardless of gender, geographical, social, or economic background (Alberts
2007, 215). This means that the state plays a very active role in the educational sys-
tem.The parliament and the government are responsible for education, and provid-
ing national curricula, aims, and guidelines for schools, as well as bearing most
expenses, even for independent schools.⁵ In Norway, only about 4 percent of stu-
dents in primary and lower secondary schools and 9 percent of the students in
upper secondary schools attend independent schools, while the corresponding
 As opposed to separative RE, where children are divided according to religious background,
and taught accordingly (Alberts 2010, 276).
 In Norway, this means that RE is mandatory for all students in the programs that are prepar-
atory for higher education; vocational education does not have RE. In Sweden, RE is a manda-
tory subject for all upper secondary school programs, including vocational ones.
 In Norway, independent schools have a limit on tuition fees of 15%, the remaining 85% being
financed by the state. In Sweden, independent schools are completely financed by the state.
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numbers in Sweden are higher at 15 percent and 26 percent respectively. These
schools are required to provide education equivalent to that of the state schools.
The educational systems of both countries are organized as comprehensive
schools, in which the first nine years in Sweden and ten years in Norway are man-
datory for all citizens, with a legal right after that to three years of upper secondary
education. It is not until upper secondary school that the students choose separate
programs and are allowed to choose what courses to take (Wiborg 2009). All these
aspects of the educational systems of both countries could be said to constitute
many of the ‘dynamics’ that condition much of the RE practice – dynamics, we
argue, that are fundamentally different from the dynamics of the media. The
case studies of this chapter are conducted on RE in upper secondary school
and, although similar in many ways, Norway and Sweden differ a bit in their organ-
ization of RE at this level.
13.1.1 Norway
RE in Norwegian upper secondary school is mandatory for every student enrol-
led in programs qualifying for higher education. This subject is called ‘Religion
and Ethics’ and is placed in the last year of upper secondary school, meaning
that most of the students are about 18 years old. Religion and Ethics consists
of four main subject areas: 1) Religion and the criticism of religion, 2) Islam
and an elective religion,⁶ 3) Christianity, and 4) Philosophy, ethics and views
on life/humanism. The subject matter is thus not very broad in as far as learning
about different religions. Christianity is given priority in relation to the amount of
time, due to its historical and cultural role in Norway.⁷ Islam is singled out as
being especially important. Religion and Ethics is non-confessional and relies
on an analytical approach that is based on methods from religious studies (An-
dreassen 2016, 118).
The subject is defined as being both knowledge-based and value-forming,
and respect and tolerance are emphasized. Mutual tolerance across differences
in religion and ‘views on life’ is explicitly identified as a ‘necessity for peaceful
 The schools choose one religion in addition to Christianity, Islam, and the humanist life-
stance (which in Norway is treated as being equivalent to belonging to a religious tradition).
 The role of Christianity in RE in Norway is much debated, although mainly at the primary and
lower secondary level. In 2006, Norway was found by the European Court of Human Rights to be
in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (Protocol 1, Article 2) guaranteeing
parents the right to decide on children’s religious upbringing, by favouring Christianity without
sufficient opt-out options.
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co-existence in a multicultural and multi-religious society’ (UDIR 2006, 1). The
national curriculum states that religious, philosophical and ethical questions
are ‘important for each individual, and for society as a whole, both as the
basis for who we are, and as a source of conflict’ (ibid., 1). So, although the cur-
ricular aims of the subject are mainly focused on cognitive knowledge (ibid., 5),
such as familiarity with holy texts, doctrines of faith, history, and traditions, the
relevance of religion to contemporary Norwegian society is given as one of the
main reasons in regard to the purpose of Religion and Ethics.
13.1.2 Sweden
Similarly to the Norwegian case, Swedish RE is a mandatory, non-confessional,
integrative subject. The subject, Religionskunskap, is called Religion in the offi-
cial English translation that is published by the Swedish National Agency for Ed-
ucation (Skolverket 2011a), and it has four broad themes as its framework. The
first is ‘Christianity, other religions and worldviews’, in which the so-called
‘world religions’ are taught in terms of historical events and contemporary ex-
pressions, both nationally and globally. The second theme is ‘views on gods
and humanity’, which focuses on the huge variety in doctrines and practices,
both between and within religions, with a particular focus on gender, socio-eco-
nomic factors, ethnicity, and sexuality. Third is ‘religion and science’, which
delves into contemporary debates on the relations between the religious and sci-
entific worldviews. Finally, there is ‘ethical theories and models’, which includes
both secular normative ethics and ethical arguments that are based in the vari-
ous religious traditions.
Just as in the Norwegian case, Sweden’s Religion subject is explicitly based
in the academic discipline of religious studies, which clearly separates it from its
roots as a subject that was meant to teach about the national evangelical Luther-
an church. Although the syllabus of the subject does not contain any explicit ref-
erences to tolerance or multiculturalism, these arguments are clearly present in
the national curriculum, which stresses that the school teaches respect and com-
passion, especially in relation to the internationalization of Swedish society
(Skolverket 2011b).
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13.2 The Two Cases
13.2.1 The Norwegian Case
The Norwegian part of this project is a case study with fieldwork conducted
throughout the school year of 2015–2016.⁸ The fieldwork was carried out in
an upper secondary school in the Eastern part of Norway. With a little less
than 1,000 students, it is a fairly large school by Norwegian standards. The
school offers several programs and in 2015 had about 10 classes of around 30
students each, in all three years. Between 15 percent and 25 percent of the stu-
dents in each class have a foreign background. Starting in September 2015, six
RE teachers were interviewed and their teaching observed in eight different Re-
ligion and Ethics classes. Although the use of media materials was the primary
research focus of the Norwegian study, the researchers also had individual re-
search questions.⁹ Fifty sessions were observed in total.
13.2.2 The Swedish Case
The Swedish case study was conducted within the broader framework of the
Teaching Religion in Late Modern Sweden project,¹⁰ in which Broberg is engaged
as a PhD student. The project involves about 20 schools, and in order to make a
comparison with the Norwegian case as relevant as possible, the school that was
most similar to the Norwegian school was selected as the Swedish case study.
The selected school is thus a public upper secondary school on the outskirts
of Stockholm. The school has about 2,000 students and an above-average num-
ber of them have a foreign background¹¹ (Skolverket 2015).While the Norwegian
school supplies the students with laptops,¹² the Swedish school supplies their
students with tablets, which were brought to, and to some extent used, in the
 The field work was conducted by PhD candidate Audun Toft and Professor Liv Ingeborg Lied.
 Toft’s primary focus was the use of media representations of Islam in the classroom. The main
body of observational data is thus from lessons about Islam. In total, Toft observed 45 sessions;
34 of these were about Islam. Lied’s focus was related to the use of popular media in RE, and
between November 2015 and March 2016 she observed five sessions.
 The Swedish research team consisted of Associate Professor Anders Sjöborg, Lecturer Malin
Löfstedt, PhD candidate Maximilian Broberg, and master’s student Johan Dynewall, all situated
at the Faculty of Theology, Uppsala University.
 33% compared to the national average of 25%.
 See Chapter 14.
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majority of the lessons observed. Four Religion teachers and a total of 18 lessons
were observed at the school during the school year 2015–2016.
13.2.3 Observations and Interviews
The main body of data was gathered by direct observation, with the researchers
present in the classroom, most often sitting in the back row among the students.
Data gathering were carried out by taking hand-written field notes,with no audio
or video material being recorded. The students were informed about the project
before the observation started. Outside the lessons, the researchers also followed
the teachers during breaks and to meetings with the RE team. The data thus in-
cludes field notes from conversations and observations with RE teachers, and
others, gathered in informal settings.¹³ The teachers were interviewed using a
semi-structured interview guide. These interviews were conducted later, after ob-
servations had started, so as to include questions about specific observations.
The interviews were between 45 and 75 minutes in length. As the Norwegian
and Swedish interview guides were different, due to their different aims, the
Swedish study included email interviews based on the Norwegian interview
guides to make for easier comparison.
13.3 Findings Across Cases
Regardless of the national differences, the material collected in both case studies
are, to a great extent, comparable, and in several aspects they are strikingly sim-
ilar. Though comparing cases from different countries has its problems (Bråten
2013), the similarities in media use are worth exploring in more detail.
In both the Norwegian and the Swedish cases we observed that different
media consistently formed an integrated part of various classroom practices.
Both schools make extensive use of media technology and media platforms.
However, the Norwegian students made much more use of their laptops than
the Swedish students did of their tablets, which resulted in different media prac-
tices. The profound impact that the use of laptops had in the Norwegian case will
be discussed further in Chapter 14.
 This aspect of the fieldwork is more prominent in the Norwegian study, but to some extent it
is also present in the Swedish study, particularly in the form of informal conversations before
and after observations and interviews.
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However, media materials and media discourses were used very similarly
across the cases. In both of the schools we observed active and extensive
media use in the practice of teaching and learning about religion. We will
focus on two aspects of this: 1) how media materials are being used as pedagog-
ical artefacts¹⁴, and 2) how events, debates, and discourses in the news media
influence the choice of the topics that are addressed and discussed in the RE les-
sons. Two examples from our observations will illustrate these aspects:
13.3.1 Observation 1 (Norway) – Anne Lise’s Class, 2
November 2015 – Media Materials as Pedagogical
Artefacts
Anne Lise¹⁵ lets the students into the classroom. It takes some time for the class
to come to order. Anne Lise turns her computer on and says, ‘We are still on
Islam. Today we will start with a song. Everyone grab one of these.’ She passes
Xeroxed copies of the song’s lyrics to the students. The song is ‘Tusen tegninger’
(A thousand drawings) by the rap duo Karpe Diem.¹⁶ As the students recognize
this they cheer, and several of them express how much they like the song. Anne
Lise tries to catch everyone’s attention as she starts playing a YouTube clip of the
music video. ‘Just put away your PCs,’ she says, ‘Everyone! Put the PCs away.’
Once the clip starts, the students settle down and concentrate on the song.
Several of them sing along. As the song fades out, the class is silent and Anne
Lise tells everyone to turn the page of lyrics over. ‘There are some questions writ-
ten on the back. So use the lyrics to underline every reference you find to reli-
gion. Discuss the rest of the questions in groups. Spend a couple of minutes be-
fore we discuss it together.’
Here, we can see how the RE lesson was structured around a music video.
The video is employed as a source with which to show what it is like to be a Mus-
lim with an immigrant background in Norway, and it is transformed into a peda-
gogical artefact on which further questions and discussions are based. Such
 By ‘pedagogical artefact’ we here mean tools used for educational purposes to amplify peda-
gogical activities in the classroom, see Chapter 14.
 All names are changed to provide informant anonymity.
 The artists behind the duo Karpe Diem are both born in Norway, with immigrant parents.
Magdi is Muslim (his mother is from Norway and his father emigrated from Egypt); Chirac is
Hindu and has parents of Indian origin. The song ‘Tusen tegninger’ is based on Magdi’s expe-
riences.
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media use in education is nothing new, but the extent to which media materials
are brought into, and made part of, the pedagogical practice is striking. This sort
of media use is prominent in our observations. Articles and op-eds from news-
papers, feature films, documentaries, TV series, talk shows, debates, video
clips of stand-up comedy, as well as news broadcasts, both from web papers
and from public service broadcasting, are only some of the many examples of
media materials observed that are used as pedagogical artefacts in RE lessons.
13.3.2 Observation 2 (Sweden) – Anna’s Class, 25 April
2016 – Media Discourses Set the Agenda
This is the second lesson about Islam and, after a brief discussion about what
the students can remember from the previous lesson, the teacher brings up a
Power Point about the early history of Islam and starts to lecture about the
life of Muhammad. The first 20 minutes of this lesson are spent on this. Anna
finishes the lecture and states:
We won’t linger too long on history, but it tells us something about the role of Islam in the
world. What is often forgotten when writing history in the Western world is how much of
our culture that can be traced to Islam and to this time. Before we move on, if you’ve
read the newspapers or watched the news this last week, you’ll have seen that several
things related to Islam and The Green Party have happened.¹⁷
A student says, ‘Khan wouldn’t shake hands.’ Anna replies, ‘Exactly, pretty in-
flated in the media. The Green Party says that men and women should shake
hands, and the prime minister says, “You ought to shake hands with both
men and women.” My question is this: is this self-evident?’ One student imme-
diately exclaims, ‘This is just the West crying about people not falling into line.’
This was followed by a long debate that took up the remaining 40 minutes of
the lesson. The students brought up many different angles: the potential tension
between freedom of religion and the rights of women; whether a representative
of a political party can be religious; if gendered ways of greeting are necessarily a
bad thing, and much more.
Approaching the end of the lesson, Anna says: ‘Could it be that this is blown
out of proportion by the media?’ Most of the students agree that perhaps this is
 This refers to the so called ‘handshake affair, when a Swedish politician refrained from shak-
ing hands with a female reporter as a result of his Islamic faith. The incident received extensive
media coverage, culminating in the politician’s resignation. See Chapter 4 for further details.
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not really that big a question after all, as most politicians shake hands, and the
fact that one individual refuses is not at all a big deal.
In this example, a recent event that was heavily covered and debated in the
Swedish news media was brought up by the teacher, and it was used as starting
point for classroom discussion. The ensuing debate touches upon several issues
concerning the role of religion in contemporary society, and a wide range of view-
points are expressed by the students. Still, the media event remains the main point
of reference throughout the lesson, setting the premises of the discussion.
Similar observations can be found in other classes. Events, debates, and dis-
courses covered in the news media are frequently brought into the classroom,
both by the teachers and the students. In several instances, these are also
made to be the main focus of whole lessons. Some other examples from our ob-
servations were the terror attacks in Paris (November 2015), a newspaper debate
about apostasy, the conditions for EU immigrants and refugees in Sweden, a
newspaper series about sharia in Norway, and concerns about the veiling of
women, a topic of recurring media coverage that inspired several different
class discussions.
As these examples show, media, in various forms, play an important role in
the RE lessons observed. One of the things that struck both teams of researchers
as worth noting was the amount of time spent on media materials and on discus-
sing recent events and debates that had been represented through the media.
This frequently displaced the topics and content from the textbook and the cur-
riculum. Moreover, these media representations of religion often influenced and
conditioned the ways both the teachers and students engaged with topics of re-
ligion in the first place.We would like to explore the interplay between media, be
it news media, entertainment, or social media, and the practice of teaching reli-
gion in more detail.
13.3.3 Showing the Relevance of Religion
When asked why she had decided to devote a 2.5-hour RE session (17 November
2015) to address the Paris terror attacks (13 November 2015) with a basis in a
documentary about radicalization,¹⁸ Charlotte said: ‘I realize … that I take
time away from other topics. But what gives the whole subject legitimacy is
that this is real. It’s around us.’ Here, she expresses one of the major concerns
that are voiced by both the Norwegian and the Swedish teachers: namely, the
 Jihad: A Story of The Others by Deeyah Khan (2015).
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question about what gives RE legitimacy as a school subject in the first place.
One of the main arguments in favour of RE is that knowledge about religious
and non-religious worldviews is a prerequisite for a well-functioning multicultur-
al and multireligious society.¹⁹ The main reason given for learning about religion
is thus instrumental; its importance is to be found in its relevance to contempo-
rary society in Norway and Sweden respectively.
The importance of showing the relevance of religion is made even more ur-
gent by what the teachers perceive to be the students’ lack of experience with
religion. The majority of the Norwegian and Swedish students are described
by the teachers as non-religious, and they struggle to see why religious educa-
tion concerns them.²⁰ Showing why the content of RE is relevant thus becomes
one of the major challenges that the teachers face. It is interesting to see that the
teachers, independently of each other, relate relevance directly to media cover-
age. Consider the following example, from an interview with one of the Norwe-
gian teachers:
Interviewer: Do you use various media material?
Guro: I try to do that. And that is one of the challenges with religious education. It’s to
show that this is actually relevant and aktuelt²¹ for our society today. Not just something
that is historical. … And therefore I think that religious education can have that function,
to encounter things they are interested in, and that they see around them and in the media.
The same views are expressed by most of the teachers interviewed. It is through
media that the relevance of religion can be shown. Media materials are needed
to give access to ‘what goes on around us’, to ‘what is real’, to ‘the world around
us’, and similar expressions that were used by the teachers. Not only are the
media the primary source of information about what happens in society, but
media materials, in the form of products produced by media professionals, are
especially well suited for this task. Anna describes the advantages of showing
interviews in class: ‘I can’t just stand there and tell them about everything. …
When you see someone saying it, it becomes a little more real.’ The teachers ex-
pressed a strong dependence on media materials, ones produced by and for the
mass media, when teaching about religion. Reality is primarily seen as being ac-
 Explicitly stated in the Norwegian curriculum (UDIR 2006, 1).
 Several studies confirm that religion seems to be of little importance to a majority of Scan-
dinavian youths (Lövheim and Bromander 2012; Lippe 2008), although there are regional differ-
ences.
 The Scandinavian word aktuelt is difficult to translate, but is the word mostly used in this
context. Aktuelt implies that something is at once important, relevant, and current.
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cessible through the media, resulting in media materials being viewed, and
used, as necessary components of RE. Media materials thus become an integral,
and indispensable, part of the pedagogical practice.
13.3.4 Facts vs. Reality
The expressed importance of constantly having to legitimize the relevance of the
subject by using media materials points to what seems to be a perceived tension
within the subject itself. This is the tension between what is seen to be the inten-
tion of RE, and the actual content of the subject, as specified in the learning out-
comes of the curriculum. Throughout the interviews, the teachers made sharp
distinctions between the content of the subject, ‘the facts’, and the world around
us, ‘reality’.²² This distinction is also frequently communicated to the students
during lessons, often through phrases like ‘we need to go through the facts be-
fore we can talk about the things you hear about’. There is a strong focus on
knowledge in the RE curricula in both Norway and Sweden. In both cases, we
observed that the curricular aims, centred on knowledge, structured the lessons
and were constantly communicated to the students.²³ The facts are also what the
students will eventually be evaluated and graded on. The teachers, throughout
the interviews, stressed the importance of the facts and the subject-specific
knowledge. However, a mention of facts is most often followed by contrasting
them with reality, with reference to events or debates that are represented
through the various media. This consistent pairing of, or complementary distinc-
tion between, facts and reality is worth exploring in more detail. Facts are pre-
sented as: 1) necessary, to gain an adequate understanding of reality (and also as
the basis for grading the students), but they are also, 2) boring, or at least not
seen to be as interesting or relevant in their own right.We can see this in a typ-
ical presentation in a lesson about Islam:
We are going to spend all next week talking about Islamism, extremism, and political
Islam, and all the things you read and hear about the IS and so on, but first we will
have to go through some basics.’ (Beatrice, observation, 19 April 2016)
 We created these categories based on the wording of the teachers, both in the classrooms
and in the interviews. The terms vary, but a distinction between ‘facts/knowledge/subject-specif-
ic/school stuff’, on the one hand, and ‘reality/society/surroundings/the world/current events
and debates’, on the other, is discernible throughout the material. We use the terms ‘facts’
and ‘reality’ as shorthand for these.
 In most of the lessons, the curricular aims for the day are written on the blackboard or are
shown on a screen, and they are referred to frequently.
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The same notion is voiced in several interviews, for example, by Christine, concerning how
she usually structures her lessons on Islam:
I try to avoid the ‘facts-trap’ i.e. that the whole session is centred on the general traits of the
religions. … When it comes to the lesson series on Islam we usually, after having talked our
way through the general stage (‘the facts-trap’), work our way towards lived religion. In this
way we can delve into the questions that the students often find interesting. (Email inter-
view, 19 May 2016)
Where the facts are necessary, but boring, ‘reality’ (represented through the
media) is: a) interesting, but, b) superficial. The majority of the teachers empha-
sized that the students really want to talk about current events and debates that
are related to contemporary society. The teachers have different views on wheth-
er students find RE an interesting subject, but they agree that it is the link to
what is going on in society that makes it interesting and relevant.
I think that the fact that the course focuses so much on what happens in the world and that
it helps you understand what is going on in society, is one of the reasons why the students
are so interested in the subject. Should you let the media control the lessons? Instinctively
perhaps it feels like ‘no’ should be the answer, but, yes, I think so. If the school shouldn’t
help the students understand the reality they live in, then who should? (Christine, email
interview, 19 May 2016)
Again, we see that the teachers report a dependence on media representations in
order to adequately teach about religion at all. This is not an unconditional de-
pendence; the teachers will choose which representations to use, and these will
be re-mediated in the classroom according to the pedagogical aims of the lessons.
Still, the media representations are seen as being necessary to legitimize the rele-
vance of the subject, since the facts alone are not enough. This dependence is mu-
tual, as the media are frequently seen as superficial, and even biased,²⁴ in their pre-
sentation of reality. The students need scholarly facts in order to understand the
mediated reality. However, as we have seen, the facts are often hurried through,
and most time is spent on various media representations.
13.3.5 Media Dynamics in RE
The strong media presence in the RE classroom has consequences for the way
religion is being represented and talked about. Integrating media materials
 This is prominent when it comes to Islam. See Chapter 15 for a discussion on how perceived
biased and negative media coverage of Islam impacts on the Norwegian lessons.
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and discourses into the pedagogical practice brings various media dynamics into
play (see Chapter 3). This does not mean that the media determine the way reli-
gion is being represented, but rather that media have been institutionalized in
the practice of RE in such a way that the conditions for teaching and learning
about religion are altered. Dynamics specific to the media become relevant in
the interplay with the dynamics of RE.
One way in which media dynamics influence the RE lessons is in the choice of
which topics should be addressed in class. The agenda-setting power of the media
is well documented and much researched (McCombs 2014). Through media cover-
age, the public gains cues as to the salience of particular topics, and several studies
attest to the correspondence between news coverage and public opinion (e.g.
Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). This is also relevant to the RE lessons, where
we observed a close correlation between media coverage and the topics covered
in the lessons. Kari put it like this: ‘To me the media control the lessons in the
way that what it says, what I get in my newspaper, which has anything to do
with what we are doing, I will use that.’ However, the choice of topics cannot be
said to be completely determined by the media. The teachers discern between re-
liable and non-reliable media sources,²⁵ and make judgements on the relevance
and suitability of topics before using them in the lessons. Teachers thus show
clear signs of having the ability to ‘access, analyse, evaluate, and communicate’
(Aufderhide 1993, quoted by Hobbs 1998, 16) media content in various forms.
This kind of competency has been described as ‘media literacy’ (Hobbs 1998),
and it is vital for teachers in their selection of material. Despite this, media cover-
age still seems to be one of the main criteria when choosing what to address in
class. As we have seen, this is primarily because the media give access to reality,
but, here, the media take on an ambivalent role for the teachers. The media func-
tion simultaneously as sources of information about current events and as arenas
in which events can take place. The lines between these are blurred. The complex
duality between media that are seen as reporting on stories because they are impor-
tant, and stories being important because they are reported in the media, is quite
noticeable in the observations. This conflation of reality and media coverage will,
in many instances, also run deeper. Beatrice says:
In a way I might prioritize Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. … Because of what happens
globally, it is so easy to connect to the situation in various countries. … This thing about
 Most favour the public broadcasting services, as well as the established non-tabloid news-
papers, like Aftenposten and Dagens Nyheter, as well as international news channels like the
BBC.
238 Audun Toft, Maximilian Broberg
Hinduism and Buddhism, it does not really feel like – it feels quite out of date right now.
(Interview, 5 November 2015)
In this example, as in several others, media coverage is equated directly with
what is going on in the world. Even though several teachers expressed that
they know that the sort of stories being covered in the media depends on specific
criteria, the access to the sides of reality that are not being covered in the media
is limited,²⁶ and this has an impact on the way religion is being taught. The most
obvious example, in both cases, is the way the Eastern religions are seen, and
presented, as being less relevant than Islam, and, to some degree, Christianity.
In addition to the impact on what is being addressed in the lessons, the use
of media materials also influences how topics are being represented. When, for
instance, a debate about the veiling of women in Islam, staged and moderated
by Aftenposten, becomes the object of several lessons,²⁷ then Aftenposten takes
on the simultaneous roles of transmitter of opinions, editor, gatekeeper, and
commentator, thus setting the premises for the debate. The media have perform-
ative agency, present framings, and employ genre-specific criteria for presenta-
tion, according to what sort of media materials are being used (see Chapter 3).
Dynamics involved in the production of media materials for use in the mass
media, such as the selection of content, framings, formatting, genre, narrative
structures, etc., then become part of the constituent conditions of RE. One of
the more obvious effects of this situation is that material concerning conflict be-
comes privileged over other material. Conflict is one of the more well-document-
ed criteria for news-worthiness and coverage (e.g. Ihlen and Allern 2008), and
our observations confirm a strong focus on conflict and controversies related
to religion. This will be examined in more detail in Chapters 14 and 15.
13.4 Mediatized RE
Looking through the lenses of institutional mediatization theory, it is fair to de-
scribe the religious education that was observed as mediatized. By this, we mean
that the use of media is not only an integral part of the normal practice of RE, but
also that the teachers see media use as a necessary component of the subject. It
may well be that this is also the case with other school subjects, but our material
 The teachers also use field trips and talk about bringing in guest speakers. However, this is
time-consuming and impractical. The immediate availability of media representations is an im-
portant part of their influence in the classroom.
 Using Xeroxed copies of op-eds from the newspaper as pedagogical artefacts.
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points to several factors that are particular to religion. The place of religion in
school is contested and controversial, both in Norway and in Sweden. It is
through its relevance to contemporary Scandinavian society that the subject is
most often legitimized. The defined learning outcomes of the subject, with strong
emphasis on knowledge about doctrines of faiths, traditions, rituals, texts, and
history, are not seen as being well suited to addressing the contemporary context
without supplements in the form of media representations.
As media materials and discourses become integrated into pedagogical prac-
tice, media dynamics become relevant to how teachers and students engage
with the representations of religion. Ideally, the media materials and media dis-
courses are supplemented and put into context by the facts and content of the cur-
riculum, and vice versa. However, this demands a certain degree of media literacy
on the part of the teacher in order to fulfil the role of RE as a nuanced and relevant
site in which young people can learn about, discuss, and engage with religion.
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Chapter 14
‘Let me Entertain You’: Media Dynamics in
Public Schools
Abstract: Today, the use of media technology, platforms, materials, and discours-
es is often integrated into the classroom practices of Scandinavian schools. Re-
porting from a case study of religious education (RE) in a Norwegian upper sec-
ondary school, this chapter explores how a media-saturated classroom
intensifies and broadens already established dynamics of academic boredom.
Media materials primarily chosen for their entertaining and attention-grabbing
qualities make up a substantive part of the observed RE lessons. Focusing on
conflicts and controversies around religion, these media materials are used to
grab and keep the attention of the students, in competition with a multitude
of options provided by laptops with Internet access. In the observed classrooms,
this use of conflict and entertainment-oriented media materials resulted in the
reproduction and reinforcement of stereotypical and exotic representations of re-
ligion.
Keywords: media-saturation, representations of religion, academic boredom, re-
ligious stereotypes
Kari¹ enters the classroom, carrying a box containing school editions of the New Testament
under one arm and her computer under the other. The students are talking quietly to each
other, some gathering around a laptop screen, others scrolling through their Instagram or
Facebook newsfeeds. As the session is about to start, Kari notes the expected learning out-
come of the day on the blackboard: ‘Acquire knowledge about the Bible’s organization,
contents, origins, and use.’² The students are still talking to each other and many of
them continue to be immersed in their online activities. ‘We need to concentrate on today’s
task,’ Kari says. ‘Today the Bible is our topic, so I hope you are using your laptops for taking
notes, and then after that you can put down the screens. … I have prepared a Kahoot.³ We
are going to interpret a text,⁴ and I want us to talk a little about the ongoing debate in the
 All the names of the informants have been changed.
 Referring to the competence aim ‘Interpret some important texts from the Bible and Christian
tradition’ in the official curriculum (UDIR 2006). The Norwegian curriculum specifies learning out-
come through specific ‘competence aims’, presented as a bullet-pointed list of learning outcomes.
We will use this term, in accordance with the official English translation of the curriculum.
 Kahoot is a game-based, online learning platform.
 Note the direct reference to the mentioned competence aim.
OpenAccess. © 2018, Liv Ingeborg Lied, Audun Toft. This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-Non Commerical-NoDerivs 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110502060-019
media about gay rights.’ One of the students raises his hand, eagerly, ‘Are we going to
watch a film?’ ‘No,’ Kari replies, ‘I know that three hour sessions are rough,⁵ but it is
hard to find something that fits. I considered using På tro og Are, but I did not find it
any good. So, no film. But, we are going to discuss homosexuality, and I hope that is a
bit interesting?’ (Observation in Kari’s classroom, 28 January 2016)
This snapshot from a religious education (RE) ⁶ session in a Norwegian upper
secondary school illustrates a very common classroom situation at this school,
pointing to some of the challenges that teachers, such as Kari, are up against
on an everyday basis. It also provides a preliminary indication of the place of
media in a contemporary classroom, and the functions of various media materi-
als in educational activities.
One of the main hypotheses of the mediatization theory, which is described
in the first part of this volume (see Chapter 3), is that the media will come to
shape and mould interaction in other social domains, fields, or institutions,
and will increasingly become an intrinsic part of these other societal fields
(e.g. Schrott 2009; Hjarvard 2013). Inspired by – and continuing the discussion
of – the mediatization theory, this essay will discuss the potential influence of
various media on areas of teaching and learning about religion in RE lessons
in selected classroom settings. The essay will discuss some of the ways in
which media may condition engagement with religion in Norwegian public
school settings.We explore how profoundly media-saturated classroom environ-
ments may influence teachers’ didactic choices and professional planning for RE
lessons, pointing out some of the dynamics that drive their choices, and discus-
sing the outcome of their strategies in the ongoing representation of religion in
classroom settings.
The essay reports from fieldwork conducted in a select upper secondary
school in the Eastern part of Norway, in the period from September 2015 to
March 2016. The fieldwork included six teachers and eight classes, and consisted
of the observation of classroom practices as well as interviews with teachers.
Fifty RE sessions were observed during this period. The researchers were seated
in the back row, allowing for the observation of both teachers’ practices and stu-
dents’ simultaneous (online media) activity.⁷ As this essay reports from a field-
work in a single school setting, we make no claims for generalizability. Rather,
 The Norwegian term used is seigt, indicating a long duration in a negative way.
 The Norwegian name of the school subject is Religion og etikk (Religion and ethics). See Toft
and Broberg’s essay (Chapter 13) for more information.
 See Toft and Broberg (Chapter 13) for a full description of the fieldwork. The current essay
draws on the data from both Toft’s and Lied’s observations.
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this is a case study, and as such our aim is to point to some key findings that may
subsequently be of interest and relevance to the larger field.
14.1 A Media-Saturated Classroom
Our first, major impression from the classroom observation was the constant,
and sometimes massive, media presence. ‘Media presence’, then, broadly con-
ceived,⁸ indicates the simultaneous presence in the classroom of:
– media technology, that is, materialized media artefacts and gadgets, such as
laptops and cell phones, but also other audio visual equipment that is pres-
ent in the classroom;
– media platforms, that is, online portals that provide access to various cate-
gories of media, based on their purpose or function, such as news and enter-
tainment media, as well as social/networked media;
– media materials, that is, media products on paper or on screen, mainly, but
not exclusively, produced by media professionals and broadcast in the mass
media;
– media discourses, that is, media language, genres, and frames that shape the
way a topic is being talked about; as well as the selection mechanisms that
decide the topics that are, in fact, talked about.
First, media technology, and laptops in particular,⁹ made up an important part of
the physical infrastructure of the classrooms observed. The teachers and stu-
dents all had laptops. A high degree of student digital literacy is an explicit
aim of the official Norwegian curriculum,¹⁰ and many Norwegian municipalities
and counties have equipped their student populations with laptops as part of
fulfilling this goal. In the classrooms observed, the laptops were a vital part of
the ‘classroom-scape’, becoming part of its spatiality and tangible materiality
 We find it relevant to make distinctions between different forms of media. Much of the liter-
ature on digital media and ICT in education conflates different kinds of educational technology
thus creating methodological and conceptual problems (Livingstone 2012, 5).
 The use of cell phones differed from the use of computers. Students brought out their personal
cell phones mostly in the breaks. Indeed, picking up the cell phone and the charger functioned
as one of the main indicators of the break. We observed few cell phones in use during the les-
sons. In these few instances, the act of handling it could be understood as a specific act of re-
sistance, being an obvious act of not paying attention.
 The curriculum defines digital competency as one of the five basic skills all students need
across subjects alongside reading, writing, oral competency, and calculation. These skills are
specified as part of the curriculum of every subject (UDIR 2006).
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in the same way as the desks and chairs. The students’ laptops were situated in
front of them and were thus between the students and the teacher, often with the
screen up. They were frequently in use during the lessons and during breaks, as
part of various classroom practices.
The teachers approached the use of laptops differently, but they all tried to
limit the students’ use of them. The physically present laptops were a frequently
recurring topic in the interaction among teachers and students. The teachers
were constantly requesting that the students turn them off, or put down the
screens during the time set apart for instruction, or reminding them to use the
laptop only for the purposes for which they were intended in the teaching con-
text. In fact, the laptops occur as a primary topic of meta-communication in all
the observed, regular, classroom sessions. However, the teachers’ request was
never completely met by all of the students in any of the sessions. This constant
material presence of the laptops on the students’ desks, and the ways in which
they attract student attention, create a classroom situation that influences the
teachers’ planning of educational activities.
Second, media were also present in the classroom in the shape of online
media platforms, which were engaged with by the students during the lessons.
Some of this activity was teacher-initiated and part of the planned educational
practice. The students consulted Wikipedia, SNL,¹¹ the homepages of various re-
ligious organizations, and the textbook’s online resources, which were available
on the webpages of the publisher. However, from our location at the back of the
classroom, it was evident that the vast majority of laptop use among the students
during teaching hours involved media platforms that were foreign or irrelevant to
the topic of teaching.¹² The students checked their email and visited various so-
cial media platforms, scrolling through their news feeds, or chatting. At times,
their social media presence could be described as massive. Some students visited
the major news portals, whereas others were engaging with sports or fashion
sites, film portals, and gaming hubs. The large majority of students would quick-
ly, although regularly and sometimes with high frequency, check updates, but
otherwise follow the teaching. Occasionally, we observed online interaction be-
tween students in the same classroom. On some particular occasions, larger
groups of students were interacting and simultaneously engaging in the same
online activities, in effect creating an alternative collective ‘reality’ in the class-
room. A small minority of students would spend the entire session streaming a
 Store Norske Leksikon (snl.no), the major online Norwegian encyclopedia.
 To protect the students’ privacy, we chose not to present student online activity in detail.We
provide generic descriptions of platforms, genres, and activities only.
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film, or constantly gaming. Furthermore, it was evident that the students’ laptop
use increased during the course of the session. As the session approached its
end, a large percentage of the students were online. In other words, the simulta-
neous engagement with a broad variety of media portals was a marked and per-
sistent practice among the students. In some classes, and in some parts of the
sessions, these practices were dominant in the group of students.¹³
Third, media materials produced by media professionals and distributed
through the mass media, such as national newspapers and broadcasters, were
frequently brought into the classroom. Teachers used a wide range of media ma-
terials among their pedagogical artefacts during teaching and instruction, and,
on some occasions, media materials constituted the main pedagogical artefact
in a given session.¹⁴ Teachers would, for instance, bring Xeroxed copies of news-
paper articles, and show documentaries and news clips on the screen, particu-
larly from established national broadcasters, such as NRK¹⁵. Their use of
media materials was not limited to news media sources, though. They would
bring in clips from films and music videos, as well as from talk shows. Teachers
also applied materials from non-media professionals, showing clips from You-
Tube and from blogs. Students would bring in a similar spread of media materi-
als, as part of their home assignments or as an integral part of the work taking
place in the classroom context. This was done in both smaller groups and in the
plenary.
Fourth, and finally, media discourses, which are defined above as media lan-
guage, genres, and frames that influence the choice of topics and shape the way
a topic is being talked about were also clearly observable in the classroom set-
 Norwegian upper secondary schools regulate students’ use of computers and their Internet
access in classroom settings differently. The school we attended had a relatively liberal ap-
proach, both in regard to the use of computers and to online presence. However, it should be
noted that the fieldwork was done at a time when the school’s system for blocking Internet ac-
cess malfunctioned.Whereas the teachers would normally be able to control, at least in part, the
students’ Internet access, the teachers had no such tools in this period.
 The term ‘pedagogical artefacts’ is used here to describe tools that are used for educational
purposes to amplify pedagogical activities in the classroom. Such artefacts may serve as the
main content of the instruction in their own right; they may serve as an example of a broader
phenomenon the teacher wishes to highlight; or the artefact may function primarily as a peda-
gogical trigger, used to attract interest and introduce another activity.
 The Norwegian state-owned public service media company Norsk rikskringkasting (Norwe-
gian Broadcasting Corporation).
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tings. Although this was an important part of the media presence in the class-
room, this aspect will not be discussed further in this essay.¹⁶
14.2 Media as a Challenge: Media-Saturation
and Boredom Coping Strategies
Our first main observation is the massiveness of media presence in the class-
rooms. Media were engaged in the form of materially present technological arte-
facts, in students’ parallel presence on social and popular media platforms, as
pedagogical artefacts and sources of information, as references in language
and bodily expressions, as well as in terms of contested social practices and ar-
tefacts that were manifest both in students’ actions and in the teachers’ meta-
communication about computer use. In sum, we were witnessing a truly
‘media-saturated’ classroom.¹⁷
As the above outline shows, students’ media engagement in the classroom is
multifaceted. However, a substantive part of the student media practices that
were observed can fruitfully be described as the expressive component of aca-
demic boredom, or as boredom coping strategies.¹⁸ Engagement with online
media that is irrelevant to the topic of the teaching session serves as a way of
leaving the situation, and it displays a clear correlation with procrastination.
As pointed out in a number of reports,¹⁹ a high percentage of students cross-cul-
turally will, for various reasons and at any given time, experience and express
boredom.²⁰ As such, academic boredom is part and parcel of academic culture.
Academic boredom is not a novelty, for sure.²¹ However, with the introduc-
tion of personal laptops in the classroom, and with no limits to online access,
the menu of available boredom coping strategies becomes rich and varied. A
 See Chapter 15 on the use of media materials in the lessons about Islam for a more detailed
discussion.
 The term media-saturation was used about societies where (mass) media have come to suf-
fuse every part of life (e.g. Ortner 1998). Today, it is widely used to indicate both the way media
are integrated across societal spheres and of the presence of a plethora of media competing for
the attention of the audience (e.g. Sherry 2002).
 See the model developed by Pekrun (2006) and Pekrun et al. (2010). On academic emotions
and boredom studies, see further, Goetz et al. (2014); Mann and Robinson (2009).
 See Dale (1997, 154); Mann and Robinson (2009).
 According to Pekrun et al. (2010) academic boredom consists of five factors: affective, cog-
nitive, expressive, motivational, and physiological.
 It is likely, rather, that as long as there have been schools students have been bored.
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whole world of online activities is constantly at the students’ fingertips, and the
laptop screens are physically located between the students and the teachers. In
this way, the laptops become an extension of the students’ individually tailored,
alternative space. Our observations consistently suggest that the bar for paying
attention to the teachers’ planned educational activities is high, particularly
over time and at the end of teaching sessions. Furthermore, the parallel and si-
multaneous activity pattern seemed habitual in the student group, and had al-
ready developed into an observable classroom practice. In this way, the
media, broadly conceived, play an important role in shaping the conditions of
classroom practices and interactions.
14.3 Entertainment and Controversies Over
Religion: Teachers’ Didactic Choices
Against this general backdrop of media-saturated classroom environments, and
continuing the discussion of the potential media dynamics that are at work in
Norwegian classrooms, a closer look at the didactic choices of the teachers in
RE lessons is warranted. As pointed out in the description, above, media mate-
rials were brought into the classroom by teachers as well as by students. The
teachers’ selection and application of media materials as pedagogical artefacts
are interesting, both because these are the situations where the use of media ma-
terials are both planned for and are explicitly integrated into the educational ac-
tivity, and because this use of media materials may provide key information
about the ways in which teachers deal with the challenges of the media-saturat-
ed classroom.
The RE sessions observed included the use of various types of media mate-
rials as pedagogical artefacts. In the following, we will present two examples
that represent broader trends in the material. On several occasions we observed
that the teachers tended to privilege media materials that were either entertain-
ing or represented controversies about religion, and that these materials, which
were chosen due to their entertaining or attention grabbing qualities, were trans-
formed into instructional content.
På tro og Are
In the brief snapshot from Kari’s classroom,which was presented in the introduc-
tion, we hear that Kari had considered using På tro og Are in her teaching ses-
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sion. Kari is certainly not alone. The Norwegian episodic show På tro og Are was
one of the most popular and steadily recurring media references in the RE class-
room settings that were observed.²² This show,which was produced for NRK, pre-
mièred in 2010 and has been aired several times. The show can be described as a
documentary series about religion, and is also labelled ‘entertainment’ and ‘life
style’ on NRK’s webpage. På tro og Are features a well-known Norwegian come-
dian and radio host, Are Sende Osen,who openly self-identifies as an atheist and
sceptic, but is most often respectful of, and open to, the lives and traditions of
religious others. In the first season, Sende Osen spends a week with a family
from each of the main religious traditions present in Norway.²³ The interviews
with the teachers confirm that this show is frequently used as a resource in
the RE sessions. All of the teachers reported having used the show, and that
they would continue using it. The episodes about Islam and Buddhism were
by far the most used, but also the episode on Judaism was mentioned. På tro
og Are was also referred to by the students in classroom contexts. We will de-
scribe observations from two sessions where the episode about Islam was used.
Erik’s RE session (5 February 2016) was designed to cover Islam,with a focus
on its main characteristics and various denominations. The very moment Erik en-
ters the classroom he says, ‘Prepare to watch an episode of På tro og Are!’ The
students cheer and start imitating Sende Osen, his particular dialect and well-
known gestures. The students had already watched the episode on Islam several
times, they were generally familiar with this show, and, judging by their reac-
tion, it is evident that they had enjoyed it. The showing of the episode was post-
poned by some initial technological challenges, but the students calmed down
as soon as the episode started playing and it generally had their full attention.
The episode about Islam is summarized like this on nrk.no:
Muslims are the new enemy of the Western world. Atheist and sceptic Are Sende Osen will
spend one week with the Muslim family Selahi in Oslo, trying to understand why.What are
their beliefs, and do they want Norway to follow Islamic law? And what happens when Are
attempts to fast during Ramadan?²⁴
This description captures the main features of the episode, features that are
probably also among the reasons for its success. The episode takes widely shared
stereotypes about Muslims as both its starting point and structuring grid, and yet
 The title På tro og Are plays on the Norwegian idiom på tro og ære (on [my] faith and honor),
as well the name of the main character, Are Sende Osen. Two seasons have been produced; a
third is in production (2017).
 i.e. Islam, Buddhism, Mormonism, Christianity, Judaism, and Sikhism.
 Our translation.
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the meeting between Are and the Selahi family is portrayed as an honest, open-
minded and warm-hearted meeting with lay practitioners of Islam. The focus on
everyday life and all its trivialities, to which the average Norwegian viewer can
relate, is intermingled with facts and information, many of which reflect the as-
sumed perceptions of the Norwegian audience about Islam as a potential threat.
The main focus is on Sende Osen, however, who with his characteristic pose,
pitch, and pointed comments, makes the series obviously entertaining.
The first 45 minutes of Erik’s class were spent on showing the episode. After
the first break, Erik moves on to the other main focus of the session, the denomi-
nations of Islam. During this second sitting,²⁵ in a moment of meta-communica-
tion, he tells the class, ‘And then there is something about “key features” – and
that is why we watched På tro og Are.’ The subtext of this mention of ‘key fea-
tures’ is a particular, explicitly defined competence aim of the official Norwegian
curriculum: ‘elaborate on key features in the religion [Islam].’ Teachers in Nor-
wegian schools have (ideally) to cover all of these competence aims, and often
plan their teaching to make sure that they have them covered. In Erik’s meta-re-
flection he tells the students, us, and himself, that this goal has now been met.
In this case, the teaching of the key features of Islam has been covered by the
students watching the episode of På tro og Are about Islam.
After the session, Erik tells us that he had planned for a brief discussion of
the episode, but due to the initial technological challenges he could not find
time for it. In other words, he did not plan for the episode to be the only peda-
gogical artefact and the only means to meet the competence aim, but, as hap-
pens frequently in classrooms, unplanned events occur, and instead of dropping
other parts of the planned session, Erik skipped the discussion, letting På tro og
Are speak for itself. Consequently, the episode on Islam became the main peda-
gogical artefact and the only content of instruction on this particular aim, with-
out introduction or a concluding discussion.
Towards the end of a three sitting RE session (5 November 2015), which was
mainly devoted to Sharia and the ethics of Islam, Anne Lise used the same epi-
sode about Islam. As the students finish their mandatory activities, Anne Lise
says, ‘So, are you ready for På tro og Are?’ The students cheer. Anne Lise
looks at her watch saying, ‘It looks like we won’t have any time left for discus-
sion, so take some notes.’ The class spends the next hour watching the episode.
As the showing comes to an end, only two minutes remains and Anne Lise dis-
misses the class. In this case, På tro og Are is used explicitly for its entertaining
qualities and as a reward at the end of a long session. The episode was not put in
 One sitting is 45 minutes, marked off by a break, usually 15 minutes.
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connection with the previous theme of the lesson and had no apparent pedagog-
ical value, although Anne Lise encouraged the students to take some notes dur-
ing the episode, indicating that she was aware of this.
14.4 Controversy at Christmas
Another tendency observed in the classrooms is that the teachers tend to select
media materials that focus on controversies about religion. A closer look at Char-
lotte’s session on humanist life stances may serve as an example. At the end of
her session (1 March 2016), Charlotte brings up a debate that played out in the
Norwegian media in 2012 about the supposed ‘de-Christianization’ of the tradi-
tional and much loved hymn ‘Fairest Lord Jesus’ (‘Deilig er jorden’).
Charlotte puts the web page ‘Avkristner “Deilig er jorden”’²⁶ up on the
screen. This NRK-produced multimedia web page, dated 17 December 2012, con-
tains news clips (video and audio) originally aired on Dagsrevyen and on Kultur-
nytt, as well as a presentation of the case. According to the news report, the Nor-
wegian Humanist Association (Human-Etisk Forbund) had recently published a
new version of the hymn, and NRK asked the editor in chief of the conservative
Christian newspaper Dagen, Vebjørn Selbekk, who is well known to the Norwe-
gian public, about his reaction to it. As might be expected, Selbekk condemned
the de-Christianized version of the hymn. The driving force of the clip is the al-
leged conflict between atheists and believers, between tradition and ‘rewriting’,
focusing on the hymn.
Charlotte introduces the web page, referring to the longstanding conflict be-
tween the Norwegian Humanist Association and the Church of Norway in the
public sphere. She reads the text out loud, scrolling down and displaying the
text on the projector, interrupted only by an instruction to the students to put
down the computer screens if they are not using the laptop to take notes. She
then shows them the video clip, which instantly catches the attention of all
the students, before she moves on to YouTube to let the students hear a record-
ing of the original version of the hymn. As the music fades out, she engages the
students in discussion until the bell rings five minutes later.
 Tone Staude, “Avkristner “Deilig er jorden”,” NRK, 12 Dec 2012, accessed 27 Sept 2017,
https://www.nrk.no/kultur/avkristner-_deilig-er-jorden_-1.10843699
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14.5 ‘The Fight Against Everyday Boredom’:
Media as Part of the Solution
The descriptions above illustrate two broader tendencies in the teachers’ use of
media materials in the classrooms observed: the teachers tend to privilege: a) en-
tertaining materials, and b) materials representing controversies about religion.
Complemented by the glimpse into Kari’s lesson in the introduction, we can see
that entertaining and conflict-focused media materials are used by the teachers
to cater for some of the same needs in the classroom. Although Kari did not fulfil
the wishes of the student who was hoping to watch a film, she offered him some-
thing in return: a class discussion of the ongoing debate about gay rights among
Christian groups, aided by selected articles from the two major Norwegian Chris-
tian newspapers, Vårt Land and Dagen, as well as a blog post. In other words,
instead of a film, she offered him a media-based discussion of a conflict that
runs deep among Norwegian Christians. Although they represent different
media genres, these newspaper articles and blogposts are applied in a similar
way to films: they are both effective means of catching and keeping the attention
of the students.
From this example we can see that the teachers plan for students’ boredom.
They are very well aware of the challenge of academic boredom in the class-
room, and their didactic deliberations and choices of pedagogical artefacts are
affected by this challenge. They plan for a variety of activities in the classroom,²⁷
they plan for different activities at different points in the sessions, and they bring
in pedagogical artefacts that they find fit to aid the teaching at the various stages
of students’ classroom activities. In other words, in the above description of the
classrooms observed, we point out how media-saturation represents a challenge
to teachers in the fight against student boredom and its manifest expressions in
the classroom. The massive media presence makes the already well-known chal-
lenge of boredom all the more acute, with a multitude of alternatives available to
the students through their laptops. In this way, the conditions for teaching in the
media-saturated classroom resemble the conditions of the larger media-saturat-
ed society (Sherry 2002), for which media materials are produced in the first
place. These are also the conditions for which certain media materials, particu-
larly entertaining and conflict-oriented ones, are especially well suited. As the
media-saturation represents a challenge, these media materials also become
 In accordance with the demands of the official curriculum and the standards of good teach-
ing practice.
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part of the solution. Our observations confirm that film clips, documentaries,
and series such as På tro og Are, are among the few pedagogical artefacts that
successfully gain the students’ attention and are able to keep it over time.
This does not mean that just any entertaining or conflict-centred media ma-
terials can be used as pedagogical artefacts. Media materials are used as part of
a didactic plan and are re-mediated into the classroom according to the aims and
topics of the lessons, complemented by, for instance, textbooks, lectures, discus-
sions, and other pedagogical tools that are available for the teachers. Mostly, the
media materials are thus resources that are used critically by professional teach-
ers as part of a larger didactical plan. Still, what we have observed is that the way
media materials are included in the pedagogical practice influence and, in some
ways, shape, the way that religion is being represented.
The transformation of media materials produced by media professionals, ac-
cording to various institutional and genre-specific criteria, into pedagogical arte-
facts carries some wider implications. In our observations, we saw that the enter-
taining properties of media materials often gained priority over the academic
content. Ideally, it should be possible to find media materials that satisfy both
these criteria, but when weighed against each other, the attention grabbing prop-
erties are frequently given the most weight. The teachers are aware of this dilem-
ma, and the use of the show På tro og Are illustrates this. During the interviews,
and in several conversations with the teachers,we discussed the use of this show
as part of the lessons. All of the teachers used episodes from På tro og Are from
time to time, and the main reason given was that it was funny, entertaining, and
drew the students’ attention. However, they all had some misgivings about the
academic value of the show. When they still chose to use it, their solution was
to spend time afterwards to discuss and nuance the show. As the earlier exam-
ples show, this part often has to give way to unforseen occurences in the course
of a hectic school day. However, even when there was room for discussion, it was
the show that set the premises for what was being talked about. Media materials,
chosen primarily for their suitability to catch and keep the students’ attention,
not only became part of the lessons, but were, in many instances, the main peda-
gogical artefacts of the lesson.²⁸ This leads us to the question of how this can
influence the way religion is being represented in the classroom.
 We have several observations of media materials being used as the primary pedagogical ar-
tefact, setting the premises for classroom discussions. Examples include documentaries, feature
films, and music videos.
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14.6 The Representation of Religion
The wide range of media materials that are used in the lessons observed makes it
difficult to isolate all the specific and different media dynamics that influence
the ways in which the teachers and the students engage with religion. Still, we
can point to some similarities across the observations which seem to be the re-
sult of the particular didactic choices made by the teachers when choosing
media materials that deal with religion, and which then have consequences
for the way religion is being represented.
The first consequence of these didactic choices is that contested issues per-
taining to the religions in question tend to be brought up in teaching, and such
contested issues may get a disproportionate share of the attention in the class-
room. Not only are controversial issues actively sought by the teachers for
their attention grabbing properties, but conflict, polarization and controversy
are also key initial features of media-produced materials. Conflict has long
been identified as one of the primary criteria for news media coverage (e.g.
Ihlen and Allern 2008), but also as a narrative device in other media produc-
tions. A focus on conflict and controversies is also well documented in relation
to the Norwegian media coverage of religion (Døving and Kraft 2013; Lundby and
Gresaker 2015). The controversies may thus come to be perceived as key traits of
the religious tradition and its practitioners. Conservative Norwegian Christians
are, for instance, represented in the classroom by their views on gay rights
and their reactions against the rewriting of a traditional Christmas hymn.
Other sides to their religiosity, their other opinions, or their generally peaceful
everyday coexistence with people of other convictions in Norwegian society,
will seldom get the same attention.
A second consequence is that exotic and unexpected traits of religious prac-
tices, and features of religious traditions that either appeal to the emotions, or
are conceived as being irrational to the Norwegian mind, may be increasingly ac-
centuated. These traits of religious practices are commonly seen in media pro-
ductions about religion. The consequence may be that media stereotypes of reli-
gions, which are designed to entertain a Norwegian audience, are brought into
the classroom context and recirculated as teachable facts. This also agrees
with studies of media coverage of religion that point to the way stereotypes,
and exotic and controversial themes, are being repeated and reproduced in var-
ious media (Poole 2002). As in the case of the episode of På tro og Are about
Islam, that is discussed above, it is often aspects of the religious diet and
dress that typically gain attention, as do prohibitions and regulations that
seem foreign or out of place to the larger society. Even the overarching frame
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of the show, where Are, as a professed atheist, sets out to explore religion as
something that he finds strange and even threatening, accentuates this.
14.7 Mediatization
In this essay we have focused on two interrelated ways in which media are pres-
ent in, and condition, the teaching and learning about religion in the class-
rooms. In the first part of the essay we showed how the classrooms observed
were characterized by a profound and multivalent media-saturation. In the sec-
ond part we discussed the teachers’ choice of media materials as pedagogical ar-
tefacts, displaying a privileging of media materials that either entertain or focus
on controversies about religion. The dynamics of academic boredom coping
strategies that are described, on the one hand, and teachers’ didactic choices
in the fight against (perceived) student boredom on the other, have suggested
that media-saturation in the classroom is an important reason why teachers priv-
ilege media materials that are entertaining or that focus on controversies about
religion.
The theoretical perspective of mediatization is useful as a heuristic device
through which to explore the role of the various media in the RE sessions that
were observed. If we loosely define mediatization as the way in which institu-
tions and societal spheres come to depend on institutional practices of the
media (Hjarvard 2013), then this is relevant to understanding the lessons ob-
served. The integration of a multitude of media in the day-to-day practice of
the school impacts on the learning and teaching about religion,²⁹ offering chal-
lenges, but also solutions, through the use of media materials,which may in turn
come to influence the representation of religion in the classroom. At the same
time, this should not be understood as the introduction of radically new or dif-
ferent practices – boredom coping strategies existed long before the classroom
became media-saturated. Rather, the media presence serves to mould practices
that are already well established in schools, but also to intensify and broaden
them, and so further conditioning and transforming the teaching practices.
The introduction of near endless opportunities for entertainment, through lap-
tops with Internet access, makes the classroom a setting in which the teachers
need to fight for the students’ attention in qualitative new ways.
 Presumably this is not confined only to religion. However, our material is limited to RE ses-
sions.
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More research is needed into the specific ways in which media materials can
shape the representation of religion.We have briefly described how media mate-
rials that are chosen for their entertaining qualities can eventually reproduce
stereotypical and exotic representations of religion; however, this is a field
that warrants further study.
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Chapter 15
Inescapable News Coverage: Media
Influence on Lessons About Islam
Abstract: For a long time, stories about terrorism, conflicts, and controversies,
which are in various ways put in connection with Islam and Muslims, have
been a prominent part of Norwegian news coverage. Based on a case study of
a Norwegian secondary school, the current chapter deals with the ways in
which the news coverage, and themes, events, and discourses contained in it,
come to be included in religious education about Islam. Using the concepts of
prototypes and cognitive frames, it is argued that the news coverage establishes
and maintains certain associations and narratives connected to Islam. Due to the
frequent and substantial use of media materials in RE classrooms, influencing
the ways Islam is represented and talked about in the classroom, the same prob-
lematic issues are thematized over and over again in similar ways across the ob-
served classes. By constantly addressing the news coverage with the intention of
nuancing and correcting problematic representations of Islam, the result may in
some instances be to reinforce and confirm the association of Islam with terror-
ism, conflict, and controversy established by the media.
Keywords: religious education, Islam, frames, news coverage, terrorism
15.1 Introduction
Anne Lise¹ is an experienced religious education teacher. Still, she is uncertain about how
to teach about Islam. The question is how, and if, she should relate her lessons about Islam
to terrorism and conflict. It is not really a part of the curriculum, and yet it seems relevant,
especially with the constant coverage in the news media. ‘Conflict and Islam, that’s the el-
ephant in the room,’ she tells me. ‘That’s what all the students think about when they hear
the word “Islam”, but they are reluctant to say it.’ This year, as she has done in previous
years, she thus introduces the topic of Islam by going through several news pieces about
terrorism and radical Islamism. In this way, she hopes to break the ice so that they can dis-
cuss it and can confront any prejudices about Islam and Muslims that the students may
have from their exposure to the news media.
 All names of informants are changed.
OpenAccess. © 2018, Audun Toft. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
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After the class had their last lesson about Islam, she showed me an evaluation note from
one of the Muslim students. The note said: ‘I think there has been too much focus on rad-
icalization and extreme Islam. Islam is so big and contains so many exciting things.Where
is all this?’ ‘This was what I was trying to avoid,’ Anne Lise said. ‘I tried to show them that
Islam is not just about the things they learn from the media, but yet, that’s the impression
they’re left with.’
The scene above illustrates one of the dilemmas that religious education (RE)
teachers in upper secondary school face when teaching about Islam. Should
they focus mainly on the curricular goals of the subject, or should they spend
time on the many controversial issues that feature in the news media where con-
flict and terror are recurring themes? This chapter explores some of the ways the
perceived massive and conflict-oriented news coverage of Islam both influences,
and becomes part of, the pedagogic practices of RE lessons.
The material is approached using a mediatization perspective. Mediatization
theory (Hjarvard 2013) gives a framework through which to understand media in-
fluence without positing a direct and determinant effect of the media on audien-
ces’ behaviour and opinions (see Chapter 3). Rather, the influence of the media
comes from the ways in which various media become integrated into the practi-
ces of other societal institutions, thus altering and conditioning the said practi-
ces (Thorbjørnsrud, Figenschou, and Ihlen 2014). Chapters 13 and 14 discuss how
media technology, platforms, and materials² form an integral part of the RE les-
sons observed, and how this impacts on the engagement with, and representa-
tion of, religion in the classroom.
This chapter will focus on the lessons about one specific religion, Islam. RE
lessons about Islam offer an interesting case for exploring media influence. In
most instances such an influence may be subtle and difficult to observe and iso-
late. However, in relation to Islam, the influence of the media on the pedagogical
practice is explicit. All the teachers³ in the case study on which this chapter re-
ports are aware of, and admit to, being strongly influenced by the media when
teaching about Islam. The observations show that media discourses, as well as
events, debates, and topics that are covered in various news media, play a prom-
inent role in lessons about Islam. All the teachers chose to address controversial
issues like terrorism and extreme Islamism in their lessons, making the lessons
about Islam very different from their lessons on other religions. Several lessons,
in most of the classes I observed (see Chapter 13), were spent talking about how
 See Chapter 14 for a description of the multifaceted aspects of media-presence in the class-
room.
 And many students too.
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Islam appears in the news,with the explicit aim of nuancing and correcting what
was perceived to be a negative and one-sided representation.
This chapter addresses the following research questions:
1. How do the teachers relate to the news coverage of Islam, and how does it
influence the pedagogical choices that they make when planning and exe-
cuting lessons about Islam?
2. In what ways can the news coverage of Islam be said to condition and influ-
ence the ways in which Islam is being represented, discussed, and talked
about in the classroom?
This approach presupposes two levels of possible influence:
a) Indirect level: where the teachers take their perception of media influence
into account when planning the lessons, and
b) Direct level: through the ways teachers and students engage with questions
about Islam in the classroom.
Using the concepts of prototypes and cognitive frames, I will argue that a too lin-
ear and straight-forward understanding, among the teachers, of the effects of the
news coverage on the students may in some instances lead to the reinforcement
and confirmation of the very notion that is seen to be problematic – namely, the
association of Islam with terrorism, conflicts, and controversies.
The empirical data for this chapter were gathered as part of a case study of
an upper secondary school in the Eastern part of Norway. The study included the
direct observation of a total of 50 RE sessions in eight classes, interviews with six
RE teachers, as well as observations from, and notes taken during, informal con-
versations and meetings with the teachers. The fieldwork was conducted during
the school year 2015–2016, with the majority of observations being conducted
between October 2015 and March 2016. The observations were recorded as hand-
written field notes. No audio/video recordings were made.⁴ As detailed in Chap-
ter 13, RE in Norway is organized as a mandatory non-confessional subject that is
aimed at all students, regardless of their religious/non-religious background. The
subject is called ‘Religion and Ethics’ in upper secondary schools, and is descri-
bed as being both knowledge-based and value-forming. It has the explicit aim of
promoting tolerance across religious, philosophical and ethical boundaries
(UDIR 2006).
 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the data material and methodological con-
siderations.
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15.2 The Conditions for Teaching About Islam
As mentioned above, the lessons about Islam that were observed differed strong-
ly from the lessons about the other religions and worldviews. When teaching
about Islam, controversies, conflicts, and potentially problematic sides of the re-
ligion were given significantly more attention than is specified by the learning
outcomes of the curriculum.⁵ The notion that Islam is a controversial religion
was explicitly communicated to the students, as in this example of Kari introduc-
ing Islam:⁶
We will start with some brainstorming about what you associate with Islam. Because Islam
is a controversial religion. It is a religion that is talked and written about a lot. I hope you
dare to say what you are thinking. (Kari’s lesson 5 November 2015)
In all the classes observed, terrorism and extremism were the main topic of sev-
eral of the lessons. Much time was also devoted to controversial issues, like the
veiling of women, the death penalty for homosexuality, infidelity or apostasy, re-
ligion as a problem for integration, the radicalization of youth, forced marriage,
and the oppression of women, to name just a few. These topics were regularly
thematized as part of the planned lessons, and were most often legitimized⁷
by referring to the news media as a way of showing their relevance. However,
as often as not, the same themes surfaced during the course of lessons devoted
to other topics, even when this was not planned. I will return to this latter point,
but first we will examine how the teachers relate to the news coverage of Islam,
and why the teachers find it necessary to include problematic issues that are cov-
ered in the news media when planning and executing their lessons.
As the introductory description of Anne Lise’s dilemma illustrates, the teach-
ers are aware of, and constantly evaluate, the role given to conflict and contro-
versy in lessons about Islam. They are all in agreement on one thing: the prem-
ises for teaching about Islam are very different from those of other religions and
worldviews. The difference is ascribed to the role of the news media, and the
ways in which stories about Islam are being covered and presented. Charlotte
says:
 The curricular learning outcomes for Islam are identical to those for Buddhism. The differen-
ces in how the two religions are approached are thus interesting.
 In seven of the eight observed classes, Islam was introduced with explicit references to con-
troversial issues from the news.
 In most classes, the teachers found it necessary to provide an explanation of why various con-
troversies were thematized.
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The media determine the focus, totally, at least when it comes to Islam. Less so when it
comes to Christianity, in my experience … but in Islam the media influence the lessons
one hundred percent. … And when it comes to Islam, the students let themselves be mould-
ed by the media to an unbelievable degree.
Although the other teachers are somewhat less categorical, they all agree that
when teaching about Islam, news coverage is a factor that they have to take
into consideration. The basic claim underlying the teachers’ perceived need to
treat Islam differently from the other topics is that the news media are the
most influential sources for the students’ knowledge about, and views on,
Islam and Muslims. These conditions are not there in relation to other religions
or topics in the subject, at least not to any comparable degree. This thus creates a
unique situation in which the teachers experience all the students having at least
some knowledge of Islam as it is represented through the news media. As Anne
Lise put it: ‘I know that when students think about Islam, they think about what
appears in the media.’ According to the teachers, the students are influenced by
the amount of coverage, providing a steady influx of focus on Islam, but also the
content of the coverage plays a role, being mainly centred on conflict and contro-
versies. The knowledge the students have of Islam and Muslims is thus seen as
problematic, and this needs to be addressed in the lessons.
15.3 Constant Coverage
The teachers claim that all the students are familiar with the media representa-
tions of Islam due to the sheer quantity of stories that are related to Islam in the
news media.
Interviewer: Do they refer to news media?
Hanne: Yes, sometimes they do.When you talk about Islam, it is impossible to avoid all the
news pieces about IS,⁸ or The Ummah of the Prophet,⁹ or Mullah Krekar.¹⁰ It is inescapable.
(Interview with Hanne, my emphasis.)
 Islamic State (IS) is the name that is most used in the Norwegian news media, but ISIS and
ISIL are also used.
 Norwegian radical Islamist group (Bangstad 2014, 65–69)
 Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad aka Mullah Krekar is a well-known radical Islamist in Norway
(Bangstad 2014, 63–65).
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Several studies show that coverage of news stories relating to Islam has greatly
increased in the last two decades (Niemelä and Christensen 2013, 14; Lundby and
Gresaker 2015, 80). Even though religion, it must be said, is a marginal topic in
the news (Lundby and Gresaker 2015), cases related to Islam seem to be over-rep-
resented in the Norwegian news media, if compared to the size of the Muslim
population.¹¹ This coverage seems to be constantly high (relative to other news
pieces on religion), even in years that have no major events connected to
Islam (IMDI 2010).
The teachers perceive, and describe, the coverage of Islam as being constant
and intense. The news coverage of Islam is something encountered on a daily
basis, as part of normal everyday life. This is frequently communicated in both
the interviews and the lessons observed, for example,when Guro asks her students
about what image from the media they meet on an everyday basis, or the students
in a lesson talk about the effects of hearing about Islam ‘all the time’. News cover-
age related to Islam is thus seen as being part of the everyday background, some-
thing that the students encounter, and are exposed to, regularly.
This steady coverage is punctuated by short periods when there is massive
coverage of terror attacks tied to radical Islamism.¹² When these events occur,
the teachers tell me, the students are both interested and active in acquiring in-
formation. In these periods they follow the news more closely. The episodes
mentioned explicitly in the interviews are the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in
January 2015 and the Bataclan attacks in Paris in November 2015.¹³ I asked
Kari if she thought the students were interested in the news.
Normally it varies. Now¹⁴ they’re really interested, but I have often thought that they are not
really that interested. But it’s obvious now. And in January, with those murders in Paris.
They were interested then.
 Statistics on religion are complex. Of a population of 5 million people, the Muslim popula-
tion is somewhere between roughly 100,000 (based on membership in Muslim faith organiza-
tions) and 200,000 (based purely on the majority religion in their countries of origin; Sultan
2012).
 I use the term radical Islamism/Islamist throughout this chapter, as these are the most com-
mon terms used, both in the classroom and in the Norwegian news media, to describe violent
and extremist forms of Islamism. This use is not meant to suggest that radical Islamism neces-
sarily entails endorsing violence.
 This event happened during the fieldwork; two of the interviews were conducted after the
attack.
 Immediately after the November Paris attacks.
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This interplay between a constant background of news stories about Islam, and
the massive and recurring coverage of violent events thus ensures, again accord-
ing to the teachers, that news media representations of Islam are well known
among the students, to the point that this is all they know and think about
when it comes to Islam.
15.4 Conflict-Centred Coverage
The coverage of Islam in the press has been quite well researched. So it is pos-
sible to get a clear picture both of the coverage now and also of the ways in
which coverage has developed over time (e.g. Said 1981; Poole 2002; Døving
and Kraft 2013). In many ways, the Norwegian coverage of Islam is becoming
more nuanced. More voices are being heard and journalists are steadily improv-
ing their knowledge and understanding of the complexities of a world religion
like Islam (Døving and Kraft 2013). The most basic underlying premise for cover-
age, however, still seems to be conflict in one form or another. Conflict is the
main criterion when it comes to the choice of what stories should be covered
(Lundby and Gresaker 2015), the framing of the stories (Bangstad 2011; Ander-
sson et al. 2012), and even as an editorial criterion for what voices are being
let into the debates through op-eds and the like (Lunde 2013).
In her seminal work on newspaper coverage of British Muslims in the late
1990s, Poole uses the notion of ‘news framework’ to analyse how portrayals of
British Muslims are limited to a few recurring topics, which are then seen as
being related (2002, 55). By looking at the main and secondary topics in the ar-
ticles, as well as which topics were referred to in the articles, she identified a
‘clustering of topics that connote several dominant symbolized meanings’ (83).
These are mostly negative and connected to the question of whether Muslim im-
migrants are a threat to various aspects of the British society (2002, 83–84).
Døving and Kraft show how this is also the case for Norwegian news coverage
of Islam. A set of different topics are repeatedly presented together and are
made part of the same framework in a way that makes them seem relevant to
each other¹⁵ (2013, 147– 148). Even though the coverage of Islam seems to have
become more nuanced, old patterns and representations are being repeated
and reproduced. One of these is of the Muslim fundamentalist who perpetrates
 The example used is how a discussion about whether a hijab may be worn as part of a police
uniform may include themes like homosexuality, terrorism, and the power of Imams,without the
relevance of these themes being questioned (Døving and Kraft 2013, 148).
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acts of terrorism because of his faith (Poole 2002). The linkage of Islam to ex-
tremism, radicalization, and terror has been established in news coverage of
Islam for a long time (Altheide 2007; Lundby and Thorbjørnsrud 2012, 99),
and also well before 9/11 in 2001 (Lueg 1995). Representing faith as the main mo-
tivation for terror links international terrorism to potential terror in European
countries due to immigration (Poole 2002, 70–71).
In 2015, the period in which most of the observations were conducted, the
Norwegian news media paid a lot of attention to the conflict in Syria, both in it-
self and as the background for other stories. The refugee crisis resulting from the
war didn’t just affect the adjacent countries, but also led to a large increase in the
number of refugees arriving in Europe. The hazardous routes taken by the refu-
gees, the response by European countries, and questions about integration and
multiculturalism, made headlines throughout the year. The Islamist organiza-
tion, IS, was also covered extensively. The establishment of a self-proclaimed Is-
lamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq attracted attention, especially as IS attracted
foreign warriors from around the world. Their harsh laws, brutal treatment of
prisoners and civilians, as well as their skills in advertising themselves through
various forms of digital media, made them the symbol of extremist Islamism
worldwide. The link between IS, the recruitment of European foreign warriors
to Syria, and the threat of terror from refugees, or at least from people masquer-
ading as refugees, was also a recurring theme in the Norwegian news coverage.¹⁶
The Norwegian Islamist group The Ummah of the Prophet, gained much atten-
tion in this regard for supporting terrorist attacks, warning against attacks on
Norwegian soil, and its involvement in the recruitment of foreign warriors to
Syria (Bangstad 2014, 66).
The major concern, shared by all the teachers, is that the students have prej-
udices and negative sentiments towards Muslims. The teachers go far in assum-
ing that the constant and conflict-centred media coverage shapes the way the
students think about Islam and Muslims.
Guro: I think it’s important to challenge prejudices and established images, and do some-
thing about them.
Interviewer: Do you experience there being prejudices there [with the students]?
Guro: A lot! A lot, a lot, a lot.
 With the most explicit example perhaps being the Islam critical organization, Human Rights
Service, which published an article saying that if Norway accepts 10,000 refugees, as many as
8,000 of them may be IS sympathizers (https://www.rights.no/2015/06/minst-8 - 000-is-sym
patisorer-hentes-til-norge/; Accessed 6 April 2017).
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As shown in Chapter 13, creating tolerance and understanding across religious
boundaries is one of the main formulated goals for the subject ‘Religion and Eth-
ics’. The teachers therefore emphasize that the prevention and countering of prej-
udices is an important part of the pedagogical mandate of RE in the first place.
These teachers use words like ‘unavoidable’, ‘unnatural to omit’, and ‘necessary’
to describe why they need to address the issues covered in the news media. The
underlying premise is that the association of Islam with terrorism, conflict, and
controversy is already firmly established among the students, and this needs to
be addressed, corrected, and nuanced, or the result will be that prejudices and a
negative view of Islam and Muslims prevail.
15.5 Islam in the Classroom: Prototypes and
Cognitive Frames
Anne Lise: OK, we’ll start on Islam. What do you think about when I say Islam?
Boy: Allah!
Anne Lise: Can you all come to the blackboard and write what you think about when I say
Islam?
Some students stand up, most stay at their desks by their laptops.
There is a lot of unrest. As some write, others make jokes. A boy shouts, ‘Allahu Akbar!’ This
evokes laughter from most of the class. Two boys talk quietly about the Islamic state and ter-
rorism. I overhear another conversation between three students, about terrorism.
After a minute or so the students have written a list of words on the blackboard: Allah, mos-
que, IS, Shia and Sunni, kaba, Id, Eid Mubarak, hijab, The five pillars, and Ramadan.
A group of students discuss with the boy that wrote ‘IS’.
Boy: Are you sick?
Boy: It is the first thing I think about when I hear Islam.
Boy: And you call us racist when we joke about it?
Anne Lise brings the class to order again.
Anne Lise: These are the things you think about? How about the things portrayed in the
media?
Boy: It’s propaganda.
Boy: Media portrays Islam as … crazy people.
One boy says quietly to another: ‘Are you allowed to say that?’ He replies: ‘Well, it’s true.’
Anne Lise: How does this affect you?
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Boy: Well it affects the way we see them, as dangerous people.
Girl: They focus on the terrorist part of Islam, the terrorist groups, and that’s all we get to
see. So it all becomes very negative.
Anne Lise: Are you able to separate facts about Islam from the image created by the media?
There are a lot of prejudices created about the religion of Islam, aren’t there? We will watch
a clip from YouTube.
Boy: [Interrupts] After the 22nd of July, several people though …
Boy: Several Muslim people were beaten up.
Boy: So the first impression was that it was terror from Muslims.
(Anne Lise’s lesson, 22 September 2015)
This episode, among several similar observations, shows support for the teach-
ers’ claims that terrorism is what the students think about when they hear the
word Islam. The change in the class was sudden. At the start of the lesson
they talked about dates for tests and holidays. However, immediately after
Anne Lise introduced Islam, the mentions of terrorism surfaced. These were
mainly jokey and within small groups, and were not addressed to the class as
a whole, but they were loud enough for everybody to notice.
Two more things are worth noting. The first is that although terrorism was a
theme among the students, this was in no way the only thing they thought about
when they heard the word Islam. Several relevant terms were written on the
blackboard, and the one item tied to terrorism (IS) was challenged internally
by the students. The second point is that, at least in the full class discussion,
most of the students show that they have a strong awareness of how the news
media cover Islam. In fact, a lot of the students subscribe to the same view as
the teachers. They hold that the media create prejudices and that the information
you get from the media is one-sided at best. Most of the time, the students, with
some exceptions, argued against the notion that terror and conflict were impor-
tant aspects of Islam. The lack of negative claims and sentiments about Islam
and Muslims was striking across all the classes,¹⁷ and a large variety of discours-
es and opinions were heard.
These observations suggest that the influence of the news media is complex.
There is little support for describing the influence as a one-way effect that deter-
 Of course, this does not mean that they necessarily don’t hold those views. They may be
afraid to voice them, as the students are getting grades in the subject, and/or they may not
want to appear to be prejudiced. They may be too ‘politically correct’ to voice their views, as
Erik put it in one interview. Still, most students express opinions that challenge any such neg-
ative sentiments.
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mines the students’ views on Islam and Muslims. As early as 1972, McCombs and
Shaw problematized the power of the mass media to shape the way people think,
arguing instead that the media’s ability to mentally order and organize our world
for us is perhaps the most important media influence. They quoted Bernard Co-
hen’s assertion that the press ‘may not be successful … in telling people what to
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’,
(Cohen 1963, quoted in McCombs and Shaw 1972, 177).
I propose to understand the observations through the two related concepts
of prototypes and cognitive frames. I claim that the most important influence
of the media coverage of Islam consists of:
a) Establishing and constantly reinforcing the association of the terms ‘Muslim’
and ‘Islam’ with extremism and terrorism, and
b) Establishing and maintaining cognitive frames which give us access to set
ways of interpreting reality, but with room for conflicting views and dis-
courses.
Using these two concepts provides us with a way to understand the classroom
interaction, without having to make too far-reaching assumptions about what
the students actually think, while still being able to account for the strong asso-
ciation that has been observed between Islam and terrorism, conflict, and con-
troversies.
15.5.1 Prototypes
There is a tendency, rooted in our usual forms of expression, to think that the man who has
learnt to understand a general term, say, the term ‘leaf’, has thereby come to possess a kind
of general picture of a leaf, as opposed to pictures of particular leaves. (Wittgenstein undat-
ed, 30)
In his attempt to clarify what he saw as philosophical confusions, Wittgenstein
made the observation that we don’t think in concepts that encompass all the es-
sential properties of the term. This doesn’t mean that we’re not able to formulate
common properties, but that the way we think about them is not in the form of
general images. Rather, we tend to think by way of prototypes, where particular
images come to mind when we think of a term, even though we know that the
term often includes a lot of different varieties. Gullestad shows how prototypes
played an important part in the Norwegian debates about immigration in the late
1990s. The example she used was how the prototypes for immigrants in Oslo at
that time was ‘Muslim’ and ‘Pakistani’, even though this was not included in any
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lexical definition of the word immigrant. Gullestad claims this enabled debaters
to talk about immigrants in general, while it was obvious to anyone listening that
they meant only a small and particular group of immigrants (2002, 89–90).
Several Muslim students said they felt that the image of the extremist/Mus-
lim was present among all the other students. Furthermore, they seldom had al-
ternative images of what the Muslim students called ‘ordinary Muslims’. This
didn’t mean that their classmates equated ‘Muslims’ with ‘extremists’, but that
the extremist/Muslim image was established as the first thing that sprang to
mind.¹⁸ This concurs with the teachers’ descriptions, that when students hear
the word Islam, they think about what’s in the media (i.e. terror and conflict).
The strength of using the concept of prototypes in relation to this material is
that it allows us to distinguish between a prototype and an opinion. Perhaps ter-
rorism is the first thing most of the students think of when they hear the word
‘Islam’,¹⁹ but this does not necessarily correlate with their opinions about Mus-
lims. However, the prototype of the extremist/terrorist also seems to be connect-
ed to a wider range of concepts that are related to the threat of radical Islamism,
both globally and locally.²⁰ To account for this, I turn to the concepts of framing
and cognitive frames.
15.5.2 Framing and Cognitive Frames
In media and communication studies, the concept of framing was developed as a
tool for understanding media influence. According to Entman, frame analysis is
helpful in examining the influence exerted by the ‘transfer (or communication)
of information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or
novel – to that [human] consciousness’ (1993, 51–52). Framing is to ‘select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, moral evalua-
tion, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ (ibid., 52). The
theory of framing relies on the ways in which we make sense of the world
 This is discussed in a Norwegian article about the Muslim students’ views on RE about Islam
(Toft, 2017).
 It even seems plausible that the teachers do the same.
 For example, how the mention of IS was often followed by reference to terror in Europe, to
fundamentalist interpretations of the Koran, to the oppression of women, or to immigration or
refugees. Just as often, it was the other way around: a discussion of immigrants, gender roles, or
the Koran might suddenly include mention of IS or the Taliban.
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through cognitive frames, an insight that has been developed across a range of
disciplines and fields. Fillmore, a linguist, gives this example:
Here is an example of a cognitive frame. There is in English, and presumably in every lan-
guage spoken by people with a money economy, a semantic domain connected with what
we might call the commercial event. The frame for such an event has the form of a scenario
containing roles that we can identify as the buyer, the seller, the goods, and the money. …
Any one of the many words in our language that relate to this frame is capable of activating
the whole frame. Thus, the whole commercial event scenario is available or ‘activated’ in
the mind of anybody who comes across or understands any of the words ‘buy’, ‘sell’,
‘pay’, ‘cost’, ‘spend’, ‘charge’, etc., even though each of these highlights or foregrounds
only one small section of the frame. (Fillmore 1976, 25)
Frames can be said to be cognitive toolkits, or symbolic–interpretative con-
structs, the main idea being that humans order experiences by relating them
to already known patterns (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998). As Fillmore puts
it, framing is ‘the appeal, in perceiving, thinking, and communicating, to struc-
tured ways of interpreting experiences’ (1976, 20). We do not go around with
every bit of information we possess in the foreground of our consciousness,
but we make use of associations, schemata, and frames to understand and inter-
pret what’s going on around us (Goffmann 1973).
According to Entman, this is also the case in conversations, and even in
thinking (1993). Frames are activated by coming across words that form part of
the frame, and a frame often has a set of central concepts that will activate
the frame for the listener. Frames can be individual, and different people can
use a wide variety of frames (Scheufele 1999), but there are often a stock of com-
monly invoked frames in social groupings, the culture, an empirically demonstra-
ble set of common frames that are exhibited in the discourse and thinking of
most of the people in a social grouping (Entman 1993, 53).
Using the concept of cognitive frames provides us with a way to understand
how different themes and words are being grouped together in ways that make
them relevant to each other. Perhaps more importantly, the activation and appli-
cation of a frame does not necessarily determine the discourses or opinions of
the people using them.
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15.5.3 The ‘Radical Islamist’ Frame
I propose that the ‘radical Islamist’ (RI) frame²¹ is such a commonly invoked
frame, established by the news media as the dominant source of information
about events around the world, but, more importantly, maintained and rein-
forced by a constant reactivation of the frame on a (more or less) daily basis.
The frame revolves around the radical Islamist, a person or group, who wants
to establish a state under Islamic rule that is guided by the Sharia and is mod-
elled on the Caliphate of the first generations after Muhammad. The radical Is-
lamist is prepared to use violence, and sees terrorism as part of the Jihad, the
holy war against the unbelievers (most often the West), and is willing to die
as a martyr. The radical Islamist is a threat to Europe (and Norway), as we al-
ready have a Muslim population among which some, or many, may be radical
Islamists, or may potentially be recruited by charismatic mosque leaders or ex-
tremist groups, either globally or locally, and as refugees from Muslim areas,
some may sympathize with the Islamists, and some may be sent here under
cover. I do not argue that other frames are not in play, but the RI frame provides
a comprehensive way of interpreting and making sense of the ways in which dif-
ferent topics and terms were clustered and brought up in the classroom.
15.6 The Prototype and the Radical Islamist
Frame in Play
As seen in the above select examples, and as several other observations confirm,
the mention of Islam seems to raise the prototype of the terrorist immediately in
the classroom, resulting in different discussions within the radical Islamist (RI)
frame. For example, the cry of ‘Allahu Akbar’ was jokingly uttered by a student,
who was imitating the stereotypical terrorist, just as talk of suicide bombs and
the hijacking of planes occurred often, and discussion, and mentions of IS
took place in most of the classes observed. Even more striking was the way
that class discussions about very different topics soon begin to follow the
same patterns and to include similar references and themes. I will give one ex-
ample in which the teacher activates the RI frame, whereupon this impacts
upon the lesson’s content.
 Constructed here as a heuristic device to account for patterns observed in the data.
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Kari starts a brainstorming session to find out what the class associates with Islam. The class
responds with ‘the Koran’, ‘Allah’, ‘the five pillars’, ‘Shia and Sunni’, ‘mosque’, and ‘Muham-
mad’. As they suggest words, Kari writes them on the blackboard. They move quickly through
the words until a boy says ‘sharia’.
Kari: Yes, what is sharia?
Boy: Isn’t that rules?
Kari wipes away some of the words, rearranging the space around ‘sharia’.
Kari:I need more space if we are to write more about sharia.
Boy: I thought it was a court of law.
Kari: I think you wanted to say more?
Boy: Haram.
Girl: And halal.
Kari: But sharia? What is that? Someone asked about it, but it sort of stopped there.
Noora, one of the Muslim girls, starts talking about the sources of sharia and the Four Schools
of Law. After a short while, Kari takes over.
Kari: And there is a lot of discussion about whether to use it or not.
Boy: Use where?
Kari: There are some countries that use it, and some of the laws are a bit …
She hesitates, and flips through the textbook.
Kari: We can turn to page 156 in the textbook.
This page is about Islamism and the question of whether a society should be based on Islamic
law and sharia.
Kari: So Islamists want to spread sharia in society, that society should be based on sharia.
And then there’s the hudud punishments, they have drawn a lot of attention. They are de-
tailed on the next page. ‘That theft shall be punished by the amputation of the hand.’
The students are shocked by this, and soon the discussion turns to how Muslims in Norway
relate to the hudud punishments and to Norwegian laws and values. Most of the class agrees
that it does not represent a danger to Norwegian society, as Norwegian Muslims don’t gener-
ally want sharia rule in Norway.
(Kari’s lesson 5 November 2015)
This example illustrates a typical pattern that was observed across classes. A
central concept of Islam – in this case, sharia – comes up. For Kari, this activates
the RI frame and consequently also the concern for what the students might
think about what she sees as a potentially controversial issue. As the class car-
ries on with the brainstorming, Kari finds it important to halt and expand on
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this, and it doesn’t take long before the topics are the hudud-punishments and
radical Islamists. Similar situations occurred in both Anne Lise’s and Hanne’s
classes. In Anne Lise’s case, her lesson about the ethics of Islam turned into a
discussion about the hudud punishments in less than five minutes. Hanne
saw the need to include a long session on the hudud punishments, with refer-
ence to IS, in her lessons on different voices in the Norwegian media debates.
The same pattern was observed in lessons about gender and gender roles, an im-
portant curricular aim in relation to all religions. In all eight classes observed,
the discussions included references to Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Taliban and
IS, as well as the question of whether Norwegian Muslims oppressed women be-
cause of their interpretations of the Koran.
This sweeping use of examples may give the impression that all of the les-
sons about Islam were about radical Islamism and terror. I have to stress that
this was not the case at all. Although this was something that was often the
theme of lessons, most focused on other aspects of Islam. However, one of the
points illustrated is how easy any topic could almost seamlessly include ele-
ments from the RI frame.²²
In the example, above, we can also see how different frames can be applied
and contested. The central question is not ‘What is sharia?’ rather, it is ‘What do
we, in this context, see sharia as an example of?’ There are, at least, three differ-
ent interpretations in play in this example:
1) The object of the lesson is brainstorming about central terms related to
Islam. Sharia is one of several such terms. (Most of the students)
2) The object is defining sharia as a concept and its sources. (Noora)
3) The object is the debate about the implementation of sharia-based laws.
(Kari)
Once the object of the lesson is settled by Kari, the RI frame is activated for most
of the students, turning the debate into one mainly about Islamism.
15.7 Media Influence
Returning to the question of media influence, there seem to be reasons for saying
that there is a significant influence of the news media on the lessons about
Islam. However, this influence is multifaceted. The most obvious influence of
 Most of these transitions felt natural and relevant in the classroom situation, as they did to
me as an observer.
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the news media on RE about Islam in the material observed is the way the teach-
ers take the media coverage into account when planning their lessons, and this
is manifested in altered pedagogical practices. This influence is dynamic and
complex, though. The teachers actively choose how to relate to the news
media in the classroom, remediating, nuancing, and, on several occasions, chal-
lenging and negating the content, claims, and views expressed in various media.
We thus do not see a situation where the news media determine the way Islam is
being represented in the classroom; rather, we see teachers consciously planning
their lessons with a basis in pedagogical reasons that agree with the aims and
mandate of RE to counter possible negative sentiments and prejudices towards
Islam and Muslims created by the media coverage. This revolves around their as-
sumption that all students associate Islam with terrorism, a notion that seems
plausible, based on the observations in this study.We do not, however, find sup-
port for the assumption that the majority of the students have strong prejudices,
and that their opinions are determined by the news media. Rather we see a large
range of claims, discourses and opinions about Islam and Muslims, many of
them in opposition to the perceived negative media coverage.
I have argued that the way the news media establish and maintain frames
influences the classroom in several ways. Even though the media are currently
becoming more nuanced in their coverage and make room for a wider range
of voices in relation to Islam, established patterns and clusterings of topics
are still repeated and reproduced. Maintained by a continuous stream of low
key coverage of different stories put into this frame, this seems to influence
the classroom scene. Everyone is familiar with the frame and thus the teachers’
need to address this is warranted.
However, this also means that constantly thematizing terrorism and radical
Islamism in the lessons about Islam strengthens the perceived relevance of the
frame, as well as the terrorist prototype, even when explicitly saying that
Islam and terrorism aren’t closely connected. Lakoff, in a book aimed at liberal
politicians in the US, offers an important insight for those wishing to influence
the opinions of others.Words are defined relatively to frames. ‘When we negate a
frame, we evoke the frame. … When you are arguing against the other side, do
not use their language. Their language picks out a frame – and it won’t be the
frame you want’ (Lakoff 2014, 19). Even though the intention behind talking
about how media coverage of Islam is centred on conflict and terrorism is to
show that this is not a fair representation of Islam, the result is to confirm
that this is the most relevant and important thing to discuss when learning
about Islam. In this regard it seems that the RE lessons about Islam actually
work in synergy with the news media. In some cases, the school even strength-
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ens the frame, by making aspects of it an important part of the pedagogical prac-
tice.
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Chapter 16
Gender, Diversity and Mediatized Conflicts
of Religion: Lessons from Scandinavian
Case Studies
Abstract: Drawing on empirical data from the Scandinavian project Engaging
with Conflicts in Mediatized Religious Environments (CoMRel), this chapter ana-
lyses the findings from case-studies in: classrooms, online communities, public
service media (PSM) production rooms, local news outlets, and interreligious
dialogue initiatives. Gender and ethno-religious diversity receive particular ana-
lytical attention. We discuss the multiple ways in which various social actors in
Scandinavia engage with mediatized conflicts about religion, and the ways in
which dominant media frames are replicated, contested, and nuanced. A main
finding is that mediatized conflicts about religion are symptomatically entangled
in a dichotomy between good or bad religion, and that social actors in the di-
verse settings are often cast in the role of ‘the ideal citizen’ or ‘the religious
other’. Despite attempts at going beyond enmeshed discourses of immigration
and othering, and a general awareness of the dominant media frame ‘Islam as
a bad religion’, the frame proves difficult to overcome.
Keywords: gender dimensions, ethno-religious diversity, mediatized conflicts,
media frames, securitization of Islam, Scandinavia, emblematic religion, other-
ing
16.1 Mediatized Conflicts
In Contested Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia,
we examine how media condition public engagement with contested issues
about religion in a variety of social settings in Scandinavia. Our case studies
in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are founded on conceptually driven compar-
isons. The strength of our research is that we approach the case studies with a
range of epistemological backgrounds and methodological tools and across a va-
riety of social settings, yet are interested in overlapping questions and conceptu-
alizations of media, religion, and conflict. Our methods include a quantitative
survey, participant observation, qualitative interviews, focus group interviews,
analysis of media content, multi-sited fieldworks, and an online ethnography.
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Our unique and rich data are collected from various media-saturated environ-
ments in Scandinavia, such as classrooms, online communities, public service
media (PSM) production rooms, local news outlets, and interreligious dialogue
initiatives. Drawing on the entire body of case studies, in this chapter we ask
the following: In what way and to what extent are media implicated in conflicts
about religion in Scandinavia? This chapter moves across the different case stud-
ies in the book. We discuss and analyse the findings of the previous chapters,
and highlight the commonalities and crosscurrents that we find across the em-
pirical cases. We delimit our discussion to the ways in which the intersection
of gender, diversity, and media frames of religion play out across the case studies
described in previous chapters. In particular, this chapter reflects on how gender
dimensions and the management of diversity are implicated in mediatized con-
flicts in the various studies. The chapter also reflects upon the theories of medi-
atization of religion and the mediatized conflicts outlined in the first part of the
book (see Chapters 3 and 4). The further development and revision of the medi-
atization theory based on our case studies will nonetheless be dealt with in more
detail in Chapter 17.
By management of diversity, we refer to the social practices of addressing,
supporting and framing ethnic and/or religious minorities. We delimit our dis-
cussion of the management of diversity to the empirical findings from our
cases (Chapters 5– 15). The interrelation between media, culture, social life,
and politics, is one of mutual influence and thus important to analyze (Hepp,
Hjarvard and Lundby 2015; Eskjær, Hjarvard and Mortensen 2015). Put simply,
media, shape culture, social life and politics – and vice versa – as media brings
about dual functions, reflecting and shaping issues occurring within these three
domains. A fundamental theoretical premise across the case studies is that
frames direct our perception, thought, and action during social and media
events (Goffman 1986, 10– 11) for which reason control and distribution of
frames is a prime concern in the operation and analysis of management. What
emerges is a highly mobile manner of directing collective conduct, which traver-
ses and correlates social spaces with frame spaces (Jacobsen 2016, 30). Framing
processes involve processes of selection and salience and tend to promote prob-
lem definitions, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recom-
mendation for the people and incidents described (Entman 1993, 52, See Chap-
ters 11, 15). In other words, media frames, framing and frameworks illustrate how
communicative ’texts’ exercise power (ibid.) and, thus, framing processes inad-
vertently bring about implicit forms of governance that may be analytically exca-
vated.
Frames are more salient when certain aspects of the frame resonate with an
individual’s cognitive schema or themes already established in public discourse,
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such as ‘Islam = bad religion’. According to Ettema (2005, 133), the success of a
frame relies on the ability of a frame to ’strike a responsive chord’ and ’draw
upon a cultural repertoire of themes and stories’. Still, in our case studies, we
also find that dominant frames do not go uncontested in the various social set-
tings we study, although some counter-frames are less successfully crafted than
others (see Chapters 8 and 11), or receive less consideration than the dominant
frames (see Chapter 6). At times, the salience and appeal of certain frames lead
to a disproportionate amount of attention to a news story such as in the case of
‘the Swedish handshake’ (see Chapter 13).
In this chapter, we explore the interplay between media, religion, and con-
flict across a range of social settings, and take into consideration that media au-
diences are not simply uncritical recipients of media frames. Audiences engage
with and contest media stories and events, but are nonetheless affected by dom-
inant media frames.We have looked into the multiple ways in which social actors
in Scandinavia engage with conflict and dominant media frames – ways that in-
clude contesting media frames, as well as replicating and nuancing them.¹ In the
World Values Survey, Scandinavia counts as the most secular corner of the
world. The levels of personal religious practice and religious self-identification
are low. However, the majority of the population in all three countries are mem-
bers of the national Lutheran Church. For most members, the affiliation to the
church is more of a cultural belonging than matter of personal belief (see Chap-
ters 2, 4, 6, and 10; Marzouki et al. 2016). While, there is a broad historical Prot-
estant Christian tradition in Scandinavia (see in particular Chapters 1 and 2),
today, this region comprises a greater diversity of religious and secular world-
views. While there are commendable attempts at ensuring a broader and un-
biased representation of religious and ethnic minorities in Scandinavian
media, minorities are often under-represented or stereotypically portrayed in
the media at large (Axner 2016, 2015; Jørndrup 2017; Figenschou and Beyer
2014). The chapters in this book on ‘contesting religion’ focuses precisely on con-
troversies and mediatized conflicts about religion that arise with diversity.
16.2 Managing Diversity
Religious and ethnic diversity can be managed in a variety of ways.
Interestingly, all the empirical findings from our case studies and survey demon-
strate that in a Scandinavian context, Islam is repeatedly pitted against either
 On framing, see Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.
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Christianity or secularism – rendering other belief systems close to irrelevant. As
previous chapters have elucidated, contestations of religion are enmeshed in dis-
courses about immigration and othering, and majority and minority population
relations (see Chapters 6–15). Here, we reflect on how religious diversity is man-
aged in a variety of Scandinavian contexts, based on the empirical findings pre-
sented in the previous chapters. While our analysis across the Scandinavia case
studies focuses primarily on how issues of framing, gender, and diversity are
managed with regards to primarily Islam and Christianity, we are in no way sug-
gesting that there are no other important belief systems or minority religions in
the region. Nor is our purpose to make a normative claim about what ethno-re-
ligious diversity essentially entails. Instead, we reflect on the multitude of empir-
ical ways (See Chapters 1– 15) in which mediatized contestations of religion play
out in present-day Scandinavia. The omnipresence of ‘dominant negative media
frames’ is palpable in our study. Such frames depict Islam as an authoritarian,
oppressive, and violent religion, which clashes with so-called ‘Scandinavian val-
ues’. Dominant frames are remediated in a variety of Scandinavian social set-
tings (see Chapters 6– 15), and shape the ways in which diversity is managed
in everyday social interactions.
A striking similarity across many of the case studies is the manner in which
dealing with the dominant media frames about Islam head-on is considered a
necessary – and perhaps somewhat courageous – act of facing ‘the elephant
in the room’. ‘Conflict and Islam, that’s the elephant in the room,’ says a secon-
dary school teacher (Chapter 15), when describing how she feels obliged to talk
about the negative media frames about Islam. Yet, by repeatedly referring to
news coverage with the purpose of countering dominant frames about Islam,
teachers may unintentionally serve to reinforce and confirm the association of
Islam with controversy. We argue that despite a general awareness of dominant
media frames, they nonetheless seem difficult to overcome. Indeed, the domi-
nant images of Muslims and Islam are continuously reproduced, remediated,
or renegotiated in all of the Scandinavian settings we have studied.
This dilemma is partially addressed by some of the social actors we study,
for instance by the teachers and PSM producers in Chapters 7, 13, 14, and 15,
which suggests that teachers and PSM producers believe they cannot ignore
the dominant negative frames, yet at the same time they struggle with how to
talk about their content in a manner that neither offends religious minorities,
nor contributes to giving such frames more momentum. Coupled with this self-
awareness is the fear of cementing the idea that Islam is a ‘bad religion’. Essen-
tially, the teachers, PSM producers, social media users, and participants in inter-
religious dialogues all face the same predicament. On the one hand, they feel
compelled to interact with the dominant frames – without condoning them –
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and on the on the other hand they are acutely aware of the fact that they may
unintentionally come to reinforce the image of Islam as a ‘bad religion’ and Mus-
lims as less than ideal citizens. For instance, in the interreligious dialogue meet-
ings or religious education (RE) classes, by stating that Muslims are ‘not just ter-
rorists’, one simultaneously reinforces the idea that many Muslims are indeed
terrorists (Lakoff 2014, as discussed in Chapter 15; see also Chapter 11).
Across the case studies we see how social actors, even those who attempt to
do otherwise, may get entrapped by stereotypical representations. In Chapter 11,
Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking’s (2011, 275) term ’banal securitization’ is used as a
signifier of the ways in which the securitization of Islam² affects the everyday
lives of Scandinavian Muslims in highly tangible ways (see also Chapter 12).
’Banal securitization of Islam’, as defined in Chapter 11, denotes everyday prac-
tices in which people and themes are categorized in stereotypical terms in re-
sponse to macro-events with local ramifications. Thus, the banal securitization
of Islam applies to the ways in which Muslims are perceived by scores of others
in light of global media events. Teachers (Chapters 13–15), PSM producers (Chap-
ters 7 and 8), as well as social media users (Chapters 6 and 9), irrespective of
their own personal faith or inclination towards secularism or atheism, all con-
tribute to the ‘banal securitization’ of religion.
Still, PSM producers, school teachers, participants in interreligious dialogue
programmes – are all acutely aware of the risks of reinforcing negative stereo-
types about Muslims and go to great pains to try to fashion counter-narratives
about Islam. Members of the Danish PSM production team in Chapter 7 explicitly
state that they feel cornered into a choice between the entrenched positions of
being either an Islam basher or an Islam apologist, neither of which appeals
to them. In their efforts to stay clear of both, the Danish PSM producers down-
play the religious identity of their participants, which may well result in a depic-
tion that transcends ‘the religious other’ ascribed representation (Nadim 2017).
While, this strategy provides more nuanced representation of religious and eth-
nic minorities, it nonetheless demonstrates how Danish PSM producers are
locked into a dialectic relationship with the dominant media frames that posit
Islam as a ‘bad religion’. PSM producers may inadvertently end up reinforcing
the negative stereotypes about Muslims as well as the dominant media frames
that posit Islam as a ‘bad religion’, For instance, Swedish PSM producers aim
to present an alternative to the dominant negative media discourses by providing
 Jocelyne Cesari (2013) and others have coined the term ‘securitization of Islam’ for the rhetor-
ical tropes, partly induced by the media, that depict Muslims in Western countries constitute as a
threat to national security.
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a platform for the equal representation of Christianity and Islam (Chapter 8).
Nonetheless, they end up reinforcing dominant frames about Islam as a prob-
lematic religion to be associated with violence and extremism. Despite the pro-
ducers’ initial intent to provide a more nuanced representation of Islam, the pro-
gramme Människor och tro (People and belief), ends up portraying Christianity
as a ‘good religion’, which in turn is contrasted to Islam.³
Intriguingly, the lack of viable positions and the sense of entrapment is evi-
dent in many of the case studies. Even in the case of the Yes to wearing the cross
whenever and wherever I choose (YWC) Facebook group, in which participants
appear to have a wider spectrum of ideological positions, we find that ultimately
one must choose being either for or against Islam – but also – for or against
Christianity and religion in general, respectively (see Chapter 6; Abdel-Fadil
2017). When taking the case studies together, it seems that completely escaping
the ‘good vs. bad religion’ dichotomy is close to impossible. Downplaying reli-
gion altogether may well be an attempt at overcoming this good vs. bad religion
dialectic (see Chapter 7), but might not necessarily resolve all tensions.
16.3 Moulding the Ideal Citizen
The good vs. bad religion frames are circumvented by Danish PSM producers’ at-
tempt to portray minority citizens in a different light (Chapter 7). Yet, in our view,
rendering religion invisible, plays into the moulding of an ideal minority citizen,
particularly when the alternative is ‘bad religion’. A similar dynamic is in play
when the inclusion of more diverse voices is attempted in the various arenas
(see Chapters 5–15). Religious and ethnic minorities experience greater access
to the media, when cast as ‘the ethnic/religious other’ (Nadim 2017). As exempli-
fied in the PSM case from Sweden minority voices have unequal access (see
Chapters 8). More importantly, a rather narrow space for the idealized citizen
with a minority religious background is carved out (Schinkel 2008; van Es 2016).
Meeting the ideal requires a particular vernacular and a specific vocabulary
and conduct. In this sense, diversity is encouraged but only in specific and high-
ly governed ways. Intriguingly, it seems that the projection of the ideal religious
minority citizen shapes interactions in several of the settings, not least in the in-
terreligious dialogues, classrooms, and everyday interactions both on- and off-
 See also Mahmood Mamdani’s famous article ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspec-
tive on Culture and Terrorism’ (2002). Here, Mamdani deconstructs cultural explanations of po-
litical results, such as the events of September 11, and (re)situates the terrorist events in a his-
torical and political context.
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line (See Chapters 6, 8, and 11– 15). Still, there appears to be an implication that
all citizens ought to hold similar views.We would argue that by sidestepping dis-
cussing religion (Chapter 7), Danish PSM producers showcase articulate, ideal-
ized, minority citizens, whose real or imagined religiosity, is downplayed in an
attempt to overcome representations as the ’religious other’ (Nadim 2017).
Still, the idealized Scandinavian citizen can take the shape of a more explicitly
religious persona, albeit in governed ways. In effect, the idealized citizen must
choose between ‘good religion’ or ‘no religion’, in order to avoid being associated
with ‘bad religion’. Despite their attempts at diversifying the participants and
speakers in their shows, the Scandinavian PSM programmes still provide uneven
and unequal access to religious minorities (see Chapter 8), and those who par-
ticipate in public debates and interreligious forums are stylized to fit a mould
of an ideal citizen (see Chapters 7, 8, 11) who is knowledgeable, peaceful, artic-
ulate, and compassionate.
In Chapter 11, Gullestad’s concept of ‘prototypes’ is referred to and in Chap-
ter 4, the authors write about ‘emblematic’ renderings of religion. What we see
across many of the case studies is what can be called ‘emblematic prototypes’,
renderings that come to reproduce the symbolic, emblematic facets of religion
while simultaneously replicating prototypes – or what Amin Maalouf (2012) re-
fers to as ‘essentialized identities’. For instance, a woman who wears the hijab
is reduced to ‘Muslim’ or the piece of cloth she wears on her head, rendering
her individuality and other facets of her identity entirely irrelevant. Thus, Scan-
dinavian Muslims do not seem to be able to escape the ways in which mediatized
frames of ‘Islam’ seep into their everyday lives. Yet, ‘emblematic prototypes’ also
shape the everyday interactions of the conservative Christians and atheists in
YWC where there is a strong symbolic attribution to either faith or non-faith.
Across the various cases, we find the construction of the ideal Scandinavian
citizen, particularly as a mould for the Muslim but also for other citizens to con-
form to (Liebmann 2017). Interreligious forums offer a prime space for displaying
the self as the peaceful, egalitarian, rational, civilized, tolerant, empathetic –
and thus idealized – citizen. Although this might be most evident in terms of
moulding the ideal Muslim participant, it also goes for the other citizens (see
Chapter 11). When considering the case studies together we can detect traces
of how all citizens are governed in a way that is aimed at transforming them
into more idealized versions of themselves and their respective citizenships
whether they identify as atheists, Christians, secularists, Muslims, etc. This
way, we detect the ways in which media condition processes of what in a
post-Foucauldian governance sense may be referred to as ‘citizen formation’
(Rose [1999] 2010) in relation to religion.
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In Chapter 8, we see how, somewhat surprisingly, the Swedish police acad-
emy student Donna Eljammal, posing in uniform and a hijab,was met with most-
ly positive feedback in the online comments to the posting of her image. Her oc-
cupational commitment to Sweden is commemorated and Donna Eljammal is
framed as a national symbol of how a young Muslim woman ideally should
take part in, and contribute to, Swedish society. Thus, the mediated Donna El-
jammal in this rendition, comes to represent the civic ideal for a Muslim
woman in Sweden.
The Norwegian PSM show Faten tar valget (Faten makes her choice) follows
the 22-year-old (non-fictional) Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini, a Muslim hijabi woman
while she makes up her mind about which political party to vote for in the Nor-
wegian parliamentary elections of 2017.While Swedish Donna Eljammal was for
the most part hailed, Norwegian Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini received many hateful
comments about both her and the hijab, including death threats.⁴
Considering this volume’s aim of examining how various media condition
public engagement with contested issues about religion, it is worth reflecting
on why two seemingly similar incidents in Norway and Sweden may have spur-
red such different responses. Faten Makes Her Choice evidently stirs up negative
emotions among what Michailidou and Trenz (2015) call ‘enraged fans’. And in
this context, insisting on the removal of a young Muslim woman’s hijab to prove
that she is wearing it of her own free will is considered a legitimate demand. The
irony of intimidating and forcing a young woman to remove a hijab in order to
demonstrate that her attire is voluntary is considerable. However, what compli-
cates the picture somewhat is that in both Norway and Sweden a number of the
positive public reactions to Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini and Donna Eljammal, re-
spectively, emphasized how it was the individual and her civic engagement,
not her hijab or her religion, that came to the foreground. It would seem,
then, that mediation of civic engagement and participation in the democracy
as an ideal citizen holds the potential to overshadow the at times near obsessive
focus on the hijab in other contexts. Thus, under particular circumstances, the
individuality of a media player may trump her ‘ascribed representation’ of a re-
ligious or ethnic group or her being cast as an ‘ethnic other’ as has been found to
be the case in recent studies (Nadim 2017, Midtbøen 2016).
To what extent can the different responses in Sweden and Norway be attrib-
uted to differences in the debate climate, timing, medium, or stratified audien-
 Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini since repeatedly addressed the vile comments in public videos and
expressed her claim to both Norwegianess and the hijab – but also exposed her vulnerability
and sadness about this turn of events.
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ces? Contextual factors such as the timing of the Norwegian show just before the
parliamentary elections in September 2017 may have amplified the conflict
around Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini, while the predominantly middle-aged, well-
educated audience of People and Belief, on which Donna Eljammal appeared,
may have subdued the level of conflict in Sweden. Yet, there seems to be more
at play. In retrospect, the massive negative response to Faten Makes Her Choice
was perhaps more about the context of the ‘cross case’ and the emblematic
Christianity of identity it inspired than the hijab itself. As described more in de-
tail in Chapter 6, the cross case was a controversy in 2013 over the Norwegian
Broadcasting Corporation’s (NRK) decision to bar one of its news anchors from
wearing her cross pendant while hosting an NRK evening news programme.
The fact that in 2017 NRK received more than 5,000 complaints about Faten
Makes Her Choice before the show had even been aired raises suspicions that
this response was coordinated. The complainers accused NRK of a double stan-
dard: NRK was allowing one form of religious attire, the hijab, but not another,
the cross, on their TV programmes. In other words, the engaged, and enraged,
publics were in fact primarily critiquing the neutrality policy in the NRK cross
case (see Chapter 6). By extension, Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini and her hijab are
understood as a threat to the cross and its visible presence. For conservative
Christians and others who see Christianity mostly as a form of belonging, rather
than believing, the NRK cross case comes to symbolize the deterioration of
‘Christian values’ on PSM while Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini gets to flaunt her
hijab. The conflation of the principle of neutrality for news bulletins with the
less strict policy for hosts of all other types of programming has been an integral
part of the cross controversy from the very start, as has the erroneous perception
that the cross is banned but the hijab is not in PSM programming. Regardless,
both Donna Eljammal and Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini are fashioned into proto-
types of ‘Muslim women’ imaginaries who either conform to ‘the ideal citizen’
or its antithesis.
More importantly for our purposes, the brief comparison between Donna El-
jammal and Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini’s experiences aptly demonstrate how med-
itatized conflicts about religion can be amplified, transformed, and multiplied
into new conflicts based on the perseverance of particular social actors. More-
over, it demonstrates how one side of a debate may succeed in getting a dispro-
portionate amount of attention on one particular aspect.
In some of the case studies we see a co-dependant dialectic between Islam
depicted as a ‘bad religion’ and Christianity portrayed as a ‘good religion’. But we
also see that within a religion, certain renderings are deemed more desirable
than others, often in accordance with or as an extension of a conceptualization
of an ideal citizen. Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini’s ideal citizenship was even con-
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doned by the prime minister of Norway who, not insignificantly, chose to high-
light how Faten Al-Mahdi Hussaini has contributed actively to anti-radicalization
programmes.⁵
The sense that religion comes to be more about belonging than believing
cuts across several of the case studies. We repeatedly see how media condition
both the culturalization and securitization of religion (see Chapter 4), most no-
tably with regards to Islam (see Chapters 8, and 11– 15) and Christianity (see
Chapters 6 and 10). Within this framework, the hijab becomes emblematically
linked to Islam, and the cross becomes emblematically associated with Christi-
anity and nationhood and we see several examples of how Islam is cast as a
‘bad religion’ and Christianity is cast as its opposite, a ‘good religion’. However,
in some instances, we observe that Christianity is being contested from within
(see Chapters 6 and 10) where tensions between ‘golden rule Christianity’ and
Christianity as identity clash. Yet, in some cases it is religion per se that is
cast as the villain (see Chapter 6). This draws a web of components that the
ideal citizen is expected to adhere to and promote.
16.4 ‘The Muslim Woman’
Despite being a trope across many of the book’s chapters, none of the chapters is
solely devoted to what has become the most prominent symbol of cultural and
religious encounters, and subsequent societal tensions, in present-day Scandina-
via: ‘the Muslim woman’. Muslim women have during the last 20 years repeated-
ly been placed at the centre of public debates in Europe and would seem an ob-
vious point of departure in a book that explores the media dynamics of cultural
conflicts in Scandinavia. The fact that the contributions in Contested Religion do
not dwell on this matter does not mean that gender dimensions are not an inter-
related part of the various case studies.
The many public debates related to the female Muslim body, clothing, and
lifestyle testify to the status of the notion of what is taken to be a highly religious
and oppressed – primarily Muslim – woman symbolizing what many perceive as
the restraining effect of religion. Tied in with this widespread imaginary is the
dominant media frame (see Chapter 3). Mass media tend to frame Islam as a dis-
tinct threat to women’s rights and gender equality, thus giving way to notions of
Muslim women as emblematic of religiously motivated violence. However, an al-
 Espen Alnes and Hanna Huglen Revheim, “Solberg: – Faten fortener ikkje hetsen,” NRK, 23
Aug 2017. https://www.nrk.no/kultur/solberg_-_-faten-fortener-ikkje-hetsen-1.13655103
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ternative media frame is gradually emerging in part as a response to the domi-
nant media frame and widespread stigmatization of young Muslims as threats
to national security in Western societies. Especially public service media, as an-
alysed in Chapters 7 and 8, employ alternative frames comprised of three
strands: first, a frame consisting of young Muslim women as symbols of toler-
ance; second, a human-interest frame in which personalization, stories, ideal
cases, and emotions are deployed in the dramaturgy of the media; and third,
representations of ‘ordinary Muslims’ with an inherent focus on Islam as (every-
day) lived culture.
The focus on ordinary Muslims is a tendency which has its equivalent in the
focus on lived religion as a distinct field of study within academia, a research
strand that has developed over the last three decades and affords attention to
everyday religion as it is lived, and practised, by millions of people (see Dessing
et al. 2013; McGuire 2008).⁶ But how does this alternative and budding media
frame impact the way gender and religion are approached in public service
media? As seen in Chapter 7, in relation to Islam, gender may, on one hand,
work as a trigger theme in relation to Islam that can easily activate tensions
and conflicts. On the other hand, the chapter also demonstrates how conscious
planning of debates – and drawing on available professional resources in public
service media – may allow gender issues such as sexuality to be addressed in
relation to religion in ways that create intense debates but at the same time
allow new voices and marginalized arguments to be heard – at least in compar-
ison with traditional news agendas on Islam. One aspect of this strategy is to
downplay the explicit religious dimensions of gender issues and instead discuss
them as generational and cultural issues.
The much-contested trope of ‘the Muslim woman’, particularly when
adorned with the hijab, is, as mentioned earlier, depicted as posing a threat to
the idealized citizen. The hijab becomes a highly visible and emblematic symbol
of Islam, and is intrinsically tied to the negative mediatized framing of Islam as a
source of conflict and gender-based oppression, leading to construing a woman’s
active choice to wear a hijab as ‘false consciousness’ and in consequence ‘the
oppressed Muslim woman’ for whom concern is expressed, is simultaneously
stripped of agency by her alleged saviours (Abdel-Fadil 2006; Abu-Lughod 2013).
The tensions surrounding the hijab surface in many of the case studies. For
instance, in Chapter 12 the hijab is what makes the female converts ‘visibly Mus-
 Studies on lived religion tend to focus on laity, instead of clergy or elites; on practices rather
than beliefs; on practices outside religious institutions rather than inside; and on individual
agency and autonomy rather than on collectivities or traditions (Ammerman 2016).
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lim’ and their identity contentious in public space. This is in stark contrast to the
Muslim male converts who are not as ‘visibly’ Muslim. Regardless of ethnicity,
women who wear the hijab are not only detectable in public space, but in effect
‘hypervisible’, to use Gullestad’s (2006) terminology. Hypervisibility implies a
distinguishability that is inescapable and fraught with tensions, often coupled
with a voice that is rendered irrelevant or not listened to, i.e. silencing diversity.
As discussed in Chapter 12, Muslim women who successfully wield the image of
a hijabi fashionista somehow evade some of the negative projections on the
hijab, and inch closer to the ideal citizen; apparently (Muslim) women cannot
be all that oppressed if they wear fashionable clothes and an eye-catching lip-
stick colour, this logic seems to suggest.
16.5 Gendered Interactions
Mediatization implies long-term transformations of social and cultural patterns
in media-saturated societies and thus shapes social interactions. However, medi-
atization does not determine the outcome of the social and media dynamics (see
Chapter 3). The ways in which religion sometimes allows for alternative ways of
imagining gender does not necessarily overthrow the mediatization thesis but it
does underline the complexity of the relationship between religion and media
and questions who exactly sets the agenda for how we understand religion
and gender (Lövheim 2013a; Sjö 2016, 137).
Chapters 11 and 12 share a focus on the responses by Scandinavian Muslims
to the predominantly negative media frames and thus of Muslims’ negotiations
of belonging in a mediatized society. Hence, these two case studies inhabit rep-
resentational challenges symptomatic to qualitative studies of this kind. When
mobilizing interlocutors – informants – for a qualitative, humanistic, or social
scientific study through institutions, organizations, and networks, researchers
often wind up with predominantly male participants who thus come to represent
various religious affiliations and organizations in a generic sense but with a
tacit, gendered bias (Rayaprol 2016). For instance, the Swedish PSM producers
inadvertently reinforce traditional forms of religious authority, by inviting chair-
persons, imams, and professors, who, in most cases, were male (see Chapter 8).
The over-representation of men when attempting to up minority media represen-
tation appears to be part of a general tendency in Scandinavia (Jørndrup 2017).
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are several differences between the ways in
which men and women relate to religion in general, and with regards to media
practices. These differences follow a pattern established in previous studies: fe-
male respondents seem to be more supportive of the statement that all religions
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should be respected, while male respondents in general seem more critical of ex-
pressions of religion in public, especially Islam, and support critical coverage of
Islam and Judaism in the media more than women do. Moreover, gender has the
strongest significance in the survey analysis when it comes to respondents’ will-
ingness to discuss news on religious extremism with others; men are more likely
to do so than women (see Chapter 2). Men are also more inclined to discuss re-
ligion and in particular religious extremism online.Within these topics, gender is
more significant than for example religious self-identification and political posi-
tion. Besides reflecting persistent gender roles and positions in the Scandinavian
context, these gender differences remind us of how research must always be at-
tentive to the way in which divergences between men and women (and other
genders), respectively, tie in with how different genders come to grasp, approach,
and interpret religion differently.
A number of studies suggest that there is a gendered dimension to the ways
in which men and women engage with social media and online debates about
sensitive topics like religion and politics (see Chapter 2, 6, 11; Lövheim 2013a,
2013b). Notably, women appear to be less active in online debates and our survey
in Scandinavia supports this understanding in that more men state that they fre-
quently discuss religion online. However, the online ethnography of the Face-
book page Yes to wearing the cross whenever and wherever I choose (YWC) (see
Chapter 6) points to the importance of the triangulation of methods. In YWC
we find a handful of dedicated women with particularly high levels of activity
that are unparalleled by male participants. This suggests that some women
may in Miller et al.’s (2016, 178) terminology be both ‘doing politics’ more, and
participating in more active ways than some of the men that statistically speak-
ing are very active online. The frequency with which women and men report to
participate in online debates reveals little about the level of engagement or the
emotional labour involved. Future studies must strive to nuance our understand-
ings of gendered online involvement in mediatized conflicts with all its invisibil-
ities and complexities.
Correspondently, another gender issue of concern to these, and other, chap-
ters is that of gendered agency. Since the 1980s, a focus on women as religious
actors has gradually occurred in response to the predominant view that religious
women are passive victims of religious ideologies. In both Chapters 11 and 12, the
issues of belonging – and citizenship – can be connected to gender at the inter-
section of religion and nationality (Sauer 2016, 108). Birgit Sauer argues that a
new concept of citizenship is constructed, negotiated and promoted in European
countries through the hijab debates (ibid.). This perspective ties in with discus-
sions of how debates on covered women in Europe should be interpreted in the
light of an underlying and dominant frame of secular European progress (Wood-
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head 2009) and with the post-secular turn in humanistic and social scientific re-
search (Gemzöe and Keinänen 2016, 3).
So, what did we learn? We learned that two main aspects are pivotal when
reflecting on gender in respect to mediatization, media frames and ethno-reli-
gious conflicts in the respective case studies. The first is the representation of
gender – understood both as the relative number of participants active in
mass and social media, various organizations, and local civic settings, and as
the way in which gender is portrayed and comes to be enacted in these arenas.
The second aspect is gendered agency in relation to, and as part of, the represen-
tations in question. Especially women’s religious agency outside a simple frame
of oppressor–oppressed in the field of gender and religion (Gemzöe and Keinä-
nen 2016, 8), continues to be of significance.
In important ways, the abovementioned dominant frames and embedded de-
bates form the background of what has been labelled the post-secular turn in hu-
manistic and social scientific research (Gemzöe and Keinänen 2016, 3). This turn
involves a questioning of earlier theories based on the premise that religion
would gradually (continue to) lose importance as a social force in Europe and
in the rest of the world. The turn implies instead that new theoretical frame-
works, such as the sub-frames mentioned above nuancing the role of religion
and gender in media (and media in gender and religion), are necessary to com-
prehend what religion is and is coming to be in present-day societies and how
religion is related to secularism. In this, the turn also involves revisiting gender
dimensions in religion, and not least in Islam. This is a task for further studies on
religion and the mediatization of religion.
16.6 The Dynamics of Mediatized Conflicts of
Religion
Media production teams and editors make choices that may have far-reaching
ramifications of which they are unaware. For instance, they may unintentionally
influence and confirm male-dominated religious hierarchies of authority or grant
unequal access to social actors in their attempts to manage, diversity. The gen-
dered and unsteady management of diversity plays into the multiple ways in
which mediatized conflicts about religion are enacted, by a spectrum of social
actors, in a wide range of Scandinavian online and offline mediatized social set-
tings (see Chapters 6– 15). Across the case studies,we find that minorities are fre-
quently ‘ethnicified’ and/or moulded into idealized forms of minority citizens
(Nadim 2017, 230).
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Tensions, controversies, and conflicts have become so integral to both media
coverage and audience engagement that they increasingly come to represent nor-
malcy. Many discussions about religion in everyday life are centred around medi-
atized conflicts, as evidenced in the various case studies in this book. We find
that various Scandinavian publics engage and interact with mediatized conflicts
about religion in ways that betray an attention economy – where conflict at times
is the glue of a given news story.
A striking feature across many of the cases studies is the importance of en-
tertainment and media events.We see for instance how the school teachers lean
heavily on both popular culture media products and over-focus on controversies
and media events linked to religion, in particular with regard to Islam, in their
attempts to reel in the students’ attention (see Chapters 13– 15). Likewise, the
choices PSM producers make play into the media dynamics of entertainment
and conflict and may in turn attract or put off publics. We must not overlook
the fact that dealing full-on with controversies can in itself be viewed as a
form of entertainment as evidenced in the classrooms, as well as in PSM produc-
tion rooms (see Chapters 7 and 8) and in the online debates we examine (see
Chapter 6).
Mass media and social media co-construct and condition worldviews and
social interactions, as illustrated throughout this volume (see Chapters 3– 15).
Contested Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia con-
tributes to a refined understanding of mediatization of religion, through theoret-
ical contributions on how mediatization is shaped through social interactions
(Chapters 3, 4 and 17), and empirical cases demonstrating how a variety of social
actors and media users engage with mediatized conflicts about religion (Chap-
ters 5– 15). In this chapter, we have provided an analysis of the interplay between
media framings and the multitude of ways in which conflicts are enacted and re-
ligion is contested based on a range of Scandinavian case studies. We contend
that our empirically-grounded analysis, of the gendered and unsteady manage-
ment of diversity, in mediatized conflicts about religion, provides a platform
from which to challenge and further develop the conceptualizations of mediati-
zation of religion (see Chapter 17). Our analysis will, together with the entire vol-
ume, Contested Religion:The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia,
hopefully inspire further in-depth studies on the complexity of contested religion
in mediatized societies.
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Chapter 17
Interaction Dynamics in the Mediatization
of Religion Thesis
Abstract: In light of the preceding case studies, this chapter revisits the theories
on the mediatization of religion and on mediatized conflicts that were outlined
in the first part of the book. The focus is on the interplay between media repre-
sentations of religious conflicts and the social interactions relating to the conten-
tious issues.With a basis in general mediatization theory, it is argued that audi-
ence activity and other forms of civic participation must be seen to be an integral
part of the mediatization processes.
Keywords: mediatization theory, mediatization of religion, interaction, audience
activity, Scandinavia
How is contested religion transformed through media dynamics? This piece
builds on and adds to the conclusions on gender and diversity in Chapter 16
by focusing a theoretical concern across the case studies. They have all been car-
ried out against the backdrop of mediatization theory (see the Introduction and
Chapters 3–4). It has been our ambition, to refine the theory on the mediatiza-
tion of religion when it comes to the roles’ regular media users, i.e., people play
within the communication dynamic through their interpretations and interac-
tions with representations in the media. Here, firstly, there is a section on the
ways in which social interactions contribute to mediatization. Then (in 17.2) an
exposé of the mediatized dynamics that are uncovered throughout the book fol-
lows. Thirdly, as mediatized expressions on religion do not necessarily have to
lead to conflicts but may also help to handle and play down tensions, this is
demonstrated through examples from our case studies. Finally, there are con-
cluding notes on the ways in which the book contributes to the theory on the me-
diatization of religion.
17.1 Mediatization through Interactions
Mediatization implies long-term transformations of social and cultural patterns
with the media as key actors in the fabric of society, although not necessarily
as the causes of changes (Hjarvard 2013; Lundby 2014). ‘Media’ are technologies
OpenAccess. © 2018, Knut Lundby. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
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for and social vehicles of communication. In media-saturated societies the ‘so-
cial construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966) has become the ‘medi-
ated construction of reality’ (Couldry and Hepp 2017). Mediatization research
tries to capture the interrelations between media changes, on one hand, and
changes in other parts of culture and society, on the other. Whether they are
termed ‘mass media’ or ‘social media’, they are increasingly digitized and inte-
grated into global communication networks. Mediatization is driven by big com-
panies and big data, as well as by individual media users and producers.Various
actors are thus involved in the mediatization of religion, from ‘above’ as well as
from ‘below’ (Lundby forthcoming 2018).
Here, the mediatization perspective is employed to analyse cultural conflicts
over religion in Scandinavia. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are media-rich so-
cieties where mediatization theories certainly apply. In Scandinavia, technolog-
ical media of some sort are embedded in almost all social institutions and every-
day relations (see Chapter 1), including religion (Hjarvard and Lövheim 2012).
The general dynamics of mediatized conflicts are important in studying
when we try to grasp the media influences on the tensions and contestations
over religion, which is the task of this book. Danish scholars have proposed
three dynamics of mediatized conflicts which have inspired our analyses (Hjar-
vard, Mortensen, and Eskjær 2015). They primarily aim at the news media, but
they may also apply to both entertainment media and social media. The
media may, first, amplify the event or phenomenon that is reported or comment-
ed upon. A second dynamic is the framing of content by the actors performing
the media production. Third, the media may co-structure power relations in com-
munication and practices in institutions and among people (see Chapter 3).
Here, the theorization on mediatization and on the dynamics of mediatized
conflicts is directed towards a deeper understanding of the mediatization of re-
ligion in times of contestation (see Chapter 4). The particular theory on the me-
diatization of religion builds on a general understanding of mediatization proc-
esses.
We explore the dynamics of ongoing mediatization rather than the outcomes
of the transformations.We are thus in line with the ambition behind the Dynam-
ics Of Mediatization (Driessens et al. 2017) as well as with The Dynamics of Medi-
atized Conflicts (Eskjær, Hjarvard, and Mortensen 2015). These dynamics may be
studied from above, through amplification, framing and co-structuring in the
media production processes. They may also be seen from below, in the manner
in which the amplification, framing and co-structuring is responded to by the
media users, as both citizens and audiences.
Individuals have various forms of engagement with the media. While ‘en-
gagement’ is a general term, ‘participation’ may point to democratic activity in
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bottom-up civic processes (Carpentier 2011a). Media users have new participato-
ry opportunities with the greater repertoire of personal, networked media and
digital multimodal tools of expression. As media user activity, the term ‘partici-
pation’ should primarily be applied to the media production of ‘user-generated
content.’ This is an active form of audience activity (Carpentier 2011b). Audiences
in the contemporary cross-media landscape (Carpentier, Schrøder, and Hallett
2014) are transformed, and thus, mediatized. Individual media users do not
themselves make audiences, as audiences refer to collective formations of
media users (Livingstone 2005, 2014). In today’s fragmented media landscape,
audiences may be made up of rather limited circles of participation and con-
sumption relating to a shared content concern. The common social and cultural
pattern of user activity or engagement are what make audiences.
The audience perspective has been surprisingly absent in mediatization
studies (Lundby 2016). The focus has mostly been on ‘media logic’ and structur-
ing frameworks in technology, organization and the symbolic horizons on the
production side of communication. Kim Christian Schrøder (2017) has taken
this to task, suggesting audience dynamics as co-constitutive of mediatization
processes. To him, the ‘audience dynamics’ are part of the media dynamics in
the mediatization processes (2017, 94, 97). He argues that audiences have an in-
tegral role as agents in the transformative communication processes. The struc-
tural power of media audiences must be included in mediatization theory.
Schrøder defines ‘audiences’ in digital, mediatized societies as ‘the people
who, in their capacity as social actors, are attending to, negotiating the meaning
of, and sometimes participating in the multi-modal processes initiated or carried
out by institutional media’ (2017, 89). He sees ‘any citizen activity that can be
seen to derive from attention to or engagement with media’ as audience activity,
if it ‘can be argued to exert a formative influence on media performance or con-
tent’ (2017, 90). This is a wide definition of ‘audiences’. Rather, I consider peo-
ple’s social interaction in ‘citizen activity’ that contests religion, whether this im-
plies active participation, or more laid-back forms of engagement as crucial part
of the definition of audiences.
Audience activity is social interaction, as is all citizen engagement. Audience
activity includes the identity work in which people engage with media content in
the processes of interpretation that are triggered by media consumption (Car-
pentier 2011b). Media consumption and participation in content creation are
two forms of social interaction with the media. All smart phone users know
how these two forms of social interaction overlap. Media consumption and con-
tribution to media content both imply identity work, i.e., processes of identifica-
tion. Identity work in relation to media content also always implies interpreta-
tions of the symbolic and narrative media material. These three ‘i’s:
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interaction, identification and interpretation, form a triangle in audience activity,
as in another citizen activity in mediatized settings. This also applies to contest-
ed religion in media dynamics. The mediatized engagement in cultural conflicts
on religion include interactions, interpretations, and identifications.
People may influence mediatization processes though audience activity, i.e.,
when they constitute themselves as audiences. However, we start with the range
of social roles in which people engage, as citizens, or act in society as ‘Christi-
ans’, ‘Muslims’, or whatever. Mediatization makes the media relevant to all
kinds of social roles; and media practices become more or less integrated into
the performance of most social roles. With mediatization, our different citizen
roles are conditioned or co-structured by the omnipresence of media, and
through activity in the various roles through which people contribute to further
mediatization. This also applies to audience activity. Sometimes, people gather
and act as audiences, but not always.
In this book, we understand religion as being a practice of mediation (Meyer
and Moors 2006, 7), a form of social interaction within which meaning-making
takes place (Lövheim 2011). In the preceding case studies, different media are in-
tertwined with the three ‘i’s in classrooms, civic settings, and in the production
and reception of public service programmes.We study public tensions and con-
flicts over religion in the interplay between representations in professional
media production, on the one hand, and interactions, interpretations, and iden-
tifications in user activity, on the other.
In this book, we mostly cut short the interlinked chain of interactions, iden-
tifications and interpretations by focusing on the interactions. The interactions
are conditioned by the institutional, mediatized structures against and within
which they take place, but the interactions also influence the institutional
frames and the ongoing mediatization processes.
Interaction patterns are inherent to mediatization theory. Stig Hjarvard pres-
ents the circle between the regular mediation processes, i.e., communicative in-
teraction with technical media, which, over time, may result in transformations
in mediatization. In the next round, the structural changes that are implied in
mediatization set up new conditions for the ongoing mediation and interaction
(Hjarvard 2018). The institutional approach to mediatization that Hjarvard expli-
cates, observes interactions between institutions, between individuals and be-
tween citizens and institutions (Hjarvard 2013), thus, from ‘above’, as well as
from ‘below’. The social constructivist approach (Krotz and Hepp 2013; Couldry
and Hepp 2013; Hepp 2013) observes mediatization through everyday interac-
tions from ‘below’. However, as argued by Schrøder (2017, 92–98), neither of
these main approaches to mediatization include a perspective on the power of
the audiences.
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Analysing the transformations of religion from a gender perspective
(Chapter 16; Lövheim 2016) opens the door between mediatization and pat-
terns of social interaction. So do the various case studies in the book. Against
this backdrop, I ask: How does mediatization work through the dynamics of
amplification, framing, and co-structuring as interaction from both ‘above’
and ‘below’?
17.2 Mediatized Dynamics in the Selected
Settings
It’s a claim from mediatization theory that the media shape and mould interac-
tion in other social domains, fields, or institutions, and increasingly become an
intrinsic part of these other societal fields (see Chapter 14; Hjarvard 2013). This
occurs in the encounter between framing and representations from ‘above’,
and of social interaction from ‘below’. In this book, we explore this interplay
in three different public spaces in Scandinavia: in public service media, in
local civic settings, and in public schools. In each setting, we ask how religious
expressions are thematized and enacted in the media (from ‘above’) and further
articulated in social interaction (from ‘below’). The thesis of mediatization can-
not be evidenced through the cases studies, but they offer empirical material for
further explorations of how the theory can be improved by this closer look at pat-
terns of interaction.
17.2.1 Public Service Media
The public service media (PSM) in Scandinavia have a strong position among au-
diences if compared to most other countries (see Chapter 5). This implies that
they are also in a strong position to amplify, frame and co-construct tensions
over religion. However, the Scandinavian public broadcasting companies contin-
uously have to adapt to ongoing mediatization by developing their services, in
particular, those on digital platforms, in order to maintain audience attention
and interaction. The PSM companies could do so by introducing new and con-
tested voices in established as well as new programme formats. The Danish tele-
vision documentary Rebellion from the Ghetto portrays minority voices that are
framed by the producers to counter dominant negative images of contested is-
sues among the audiences (see Chapter 7). The Swedish radio programme People
and Belief deliberately introduces new Muslim voices in order to strive for better
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representation. This case demonstrates the dynamics of framing and performa-
tive agency in the internal interaction between producers within the radio com-
pany, and how they come to control the interaction with the listeners through
asymmetrical relations in phone-in sessions. Despite intentions to contribute
to a more nuanced public debate on the role of Islam in Sweden, the pro-
grammes’ representations play into the dominant understandings and establish-
ed relations between various groups in society. Despite the efforts by the produc-
ers, the programmes do not manage to challenge and change the existing co-
structuring of power relations (see Chapters 8 and 16).
However, in general, the PSM companies, through their programming, ex-
ploit mediatization dynamics that co-structure the perceived conception of reli-
gion and of conflicts that are related to religion, among the audiences. Reactions
from the audiences also help producers to adjust the framings of the pro-
grammes, as demonstrated in the case of Rebellion from the Ghetto. Being
aware of the mediatized conditions of conflicts over religion, PSM companies
in Scandinavia have the expertise and resources, through careful planning, to
counter the entrenched positions in conflicts over religion, as the authors of
Chapter 7 note.
The Facebook group following the radio magazine on People and Belief is
more accessible to alternative voices than are the phone-ins, but there is little
interaction across postings, and thus a limited counter influence on the framing
that is undertaken by the producers (see Chapter 8). This is different in the Nor-
wegian Facebook group Yes to wearing the cross whenever and wherever I choose,
which was set up after the incident in which the Norwegian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration, NRK,would not allow a news anchor wear a cross pendant whilst reading
the news. The careful analysis of this Facebook group, in Chapter 6, reveals a va-
riety of attempts to frame the debate from ‘below’. The interaction on this site
mediatizes the debate by ‘nationalizing Christianity and hijacking religion’, as
the title of the chapter phrases it. Despite the fact that there are more than
110,000 participants in the Facebook group, the amplification into the general
public sphere of this intense interaction and audience activity from ‘below’
may be rather limited. However, triggered by public service programming, this
study offers insight into a social media space in which people engage with
each other over cultural conflicts that are related to religion, thus mediatizing
a debate within the frames of the Facebook group.
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17.2.2 Local Civic Settings
In local civic settings dominant media frames on religion and conflicts, mainly
those relating to Islam and Muslims, form a backdrop for local interactions be-
tween various actors. These dominant frames are generally critical of the Muslim
presence and of Islam as a religion; at least this seems to be the predominant
perception amongst the Muslims who are interviewed in studies for this section
of the book. One is the chapter on ‘Media, Muslims, and Minority Tactics’ in two
Norwegian urban settings (Chapter 11). Another is the study of Danish converts to
Islam in Greater Copenhagen (Chapter 12). These settings are characterized as
being ‘mediatized civic settings’ to underline how various media transform the
local context through the amplification of religious conflict, the negative framing
of Islam and Muslims, and the media’s co-construction of a critical social and
communication space on contested religion (see Chapter 9). However, as we
are reminded in Chapter 12, to ‘properly understand the dynamics of mediatiza-
tion in particular cases, media dynamics need to be rigorously contextualized by
broader processes of historical and social change’ (page 221).
There are initiatives to create ‘counter publics’ that are based in social media
networks, telling other stories from, and on, the minorities in question. Such
uses of social media do not seem to fit easily into the typology of the dynamics
of mediatized conflicts (see Chapter 9). However, counter publics try to amplify
alternative framings and to co-construct another communication space on con-
tested religion.Whether dominant or alternative, the mediatized setting and con-
tested understanding of religion is played out in social interaction, the dominant
from ‘above’, and the alternative from ‘below’. These moves from above and
below meet in the particular setting being studied.
For those taking part from ‘below’, identifications with particular meanings
or positions are always part of the social interaction. This comes through strongly
in the study of the dual identity as both Muslim and Dane amongst converts in
Copenhagen. In their interaction with the negative media frame, with ethnic
Danes, and in their experience of Danish institutions, they are torn between
their religious and national sense of belonging. Given all the negative attention
they receive, they tend to give priority to their identities as Muslims. Their own
interpretations of the conflicts are expressed in media engagement, in particular,
in social media, which is more accessible to them than the mass media (Chap-
ter 12). The tensions between these dual identities are thus played out in a medi-
atized setting.
The mediatized context also guides much of the minority-majority social in-
teraction by young Muslims in the Norwegian cities (Chapter 11). Although they
live in localities with a strong Muslim presence, they are the minority in local in-
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teractions relating to religion. They have to relate to the co-structuring of the
local interaction that follows from the conflictual media representations of
Islam and Muslims. Participation in local interreligious dialogue fora emerges
as a minority strategy through which ‘to cope with, counter-, and calibrate neg-
ative media portrayals, since these actions are ways of performing belonging to
the Norwegian nation and conducting Norwegian citizenship’ (Chapter 11,
page 190).
During the period of this research, the Norwegian government has laid down
a strict policy on refugees and asylum seekers, as noted in Chapter 10. The then
Minister of Immigration took a tough line, backed up by decisive and rhetorically
smart media representations. Her critical public comments on religion and immi-
gration in mass and social media, with the coining of ‘sticky tropes’ such as ‘im-
migrants are carried into Norway on a chair of gold’ and the denouncing of the
pro-immigration camp as a ‘tyranny of good’, served to amplify tensions and had
repercussions in everyday interactions in Norway. The Minister and her commu-
nication advisor utilized the media dynamics of mediatized conflicts to the ex-
tent that her controversial comments were always in the spotlight. Both her stag-
ing of contentious issues in public debate and her frequent reinforcement of
dominant media frames in regard to Islam are textbook examples of the ampli-
fication and co-structuring of mediatized conflicts.
Chapter 10 analyses some counter communication against these governmen-
tal media representations. This opposition appears in local Christian papers and
in online publications in the ‘bible belt’ in Southern Norway. These outlets are
‘religious media’, one of the categories of mediatized religion alongside journal-
ism on religion and the ‘banal religion’ in popular entertainment media (Hjar-
vard 2012). Of the three forms of mediatized religion, religious media are the
ones that usually transform the religious material the least, according to
media criteria. In the interaction with their in-group local audiences these reli-
gious media perform a kind of counter-mediatization against the mediatized rep-
resentation and framing of the governmental policy by the Minister of Immigra-
tion. The local Christian media frame the issues differently and try to co-
construct another communication space on immigration issues.
17.2.3 Public Schools
The studies in public schools are undertaken in upper secondary classes in Nor-
way and Sweden, with field observations in classrooms during lessons on reli-
gion and ethics. The pupils come from a variety of religious backgrounds. At
the outset, we knew that mediatization makes media texts into resources for so-
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cial interaction, shapes the social environment and configures relationships and
structures of power between institutions and between individuals. The field ob-
servations of the classroom interaction gives flesh on these bones.
The mediatization perspective appears to be highly relevant to the practice
of Religious Education (RE). Media material provides references for the interac-
tions and discussions, and they are brought into the classroom by the students
as well as by the teachers. The mediatized coverage of religion and of conflicts
related to religion, thus influence the interactions within the classroom in RE
sessions (see Chapters 13, 14 and 15). As noted by the authors, when ‘media ma-
terials and discourses become integrated into pedagogical practice, media dy-
namics become relevant to how teachers and students engage with the represen-
tations of religion’ (Chapter 1, 240). Such an influence on the classroom practices
is another example of the co-structuring of power relations.
Sitting at the back of the classroom, the researcher is able to see what’s on
the students’ laptop screens during RE sessions. The concentration may be on
entertainment and social media rather than on the topic of the lesson. The teach-
er fights to get attention. The ‘song’ title of the chapter is pertinent: ‘Let Me En-
tertain You.’ To cope with the students’ boredom and to make the teaching rele-
vant to their mediatized world, the teacher brings in a variety of media material.
A lesson on basic elements in Islam boils down to the screening of an entertain-
ment television programme on Islam. The availability of physical media and the
wide use of media material make media dynamics an inherent part of classroom
situations. The media representations and the media use extensively condition
the engagement with religion in Norwegian public schools (see Chapter 14).
The media co-construct the learning and teaching setting in religious education.
The framing of religion in the media which focuses on conflicts, makes it dif-
ficult to teach the basic structures of religions. This is demonstrated in Chapter 15.
In lessons on Islam, the amplification into the teaching of news coverage that
frames Islam through terrorism and conflict, co-constructs the classroom into
a mediatized meeting-place. Despite teachers’ intentions to nuance and correct
the media representations of Islam, the outcome of the extensive media referen-
ces may be to confirm the media depictions of Islam.
17.3 Playing Conflicts Up or Down
Amplification, framing and the co-construction of and over religion may also
offer resources with which to handle tensions. Religious symbols, artefacts,
and claims put forward in the media may also work to manage, soften, and nu-
ance what is otherwise contested.
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The Danish TV production Rebellion from the Ghetto, offers an example of
how careful production planning has reduced conflicts around the Muslim pres-
ence – by downplaying the term ‘religion’ (Chapter 7). In Scandinavia, in recent
years, social and cultural conflicts have easily tended to be labelled ‘religious
conflicts’. This, for example, occurs when immigration from countries with a
Muslim-majority is linked to conflict and terrorism. However, a person coming
from a country where Islam is strong does not need to be a practicing Muslim
at all. He or she may even be fleeing religious domination by emigrating to sec-
ular Scandinavia.
In Rebellion from the Ghetto the producers portray the young minority
participants in the documentary without labelling them as religious. The partici-
pants in the programme were allowed to step forward as persons with a wider
repertoire of experiences. Instead of a focus on their religious beliefs the docu-
mentary took on issues like homosexuality and the freedom to choose your part-
ner. This conscious producer strategy resonated in the interaction with the audi-
ences. Minority actor’s voices were heard in printed press and broadcast radio
discussions. The proportion of minority voices was also high on the Facebook
page of the documentary. The strategy to downplay ‘religion’ as a main marker
seems to have encouraged minority voices to step forward and to avoid an ag-
gressive debate. The authors conclude that the dynamics of mediatized conflict –
amplification, framing and co-structuring – can ‘be mobilized to support a more
sensitive and nuanced debate about controversial issues (Chapter 7, 132). Satire
may offer a similar contribution to counter the dominant negative framing on re-
ligion in news media, as seen in the Danish comedy show Still Veiled, with four
Muslim minority actresses poking fun at Danish stereotypes and prejudices
(Hjarvard and Rosenfeldt 2017).
On the other side, entertainment may also be used to play up conflicts or
controversies that are related to religion, as pointed out towards the end of Chap-
ter 16. This applies, for example, in classroom sessions in Religious Education
(see Chapters 13– 15) and in social media debates on public service programming
(see Chapter 6). These are examples of mediatization, the transformation of so-
cial and cultural practices through social interaction by the use of various media
in the said settings.
Whether conflicts are played up or down also depend on the structural
frames. The study of participation in the Swedish radio programme People and
Belief (Chapter 8) shows how the structure of operation conditions – and limits –
the scope of interaction and diversity in the programme, particularly with regard
to invited guests. Similar structural limitations are discussed in Chapter 9 which
focuses on civic settings for social interaction over contested media representa-
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tions. Mass media as well as social media co-construct and condition social in-
teraction (see also Chapter 16).
17.4 Contributing to the Theory on the
Mediatization of Religion
What do the case studies in this book teach us about the dynamics of the medi-
atization of religion from the perspective of social interaction and of audience
activity in particular? As stated in Chapter 16, a main presupposition in our re-
search is that media audiences actively engage with media stories and events,
and are affected by dominant media frames. Nevertheless, they cannot be re-
duced to uncritical recipients. Our studies take a broader approach to social in-
teraction with the media, as discussed above (in 17.1).
The theory of the mediatization of religion is presented in Chapters 3 and 4,
in which further references are also given. In brief, the mediatization of religion
concerns the dynamics within which religious expressions, practices and institu-
tions are influenced, or re-shaped, through their involvement with various media
in a media-saturated environment.We delimit ourselves to the public aspects of
religion. The claim is that religion in public spaces, over time, is transformed in
its interplay with the media (Lundby 2013, 2017). As stated in the Introduction,
we are concerned with media producers, but more so with the roles that media
users play through their interpretations and interactions with media representa-
tions – and with how these user patterns in turn work on religious practices and
religious institutions. The mediatization of religion depends on the interplay be-
tween the particular form of media and the religious setting (Lövheim 2011). The
various case studies in this research inform the understandings of the mediati-
zation of religion from various viewpoints.
As we look for controversies and conflicts that are related to religion in medi-
atized public settings, we go beyond individual user experiences. We consider
patterns of media use in collective formations, amongst the audiences, and
through agency in various social roles. The aim to contribute to the theory on
the mediatization of religion through patterns of user interaction thus represents
an ambition to contribute to the theory from the perspective of audience activity,
as well as from civic activity in engagement with media.
The interaction aspects of mediatization encompass more than audience ac-
tivity, as indicated in Chapter 3 and in Section 17.1, above. Media institutions con-
dition the social interaction and meaning making. Here, the question is, how do
various patterns of audience and civic engagement mould the processes of the
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mediatization of religion? What do the case studies in the three selected settings
tell us? The answers concern specific conflicts and controversies about religion,
but that may inform the theory on the mediatization of religion in general.
First, the audiences and media uses in the researched public spaces are very
diverse. People who relate to outlets from the selected public service media are
the closest to being considered media audiences. In the public schools, the stu-
dents in the classroom make a small-scale audience in their interaction with
their teacher and with all the media material that is brought into the classroom.
In the local civic setting, the media users may gather as small, local audiences,
as when the grass-roots Christian communities relate to national policies
through parish publications (Chapter 10), or when Muslim youth try to cope
with the dominant negative media framings of Islam (Chapters 11 and 12).
These media users exert an influence on the conceptions of contested reli-
gion in their respective mediatized environments. The Muslim youth in the Nor-
wegian urban context exert an indirectly formative influence on media perform-
ance or content, as with Zunair through a counter film project, or through
involvement in dialogue work that may later be channelled into media represen-
tations (Chapter 11). The Muslim converts in Copenhagen, rather, exert their in-
fluence through their resistance to what are perceived to be the hostile media,
and this may be picked up by news media and elaborated in social media (Chap-
ter 12). The local Christians in the Norwegian ‘bible belt’ exert audience influence
through their support for, and use of, the local publications that criticize nation-
al immigration policies (Chapter 10). In the classrooms in upper secondary
schools the boredom or conflictual media discussions on Islam change the con-
tent of the teaching (Chapters 13– 15, see also Chapter 16).
The three cases from public service media relate to three different countries,
one focusing on radio, another on television, and a third on a Facebook group.
The phone-in sessions and feedback through social media to the Swedish radio
magazine People and Belief document the programme’s audience activity. How-
ever, the structure of the phone-in sessions, with a gatekeeper host, made it dif-
ficult for listeners to react directly to the representations within the programme
(Chapter 8). The producers of the Danish TV documentary Rebellion from the
Ghetto managed to engage the audience through careful planning, letting the au-
dience reactions inform the crafting of the programme (Chapter 7). The establish-
ment of the Norwegian Facebook group Yes to wearing the cross whenever and
wherever I choose was an audience reaction to incidents in public service
news practices. Participants taking different positions in these ongoing debates
influence the conception of these contested issues on religion and nationality
(Chapter 6).
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Second, in most cases the audience and civic activities played back on, and
influenced, the institutions that framed the media material. The exception is the
said Facebook group, which did not manage to change the broadcasting guide-
lines. However, even in this case, the interaction within the Facebook group
shaped the conceptions of the contentious issues at play. In the Swedish PSM
case, People and Belief, the audience activities had a limited influence on the
representations in the programme due to the established production structures.
The producers grasped the audience’s sentiments, but they were trapped by the
traditional ideals and formats of public service radio. Different production struc-
tures make it difficult to compare, but in the Danish programme Rebellion from
the Ghetto such discrepancies were avoided by the careful planning of the ways
in which audience voices should be included in the programme set-up. In the
local settings, the audiences of young Muslims had a limited and indirect feed-
back to the media institutions that portrayed them but, as they lifted their voices,
they could be heard. The readers of the local Christian publications, in contrast,
had a direct influence of these online and offline outlets within their commun-
ities, but possibly had a limited influence on national policies. In the public
schools, the audience activity among the students clearly influenced the repre-
sentations of Islam and other issues in Religious Education. The media materials
that were drawn into the classroom by the teachers, as well as by the pupils, did
make the teaching about religion more conflictual and contentious than had
originally been set in the curriculum.
Third, the above examples indicate that the theory on the mediatization of
religion (and on mediatization theory in general) should encompass interac-
tions, interpretations and identifications among the audiences as part of the
theory. As Kim Schrøder puts it: ‘audience dynamics should be seen as an inte-
gral part of the ongoing processes of building the media logics that govern the
media institutions’ encounter with other societal institutions in overall processes
of mediatization’. Media logics have to include ‘audience logics’ (Schrøder 2017,
102). However, our case studies also demonstrate that an audience perspective
alone does not capture the variations in mediatized influences from ‘below’.
We need a broader grasp on social interactions in audience activity, as well as
in wider civic activity, the co-construction from below of power relations.
The media construct the ways in which contested religion becomes repre-
sented in the public realm. However, the representations are informed by the
ways in which citizens interpret the religious dimensions of social conflicts. To-
gether, the media institutions, the audience and civic activities have a consider-
able influence on how conflicts on religion are amplified and dramatized. The
amplification, framing and co-structuring of the communication in mediatized
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conflicts on religion have to be studied from ‘below’, as well as from ‘above’. The
theory on the mediatization of religion must accommodate this interplay.
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Chapter 18
Globalization and the Mediatization of
Religion: From Scandinavia to the World
Abstract: Scholarship on mediatization has focused on the interactions between
the institutions of the media and the realms of society that have been historically
separate from those institutions, seeking to develop an empirical record that al-
lows us to better understand the role of media in sociocultural change. The chap-
ters in this book have sought to contribute to this field by asking: what role have
the various media industries, platforms, and practices played in the unfolding of
conflict, and, in turn, how have these dynamics shaped and continue to shape
religion? And although mediatization research has now taken place all over
the world, this book has provided a rich set of theoretically informed, empirical
case studies on the role of media in exacerbating and/or assuaging conflicts
around religion in contemporary Scandinavian societies, recognizing that north-
ern Europe is the context in which much of the theoretical work on mediatization
had its origins and has continued to develop. The purpose of this chapter, then,
is to discuss the relevance of mediatization theory for scholars interested in the
comparative analysis of the often turbulent relationship between media, reli-
gion, and conflict in national contexts outside of Scandinavia. In this chapter
we examine three underlying points of connection between Scandinavian and
other national contexts to explain the general salience of this book for scholars.
First, we examine the significance of national myths and their relationship to an
imagined homogenous community in public responses to immigration. Second,
we explore processes of globalization: the worldwide realities of migration, and
displacement, and the complex entanglements of religion with alterity in nation-
al contexts of secular governance. Finally, with reference specifically to current
challenges to public service media, we argue that the book provides a valuable
framework for further analyses of the changing ways in which media condition
public engagement with religion, thus contributing to our understandings of the
mediatization of religion.
Keywords: globalisation, conflict, religion, Scandinavia, national myths, media-
tization of religion
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18.1 Introduction
Researchers from around the world have long been interested in the relationship
between communication technologies and sociocultural change. In recent deca-
des, scholars in northern Europe have been especially productive in generating
research in the tradition of mediatization, exploring the ways that communica-
tion media have shaped the conditions of societal institutions throughout vari-
ous epochs in history. This book has curated a series of empirical studies that
have focused on conflict, considering how communication media have mediated
conflict and, in turn, shaped the ways in which religion has been represented,
practiced, taught, and negotiated in the public spaces of Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark. Given that the cases are set in Scandinavia, the purpose of this final
chapter is to explore the specificity of this context, and to flesh out how the theo-
ry of mediatization of religion as explored in this book (see Chapters 3, 4 and 17)
can contribute to scholarship on the role of media, conflict, and change in other
parts of the world.
It is very tempting to romanticize Scandinavian cultures and there is fairly
reliable evidence to substantiate particular idealized perceptions. Norwegians
are the happiest people in the world, according to the UN’s 2017 World Happi-
ness Report.When US citizens are asked to describe what they think an ideal dis-
tribution of wealth would look like in the US, the picture that emerges looks a lot
like Sweden (Norton and Ariely 2011). Norway regularly tops the lists of the
wealthiest and the most naturally beautiful countries on earth (Miller 2014;
Tasch 2016). Scandinavian welfare states and secular democracies are the
envy of the world, with relatively high income equality, healthy labor unions
that defend workers’ rights, pluralist, coalition-based political systems, and rel-
atively low unemployment rates (Mulvad and Stahl 2015). Scandinavians are per-
ceived as healthy, happy, beautiful people who live in beautiful places: they
seem ‘practically perfect in every way’, enthuses British journalist Michael
Booth (Worrall 2015).
Scandinavians, as the studies here reveal, see themselves as individualistic
and rational, secular and tolerant, and as supporters of democratic governments
that earn trust by protecting the rights of all (see Chapters 1 and 2). For example,
since 1766, Swedish law has granted public access to government documents un-
less they fall under special secrecy restrictions. It is the oldest piece of freedom
of information legislation in the world (Eck and Fariss 2017). Robust public serv-
ice media systems that promote pluralism and tolerance are understood as the
bedrock of participatory social democracy, and Scandinavian public media gen-
erally appear to avoid the worst excesses of racism (see Chapter 5). Or so it
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looked until the autumn 2015 when seemingly uncharacteristic racialized resent-
ment in Scandinavia was expressed in public and media forums at the number of
new arrivals, mainly Syrian and Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers (Tanner 2016).
Such sentiments are by no means unprecedented but they acquired an alarming
intensity as racist and xenophobic sentiments were being more openly expressed
and right-wing populist movements seemed to be gaining a greater foothold
across Scandinavia.¹ The risible case of an anti-immigrant Norwegian group mis-
taking empty bus seats for Muslim women wearing burqas captured the absurd
extremes of Islamophobic rhetoric.² Europe’s migration crisis had reignited de-
bates about immigration linked to controversies about religion that had been
sparked a decade earlier by the publication of the Muhammad cartoons in the
Danish Jyllands-Posten. Such discouraging and troubling responses challenged
visions of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark as tolerant and welcoming societies,
calling into question the very strength of the democratic institutions and egali-
tarian values upon which they pride themselves.
Media controversies that implicate religion as a or the source of conflict pro-
vide templates for understanding the mediatization of religion (see Chapters 3
and 4). As this book has noted, Hjarvard, Mortensen, and Eskjaer (2015) have de-
scribed the role of conflict in mediatization processes (see Chapter 3) in relation
to three dynamics. First, the media amplify an event or phenomenon by reporting
on it in particular ways using specific templates. Second, the institutional logics
and practices of media professionals play a role in framing the phenomenon.
And third, the media co-structure power relations by providing the platforms
for the staging and performance of conflicts.
The dominant media framing of the Muhammad cartoon controversy, for ex-
ample, was that of a ‘culture war’ – a battle between Denmark’s Christian herit-
age and a confrontation with Islam. The news media amplified Samuel Hunting-
don’s ‘clash of civilizations’ trope that was promulgated after the attacks of 11
September 2001 (Eine, Risto, and Phillips 2008). Public and media responses
 David Zucchino, “’I’ve Become a Racist’: Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions Over Iden-
tity,” The New York Times, 5 Sept 2016, accessed 25 Sept 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
06/world/europe/denmark-migrants-refugees-racism.html;
Alberto Nardelli and George Arnett, “Why Are Anti-Immigration Parties So Strong in the
Nordic States?” The Guardian, 19 June 2015, accessed 1 Sept 2017, https://www.theguardian.
com/news/datablog/2015/jun/19/rightwing-anti-immigration-parties-nordic-countries-denmark-
sweden-finland-norway
 Jon Henley, “Bus Seats Mistaken for Burqas by Members of Anti-Immigrant Group,” The
Guardian, 2 Aug 2017, accessed 1 Sept 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/
bus-seats-mistaken-burqas-anti-immigrant-group-norwegian
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to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Scandinavia, as elsewhere, similarly reproduced this
kind of binaristic thinking, linking refugees with Islam and with terrorism,
and creating an opposition between deserving and fake refugees (Chouliaraki,
Georgiou, and Zaborowski 2017). Some media reports then suggested that terro-
rists and rapists were hiding amidst the new arrivals, provoking spirals of public
fear and social insecurity (Gillespie et al. 2016). Social media platforms then
served as primary locations where conflicts over these understandings played
out, with various groups and individuals striving to reinforce or reframe domi-
nant assumptions.
Processes of mediatization, like those of urbanization and globalization,
have their roots in the rise of institutionalization, as autonomous industries,
structures, and organizations began to coalesce in the realms of religion, educa-
tion, science, politics, and trade. It was during the late modern period that media
began to emerge as a series of semi-autonomous industries and related practices
that were then integrated into “the very fabric of human interaction (Hjarvard
2012, 30). Studies of mediatization have explored how particular domains of so-
ciety that have become institutionalized – politics, religion, education, trade, for
example – and the various sociocultural aspects of that domain – including a
domain’s organizations, norms, and practices – have been potentially affected
by the media. Mediatization studies, then, are especially interested in teasing
out how the institutional, technological, or cultural aspects of how one or
more of these domains have changed within a broad timescale.
In this book, religion has been viewed as ‘a practice of mediation and a form
of social interaction within which meaning-making takes place’ (Lövheim 2011).
Religion is an institution in that religion refers to both individual and collective
practices and the organizational settings through which some of those practices
are codified and passed down through generations. The claim of the book over-
all, then, is that religion as a societal domain, including especially its form in
public spaces, is transformed over time in tandem with the societal domain of
the media. And a focus on the mediatization of religion brings attention to
how overall changes, of which media are a part, contribute to new forms of ac-
tion and interaction and give shape to how we think of humanity and our place
in the world. Thus the authors of this book argue that processes of mediatization
give rise to how humans understand their relationships with one another and
with those very domains (Clark 2011).
Processes of othering, of structuring social identities and differences are in-
herent in the mediatization of religion. Ritualistic representations of Islam as a
primary cause of cultural conflict are now so deeply embedded in European and
North American public and media imaginaries that they are very difficult to dis-
lodge. Such media templates have done little to advance public understanding of
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either religion or conflict, but they are vital to the cyclical reproduction of inse-
curity (Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2017).
The studies in this book show that many so-called ‘religious conflicts’ have
less to do with religion or culture than with endemic processes of globalization:
new nationalisms, failed states, militarism, migration flows, economic interde-
pendence, ecological degradation. Poverty, inequality, and oppression are the
principal driving forces of societal conflicts that implicate religion or mobilize
it for political purposes. As a consequence, it is important to reframe investiga-
tions of ‘religious conflicts’ in the wider context of globalization processes. In
our own work as ethnographers, we have advocated a mixed method approach
to the study of these sociocultural conflicts, foregrounding the empirical analysis
of historical documents and lived experiences within specific domains so as to
shed light on the contours of these changes while also resisting a presentism
that might overemphasize newness at the expense of continuity. We believe
that this is an important first step towards offering more nuanced analyses of
the various ways in which religion is imagined, constructed, and implicated in
conflict.
In examining mediatized controversies that implicate and mobilize religion,
the studies in this book enable us identify the various textual politics at work in
depictions of conflict, including forms of orientalising and demonizing, denigra-
tion and idealization, and sublimation and displacement. Rather than presum-
ing the meanings ascribed to religion, it becomes possible to see when, how,
and where religion emerges as a controversial issue, as a cause of conflict, or in-
deed as a means of conflict resolution. In this way, the book offers a prism
through which further analyses and comparative case studies can develop. But
the key question for scholars unfamiliar with Scandinavian national contexts re-
mains: How might we tease out from these Scandinavian studies the wider im-
plications for the ways in which we research the role of media in producing
and reproducing ‘religious controversies’, as well as conditioning public engage-
ment with religious conflict in other parts of the world? To answer this question
we argue that not only do we need a global and a comparative perspective, but
also an historical approach to situate practices of othering in myths of national
origin and to explicate how media are linked to processes of socio-cultural
change over the longue durée.
18.2 Ancient and Modern Myths of Nationhood
This book explores the particularities of Scandinavian countries but what is per-
haps most interesting and surprising for the non-Scandinavian reader is not how
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different Scandinavians are when it comes to questions of the relations between
religion, nation, and ethnicity, but how similar they are to many other places in
the world in the ways that broad historical processes shape contemporary con-
flicts. Like most European countries, they experienced nationalist fervor and
anti-Semitism before World War II. They also have complex intertwined histories
of colonialism, with Greenland first being ruled by Norway and then Denmark,
and then later the Swedish Gold Coast being taken over by Denmark (and the
Dutch). And they, too, have seen a growth in right-wing populist nationalism,
not unlike recent similar developments in France, Germany, and Switzerland,
as well as in the US and UK.
Scandinavian countries, moreover, share with other liberal secular democra-
cies around the world a certain idealism about how citizens can and should work
together for the public good via democratic decision-making, and in so doing
sustain a common national identity. This idealism can be characterized as
based on a unifying societal myth, following the work of Roger Silverstone
who, in turn, drew upon anthropological concepts and theories of religion, in
particular those of Clifford Geertz and Mircea Eliade. Silverstone argues that
myths are not logical or rational but they hold often-inexplicable, emotionally
satisfying deep meanings for collectivities (Silverstone 2006). This is not just
true of ancient myths but also holds for television and film. Despite their reliance
upon recognizable genres and narratives, media myths are not static. Ancient
myths and contemporary media narratives have two important and complemen-
tary dimensions, Silverstone argues: they are collective and constraining. They are
collective in the sense that the narratives must elicit some degree of consensus
and acceptance, and hence reinforce the values and viewpoints that are most
central – to at least a large segment of a community at any one moment.
Myths are also constraining because, in the requirement to resonate with expect-
ations, mythical codes tend to reinforce hierarchies of actually existing social re-
lationships. Cultural contexts of production constrain expectations and shape
the reception of myths.
To us as scholars based in the US and UK, Scandinavian myths of the origins
of democratic governance appear to have strong echoes with American and Brit-
ish national narratives. They involve stories about, for example, the rise of de-
mocracy out of various workers’ movements that resulted in conflict that ulti-
mately challenged monarchical sovereignty and brought about more
representative forms of governance. There are also stories about how contempo-
rary structures of governance arise out of a primordial national identity rooted in
the mists of time bearing essential defining traits and values. Such myths of na-
tional identity encapsulate a common historical trajectory and destiny: in partic-
ular the shift from monarchy to self-governance and from ethno-cultural homo-
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geneity to diversity. Myths of the origins of democratic governance rooted in cul-
tural homogeneity are deeply entwined in the flourishing of contemporary anti-
immigrant populist movements and their visions of society – an important part
of ‘the context’ to be factored in when explaining how public responses to mi-
grant religion and socio-political conflict evolve.
National myths of cultural and religious homogeneity are especially perverse
in the US context. In excluding North American Indians, the national story wraps
the earliest waves of settler migration into a myth of manifest destiny, denying
the realities of extermination, ethnocide, and exploitation. The point here is
that while the style in which the ‘imagined community’ of the nation is con-
ceived is unique (Anderson 1983), national myths and rituals that are represent-
ed and performed via media function in similar ways across societies – to in-
clude and exclude, to draw boundaries between those who belong and
outsiders. By investigating how mediatized national myths operate in Scandina-
vian countries, this book brings to light how their collective and constraining
features can be compared with other contexts. This can help other scholars arrive
at a better understanding of how mediatized unifying myths of origin, by their
very nature, position migrants’ cultures and religions as disruptive and other,
and how they work to reproduce a particularistic national sense of belonging
and identity. But we can only get so far with this historical perspective. We
must also situate current debates about cultural conflicts, migrant religions,
and public controversies in the wider contexts of the forces driving globalization
and forcing migration.
18.3 Shared Worldwide Realities of Migration
and Forced Displacement
This book was researched and written in the context of the greatest period of forced
displacement in recorded history. The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) Global Trends
Report found that in 2015, 65.3 million people, or one person in every 113 globally,
were displaced from their homes due to war and persecution. Children made up 51
percent of the world’s refugees. The number of recent, internally displaced people
and refugees fleeing their countries was four times higher than it was in 2014. These
migrations are directly related to longstanding and ongoing political conflicts in
Iraq; others, such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan, have lasted more than
three and four decades respectively, while the war in Syria is in its seventh year
as we write. Seemingly intractable conflicts have been occurring more frequently,
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yet the rate of effective solutions and resolutions of conflicts is slowing down (Ed-
wards 2016) or is even a total failure as with Syria.
Around the world, successive conflicts and the resulting tumult have shaped
patterns of migration, displacement and diaspora formations, as have natural
and environmental disasters, and dreams of better economic opportunity.
Today, London is home to the most ethnically diverse population in the world,
largely as a result of migration from former UK colonies in the post-World War
II period. The US and Russia have the second and third largest numbers of for-
eign-born residents, with the journey from Mexico to the US being the most fre-
quent migrant journey in the world. The countries with the highest shares of for-
eign-born workers are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain – all
of which are rich in resources especially compared with their neighboring coun-
tries (Inkpen 2014).
Nation-states throughout the world have long experienced migration and
demographic shifts as a result of invasions, slavery, human trafficking, disasters,
and labor opportunities. The 16th century saw notable changes in the US, the UK,
and central European countries’ populations due to heightened trade and a de-
sire to escape persecution. Changes to the populations in Brazil, Russia, India,
and China began occurring later, dating back to the 19th century in response to
the labor demands that arose with the abolition of slavery. The late 19th and
20th centuries saw the development of immigration laws and border policies
and practices that triggered a net emigration of educated workers from China,
India, the Middle East, and many Asian countries to former colonizing countries.
Some countries, like Portugal, have changed more recently from countries of net
emigration to net immigration due to a strengthening economy and the end of
right-wing authoritarian regimes.
Throughout these shifts, like many countries in central and southern Europe,
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark maintained largely stable populations, although
these countries experienced significant outward migration from the mid-19th until
the early part of the 20th century due to economic pressures. These trends began
to change following the Second World War. Now with the strengthened economies
of Scandinavian societies, they have become very attractive sites for migrants, and
for Iraqi, Afghan and Syrian refugees in particular (Tanner 2016).
The war in Syria has been devastating. In 2016, from an estimated pre-war
population of 22 million, the UNHCR Global Trends report identified 13.5 million
Syrians requiring humanitarian assistance, of which more than 6 million are in-
ternally displaced within Syria, and around 5 million are refugees outside of
Syria. In 2018 as this book goes to press the figures reported by the UNHCR
are even higher: 6.5 million displaced within Syria, 5.6 million refugees have
fled and 3 million are in neighbouring countries. An inestimable 884.000 asylum
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claims in total.³ The countries that have taken the highest number of Syrians are
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Conflicts in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and the
Central African Republic are resulting in refugees in Chad, Nauru, Mauritania,
Kenya, and Djibouti. The fact is that we are living through a time of displacement
of unprecedented scale and scope, and its consequence is the shared global re-
ality of complex migratory flows, and will be for a long time to come.
One key difference between the countries in Scandinavia and other countries
is that, as noted in this book’s first chapter, Scandinavian countries are relatively
small in population size. As a result, demographic shifts following recent immi-
gration have been felt more intensely. Size matters. This is reflected in a common
media framing of immigration controversies – the numbers game. A great deal of
media debate revolves around two dominant public perceptions: first, that there
are just too many of ‘them’ coming and second, that ‘the welfare state’ simply
does not have the resources to cater for ‘them’ and for ‘us’, and ‘we’ will be
the losers. These fearful representations and perceptions combine with an al-
ready potent, intense social anxiety around accelerated social change caused
by complex external and internal factors. This (re)produces a toxic mix of public
unease that becomes fixated on immigration as the main cause of all social ills.
Social insecurity becomes indissolubly tied to fears about immigration, calling
into question Scandinavian self-identification as welcoming and tolerant. Com-
petition over scarce resources can very quickly topple myths of tolerance.
These mediatized chain reactions have historical and comparative precursors
and precedents and are common in many countries. Understanding these com-
mon threads between nations as well as their differences is very important.
It should be noted that Sweden has taken in more asylum seekers and refu-
gees in the last two years than any other European nation (relative to its size),
including Germany, and Sweden’s provision for refugees is widely regarded
among European refugee support groups as exemplary. But for others, Sweden,
though a ‘humanitarian superpower’, has become a textbook case of how not to
tackle immigration – taking too many asylum seekers in and not managing their
integration well.⁴ One of the very compelling and most valuable aspects of this
book is the ways in which it highlights differences among Scandinavian coun-
tries, offering rich opportunities for comparisons at the cross-national level
not just from case studies but from survey data. Another valuable aspect is
 UNHCR, “Syria Emergency,” accessed 1 Sept 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.
html
 Tove Lifvendahl, “How Sweden Became an Example of How Not to Handle Immigration,” The
Spectator, 3 Sept 2016, accessed 25 Sept 2017, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/09/how-sweden-
became-an-example-of-how-not-to-handle-immigration/
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the recognition that there are contexts that still hold greater trust in societal in-
stitutions than is the case in the US, UK, and elsewhere in the world (Gray 2016).
Will current conflicts and controversies, as they are amplified, framed, and
played out in commercial social media spaces, contribute to a rejuvenated
sense of trust in societal institutions, or in an undermining of that trust? Only
time will tell. Finally, this book is telling in that it reveals a tendency to view re-
cent religious controversies through the lens of ‘culture wars’ that position reli-
gion in opposition to the secular and as a source of conflict rather than of col-
laboration.
18.4 Contesting the lens of ‘Culture Wars’
Although about half of the Scandinavians in the 2015 CoMRel survey regard
Islam as a threat to their national culture, a majority do not support hostility to-
wards foreigners (Chapter 2). This suggests a greater fear of religious than of na-
tional differences. The book shows that the struggle between secularized ver-
sions of religion and traditional, conservative and fundamentalist versions of
religion is understood in quite specific terms – primarily as a struggle between
Christian heritage and militarized Islam. Such a predominant ‘culture war’
lens of a Christian ‘us’ and a militant Muslim ‘them’ is deeply contested and dis-
puted, but remains compelling for some and difficult to dislodge (Hunter 1992;
Fiorina 2010). Dogmatic beliefs about the incompatibility of Islam with Christian
Scandinavian society are often closely tied to myths of origin and of the nation,
as described above, that portray a transition from harmonious homogeneity to
intrusive diversity.
There is little doubt about the realities of Islamist terrorism – or indeed
about other religious fundamentalisms that are rooted similarly in complex his-
torical political and economic relationships. But in recent years Islamist-inspired
attacks by different groups have received much greater media prominence and
the mediatization of these events conforms to certain patterns that condition
and shape public responses and can reinforce the ’us’ vs. ’them’ frame. Reports
on attacks include those on Paris (2015 and 2017), on Beirut (2015 and 2017), and
on the Kandahar airport in Afghanistan (2015), the attacks against the Sehwan
worshippers in Pakistan (2017), the Palm Sunday attacks on Christian churches
in Tanta and Alexandria, Egypt (2017), and Boko Haram attacks in northern Ni-
geria (2015). The US and UK have also experienced attacks, in London (2005, 53
killed and more than 700 injured) and Westminster (2017), as well as an earlier
attack on the Israeli embassy in London in 1994. The US attack in San Bernardi-
no (2015) followed the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, in 2001 in
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which nearly 3,000 were killed and 6,000 injured. This was when the frame of
‘culture war’ first came into focus for US citizens, centered on the question of
the relationship between Islam and terrorist violence. In 2017, the seven-country
immigration ban Trump imposed brought conflicting approaches to migration to
the forefront of media and public debate once again.
What is often overlooked is the way that ritualistic media responses to these
attacks provoke and exacerbate social insecurity, and bring about grave conse-
quences for those seeking asylum and reunification with families already in
the UK or US who have no connection with terrorism or terrorist acts. And violent
conflict, of course, is not confined to those affiliated with Islamist organizations.
Some strains of Buddhism have become militant, for example in Myanmar where
the current torture and expulsion of Rohingya Muslims continues to shock the
world. The 2011 killing of 77 people in Norway was carried out by a right-wing
extremist claiming affiliation with Christianity, and the US has seen a rise in sim-
ilar terrorist acts carried out by extremists with Christian affiliations (ADL 2017).
Islam, like all religions, is both a set of principles and practices with cultural
precepts, but legacy news media sources have tended to portray Islam as homo-
geneous, one dimensional and inherently violent. But this is misguided, as reli-
gious wars of the medieval period that sought to reclaim Muslim-dominated
lands for the Latin church serve as a reminder that religions are never inherently
violent or non-violent; such characterizations are too simplistic and unhelpful.
By calling the ‘culture wars’ framework into question, this book moves the dis-
cussion forward – reframing current conflicts as in large part due to struggles
over material resources that have resulted from centuries of exploitation in cer-
tain parts of the world for the benefit of those living other parts of the world.
Scandinavian nations see themselves as largely secular despite the lengthy
tradition of Lutheran state religion. This may be due to the fact that over time,
paradoxically, religion itself has undergone a process of secularization. The no-
tion of the secular in any case is itself very slippery (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless
the very concept of secular democracy sets the tone and the conditions in which
the publicness – the visibility and audibility – of religion can be expressed. In
Scandinavia, even Christianity, if practiced ‘too fervently’, can be perceived as
just as much a threat to national identity as the zealous practice of Judaism or
Islam (see Chapters 6–8).
The notion of secular Scandinavia may well be misleading and need to be
challenged. The book shows how some citizens contest claims about a transition
in Scandinavian society from Christian Lutheran values and traditions towards
secularism. Such a recognition draws attention to the fact that the notion of
the secular only derives its meanings by its association with the Christian reli-
gion and the sacred. The media play with the scared–secular distinction in
Globalization and the Mediatization of Religion 325
ways that defy easy categorization (Knott, Poole, and Taira 2013). This is some-
thing we need to grapple with in understanding the mediatization of religion
around the world and its role in effecting socio-cultural change. While the
book privileges the concept of mediatization and its potential role in precipitat-
ing socio-cultural change, we must keep in perspective that media – especially
public service media – are undergoing profound challenges and transforma-
tions, as well.
18.5 Media as Sites of Contestation in
Democratic Governance
In the Scandinavian context, the concept of public service media refers mainly to
legacy news media, as these organizations are charged with reflecting and shaping
public opinion (see Chapter 5). By public service media, we mean mainly broad-
casting and online media funded by the state rather than the press and other pub-
lications which are mainly funded privately. Public service media are seen to play
an important role in both sparking and managing public debate about religion
(through framing, as mentioned in Chapter 9). Because public service media are
expected to reflect widely held views of tolerance, they also are understood to
shape the ways that controversies around religion are represented and negotiated
in reception processes and social interaction. In this book public service media are
seen as playing a catalytic role in exacerbating as well as assuaging conflict. They
are deemed to have a social responsibility to contain and productively manage con-
flict (see Chapter 5). Religious publications are viewed as somewhat apart from this
mandate, and reflect alternative perspectives (see Chapter 10). However, the media
thrive on controversy and conflict in order to attract and maintain audiences and,
in their predisposition to dramatize and even sensationalize events, they reinforce
the semantic and symbolic connections between religion and controversy. So we
argue that there is a structural conflict in public service media – on the one
hand to promote tolerance and multiculturalism, and on the other to secure audi-
ences’ attention via conflict and controversy. The same may be said for how teach-
ers try to arrest the attention of their pupils by focusing on conflict and controversy
(see Chapter 14).
But the news media, too, have themselves become a hotly contested topic as
allegations of ‘fake news’ and post-truth media abound. Scandinavian countries
are no exception in having witnessed a massive decline in audience share for
public service media as Facebook, Google, Amazon, Netflix, and other services
divert audiences’ attention. Media, like migration, are increasingly best under-
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stood as part of processes of globalisation.What happens elsewhere in the world
is immediately transmitted and circulated, with social media users often break-
ing news well before broadcast and print media. Moreover, when people migrate,
they carry media preferences with them. The emergence of diaspora communica-
tions and media, the challenges of social media, and the potency of global media
corporations and instantaneous and perpetual digital connectivity profoundly
alter the centrality of public service media in any one nation-state and public
service media’s ability to condition public responses to controversies.
In February 2017, for instance, when Donald Trump defended his ban on
travel from seven Muslim-majority countries by claiming that Sweden had suf-
fered Islamist terrorist attacks the night before, this baffled Swedish audiences
who had experienced no such thing. The statement was one of hundreds of false-
hoods uttered by the US president, many of which had their origins in the com-
mercial and highly partisan US news organization Fox News (Tronarp and Sund-
holm 2017; Eck and Fariss 2017). But the falsehood was also clearly intended to
construct a boundary between ‘us’ (those of us who are victims or prospective
victims of terrorist attacks) and ‘them’ (those who are imagined as perpetrators
or supporters of such acts). It touched upon the myth of the nation and the
‘other’ as it circulated through memes, tweets, image macros, and other forms
of social media. In much of the theorizing about media, news media have
been understood as institutions that orchestrate relations between various soci-
etal actors and institutions in a democracy through established professional eth-
ics, but when that role is jeopardized, it makes citizens wonder who they can
trust. Politicians and media are among the least trusted professionals (Skinner
& Clemence 2017).
The book offers important insights into the multifarious intersections of social
media and public service media, including why users may or may not want to share
and/or discuss matters of religion in online spaces (Chapter 12), and how they dis-
cuss matters of religion in public debate (Chapter 10) and in schools and their on-
line portals (Chapters 13–15). Social norms about which kinds of speech acts are
permissible in public spaces emerge as factors of great interest. Who is allowed
to speak about what is a persistent topic of debate too among public media produc-
ers charged with attracting huge audiences while also fostering greater awareness
and tolerance (see Chapter 5). The case studies in this book open the door to con-
sidering the many ways in which the theories of mediatization have been rooted in
a ‘legacy media’ and a public service media model that has been surpassed by so-
cial media. Indeed mediatization theorists these days, e.g. Stig Hjarvard, are very
much concerned with analysing social media.
While this book was being finalized, a song denouncing UK Prime Minister
Theresa May as a ‘liar’ climbed the charts of Amazon UK’s downloads despite
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receiving no mainstream radio airplay due to impartiality guidelines (Weaver
2017). Such examples cause us to wonder whether our very concepts rooted in
legacy media need fundamental revision in light of social media. Mediatization
theorists have been grappling with how best to understand and research social
media and the ways in which these platforms have created new centers of power
that have unforeseen and unforeseeable implications for the exacerbation of so-
cial and political conflicts. Social media both empower civil society and enrich
corporate actors like Facebook who are increasingly garnering the kind of edito-
rial authority once ascribed to institutional media. This book offers important in-
sights into how these dynamics play out in contemporary controversies about re-
ligion and conflict. The implication of the book is that we need to protect public
service media more than ever in the face of the onslaught of social media and
their partisan echo chambers, and the steady erosion of public media systems
that can provoke national conversations and therefore approximate the ideals
of a public sphere of democratic communication.
18.6 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on why scholars outside the Scandinavian context
might find in this volume many points of connection worthy of further dialogue
and exploration. First, we noted that all modern nations produce foundational
myths of origin and destiny even if the style in which they are imagined is
very different. Myths of the birth of democratic governance in Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark has striking parallels with those of the US and UK.While the book
underscores differences between Scandinavian countries, such parallels provide
rich comparative material on which to build.
Second, we argued that like in Scandinavia, many countries around the
world are experiencing the effects of globalization, migration, and displacement.
Such experiences represent a shift from out- to in-migration in Scandinavian
countries, offering a distinctive vantage point from which to compare countries.
All over the world states are grappling with migration, changing populations
and cultural and religious change. It is vital to understand how our interwoven
histories also present us with moral responsibilities in situations of humanitar-
ian need. Sweden presents a good case in point to compare with other European
nations in terms of how they have responded to the current ‘migration crisis’ and
to ensuing socio-cultural change.
Third, we argued that many nations around the world are struggling to deal
with the tensions that arise between a commitment to secular governance and
the realities of living in a world in which religion remains a vital social force.
328 Lynn Schofield Clark, Marie Gillespie
Its resurgence and renewed public visibility underscore the fact that modern na-
tions are shaped by their own particular religious histories and that viewing con-
flicts through the lens of culture wars is divisive.
To the extent that this book considers the evolving role of media in demo-
cratic governance, and the specific contours of religion and religious conflicts
within that governance, it provides a means of exploring the particular condi-
tions under which mediatized conflicts might produce worse or better outcomes
for peaceful multicultural co-existence. In exploring the role of media in how
conflicts are constructed, constituted, and reproduced in Scandinavia, the
book also provides a framework for scholars elsewhere who similarly want to
understand, and respond to, the cyclical and ritual, systemic and changing
role of the media in relation to the state and other political and social institu-
tions. In so doing it affords a deeper understanding of the specific nature of
and particular conditions under which mediatized conflicts that implicate reli-
gion might get worse or get better over time.
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Birgit Meyer
Afterword: Media Dynamics of Religious
Diversity
Abstract: In this afterword I reflect on the development of the concept of medi-
atization in light of increasing diversity and contestations of religion and sketch
some directions for further research on the dynamics of co-existence across reli-
gious and other differences.
Keywords: mediatization, media dynamics, religious diversity, co-existence
Focusing on contestations around the public presence and representation of re-
ligion in the increasingly diverse and at the same time strongly secularized soci-
eties of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the starting point of this volume is the
hypothesis that ‘public practices and expressions of religion are transformed
through their interplay with various media’ (Introduction, 6). In so doing, it
builds upon the debate around the mediatization of religion (and society) in
which many of the contributors participated over the past decade. Obviously
these debates generated a productive and convivial scholarly discursive com-
munity that proved to be able, under the competent and generous guidance of
Knut Lundby, to pull off a joint interactive research project across countries
and disciplines. Responding to the Research Council of Norway’s call to study
processes of social change from the angle of ideas and communication practices,
this volume identifies the media–religion–society nexus as a privileged entry
point into the dynamics of the co-existence of actors with increasingly diverse
religious backgrounds and different attitudes towards religion in modern Euro-
pean societies.
Importantly, as the volume shows (see especially Chapter 4), understanding
current transformations and contestations depends on a clear grasp of how past
modes of organizing and representing the role and place of religion in society
have repercussions on current representations of and attitudes towards religious
diversity, especially with regard to Islam. The three Scandinavian societies have
in common characteristics – such as the longstanding dominance of the Luther-
an state church, strong traditions of welfare and egalitarian values, and a widely
shared secular attitude – that resonate in the ways in which diversity is ad-
dressed on the levels of politics, policy, and everyday life. The volume offers
not only a well-integrated comparative study of the complex, transforming rela-
tions between media, religion, and society in times of high diversity in Scandi-
OpenAccess. © 2018, Birgit Meyer. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
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navia that can serve for further comparison with other regions in Europe. It also
provides a stimulating conceptual intervention that seeks to reflect on and push
further the theory of mediatization in light of the current challenges with regard
to transformations related to diversity as they occur in the contexts of public
service media, local civic settings, and schools.
The Mediatization of Religion
The rise of the notion of mediatization and the debates fuelled by it would de-
serve a study of its own. My concern here is more modest. In my understanding,
scholars such as Lundby, Stig Hjarvard, and Mia Lövheim launched the theory of
the mediatization of religion as an intervention into debates about religion and
modernity in the social sciences. Arguing against a simplistic understanding of
secularization as the disappearance of religion, in a foundational piece Hjarvard
called attention to the process ‘through which core elements of a social and cul-
tural activity (for example, politics, teaching, religion and so on) assume media
form’ (2008, 13). The various subsystems into which modern Scandinavian soci-
eties were differentiated were subsumed under the logic of the media. This im-
plied that the authority with regard to the public representation of religion rested
no longer within the Lutheran (state) churches; instead the church, as the prime
religious institution, became subject to modes of framing and reporting em-
ployed in the mass media. Tellingly, Hjarvard paid most attention to the process
of mass media taking over functions that had so far been accommodated by the
Christian churches, and to the rise of ‘banal religion’ as a secular functional sur-
rogate for Christian belief. The central argument, as Hjarvard put it in another
important piece, was that ‘the media have taken over many of the cultural and
social functions of the institutional religions and provide spiritual guidance,
moral orientation, ritual passages and a sense of community and belonging’
(2011, 119, emphasis added). This argument made a lot of sense with regard to
Christianity as a major exponent of institutional religion in the Nordic countries.
Mediatization theory clearly owes its initial explanatory strength to offering an
alternative perspective on the decline of belief, church attendance, and church
membership by calling for seeing these changes through the lens of the media
rather than the lens of religion. But what about other ‘institutional religions’ as-
sociated with migrants and refugees, in particular Islam? In the initial articula-
tions of mediatization theory, even though issues such as the conflicts around
the Muhammad cartoons were mentioned, religious diversity was not yet ad-
dressed conceptually. How suitable is this theory, albeit in its initial articulation,
for understanding the stakes in current contestations about religious diversity in
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today’s highly differentiated media environments? How, in other words, to move
from what one could call ‘Mediatization.1’ to a follow-up version, ‘Mediatiza-
tion.2’ – taking into account the diversification of the media (especially regard-
ing the rise of social media) and the plurality and pluriformity of the religious
field?
I read this volume and the research on which it is based as a double-sided
project. It not only assesses and showcases the merits of a media perspective for
the analysis of concrete instances of contestations around religion, but also
seeks to further develop mediatization theory so as to accommodate the current
dynamics of diversity. The introductory chapters convey a broad (and soft) under-
standing of the mediatization of religion. Useful distinctions are made between
forms of mediatized religion – ‘“religious” media that are controlled by religious
organizations; journalism on religion, as represented by the secular press, and
“banal religion”’ (Introduction, 6) – and types of media dynamics – ‘amplifica-
tion’, ‘framing and performative agency’, and ‘co-structuring’ (see Chapter 3).
The fact that many contributions fruitfully work with these sets of categories –
foregrounding in particular the amplification and framing undertaken by jour-
nalism on Islam – testifies to their heuristic value for analysing how media in-
tervene in and shape the ways in which diversity is experienced and debated.
In their concluding reflection, Mona Abdel-Fadil and Louise Liebmann (in Chap-
ter 16) and Lundby (in Chapter 17) stress that the goal of the volume is not to as-
sess whether the thesis of mediatization can be evidenced through the various
empirical case studies. And yet, these studies offer intriguing insights that
could to be taken up for further theoretical reflection.What I find particularly in-
triguing is that institutionalized religions as Christianity and Islam appear to be
subject to fundamentally different mediatizations. Many of the case studies spot-
light how dominant media frames repeatedly offer representations of Islam as a
‘bad religion’ which is implicitly contrasted with Christianity as a ‘good religion’.
In my reading, the case studies propose that a conceptual shift is needed from
the framework of the mediatization of religion towards the media dynamics of
religious diversity.
Another remarkable finding of these case studies is the fact that the report-
ing about Islam in relation to various contested events tends to fall back on an
old and resilient notion of religion as shaped by Lutheran Christianity that, as
pointed out by Lövheim and Liv Ingeborg Lied, ‘has acted as a model for the
ways in which Scandinavians perceive religion in general, and also its place in
society’ (Chapter 4, 66). As a consequence, Islam and other religions associated
with migrants and refugees are apprehended in relation to the normative ideal of
Lutheran Christianity, rather than on their own terms. That this is the case on the
level of public debate should, of course, not imply that this normative ideal
Afterword: Media Dynamics of Religious Diversity 335
should guide our scholarly analysis. As Lövheim and Lied point out, ‘a more
nuanced grasp of contemporary religion and its complexities’ (Chapter 4, 71) is
needed. At stake is the relation between media, religion, and secularity. Secular-
ity ‘produces’ a particular modern form of religion (e.g. Asad 2003), which serves
as the normative backdrop against which the various religious manifestations in
diverse societies are evaluated but into which they do not necessarily fit. Exactly
for this reason, any analysis of contestations about religion and differences be-
tween religions needs to reflect thoroughly on the genealogy of the prime notion
of religion mobilized in these contestations, as Lövheim and Lied also point out.
The point here is that the resilience of a Protestant model of religion in a secular
setting, which forms the implicit subtext of dominant media frames, has reper-
cussions for the ways in which Islam is mediatized. This does not seem to be
analogous to the mediatization of Christianity. Rather than mixing Islamic
forms into a cocktail of ‘banal’ religion for public use, Islam is primarily reported
about against the backdrop of an understanding of a normative Christian ideal
from which it deviates. The mediatization of Islam in public journalism in
mass media tends to yield a stereotype framing of Islam as being problematic.
It does not lend itself easily to being ‘banalized’, as the frequent contestations
about the representation of Muslims and signs referring to Islam show. Media
clearly have the power to shape and control the terms of public debate (as the
idea of co-structuring suggests), but they do so by echoing a particular configu-
ration of the relation between state and religion as it existed prior to the onset of
the mediatization of Christianity. As a follow-up to this research project, it would
be interesting to undertake a systematic comparison of the mediatization of
Christianity and the mediatization of Islam, and other religious traditions. In
this context, it would also be important to pursue further the differences with
regard to dynamics of mediatization in dominant mass media and social
media in relation to Christianity and Islam (as pointed out by David Herbert
in Chapter 9)
In sum, placing this volume in the history of the study of mediatization in
the Nordic network, it seems to me that mediatized religion no longer primarily
features as a symptom of secularization in the sense of taking over cultural and
social functions formerly provided by the church. Mediatization, as the case
studies spotlight, (re)produces above all the dominant normative frame into
which old and new religions have to fit in a secular society. The implications
of this shift, which is documented in many of the case studies, still await
being spelled out in full on the conceptual level of ‘Mediatization.2’.
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Conducting research on the relation between religion and media myself, over the
past decade I have engaged in stimulating conversations with the scholarly com-
munity that produced this volume. Notwithstanding certain reservations with re-
gard to the scope of the theory of mediatization (Meyer 2013), I appreciate the
intellectual energy that is unleashed in the search for patterns in the transform-
ing relations between media, religion, and society. As the rich case studies show,
both media and religion are umbrella terms that encompass highly diverse phe-
nomena and need to be unpacked.While the term media refers to different kinds
of mass media and social media, the term religion points to a pluralistic environ-
ment in which practitioners of various religious traditions – most prominently
Lutheran Christianity and Islam – co-exist with New Age spiritualists, staunch
atheists, and people who emphasize the civilizational value of Christianity.
The volume convincingly points at the crucial role played by media in influenc-
ing current contestations around newly visible and relatively unfamiliar manifes-
tations of religion. The case studies, though focusing on Scandinavia, certainly
speak to the dynamics of diversity as it plays out in, for instance, Germany
and the Netherlands. I very much applaud the focus on neighbourhoods and
schools as concrete sites in which people with different ethnic, cultural, and re-
ligious backgrounds co-exist and live and struggle with each other. I am much
intrigued by the point raised by Herbert that ‘more diverse neighbourhoods,
with an established history of migration and with many immigrants from differ-
ent backgrounds, seem to work in favour of civic integration’, because in these
settings binary categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, though reiterated on the level of
mass media, do not hold (Chapter 9, 166– 167). In my view, more comparative re-
search, on a European level, is needed to explore the dynamics of such micro-
fields in which difference is articulated, contested, accommodated, and maybe
even overcome or relativized.
Another intriguing issue concerns the ‘nationalization’ of Christianity which,
as pointed out by Abdel-Fadil in Chapter 6, is mobilized in an exclusivist manner
that emphasizes the importance of Christian symbols, such as the cross, as expres-
sions of a core national identity threatened by diversity. This resonates with a
broader post-secular re-apprehension of Christianity as cultural heritage. This
stance is also articulated in public debates about how to preserve the material re-
mains of ‘unchurching’, such as abandoned church buildings, sacred places, and
(holy) objects (Knott, Krech and Meyer 2016). Even people with a secular mindset
are hesitant to simply do away with these traces of the Christian past.
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Understanding the dynamics of diversity and the modalities of co-existence
is the prime challenge we face as scholars in the social and cultural sciences at
this moment. To advance our understanding, I suggest to forge connections be-
tween scholars of mediatization of religion and scholars working on ‘superdiver-
sity’ and ‘new diversities’ (e.g. Vertovec 2015) and the ‘culturalization of citizen-
ship’ (e.g. Duyvendak, Geschiere, Tonkens 2016). In September 2016 I started the
collaborative research project Religious Matters in an Entangled World (www.re-
ligiousmatters.nl), which approaches contestations arising about religion by fo-
cusing on concrete religious items such as buildings, images, objects, food, bod-
ies, and texts. Of course, the items may be analysed as religious media in a
framework of mediation so as to assess their value within a particular religious
grouping, but at the same time they certainly are subject to constant mediatiza-
tion. As prime operators in shaping publics and making communities, media are
key to framing commotions around the material presence of religion into contest-
ed matters in broader society. The volume offers much food for thought and I will
certainly follow the work of my Scandinavian colleagues with keen interest and
look forward to future conversation and collaboration.
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Appendix: Regression Analyses to
Chapter 2
The Appendix presents the detailed results of the regression analyses described
in Chapter 2 on Attitudes: Tendencies and Variations. Table A.1 describes the var-
iables included in the regression analyses, while Table A.2 and A.3 show the re-
sults of the regression analyses. All the regression models were estimated in
STATA 14.2.¹
 For ease of interpretation and comparison, the variables age, religious self-identification, and
political orientation (GAL/TAN) have been recoded from scales into dichotomous variables. As
such, the results may differ from an analysis when these variables are used as continuous scales.
However, preliminary tests do not give reason to suspect such differences.
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Table A.1 Variables included in the regression analyses.
Variable description Values
Dependent variables
Islam represents a threat to Danish/Norwegian/
Swedish culture
() Fully or partly disagree, () Neither
Nor, () Fully or partly agree²
Xenophobic attitudes should be tolerated
Mockery of religion should be tolerated
How often do you discuss news about religious
extremism with others?
() Monthly, more seldom or never, ()
Daily or weekly³
Have you during the last  months discussed
news on religious extremism with others through
comments or discussion online?
() No, () Yes
Independent variables
Gender () Male, () Female
Age ()  or younger, ()  and older
Religious self-identification () Low or no rel. self-id., () Moderate or
high religious self-identification
Political Orientation (GAL/TAN) () Libertarian/Post-materialist, () Cen-
tre, () Traditional/Authoritarian
Country () Denmark, () Norway, () Sweden
 Answers given to a five-degree scale have been reduced to the options ‘Fully or partly agree’,
‘Neither Nor’, and ‘Fully or partly disagree’ for all three variables.
 Answers given to a five-degree scale have been reduced to the two options above.
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Table A.2 Critique and tolerance of religion.
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(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)










(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Traditional/Authoritarian Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Country
Denmark . .*** .*** .*** .*** .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Norway . .*** .** .*** . .***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Sweden Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Intercept – . .*** –
.***
.*** . .***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
N , , ,
Notes: The reference category on the dependent variable is ‘Fully or partly disagree’ for all of the
models; (1) Neither Nor; (2) Fully or partly agree. All models are multinomial logistic regression
models. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix: Regression Analyses to Chapter 2 341
Table A.3 Participation in discussions of news on religious extremism.
Discussion of news on
rel. extremism
Online debate on news on
rel. extremism
Gender – .*** – .***
(.) (.)
Age . – .***
(.) (.)
Religious self-identification .*** .
(.) (.)
Political orientation (GAL/TAN)
Libertarian/Post-Materialist – .*** – .
(.) (.)
Center – .*** – .***
(.) (.)
Traditional/Authoritarian Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Country
Denmark – . – .
(.) (.)
Norway – . – .
(.) (.)
Sweden Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Intercept . – .*
(.) (.)
N , ,
Notes: Both models are logistic regression models. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05.
* p<0.1
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